P V VENKATARAMANA vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
Reserved on : 18.08.2026
Pronounced on : 30.10.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
REVIEW PETITION NO.120 OF 2026
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.12383 OF 2023 (LA – BDA)
BETWEEN:
P.V.VENKATARAMANA
S/O LATE SRI VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.401,
DEVIN INDIRA PARADISE,
TH
5 CROSS, DEVI PARADISE LAYOUT,
NEXT TO SHOBHA CITY,
TANISANDRA MAIN,
BENGALURU – 560 064.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI BIPIN HEGDE, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
PADMAVATHI B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
AND:
1.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
- 2 -
URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BENGALURU – 560 020.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONER.
3. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BENGALURU – 560 020.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.HEMALATHA V., AGA FOR R-1;
SRI M.AJAY KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 AND R-3)
THIS REVIEW PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION.114 R/W
ORDER 47 RULE 1 OF CPC 1908, PRAYING TO REVIEW THE ORDER
DATED 30.01.2026 PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.12383/2023.
THIS REVIEW PETITION, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 18.08.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
- 3 -
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court seeking review of the order
dated 30.01.2026 passed in W.P.No.12383/2023.
2. Heard Sri Bipin Hegde, learned counsel for the petitioner,
Smt. Hemalatha V., learned Additional Government Advocate for
respondent No.1 and Sri M. Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for
respondent Nos.2 and 3.
3. This Court after hearing the parties in W.P.No.12383/2023,
had disposed the matter on 30.01.2026, on the following reasons:
“7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The
dates of preliminary notification and the final notification are
also a matter of record. It would suffice if the narration would
commence from the date on which the learned single Judge of
this Court disposed of Writ Petition No.44949 of 2003 and
connected cases on 06-06-2006, wherein one of the writ
petition filed by the petitioner is Writ Petition No.6198 of 2004.
The learned Judge upholds the acquisition with certain
directions. The order reads as follows:
“…. …. ….
The challenge to the acquisition in all these writ
petitions fails and it is accordingly rejected. The acquisition
proceedings are upheld, subject to the following conditions:
(A) The petitioners who are all the owners of sites in
question (not duly converted for non-agricultural use
in accordance with law) which are acquired are entitled
to the following reliefs:
- 4 -
(i) These petitioners shall register themselves as
applicants for allotment of sites under the Bangalore
Development Authority (Allotment of Sites) Rules,
1984, within a period of two months from today
(extendable by another one month by BDA, if sufficient
cause is shown). Petitioners will have to pay only the
registration fee. They need not pay initial deposit as
their sites have been acquired and they are not
entitled to receive compensation in regard to the sites
under this arrangement.
(ii) The petitioners shall file applications for allotment of
sites to BDA within three months from today, in the
prescribed form stating that they are applicants who
were the petitioners in these writ petitions. Petitioners
shall file their documents with BDA along with the
application to verify the same
(iii) BDA will treat them as applicants entitled to priority in
allotment and allot each of them a site measuring 30'
th
x 40' in "Further Extension of Banashankari 6 Phase"
or in any other nearby layouts in Bangalore at the
prevailing allotment prices subject to petitioners
satisfying the twin requirements for allotment under
the BDA (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1984, that they
must be the residents of Bangalore (ten years
domicile) and should not be owning any residential
property in Bangalore.
(iv) If there are no rival claimants for compensation in
regard to the plots claimed by the petitioners, and if
the ownership of the petitioners in regard to their
respective sites which have been acquired is not
disputed, BDA shall calculate the compensation
payable to the petitioners and give credit to the same
by adjusting the same towards the allotment price for
the site to be allotted and call upon the petitioners to
pay the balance. Petitioners shall be given six months
time for making payment (to enable petitioners to
know the amount of compensation, which they will be
entitled and to ascertain how much balance they
should pay).
(v) If there are rival claimants in regard to the survey
numbers or the sites or if any petitioners' title in
regard to the sites are challenged, BDA shall make a
reference in regard to the compensation in regard to
such site/land in question, to the Civil Court under
- 5 -
Section-30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the
petitioners will have to sort out the matter before the
Reference Court. In that event, such petitioners will
have to pay the full allotment price within the time
stipulated, without seeking adjustment of
compensation for the acquired site.
(vi) If any of the petitioners does not fulfill the
requirements for allotment, under the allotment Rules,
their cases may be considered for allotment of 20' x
30' sites as per the Rules containing incentive scheme
for voluntary surrender of land. For the purpose of the
said scheme, such petitioners will be deemed to have
voluntarily surrendered the sites.
(vii) The above scheme will be available to only those who
are owners, as a consequence of execution of
registered sale deeds in their favour prior to the date
of preliminary notification (and not to GPA/Agreement
Holders).
(viii) The Authorities shall also consider whether these
petitioners have purchased the sites by way of
investment or with the intention of having a roof over
their head and based on the said consideration, to
pass appropriate orders, in the light of the
observations made in this order.
B(i) All the petitioners who are the
landowners/converted site owners (duly
converted for non-agricultural use of land, in
accordance with law), who are seeking dropping
of the acquisition proceedings in so far as their
respective lands/sites are concerned, on the
ground that: (a) their lands are situated within
green belt area (b) they are totally built up; (c)
converted for non-agricultural use; (d) garden
and recognised nursery lands; (e) who have built
hospitals, educational institutions and factories;
(f) who have not been served with the notice of
acquisition and (g) who are in doubt about the
inclusion of their land in the notification are
permitted to make appropriate application to the
authorities seeking such exclusion and
exemption and producing documents to
substantiate their contentions within three
months from the date of this order.
- 6 -
(ii) it is made clear that the authority shall consider such
request keeping in mind the status of the land as on
the date of preliminary notification and to exclude any
developments, improvements, constructions put up
subsequent to the preliminary notification and then
decide whether their cases are similar to that of the
landowners whose objections were upheld and in
respect of those lands no final notification is issued
(iii) in the event the Authority comes to the conclusion that
those persons are similarly placed and are covered by
the Resolution of the BDA dated 28.06.2003 in Subject
No. 177/2003, then to de-notify their lands/sites, built
up portion and exclude them from acquisition
(iv) Petitioners who are interested in availing this benefit
shall make appropriate application within 90 days from
the date of this order and thereafter, the authority
shall give notice to those persons, hear them and pass
appropriate orders expeditiously.
(C) Till the aforesaid exercise is undertaken by the
Authority on the applications fled by the petitioners
either for allotment of site or for de-notifying or
exemption sought for are considered, their possession
shall not be disturbed and the existing construction
shall not be demolished. After consideration of the
application in the light of the aforesaid direction, the
Authorities are at liberty to proceed with the
acquisition.
(D) The suggestion made by this Court in paragraph-25
during the course of this order may be considered in
all earnestness, particularly, in the cases of those who
have already put up construction and living therein
prior to preliminary notification.
