SHAMSHAD NAVAZISH KHAN vs MD SHAHID AND ORS
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
CO 4059 of 2025
Shamshad Navazish Khan
Vs.
Md. Shahid & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Anindya Sundar Das
: Mr. Shaunak Ghosh
: Ms. Paramita Mondal
: Mr. Syed Ali Afzal
: Mr. Suman Halder
: Ms. Susmita Das
For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Tarique Quasimuddin
: Mr. Abbas Ibrahim Khan
: Ms. Meena Shabnam
Heard on : 07.09.2026
Judgment on : 20.11.2026
Uploaded on : 20.11.2026
Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-
1. In the instant revision, the petitioner/tenant has challenged the
order of the Court dated 24.7.2025 in Title Suit No. 979 of 2023.
The Court, that is Judge Bench VI, City Civil Court, by dint of the
said order, has allowed installment for the occupation charge,
earlier directed against the present petitioner/tenant, to be paid
to the opposite party / landlord, in connection with the said suit.
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The Court enhanced the number of installments for payment of
arrear occupation charge from 10 to 20, directing the
petitioner/tenant to pay a sum of Rs. 63,250/- per installment.
Ultimately, the Court directed the present petitioner/tenant to
pay the current occupation charge, along with the monthly
installment of the arrear occupation charge to the tune of Rs.
63,250 /-per month.
2.
The present revision is to challenge the said order. Let the factual
background culminating into the present revision to be filed by
the petitioner be stated in a nutshell, which is as follows: - As
stated earlier, the petitioner is the tenant, whereas the opposite
party is the landlord of the subject premises. A Title Suit No. TS
388 of 2023 was filed by the tenant before the 6th Bench of City
Civil Court, which was for a decree of declaration and permanent
injunction. Subsequently, the landlord has filed the other Title
Suit No. TS 979 of 2023 for a decree of declaration, permanent
injunction, mesne profit, and arrear rent value to the tune of Rs.
70,52,00/- along with an application under order 39 Rule 1 and
2 of the CPC, before the same Court. In Title Suit No. 979 of
2023, the present petitioner being the defendant, filed his written
statement and written objection as to the plaintiff landlord's
prayer under order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC.
3. In connection with the said suit, that is TS 979 of 23, the
plaintiff/landlord filed an application on 25.9.23, praying for
occupation charge. The landlord stated that leave and license
agreement between the parties dated 1.4.22 had expired on
28.2.23. However, allegedly in spite thereof, the present
petitioner/defendant did not vacate the licensed premises and
continued unauthorized possession over there for months
together. According to the landlord, the license fee was settled to
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be Rs. 55,000/- per month payable by the licensee/petitioner
and due to his unauthorized overstay on the premises, such fee
fell due from the month of March, 2023 to September, 2023 and
thereafter. By filing the said application in connection with the
suit as above, the landlord has sought for direction of the Court
that for the period of alleged unauthorized overstay of the
petitioner licensee in the suit premises, he may be directed to
pay occupation charge to the tune of Rs. 55,000/- per month;
considering his unauthorized occupation period and non-
payment of any charges therefor, the landlord said that an
amount of Rs. 70,52,00/- stood as outstanding. The prayer was
made that during the time of unauthorized overstay of the
petitioner/defendant at the suit premises and also till the time of
pendency of the instant suit, he may be directed to pay the
occupation charge at the rate as above including the arrear
prayed for by the landlord.
4. In the impugned order, the Court has found that during
pendency of the suit, the plaintiff/ landlord/opposite party would
be entitled for occupation charge and directed the same to be
paid by the defendant/licensee/the present petitioner, the actual
current amount of occupation charge and also the arrear in 20
installments. Hence being aggrieved, the petitioner challenges the
said order before this Court.
