THE SECRETARY IPH vs VIJAY CHAUHAN AND ORS

2026:HHC:47812
High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

FAO No.75 of 2022

Reserved on: 16.10.2026
Date of Decision: 30.10.2026
Uploaded on: 30.10.2026
______________________________________________________________
The Secretary I&PH to the
Government of H.P. Shimla …….Appellant

Versus

Sh. Vijay Chauhan and Others ….Respondents
______________________________________________________________
Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Yogesh Jaswal, Judge.

1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.

For the appellant: Mr. Mandeep Thakur, Deputy Advocate
General.

For the respondents : Mr. Ajay Chandel, Senior Advocate, with
Ms. Ridhi Verma and Mr. Sidhant
Jamwal, Advocates.
______________________________________________________________

Yogesh Jaswal, Judge :

The present appeal is directed against the order
dated 22.06.2019 passed by the learned Commissioner under
the Employee's Compensation Act, Sarkaghat, District Mandi,
H.P. in W.C.A No.13 of 2013, vide which the claim petition filed
by the respondents (petitioners/claimants before learned trial
Court) was allowed and compensation of ₹ 3,12,940/- along with

1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the
accident till final payment was awarded in favour of respondents
No.2 and 3. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for
convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the Assistant Engineer, I&PH Sub Division,
Sarkaghat forwarded non-fatal and fatal accident reports dated
20.07.2006 and 21.07.2009 along with Rapat Roznamcha dated
20.07.2006 to the learned Commissioner under the Employee’s
Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, ‘the Act’) . As per the
record, on 20.07.2006 at about 1:20 PM, deceased Jaswant
Singh, who was working as a Fitter in the I&PH Department, fell
down from the second floor of the departmental building while
repairing a water pipe. He was immediately shifted to the
hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. At the time of the
fatal accident, deceased was drawing monthly wages to the tune
of ₹ 4,260/- plus allowances and was aged 49 years and 6
months. The legal heirs of deceased, namely, Vijay Chauhan
(son), Meera Devi (widow) and Shashi Bala (daughter), claimed
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compensation under the provisions of the Act on account of the
untimely demise of the breadwinner of their family.

3. The appellant-department resisted the claim petition
on the premise that deceased was a regular government servant
governed by the Civil Services Rules and Fundamental Rules. It
was asserted that upon his demise, his entire terminal and
₹
service benefits, including ex-gratia payment of 21,300/-, leave
encashment of ₹ 15,848/-, GPF of ₹ 1,25,952/-, death-cum-
retirement gratuity (DCRG) of ₹ 98,916/- and group insurance
sum of ₹ 31,302/-, were disbursed to his family members,
besides sanctioning family pension in favour of his widow.
Furthermore, employment on compassionate grounds had
already been provided to his son, namely, Vijay Chauhan. It was
contended that late Jaswant Singh, being a regular government
employee, could not be termed as a workman under the Act and
therefore the claim petition was not maintainable.
4. The learned Commissioner called upon the parties to
produce their evidence. The petitioners examined Vijay
Chauhan (PW-1), who placed on record the post mortem report
(Ex.C1), legal heirs certificate (Mark X) and copy of the Pariwar
register (Mark Y). On behalf of the department, two witnesses
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stepped into the witness box, namely, RW-1 Balak Ram, Senior
Assistant and RW-2 Dalip Chand, Junior Engineer. The
departmental witnesses produced the statement of payments
(Ex.RW1/A), fatal accident report (Ex.RW1/B) and non-fatal
accident report (Ex.RW1/C).
5. Learned trial Court, upon appreciating the evidence
on record, held that deceased died while on duty during the
course of his employment with the department. Learned trial
Court further held that petitioner No.1, Vijay Chauhan, was
major at the time of the death of Jaswant Singh and was
employed on compassionate grounds and as such, did not fall
within the definition of 'dependent' under Section 2(1)(d) of the
Act. Finding petitioner No.2 (widow) and petitioner No.3
(daughter) entitled to compensation, the learned Commissioner
applied the statutory wage ceiling of ₹ 4,000/- per month under
Explanation II to Section 4(1)(a) of the then Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 and assessed 50% thereof at ₹ 2,000/-.
Multiplying the same by the statutory factor of 156.47 applicable
to the age of 49 years and 6 months under Schedule IV of the
Act, compensation of ₹ 3,12,940/- was awarded along with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the
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accident till realization, to be shared between petitioner No.2
(60%) and petitioner No.3 (40%). No penalty was imposed in view
of the compassionate employment extended to the son.
6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
trial Court, the appellant-department preferred the present
appeal on the grounds that the claim was barred by limitation
under Section 10 of the Act; that no formal opportunity was
granted to file a written reply; and that a regular Government
servant receiving pensionary and retiral benefits could not be
treated as a workman under the Act.