These writ petitions are disposed of accordingly.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, clause B(i)
assumes significance. The learned Judge directed all the
petitioners who are land owners/converted site owners to
submit a representation/application to the Authority seeking
exclusion and exemption by producing documents to
substantiate their contentions within three months. The
- 7 -
petitioner submits his representation before the Authority
seeking dropping of his land from acquisition. In the
interregnum, the petitioner had also challenged the order of
the learned Single Judge insofar as it upheld the acquisition, in
Writ Appeal No.1498 of 2006. During the pendency of the said
appeal, an endorsement comes to be issued by the BDA in
favour of the petitioner, which reads as follows:
ಾಂಕ
“¨ÉA.C¥Áæ/GC(¨sÀƸÁé)/J5/¦Dgï/126/07-08 : 22-8-2007
ಂಬರಹ
:- 6198/04
ಷಯ ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ಉಚ ಾಾಲಯದ ಅ ಸಂ ೆ
06.06.2006
ಮ ತ!ೆ ಅ ಗಳ $ೕ&ೆ ಾಂಕ ರಂದು
.
(ೕ)ರುವ ಆ,ೇಶದಂ.ೆ ಕ/ಮ ಜರು1ಸುವ ಬ2ೆ3
6
$ೕಲ4ಂಡ 6ಾನ ಉಚ ಾಾಲಯದ ಆ,ೇಶದಂ.ೆ ಬನಶಂಕ ೇ ಹಂತ
. 14/1 10
ಮುಂದುವ ದ ಬ8ಾವ9ೆ2ೆ :ೇ ದ ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ ಸ?ೆ ನಂ ರ @ೈB
ಗುಂCೆ
D ೕಣ ವನುF ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡುವ ಬ2ೆ3 Jೋ ಅ ಸLMಸುವNದು
.
ಸ ಯOೆP
6ಾನ ಉಚ ಾಾಲಯವN (ೕ)ರುವ 6ಾಗ ಸೂQಗಳ ಅ)ಯLM $ೕಲ4ಂಡ
ಜRೕನು ಬರು ರುವ Jಾರಣ ಸದ ಜRೕ(ನ ಬ2ೆ3 @ಾ/IJಾರವN ಾಂಕ
25.06.2007
ರಂದು ನ8ೆದ ಸSೆಯLM
ವರ?ಾ1 ಚQ D ಸದ ಜRೕನನುF
ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡಲು ಸJಾ ರJೆ4 ಪ/:ಾ ವೆ ಕಳU ಸಲು
, .
ೕ6ಾ (ಸ&ಾ1ರುತ ?ೆಂದು ಈ ಮೂಲಕ =ಸ&ಾ1,ೆ
( )
ಕರಡು ಪತ/ ಉಪ ಆಯುಕ ರು ಭೂ:ಾH
.
ರವ ಂದ ಅನುWೕದ ೆಾ1ರುತ ,ೆ
¸À»/- 22/8/17
«±ÉõÀ ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀ
XೆಂಗಳYರು.”
- 8 -
The BDA accepts dropping of the land from acquisition through
the aforementioned endorsement. The petitioner then
withdraws the writ appeal based upon the said endorsement.
The order in Writ Appeal No.1498 of 2006 is as follows:
“Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits
that the appellant may be permitted to withdraw the Writ
Appeal since recommendation has been made by the BDA to
the Government as per the letter dt. 22.8.2007 and appellant
wants to work out his remedy in accordance with law.
Accordingly, Writ Appeal is dismissed as withdrawn
with liberty to the appellant to work out the remedy in
accordance with law.”
Representation is submitted on 23-05-2017 after the order
passed by the Division Bench. No action is taken.
8. Writ Petition No.36757 of 2017 is filed by the
petitioner seeking a mandamus for consideration of the
representation. This comes to be disposed of by the following
order:
“…. ….. …..
5. In view of the endorsement dated 05.04.2017
issued by the Bangalore Development Authority intimating the
petitioner that the recommendation sent to the Government
is still pending before the first respondent and the
representation of the petitioner dated 02.04.2017 as well as
23.05.2017 submitted before the respondent No.1 being
unconsidered, it is appropriate for this Court to direct the
respondent No.1 to consider the said representations of the
petitioner in the light of the order passed by this Court in
W.P.No.6198/2004 dated 06.06.2006 as well as the
recommendations of the Bangalore Development Authority
dated 22.08.2017 and 05.04.2017 and is ordered accordingly.
The respondent No.1 shall take a decision in accordance with
law in an expedite manner and the same shall be
communicated to the petitioner.
The compliance of this order shall be made preferably
within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of
certified copy of the order.
With the aforesaid observations and directions, the
writ petition stands disposed of.”
- 9 -
Then comes the impugned order dated 25-01-2023 rejecting
the claim for de-notification and it reads as follows:
“ :
ಇವ ಂದ
,
ಸJಾ ರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ Jಾಯ ದ_
,
ನಗ!ಾ`ವೃ b ಇ&ಾ ೆ
, .
Jಾಸ :ೌಧ XೆಂಗಳYರು
EªÀjUÉ:
_/ೕ e.
?ೆಂಕಟರಮಣ,
e ನಂ:401, 8ೆ
k ಇಂ!ಾ @ಾರ8ೇl,
ಥnಸಂದ/ ಮುಖ ರ:ೆ ,
oೊಕ4ನಹ=>,
XೆಂಗಳYರು -560064
,
6ಾನ !ೇ
: , , ,
ಷಯ XೆಂಗಳYರು ದsಣ .ಾಲೂMಕು ಉತ ರ ;ೋಬ= ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ
. 14/1 10
ಸ?ೆ ನಂ ರLMನ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನನುF ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ
. .
JೈKಡಲು Jೋ ರುವ ಬ2ೆ3
: 1. :
ಉ&ೆMೕಖ @ಾ/ಥRಕ ಅIಸೂಚ ೆ ಸಂ ೆ K)ಎlಎu
. 4/ /194/ 02-03,
ಎಒ ಎ eಆw
:07.11.2002.
ಾಂಕ
2. : 750 ¸Áé
ಅಂ ಮ ಅIಸೂಚ ೆ ಸಂ ೆ ನಅಇ Xೆಂಭೂ
2003, :09.09.2003.
ಾಂಕ
3.
6ಾನ ಉಚx ಾಾಲಯದ ಅ
:36757/2017 , :11.04.2019.
ಸಂ ೆ ರ ೕಪN ಾಂಕ
4. :03.05.2019.
ತಮy ಮನ
ಾಂಕ
- 10 -
5. : / /524/2019-20,
ಪತ/ ಸಂ ೆ Xೆಂಅ@ಾ/
ಭೂ:ಾHಅ
: 05.10.2020.