5. Mr. Shaunak Ghosh, learned advocate for the petitioner, has
submitted that the impugned order suffers from gross illegality
and the same is in stark contradiction with the position of law
settled as on date. Mr. Ghosh says that the Court would not be
justified in allowing occupation charge at an interim stage of the
proceeding without finally determining the respective rights and
liabilities of the parties in the suit. In this regard, he was referred
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to the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Poonam
Kejriwal v. Bhagwandas Auto Finance Ltd. & Ors. reported
in 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 1203 . He specifically relies on the
portion of the judgment where the Court has held that in a suit
for eviction and mesne profit against the alleged trespasser, there
is no scope for the Court to pass any interim order in terms of
order 39 of the Code, directing the defendant to pay any amount
of money as occupation charge, as condition of staying in the
property, before decision on merit. Therefore, according to Mr.
Ghosh, the Court has dealt with the law in the manner that
before final decision as regards the respective rights and
liabilities of the parties in a suit, the Court cannot direct for
payment of money by the occupier of the property as occupation
charge. Since in the instant suit the respective rights of the
parties are yet to be decided by the suit Court, Mr. Ghosh
submits that according to the law settled by the Hon'ble Division
Bench in the judgment of Poonam Kejriwal (supra) , the Court
could not have directed for grant of occupation charge. According
to him, on that score, the impugned order suffers from illegality
and requires immediate intervention of this Court. It is submitted
that the same is liable to be set aside.
6.
The opposite party raises objection to such contention and
prayer of the petitioner. It is submitted firstly that the monthly
license fee is an agreed sum of money which the petitioner used
to pay during the period of his license. It is submitted that after
expiry of the period of license, though the petitioner continued to
occupy the premises unauthorizedly without any license
agreement, but stopped paying any fee or any charges therefor. It
is submitted that so far as the petitioner is in occupation of the
premises, he cannot refrain from paying for the same of an
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amount which is agreed between the parties. That, the petitioner
has been violating the condition for payment of fees or charges
for occupying the property is an admitted fact in the instant case,
and the petitioner would be legally obliged to bear the
consequences thereof. So far as the impugned order dated
24.7.2025 is concerned, according to Mr. Tarique Quasimuddin,
learned advocate appearing for the respondent/opposite party,
there is no illegality or impropriety in the same as alleged. That,
since it is an admitted fact on record that the petitioner is in
possession of the suit property beyond period of license and
without payment of any charges therefor, the Court has come to
a just and lawful finding that the petitioner would be liable for
payment of occupation charge including the arrears thereof.
7. The following judgments have been referred to by Mr. Tarique
Quasimuddin: -
i. Karam Kapahi and Others versus Lal Chand Public
Charitable Trust and Another reported in (2010) 4 SCC
753
ii. Frostees India Private Limited versus Ahuja & Company
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 6316
iii. Green Band Apartments Private Limited and Others
versus Mint Matrix and Others reported in 2021 SCC
OnLine Cal 428
iv. Sanhita Roy versus Indrani Basak reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine Cal 7468
8. It appears that a leave and license agreement was entered into
between the parties with respect to the suit property on
01.04.2022. The same expired on 28.02.2023. It appears that the
petitioner, who happened to be the licensee over the suit
premises under the said agreement dated 01.04.2022, continued
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possessing over the suit property even thereafter and till date. He
has also filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction
bearing Title suit No. 388 of 2023.
9. The other suit between the parties is that No. TS 979 of 2023, in
connection with which the present revision arises.
10. In view of the fact that the petitioner being admittedly in
occupation of the suit premises beyond the period of license
earlier granted in his favor by the landlord to occupy the same,
would be liable for payment of occupation charge as per law. His
suit for declaration and injunction may not bear any relevance or
connection not to hold him liable for payment of occupation
charge for a portion of property on which apparently his right to
occupy extinguishes with extinction of the validity period of the
leave and license agreement. In the impugned order, the learned
trial Court has recognized this right of the opposite party/
landlord that is to receive occupation charge during the
pendency of the suit. The Court has gone further to allow the
petitioner a substantial amount of easy installments to liquidate
his arrear. The fact of occupation of the premises beyond period
of leave and license agreement being not disputed in the instant
case, this Court finds hardly any impropriety, much less any
illegality, in the impugned order of the Court dated 24.7.2025.