7. This Court framed the following substantial
questions of law on 16.10.2026:
“1. Whether deceased Sh. Jaswant Singh, being a regular
employee of the IPH Department, was not a workman, as
provided under Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen Compensation
Act?
2. Whether the Commissioner was not justified in law in
awarding the compensation of Rs.312940/- along with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum in favour of the
petitioners from the date of accident till actual realization of
the respondents?
3. Whether the impugned order passed by the
Commissioner is liable to be set aside and quashed as no
opportunity to file reply to the claim petition had been afforded
to the appellants?"

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8. I have heard Mr. Mandeep Thakur, learned Deputy
Advocate General, for the appellant and Mr. Ajay Chandel,
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Ridhi Verma and Mr.
Sidhant Jamwal, learned counsel for the respondents and have
carefully gone through the records.
9. Mr. Mandeep Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate
General, submitted that late Jaswant Singh was a regular
employee of the State Government governed by the statutory
Civil Services Rules. All retiral dues, gratuity, ex-gratia grants
and family pension had been paid to his family and
compassionate employment was provided to his son. He argued
that a regular government servant does not fall within the ambit
of a workman under the Act. He further contended that the
claim was filed after a period of five years and was barred by
limitation under Section 10 and that the department was
prejudiced for want of an opportunity to file a formal reply.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Chandel, learned Senior
Counsel, for the respondents supported the impugned order and
submitted that deceased was working as a Fitter on a water pipe
and fell squarely within the definition of a ‘workman’ under
Section 2(1)(n) read with Schedule II of the Workmen's
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Compensation Act, 1923 (now Employee's Compensation Act).
He submitted that receipt of service benefits under pension rules
does not deprive a workman of statutory compensation under
this welfare enactment. He further pointed out that the accident
and duty were admitted by the department's own witnesses and
the department had fully participated and led evidence before
the Commissioner, leaving no room for grievance.
11. At the outset, it is well-settled that an appeal under
Section 30 of the Act lies before the High Court strictly on a
substantial question of law. The Commissioner is the final Court
on facts and this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence unless
the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner suffer from
perversity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Golla Rajanna v.
Divl. Manager, (2017) 1 SCC 45 , observed as under:
“10. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts.
Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal
only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare
legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this
crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to
reappreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on the
percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The
whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the
competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act. ”

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12. This principle was reiterated in North-East
Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha, (2019)
11 SCC 514 and Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1105, holding that
the appellate jurisdiction under Section 30 is not like a Regular
First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
is restricted to examining substantial questions of law.
Substantial Question of Law No.1:
13. This question relates to whether deceased Jaswant
Singh, being a regular employee of the I&PH Department, was
not a workman under Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Since, the accident occurred on 20.07.2006,
prior to the coming into force of the Workmen's Compensation
(Amendment) Act, 2009 [which took effect in 2010, renaming the
enactment as the Employee's Compensation Act and
substituting the term 'employee' in Section 2(1)(dd)], the
provisions of the then Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
apply in the present case.
14. Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
1923 defined a workman as any person who is employed in any
such capacity as is specified in Schedule II of the Act.
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Furthermore, Section 2(2) of the Act contains a deeming
provision making it clear that the exercise and performance of
the powers and duties of a local authority or of any department
acting on behalf of the Government shall, for the purposes of the
Act, be deemed to be the trade or business of such authority or
department.

15. Turning to Schedule II of the Act, clause (x) [which
corresponds to the enumerated categories of workmen]
specifically covers persons:
"employed in the construction, working, repair or demolition of
any aerial ropeway, canal, pipe-line or sewer;"
16. Admittedly, deceased Jaswant Singh was employed
as a Fitter in the Irrigation and Public Health (I&PH) Department
and was actively engaged in repairing a water pipe at the time of
the fatal fall. His nature of duties squarely brought him within
the statutory category specified in Schedule II.
17. The question whether a regular government servant
covered by pension, provident fund and family benefit rules is
excluded from the definition of a workman was considered by a
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v.
Khadeeja Beevi, 1989 ACJ 332 . In that case, a regular
government mahout in the Forest Department met with an
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accident and died. Rejecting the State's contention that regular
government servants are excluded from the Act, the Division
Bench held:
"2. ...The only question seriously pressed before us was that the
deceased Abdul Khadir, being a Government servant, cannot be
considered to be a workman within the meaning of Section
2(1)(n) of the Act. We are of the view that this contention is
without substance. Section 2(1)(n) of the Act taken along with
Schedule II, item (xxii) states that persons employed in the
training, keeping or working of elephants or wild animals are
workmen within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. In the
light of Schedule II, item (xxii), it is futile to contend that
deceased Abdul Khadir was not a workman employed by the
appellants. On this short ground the only plea of the appellants
fails."