ಾಂಕ
6. ,
6ಾನ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ Jಾಯ ದ_ ನಗ!ಾ`ವೃ b ಇ&ಾ ೆ
, :29.06.2022.
ಇವರ ಅಧ z.ೆಯLM ನ8ೆದ ಸSೆ ಾಂಕ
6
ಬನಶಂಕ ೇ ಹಂತ ಮುಂದುವ!ೆದ ಬ8ಾವ9ೆಯ ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನJಾ41
17(1) 1532 17
XೆಂಗಳYರು ಅ`ವೃ b @ಾ/IJಾರದ Jಾ{| ಕಲಂ ರ)ಯLM ಎಕ!ೆ
(1) ,
ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕ(2ೆ ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರಂ.ೆ @ಾ/ಥRಕ ಅIಸೂಚ ೆಯನುF ;ೊರ)ಸ&ಾ1ದು|
19 (1) 750
XೆಂಗಳYರು ಅ`ವೃ b @ಾ/IJಾರದ Jಾ{| ರ)ಯLM ಒಟುP ಎಕ!ೆ ಜRೕ(2ೆ
(2) ,
ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರಂ.ೆ ಅಂ ಮ ಅIಸೂಚ ೆಯನುF ;ೊರ)ಸ&ಾ1ದು| ಸದ ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ
ಪ/B/{ಯನುF ಪ/_FD ಹಲ?ಾರು ಭೂ6ಾLೕಕರು 6ಾನ ಉಚx ಾಾಲಯದLM ,ಾ?ೆ
, :44949/2003
ಸLMDದು| ಅ ಸಂ ೆ ಮತು ಇ(Fತ!ೆ :ೇಪ 8ೆ2ೊಂಡ
ಪ/ಕರಣಗಳLM 6ಾನ ಾಾಲಯವN JೆಲವN 6ಾಗ ಸೂQಗಳನುF ರQD
, ,
ಅ ಯನುF ಇತ ಥ 2ೊ=Dದು| ಅದರನHಯ ಪ _ೕLD ಉ,ೆ|ೕ_ತ ಬ8ಾವ9ೆ ರಚ ೆ2ಾ1
43
ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನಪ)DJೊಳ>ಲು ;ೊರ)Dದ @ಾ/ಥRಕ ಅIಸೂಚ ೆಯLMನ ಒಟುP ಎಕ!ೆ
25
ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನನುF ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡಲು @ಾ/IJಾರದ
:09.04.2008 ,
ಾಂಕ ರ ಸSೆಯ (ಣ ಯದನHಯ ಆಯುಕ ರು XೆಂಗಳYರು ಅ`ವೃ b
.
@ಾ/IJಾರ ಇವರು ಸJಾ ರJೆ4 ಪ/:ಾ ವೆ ಸLMDರು.ಾ !ೆ
43 25 .14/1
ಸದ ಎಕ!ೆ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕ(ನLM ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ ಸ?ೆ ನಂ
10 ,
ರLMನ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನು ಸಹ ಒಳ2ೊಂ)ದು| ಸದ ಜRೕನನುF ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ
JೈKಡುವಂ.ೆ Jೋ .ಾವN 6ಾನ ಉಚx ಾಾಲಯದLM ಅ
:36757/2017 ,
ಸಂ ೆ ನುF ,ಾಖLDದು| ಸದ ಅ ಯLM 6ಾನ
(3) ,
ಾಾಲಯವN ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರLM (ೕ)ರುವ ೕe ನLM @ಾ/IJಾರ ಂದ ಸJಾ ರJೆ4
12 ,
ಸLMDದ| ಪ/:ಾ ವೆಯ ಕು ತು ?ಾರ,ೊಳ2ಾ1 (ಯ6ಾನು:ಾರ ಕ/ಮJೈ2ೊಂಡು
.
Jೈ2ೊಂಡ (ಣ ಯವನುF ಅ ,ಾರ2ೆ =ಸುವಂ.ೆ ಆ,ೇ_Dತು ಅದರಂ.ೆ
(4) :03.05.2019
ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರಂ.ೆ .ಾವN ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ಸJಾ ರJೆ4 ಮನ
ಯನುF
- 11 -
, ,
ಸLMD XೆಂಗಳYರು ದsಣ .ಾಲೂMಕು ಉತ ರಹ=> ;ೋಬ= ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ ಸ?ೆ
.14/1 10 .
ನಂ ರLMನ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನನುF ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡಲು Jೋ ರು ೕ
ಈ ೆF&ೆಯLM ಪ/_Fತ ಜRೕನು 6ಾನ ಉಚx ಾಾಲಯವN (ಗ ಪ)Dರುವ
?
ಾವ 6ಾಗ ಸೂQಗಳ) ಬರುತ ,ೆ ;ಾಗೂ ಸದ ಜRೕನು @ಾ/IJಾರದ ಬ8ಾವ9ೆ
?
ರಚ ೆ2ಾ1 ಅವಶ
,ೆ{ೕ ಎಂಬ ಬ2ೆ3 ಸಂಪ}ಣ 6ಾ ~ಂ2ೆ ವರ ಸLMಸುವಂ.ೆ
,
XೆಂಗಳYರು ಅ`ವೃ b @ಾ/IJಾರವನುF Jೋರ&ಾ1 6ಾನ ಉಚx ಾಾಲಯವN
43 25
(ೕ)ರುವ 6ಾಗ ಸೂQಗಳ) ಬರುವ ಎಕ!ೆ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನನುF
,
ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡಲು ಈ2ಾಗ&ೇ ಸJಾ ರJೆ4 ಪ/:ಾ ವೆ ಸLMDದು| ಅದರLM ಪ/_Fತ
, , ,
XೆಂಗಳYರು ದsಣ .ಾಲೂMಕು ಉತ ರಹ=> ;ೋಬ= ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ ಸ?ೆ
.14/1 10
ನಂ ರLMನ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನು ಸಹ ಒಳ2ೊಂ)ರುತ ,ೆ ಎಂದು ವರ
.