11. The judgment cited by the petitioner is of no avail to him in
connection with the instant case for the reason that the same
pertains to an order for payment of charges passed by the Court
under order 39 Rule 1 and 2, wherein the Court has held that a
direction for payment of charges for occupying the premises is
beyond scope of provision under order 39 of the CPC and while
deciding on a prayer under that provision of law, the Court
cannot pass such a direction. In the instant case, the Court has
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passed the impugned order dated 24.7.2025 while deciding a
prayer of the petitioner under Section 151 of the CPC, which
confers wide discretionary power to the Court. Warranting
circumstances cannot preclude the Court from exercising its
inherent jurisdiction. Scope of both the said legal provisions are
distinct and distinguishable. The principle laid down in Poonam
Kejriwal (supra) is confined to the exercise of jurisdiction under
Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and does not lay down an absolute
prohibition against every interim direction for payment of
occupation charges during the pendency of a suit. In the present
case, the impugned direction was issued in exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC, which operates in a
distinct field and enables the Court, in appropriate
circumstances, to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of
its process. The trial court has not granted the monetary relief as
a condition for obtaining or retaining an interim injunction, but
has recognised the obligation arising from the petitioner's
continued occupation of the premises beyond the agreed period
of licence without payment of any occupation charges.
Consequently, the ratio of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment
does not operate as a bar to the particular exercise of inherent
jurisdiction undertaken by the trial court in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. In the factual background of
the present case therefore, the ratio of the Division Benches’
judgment as above shall not have any manner of application.
12. The admitted fact that the petitioner continued to occupy the suit
premises even after expiry of the leave and licence agreement,
without making payment of any amount towards such
occupation, furnishes a sufficient prima facie basis for directing
payment of interim occupation charges. The parties had
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admittedly agreed upon a monthly licence fee of Rs.55,000/-,
which, though not conclusive of the damages payable for
unauthorised occupation, provides an objective and mutually
accepted contractual benchmark for determining the provisional
financial liability during the pendency of the proceedings.
Permitting the petitioner to continue enjoying the premises
without making any payment whatsoever, merely because the
respective rights of the parties are awaiting final adjudication,
would result in an inequitable advantage to the petitioner at the
expense of the opposite party. Such an interim direction is
intended neither to finally determine the quantum of mesne
profits nor to prejudge the legality of the petitioner's claim to
continued occupation, but merely to regulate the financial
consequences of such occupation pending adjudication. The
amount so directed to be paid would remain subject to
adjustment or appropriate determination by the trial court while
finally deciding the respective rights and liabilities of the parties.
In these circumstances, the direction for payment of provisional
occupation charges, particularly when the trial court has also
extended the facility of payment of arrears by instalments,
cannot be regarded as an impermissible adjudication of the
substantive dispute between the parties.
13. The expiry of a leave and licence agreement and the legal
consequences flowing from the licensee's continued occupation
thereafter are two distinct, though interconnected, legal
questions. Expiry of the contractual period brings the authority
to occupy the premises under the licence to an end, but it does
not, by itself, conclusively determine the nature of the licensee's
subsequent occupation, the legal character of his possession or
the extent of his financial liability. Such consequences have to be
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examined with reference to the terms of the agreement, the
conduct of the parties and the circumstances in which
occupation has continued. Nevertheless, a licensee cannot
ordinarily claim an unrestricted right to enjoy the premises
without financial consideration merely because the landlord's
entitlement to recover possession or the quantum of damages
remains subject to adjudication. The admitted contractual rate of
licence fee may, in an appropriate case, furnish a prima facie and
provisional basis for determining interim occupation charges,
without necessarily constituting the final measure of mesne
profits or damages for unauthorised occupation. Therefore, while
the ultimate legal status of the petitioner and his liability for
mesne profits must remain open for determination in the pending
suit, the admitted fact of continued occupation beyond the
contractual period may legitimately be taken into consideration
for regulating the interim financial obligations of the parties.
14. For the reasons as above, in the considered opinion of this Court,
the instant revision does not merit any success, and the same is
liable to be rejected. Hence, it is ordered that the revision No.
C.O. 4059 of 2025 is dismissed.
15. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)