18. Similarly, in District Forest Officer, Madurai
Division v. P. Ganesan and Ors. , 2007 ACJ 1521 , the Madras
High Court, while dealing with a government employee who had
received D.C.R.G. under the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978,
approved the rulings in State of Gujarat v. R.K. Deshdia,
1991 LLN 536 and The State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Chellam,
2003 (3) LW 634 to hold that holding a post in the civil services
of the State or being eligible for death-cum-retirement benefits
does not exclude an employee from the definition of a workman
under the Act if the duties fall within Schedule II.
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19. Therefore, the regular employment of late Jaswant
Singh and the receipt of service benefits by his family members
did not take him out of the definition of a workman under the
Act. Deceased Jaswant Singh was very much a workman within
the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. Substantial Question
of Law No.1 is accordingly answered in the negative, in favour of
the respondents and against the appellant.
Substantial Question of Law No.2:
20. This question addresses whether the learned
Commissioner was not justified in law in awarding
compensation of ₹ 3,12,940/- along with interest at the rate of
12% per annum. In this context, the plea of limitation under
Section 10 raised by the appellant also merits consideration. The
accident occurred on 20.07.2006. The departmental authorities
themselves forwarded the accident reports and Rapat
Roznamcha to the learned Commissioner. Under Section 10 of
the Act, the lack of a formal notice does not bar proceedings
where the employer had knowledge of the accident from any
source at or about the time of the occurrence. Furthermore, the
fourth proviso to Section 10(1) confers discretion upon the
Commissioner to entertain a claim petition even beyond the
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period of two years if satisfied that there was sufficient cause.
Since, the department's own communication dated 21.07.2009
was placed before the Commissioner, the learned Commissioner
rightly entertained the matter and no question of limitation
survives to defeat a legitimate claim under a welfare statute.
21. Coming to the calculation of compensation, deceased
₹
was earning 4,260/- per month. Under Explanation II to
Section 4(1)(a) of the Act as applicable on the date of accident,
monthly wages exceeding ₹ 4,000/- were deemed to be ₹ 4,000/-
only. The learned Commissioner correctly took 50% of the
₹
deemed wage, which came to 2,000/-. Deceased was 49 years
and 6 months old at the time of the accident, for which the
relevant factor specified in Schedule IV of the Act is 156.47.
Multiplying ₹ 2,000/- by 156.47, the total compensation works
out to ₹ 3,12,940/-. The learned Commissioner also rightly
excluded petitioner No.1 (the major son who was granted
compassionate employment) and allocated the compensation
between the widow (60%) and the daughter (40%).
22. Under Section 4A(3)(a) of the Act, where an employer
is in default in paying compensation within one month from the
date it fell due, the Commissioner is statutorily mandated to
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direct payment of simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of the accident. The award of interest at 12% per
annum is in strict conformity with statutory provisions and
settled law. Therefore, the learned Commissioner was fully
justified in law in awarding compensation of ₹ 3,12,940/- along
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Substantial
Question of Law No.2 is answered in the negative, in favour of
the respondents and against the appellant.
Substantial Question of Law No.3:
23. Regarding the grievance that no opportunity to file a
reply had been afforded to the appellant, the record of the
learned Commissioner reveals that the department was duly
represented by an Assistant District Attorney. The department
actively participated in the trial, cross-examined the claimant's
witness and produced two official witnesses (RW-1 and RW-2)
along with departmental files and exhibits (Ex.RW1/A to
Ex.RW1/C) to place its complete defence before the Court. No
prejudice was shown to have been caused to the department.
Having actively participated and led its evidence in defence, the
department cannot now turn around and raise a hyper-technical
plea of lack of opportunity. Substantial Question of Law No.3 is
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answered in the negative, in favour of the respondents and
against the appellant.

24. There is no misreading or misappreciation of
evidence on the part of the learned Commissioner, nor does the
impugned order suffer from any perversity or illegality. The
findings arrived at by the learned Commissioner are reasonable,
just and fully supported by the record.
25. In view of the above discussion, the present appeal
fails and the same is dismissed. The order dated 22.06.2019
passed by the learned Commissioner under the Employee's
Compensation Act, Sarkaghat, District Mandi in W.C.A
No.13/2013 is upheld.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall
also stand disposed of.

(Yogesh Jaswal),
Judge
October 30, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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