ಸLMಸ&ಾ1ತು
:118/2007, :25.06.2007
@ಾ/IJಾರದ
ಷಯ ಸಂ ೆ ಾಂಕ ರ
(ಣ ಯದಂ.ೆ ಸದ ಜRೕನು ಾಾಲಯವN (ಗ ಪ)Dರುವ 6ಾಗ ಸೂQಯ)ಯLM
, ,
ಬರುವN,ಾ1 ಸJಾ ರJೆ4 ಪN:ಾ•ವ ೆಯನುF ಸLMಸಲು (ಧ D ಅದರಂ.ೆ ಭೂ6ಾಪಕರ
, , .14/1 05
ವರ ಯನುF ಪ8ೆಯ&ಾ1ದು| ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ ಸ?ೆ ನಂ ರLM ಎಕ!ೆ
:13.01.1995 , 10
ಜRೕನು ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ಭೂ ಪ ವತ ೆಾ1ದು| ಪ/_Fತ ಗುಂCೆ
. 8
ಪ/,ೇಶವN ಒಳ2ೊಂ)ರುತ ,ೆ ಪ/_Fತ ಜRೕ(ನ ಸುತ ಲೂ ಅ) D$ಂ XಾM€ನ
20*15 ,
Jಾಂ@ೌಂ• ಎDD _ೕ ‚ೆ• (6ಾ ಣ?ಾ1ದು| ಸದ ಜRೕನು @ಾ/ಥRಕ
ಅIಸೂಚ ೆ1ಂತ ಮುಂQತ?ಾ1 ಭೂಪ ವತ ೆಾ1ರುವNದು ಕಂಡು ಬಂ ರುತ ,ೆ ;ಾಗೂ
, ( )
2ಾ/ಮ ƒಾಣJೆ4 ;ೊಂ Jೊಂಡಂ ದು| @ಾ/IJಾರದ Jಾಯ @ಾಲಕ ಅ`ಯಂತರರು ದsಣ
10 6
(ೕ)ರುವ ವರ ಯLM ಪ/_Fತ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕನು ಬನಶಂಕ ೇ ಹಂತ ಮುಂದುವ!ೆದ
, .
ಬ8ಾವ9ೆ2ೆ ;ೊಂ Jೊಂಡಂ ದು| @ಾ/IJಾರದ ಬ8ಾವ9ೆ2ೆ ಾವN,ೇ ಅ)„…ರುವN ಲM
ಸದ ಪ/,ೇಶವN @ಾ/IJಾರ ಂದ ರಚ ೆಾ1ರುವ (?ೇಶನಗಳ ಂ,ೆ
, -5
ಬರು ರುವNದಂದ ಾವN,ೇ ಅಡಚ9ೆ…ಲM ಎಂದು ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರ ಪ/:ಾ ವೆಯLM ಉಪ
( ) .
ಆಯುಕ ರು ಭೂ:ಾH K)ಎರವರು ವರ 6ಾ)ರು.ಾ !ೆ
: 36767/2017
6ಾನ ಉಚx ಾಾಲಯವN ಅ ಸಂ ೆ ರLM
: 11.04.2019 ,
ಾಂಕ ರಂದು (ೕ)ರುವ ೕe ನ ೆF&ೆಯLM ಸದ ಪ/ಕರಣದLM
-6
.ೆ2ೆದುJೊಳ>ಬಹು,ಾದ ಕ/ಮಗಳ ಬ2ೆ3 ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರಂ.ೆ ಸJಾ ರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ
- 12 -
,
Jಾಯ ದ_ ನಗ!ಾ`ವೃ b ಇ&ಾ ೆರವರ ಅಧ z.ೆಯLM ನ8ೆದ ಸSೆಯLM ಚQ D
, .14/1 6
(ಣ …Dರುವಂ.ೆ @ಾ/IJಾರದ ,ಾಖ&ೆಗಳನFಯ ಸ?ೆ ನಂ e ರLMನ ಎಕ!ೆ
07 3 24
ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕ(ನ @ೈB ಎಕ!ೆ ಗುಂCೆ ಜRೕ(2ೆ ಸಂಬಂIDದಂ.ೆ ಅಂ ಮ
:12.01.2004
ಅIಸೂಚ ೆಾದ ನಂತರ ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ಅ?ಾ•
, :10.02.2004
ಅನುWೕದ ೆಾ1ದು| ಾಂಕ ರಂದು :ಾHIೕನJೆ4 ಪ8ೆದು .ಾಂ /ಕ
SಾಗJೆ4 ಹ:ಾ ಂತD @ಾ/IJಾರವN :ಾHIೕನJೆ4 ಪ8ೆ ರುವNದಂದ XೆಂಗಳYರು ದsಣ
, , .14/1 10
.ಾಲೂMಕು ಉತ ರಹ=> ;ೋಬ= ;ೊಸಹ=> 2ಾ/ಮದ ಸ?ೆ ನಂ ರLMನ ಗುಂCೆ
.
ಪ/_Fತ ಜRೕನನುF ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡಲು (ಯಮಗಳLM ಅವJಾಶ
ರುವNಲM
-4
ಅದರಂ.ೆ ಭೂ:ಾHIೕನ ಂದ JೈKಡುವಂ.ೆ Jೋ ರುವ ಉ&ೆMೕಖ ರ ತಮy ಮನ
ಯನುF
.
ರಸ4ಸ&ಾ1,ೆ ಎಂದು =ಸಲು (,ೇ _ಸಲ†‡P,ೆ|ೕೆ
,
ತಮy ನಂಬು2ೆಯ
¸À»/- 25/01/2003
( . )
ಎl ?ಾಕw
( )
ಸJಾ ರದ ಅIೕನ Jಾಯ ದ_ ಪ/
.
ಗ!ಾ`ವೃ b ಇ&ಾ ೆ
( . . -1)”
K ) ಎ ಮತು XೆಂಗಳYರು
The petitioner claims on the strength of the
communications and endorsements issued by the BDA
recommending the land for de-notification. Though the
recommendation was clear, the State has not acceded to de-
notify the land.
9. The issue now would be, whether this Court can
direct de-notification of the land? In identical circumstances, a
coordinate Bench of this Court in MALLAPPA v. STATE OF
1
KARNATAKA , was answering a prayer seeking de-notification
of a particular extent of 10 acres 25 guntas in two survey
numbers in Bagalkot. The coordinate Bench by the following
order rejects the claim:
“…. …. ….
1
Writ Petition No.4465 of 2008 disposed of 05-07-2019
- 13 -
11. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners’
lands were acquired under 4(1) and 6(1) notifications
dated 09.08.1991 and 20.06.1992 respectively. In
respect of the acquired lands, award was passed on
02.06.1994 and on reference, compensation was
enhanced. The petitioners have received the
compensation including the enhanced compensation. The
petitioners have not challenged the acquisition and on
the other hand they have accepted the acquisition by
receiving the award amount and handing over
possession. When once the acquisition proceedings is
complete and possession is taken, the land vests with
Government free from encumbrance. When once the
lands on acquisition vest with the State Government, it is
for the State Government to utilize the same for public
purpose. Even if the lands are unutilized or not utilized
for the purpose for which the lands are acquired, it
cannot be reassigned to the petitioners nor the
petitioners can seek for reconveyance of the lands on the
ground that the lands are not utilized. The lands which
are acquired and which are not utilized for the purpose
for which they were acquired could be utilized for any
other public purpose.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in
(1996) 3 SCC 491 relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondent No.5 at Paragraph No.4 has held as follows:
“It is contended for the respondents that since the
acquisition is for housing scheme, the land cannot be used
for commercial purpose, namely, District Center.
Therefore, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench
have rightly disapproved the change of the user contrary to
the purpose notified in section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act. We find no force in the contention. It is conceded by
the learned counsel that the construction of the District
Center for commercial purpose itself is a public purpose.
No doubt it was sought to be contended in the High Court
that in a housing scheme, providing facilities for
commercial purpose is also one of the composite purposes
and that, therefore, acquisition was valid in law. However,
the contention was rejected by the High Court. We need
not go to that part. Suffice it to state that it is a well
settled law that land sought to be acquired for public
purpose may be used for another public purpose.
Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the
land is sought to be acquired for housing scheme but it is
- 14 -
sought to be used for district Centre, the public purpose
does not cease to be public purpose and the nomenclature
mentioned in the notification under section 4(1) as housing
scheme cannot be construed to be a colorable one. The
notification under section 4(1) could not have been
quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used
for District Center, namely, for commercial purpose. It is
obvious that the lands acquired for a public purpose should
serve only the public purpose of providing facilities of
commercial purpose, namely, District Center as conceded
by the learned counsel in fairness to be a public purpose.
The notification under section 4(1) cannot be quashed on
the ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly
wrong in quashing the notification on the ground of change
of user.”
13. Admittedly, the lands were acquired in the year
1991 and 1992 by issuing preliminary and final
notifications under the Act. After more than 15 years from
the date of acquisition, for the first time on 09.03.2007
petitioners are said to have made representation
requesting denotification and thereafter in the year 2008
acquired
filed the present writ petition, when the lands
were allotted to respondent No.5 for establishment of
petrol pump. There is inordinate delay of more than 15
years in questioning the acquisition or in requesting
reassignment or to denotify. It is not in dispute that the
petitioners did not oppose the acquisition when 4(1) and
6(1) notifications were issued in the year 1991 and 1992.
They participated in the award proceedings and
subsequently got enhanced compensation. There is
inordinate delay in approaching this Court, which is
not at all explained in the writ petition. The
petitioners have no right to request for denotifing
the acquired land subsequent to final notification
and taking possession. Here it is not in dispute with
regard to taking possession of the acquired land
and the petitioners having received the
compensation. There is no provision under the Act
to denotify the lands once the possession of the
lands is taken. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing
with the issue of denotification and whether the
land could be reassigned if the land acquired is not
utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired
- 15 -
has held as follows in the judgment reported in
(2013) 4 SCC 524 in the case of Mahadeo (Dead)
though LRs and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others at paras 14 and 16:
“14. There is no dispute with regard to
the settled proposition of law that once the
land is acquired and mandatory requirements
are complied with including possession having
been taken, the land vests in the State
Government free from all encumbrances. Even
if some unutilised land remains, it cannot be
re-conveyed or re-assigned to the erstwhile
owner by invoking the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. This Court in the case of Govt.
of A.P. vs. V.Syed Akbar AIR 2005 SC 492 held
that :-
“10. It is neither debated nor disputed as
regards the valid acquisition of the land in
question under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act and the possession of the land
had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the
Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land has
vested absolutely in the Government free from all
encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act, the Government could withdraw
from the acquisition of any land of which
possession has not been taken. In the instant
case, even under Section 48, the Government
could not withdraw from acquisition or to
reconvey the said land to the respondent as the
possession of the land had already been taken.
The position of law is well settled. In State of
Kerala and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr.
(1997) 5 SCC 432 para 4 of the said judgment
reads: (SCC p. 433)
‘4. In view of the admitted position that the
land in question was acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of
the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State
free from all encumbrances. The question emerges
whether the Government can assign the land to the
erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is
acquired for a public purpose, after the public
purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be
used for any other public purpose. In case there is
no other public purpose for which the land is needed,
then instead of disposal by way of sale to the
- 16 -
erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public
auction and the amount fetched in the public auction
can be better utilised for the public purpose
envisaged in the Directive Principles of the
Constitution. In the present case, what we find is
that the executive order is not in consonance with
the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid.
Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is
well justified in declaring the executive order as
invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for
a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the
Government should be sold only through the public
auctions so that the public also gets benefited by
getting a higher value.’”
15. xxxxx
16. Indisputably, the land in question was
acquired by the State Government for the purpose of
expansion of the city i.e. residential/commercial
construction building of under planned development
scheme by the Meerut Development Authority and
that major portion of the land has already been
utilized by the Authority. Merely because some land
was left at the relevant time, that does not give any
right to the Authority to send proposal to the
Government for release of the land in favour of the
land owners. The impugned orders passed by the
High Court directing the Authority to press the
Resolution are absolutely unwarranted in law.”
14. The petitioners have no locus standi to challenge
the allotment of land made in favour of respondent No.5 for
the purpose of establishment of petrol pump. The petitioners
have neither made application for allotment of land nor they
are the rival contenders for establishment of petrol pump. The
respondent No.5 made application for allotment of land for
establishment of petrol pump and respondent taking into
consideration the necessity of petrol pump, as there was no
petrol pump for about 7 k.m. on the Navanagar and Bagalkot
link road, allotted 15 guntas of land. The petitioners cannot
have any grievance with regard to allotment of land to
respondent No.5. The establishment of petrol pump would be
for general public and it cannot be at any stretch could be
considered as for private purpose. In the decision cited by the
petitioner i.e. 1992 (1) KLJ 589 (DB) in the case of
Mrs.Behroze Ramyar Batha and Others Vs. The SLAO
Bangalore it is observed that “where a cross section of the
public or even an individual is benefited as a member of public
- 17 -
and not as an individual thereof, certainly it will be a public
purpose.” Hence, the contention that allotment of land to
respondent No.5 for establishing petrol pump is not for public
purpose cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the petitioners’ lands
were acquired for formation of road in the Bagalkot Navanagar
areas. So as to achieve alround development of the Bagalkot
Navanagar area and with an object of securing further
development, the respondent Authority allotted the land for
establishment of petrol pump.
15. The petitioner relied on the decision reported in
(2011) 10 SCC 608, Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Another
Vs. G.Jayarama Reddy and Others to contend that lands
acquired for the purpose of formation of road could not have
been allotted to petrol pump. With respect I find that the said
decision would have no application to the facts of the present
case. In the above cited decision lands were acquired for
public purpose and then the same were transferred to a
private individual and corporate entities by citing poor financial
health of the corporation as the cause for doing so. Moreover,
in that case the acquisition notification concerned had already
been quashed in their entirety in earlier writ petitions filed by
some land owners. Under those circumstances, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that land acquired for public purpose
cannot be transferred to private parties.
16. Further, the contention of the petitioners is that
respondent No.5 was the member of respondent No.2-
Authority and respondent No.5 got allotted the land in his
favour. The learned counsel for respondent No.5 repelling the
contention of the petitioners has stated that the allotment of
land for the purpose of establishment of petrol pump was
much prior to respondent No.5 becoming the member of
respondent No.2-Authority. He submitted that respondent
No.5 became member of respondent No.2-Authority on
15.02.2007 and he was member till 08.10.2007. But he
submits that the site for establishment of petrol pump was
allotted much prior i.e. on 28.12.2006. Therefore, taking into
consideration the above factual position, I am of the view that
the petitioners’ contention would not merit any consideration.
17. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is
rejected.”
10. The Apex Court long before the order passed by the
coordinate Bench, had in GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA
- 18 -
2
PRADESH v. SYED AKBAR interpreting Section 48(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, held as follows:
“…. …. ….
10. It is neither debated nor disputed as
regards the valid acquisition of the land in
question under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act and the possession of the land
had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the
Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land has
vested absolutely in the Government free from all
encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act, Government could withdraw from
the acquisition of any land of which possession
has not been taken. In the instant case, even
under Section 48, the Government could not
withdraw from acquisition or to reconvey the said
land to the respondent as the possession of the
land had already been taken. The position of law
is well settled. In State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran
Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432] para 4 of the said
judgment reads: (SCC p. 433)
“ 4 . In view of the admitted position that the
land in question was acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of
the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the
State free from all encumbrances. The question
emerges whether the Government can assign the
land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that
if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after
the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the
land could be used for any other public purpose. In
case there is no other public purpose for which the
land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of
sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put
to public auction and the amount fetched in the
public auction can be better utilised for the public
purpose envisaged in the directive principles of
the Constitution. In the present case, what we find
is that the executive order is not in consonance
with the provision of the Act and is, therefore,
2
(2005) 1 SCC 558
- 19 -
invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division
Bench is well justified in declaring the executive
order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made,
should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land
of the Government should be sold only through the
public auctions so that the public also gets
benefited by getting a higher value.”
11. In that case, an extent of 1.94 acres of land was
acquired in 1952 for construction of national highway and the
construction was completed in 1955 in 80 cents of land and
the balance of land remained unused. The remaining land was
sought to be sold to the landowner at the same rate at which
the compensation was awarded under Section 11. This again
was challenged in the writ petitions. The Government tried to
sustain the action on the basis of the executive order issued
by the Government for permission for alienation of the land.
On these facts, the position of law was made clear in para 4
extracted above. Thus, it is clear that under Section 16 of the
Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land should vest in the
State free from all encumbrances and that any executive order
inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
was invalid . Further that if the land is acquired for a public
purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the
land could be used for any other public purpose. In our view,
this decision supports the case of the appellants fully.
12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State
of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] claim of the petitioner for
restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to
the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para
2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 406)
“ 2 . … We do not think that this Court would be
justified in making direction for restitution of the land to
the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back
and vested in the Municipality free from all
encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity
of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is
axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose
would be utilised for any other public purpose, though
use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It
is not intended that any land which remained unutilised,
should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom
- 20 -
adequate compensation was paid according to the
market value as on the date of the notification. Under
these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in
refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.”
13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court
in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh [(2003) 1
SCC 335] referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda
Patil [(1996) 6 SCC 405] and other cases held that: (SCC p.
340, para 12)
“12. If the land was not used for the purpose for
which it was acquired, it was open to the State
Government to take action but that did not confer any
right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the
land.”
Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus: (SCC p. 340)
“ 10 . In Chandragauda Ramgonda
Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] it
is stated that the acquired land remaining
unutilised was not intended to be restituted to the
erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation
was paid according to the market value as on the
date of notification.
11 . Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the
Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] it is held that
acquired land having vested in the State and the
compensation having been paid to the claimant, he
was not entitled to restitution of possession on the
ground that either original public purpose had
ceased to be in operation or the land could not be
used for other purpose.”
14. From the position of law made clear in the
aforementioned decisions, it follows that ( 1 ) under
Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land
acquired vests in the Government absolutely free
from all encumbrances; ( 2 ) the land acquired for a
public purpose could be utilised for any other public
purpose; and ( 3 ) the acquired land which is vested in
the Government free from all encumbrances cannot
- 21 -
be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner
merely on the basis of an executive order.
15. At the hearing, we specifically asked learned
counsel for the respondent whether the Board's Standing
Order No. 90(32) was issued under any particular statute,
the learned counsel was not able to point out to any
provision of law under which it was issued. He was not in a
position to show that the said order bears any statutory
force. Even otherwise, as per para 32 of the said order, the
land acquired, no longer required for the public purpose for
which it was acquired, could not be disposed of in favour of
any person other than a citizen of India and that too without
the sanction of the Government. If the land acquired for the
public purpose is specifically relinquished, such land could
be disposed of as stated in the said paragraph. If the land
relinquished is likely to be again required for public
purposes, it should be merely leased out for such term as
may be considered desirable in each case. If the acquired
land was an agricultural land at the time of acquisition, it
should be disposed of inviting for sale in public auction by
giving wide publicity in respect of sale. If at the time of sale,
anybody puts forth his claim in respect of any field either as
an adjacent owner or as an original owner, the sale of that
field should be stopped and his claim investigated and
disposed of in the manner specified in sub-clauses ( i ) and
( iv ) of Note (2) of the Board's Standing Order No. 90(32). If
it is found that his claim is not proved, the field should be
sold by public auction. In the case on hand, there is nothing
on record to show that the part of the acquired land which
remained unused was relinquished by the Government. A
letter of the Resident Engineer stating that the unused land
was no more required cannot amount to relinquishment of
the said land by the competent authority. In order to make
a claim under para 32 of the said Board's Standing Order in
the first place, it was necessary that the competent
authority had subsequently relinquished the unused land.
After such relinquishment of the land, the land had to be
notified for sale in public auction. If at the time of sale of
such land, the original owner made a claim, sale could be
stopped and his claim could be investigated and thereafter
the land was to be disposed of in the manner specified
under the said paragraph. Added to this, by virtue of the
- 22 -
amendment to para 32 brought about by GOMs No. 783
dated 9-10-1998, the land for the public purpose shall be
utilised for the same purpose for which it was acquired as
far as possible and in case the land is not used for the
purpose for which it was acquired due to any reason, the
land shall be utilised for any other public purpose as
deemed fit. It appears this amendment was not brought to
the notice of the High Court.
16. Chapter V of the Act deals with occupation
of khalsa land and right of occupant. Under Section 54,
procedure is prescribed for acquiring unoccupied land. This
section enables a person to submit a petition to the
Tahsildar if he is desirous of taking unoccupied land. On
such application, the Tahsildar may in accordance with the
rules made by the Government give permission in writing
for occupation. Section 54-A indicates the procedure in
respect of land acquired for the purpose of public benefit
and which is no more required. It is clear from plain and
clear language of the said section that when an agricultural
land acquired for public benefit is no longer required,
the patta thereof shall be made in the name of the person
or his successor from whom such land was acquired
provided he consents to refund the compensation originally
paid to him. This section does not say that the agricultural
land acquired for public benefit is no longer required for the
purpose for which it is acquired . This section can be
attracted only in a case where agricultural land acquired for
public benefit is no longer required not necessarily for the
specific purpose for which it was acquired. Added to this,
that the land is no more required is a decision required to
be made by the competent authority. As in the present
case, mere letter of the Resident Engineer that the unused
land is no more required is not enough. When the land is
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act which is vested in
the State Government free from all encumbrances, the
question of reconveying the land as claimed by the
respondent could not be accepted in view of the clear
position of law stated in the decisions of this Court
aforementioned. Whether the unused remaining land out of
the acquired land was sufficient or not for the purpose of
construction of Mandal Revenue Office could not be decided
by the High Court. It was for the competent authorities to
- 23 -
decide about the same. The High Court, in our view, was not
right in saying that the proposal to construct the Mandal
Revenue Office in the unused land acquired was an
afterthought. No material was placed on record to attribute
any mala fides on the part of the authorities or to support
the case that the proposal to build a Mandal Revenue Office
was an afterthought.
17. Thus viewed from any angle, we find it difficult to
sustain the impugned order. Consequently, it is set aside
and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.
The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.”
The Apex Court holds that once the land is vested with the
Government even unused, cannot be reassigned or de-
notified.
11. The petitioner now seeks 10 guntas of land out of 3
acres and 24 guntas, acquired and is in possession of
Government, which comes to be rejected, rightly so, on the
score that once possession is taken and vesting occurs,
Section 48(1) of the Act cannot be applied. It becomes
apposite to refer to a judgment of the High Court of Delhi in
3
NAGIN CHAND GODHA v. UNION OF INDIA wherein the
Division Bench interprets Section 48 and holds that the
petitioner enjoying possession even after taking over symbolic
possession and being in such possession cannot subsequently
come to the Court for de-notification of the land. The Division
Bench has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
3. It is also stated by the respondent that wider public
interest is liable to be borne in mind while exercising the
power of granting stay and injunction while entertaining writ
petition. It is also required to be borne in mind that on
account of proceedings initiated earlier the authorities could
not take action in the matter.
4. As against this, it is submitted that the land is
in possession of the petitioner and therefore
3
2003 SCC OnLine Del 411
- 24 -
considering the provisions contained in Section 48(1)
of the Act, the application, which is made to the Lt.
Governor is required to be disposed of first. Section
48(1) reads as under:—
“(1) Except in the case provided for in Section
36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw
from the acquisition of any land of which possession
has not been taken.”
5. The question, which is required to be determined, is
whether possession was taken or not. It is contended before
the Court that symbolic possession is no possession unless
and until the person is actually dispossessed it cannot be said
that possession is taken by the acquiring body. Our attention
has been drawn to Annexure-1 (p. 218) to the counter filed
by the respondent. It is dated 22.9.1986. It is clear that
formal possession of land in Khasra No. 166(3-06), 167(3-
11), 627/174 (0-18), 628/174(1-00) total 8 Bighas 15 biswas
of village Lado Sarai has been handed over to the appropriate
authority. It is contended that the property is built up and it
cannot be said that the possession thereof was taken. It is a
big plot of land and by drawing Panchnama the possession
was taken. It was contended before us that when possession
is taken in such fashion, it cannot be said that the possession
-was taken. Reliance was placed on the case of Balwant
Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, 1976 (1) SCC 700 to say
that symbolic possession is no possession. We indicate the
Apex Court has stated in para 22 as under:
“It would thus be seen that a symbolical or
formal delivery of possession as understood in law has
the effect of dispossessing the judgment-debtor from
his right or interest in the property. It does not
dispossess the unactual possession in his own right not
liable to be evicted under the decree or in pursuance of
the auction sale. A symbolical or formal delivery of
possession against the judgment-debtor is giving of
actual possession of the property in the eye of law and
has the effect of dispossessing him although as matter
of fact he may have succeeded in resuming back
possession as before shortly after dispossession.”
It is required to be noted that in para 25, the Apex
6.
Court has laid down as under:
- 25 -
“...Unless possession is taken by the written
agreement of the party concerned the mode of taking
possession obviously would be for the authority to go
upon the land and to do some act which would indicate
that the authority has taken possession of the land. It
may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or
otherwise or by handing a written declaration on the
spot that the authority has taken possession of the
land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the
land to effectuate the taking of possession is not
necessary. No further notice beyond that under Section
9(1) of the Act is required., When possession has been
taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is
dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the
land vests in the government.”
7. It is also required to be noted that in a recent
decision of the Apex Court in Balmokand Khatri Educational
and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab (1996) 4
SCC 212 and in the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A
Viswam (Dead by LRs) , 1996 (8) SCC 259 has held as
under:—
“It is seen that the entire gamut of the
acquisition proceedings stood completed by 17.4.1976
by which date possession of the land had been taken.
No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the
appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-
settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical
possession of the land under compulsory acquisition.
The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the
panchnama in the presence of the panchas and taking
possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is
the accepted mode of taking possession of the land.
Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would
tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession.”
8. The aforesaid decisions were followed by the
Division Bench of this Court in Puran Singh v. Lt.
Governor, Delhi , (1999) 78 DLT 412.
9. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Delhi Development Authority v. Prasadi , 2003 (69) DRJ
751, LPA No. 562 of 2001 decided on 26.9.2002 had an
- 26 -
occasion to examine similar question. In para 71, it is
held as under:—
“the said report states that possession of
600 bighas of land has already been taken, this
fact alone sufficiently would warrant the
reexamination of the matter [Refer: (1) General
Manager, Telecommunication v. Dr. Madan Mohan
Pradhan , 1995 (4) Supp SCC 268, (2) P.
Chinnanna v. State of A.P. , 1994 (5) SCC 486, 3)
Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust
Amritsar v. State of Punjab , 1994 (6) SCC 212,
(4) Sanjeevanagar Medical & Health Employees
Co-operative Housing Society v. Mohd Abdul
Wahab , (1993) 3 SCC 600, (5) Rajasthan Housing
Board v. Shiv Kishan , (1993) 2 SCC 84 and 6)
Awadh Bihari Yadava v. State of Bihar , (1995) 6
SCC 31]”.
10. The Apex Court in the case of Executive
Engineer Jal Nigam Central Stores Division U.P. v.
Suresha Nand Juyal , (1997) 9 SCC 224, also considered
the question of symbolic possession taken by the
Officers. Therefore, in view of what is stated
hereinabove, it is not possible for this Court to agree
with the submission of the learned counsel that
possession is not taken. Suffice it so say that after
symbolic possession is taken, if the petitioner is
enjoying the possession, he is enjoying the possession
as a trustee on behalf of the public at large and that by
itself cannot be considered to be a ground to contend
that possession is not taken. It is the duty of the
person who is occupying the property to look after the
property and to see that the property is not defaced or
devalued by himself or by others. He cannot
subsequently come to the Court to say that actual
possession is not taken and therefore he should be
protected and land be denotified.
11. In the case of DDA v. Prasadi , (supra) the Apex
Court had the occasion to consider the question of de-
notification. In para 71:—
“We now revert to the most important aspect. It
was the case of the respondents herein in the writ
- 27 -
petition which was argued with all vehemence before
us as well that the possession of the land was not
taken by the DDA, and therefore, review of the earlier
decision by the impugned decision dated 6th July,
1999 was clearly uncalled for. The learned Single
Judge has accepted this submission and in fact dealt
with this aspect at great length. While coming to the
conclusion that no legal possession of the land was
taken over by the DDA. While dealing with this aspect,
it would be necessary to take note of certain factual
events.”
The Court has pointed out that in such a situation legal
possession is that the land owner had no right in the land
after acquisition is complete.
12. The Division Bench of this Court in a reported
decision in the case of Ajit Singh v. Union of India, (2001) 89
DLT 495 : 2001 (57) DRJ 335(DB) (to which one of us, A.K.
Sikri, J. was a party) pointed out in para 8 as under:—
“8. Section 16 signifies culmination of the land
acquisition proceedings. As it has happened in the present case,
compensation has been received by the land owners and
possession of the land has been taken over by the Government.
The award was made in May, 1987 and possession of the lands
was taken in pursuance thereof. It is settled law that once the
land vests in the Government after its possession is taken over
by it, the land becomes; absolute property of the Government.
Thereafter even the Government does not have any power to
denotify the land or to quash the notifications under which it had
been acquired. The effect of taking possession under Section 16
is that a curtain is drawn so far as the land acquisition
proceedings are concerned. The Government becomes absolute
owner of the land. The land goes outside the purview of the land
Acquisition Act. If later the Government has to pass on the title
of the land to anyone else including its erstwhile owners, it can
do so only by conveying the title by way of a sale deed or grant
etc, i.e. the land thereafter has to be dealt with in accordance
with ordinary civil law.”
13. Thus, once there is vesting of land, it is for the
Government to make use of the land. Even if the purpose
is changed, others have no right because there is
vesting. It is stated in the affidavit by the respondent
that the competent authority has placed the land at the
disposal of the DDA. Thus land vests with the DDA and it
- 28 -
is for the BDA to make use of the land for the purpose
which is in the interest of the public at large.
14. Learned counsel appearing for the DDA submitted
that in the interest of justice and public interest, High Court
should be slow in exercise of discretionary power. High Court
must balance the competing interests of the parties. Learned
counsel has placed reliance on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra , (1997) 1 SCC 134 and drawn our attention to
para 10 of the judgment, where the Apex Court has laid down
as under:—
“10. Before parting with this case, we think it
necessary to make a few observations relevant to land
acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched
upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic
advancement to make our economy competitive in the
world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct
investment to the maximum extent. We propose to
compete with China economically. We wish to attain the
pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian
countries, referred to as “Asian tigers”, e.g. south Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all
hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining
such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our
country. The means of transportation, power and
communications are in dire need of substantial
improvement, expansion and modernization. These
things very often call for acquisition of land and that too
without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of
these cases, the persons affected challenge the
acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are
generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High
Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in
some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also
made. Whatever may have been the practices in the
past, a time has come where the courts should keep the
larger public interest in mind while exercising their
power of granting stay/injunction. The power under
Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in
furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the
making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land
acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice
and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one
and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction
or other similar orders, more particularly of an
interlocutory nature is equally discretionary. The courts
- 29 -
have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private
interest while exercising the power under Article 226 —
indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be
open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally
that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-
compliance with some legal requirement that the
persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular
amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or
calculated at a certain percentage of compensation
payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate
relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition
proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is
ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests.
Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say
we hope and trust that these considerations will be duly
borne in mind by the courts while dealing with
challenges to acquisition proceedings.”
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also
submitted that such denotification orders are passed in
the cases of other persons and thus others are given
benefit and so far as the petitioner is concerned he is
left out and discriminatory treatment is given by not
deciding the application. This contention is meritless.
In support, we adopt the reasoning given by a Division
Bench of this Court in Shanti Sports Club v. Union of
India , 2001 (60) DRJ 16, wherein this Court has
pointed out as under:
“The learned counsel for the petitioners also
argued that the petitioners have been suspected to
discrimination as certain other lands which were
subject matter of acquisition have been denotified
under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. We find
no force in the contention since the land is still needed
for the housing project. Similar argument advanced
before the Full Bench in Roshanara Begum v. Land
Acquisition Collector for challenging the acquisition
was rejected and it was held that there cannot be any
question of discrimination merely because some of the
lands were denotified in exercise of the powers under
Section 48 of the Act, it seems to us that in case some
land is wrongly denotified for showing favour to a
party, such action of the State can be challenged. But a
party cannot seek denotification of the land on the
analogy of a case where State withdraws from
acquisition on extraneous grounds as two wrongs
cannot make a right.”
- 30 -
16. Learned counsel also submitted that site of
the road has been shifted and therefore there is no need
of acquiring this land. Only a part of the land is required
for the purpose of construction of road and the
petitioner is ready and willing to give the same. On the
contrary, on behalf of the DDA it has been pointed out in
the affidavit that the land is required for district park as
well as the road. Considering the contentions which are
on affidavit, after acquisition proceedings are complete,
the Court is of the opinion that the Court should not
interfere in such matters and the petition is dismissed
with costs quantified at Rs. 5000/-. Interim order stands
vacated.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
12. Insofar as recordings in the note sheet are
concerned, any recording in the note sheet cannot render any
right in favour of the petitioner. They are all rights that are
still born. In law, once possession is taken, if Section 48(1)
cannot become applicable, it simply cannot become applicable.
Plethora of notings in the note sheet remain notes in the note
sheets and cannot become an order contrary to law.
13. Finding no merit in the petition, the petition stands
rejected , with a direction to the respondent/BDA to award
compensation to the land of the petitioner in accordance with
law, in the event compensation is not awarded and disbursed
to the petitioner as on date, without brooking further delay.”
The subject review petition is preferred on the score that the
order dated 30.01.2026 passed in W.P.No.12383/2023 suffers from
an error apparent on the face of the record.
4. Sri Bipin Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner is in
- 31 -
possession of the property even as on today, while the finding in
the impugned order is that, the possession has been taken by the
Bengaluru Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
BDA’ for short). In the statement of objections filed along with the
documents by respondent Nos.2 and 3 – BDA themselves in the
writ petition would indicate that the petitioner is still in possession
of the property. The map appended to the statement of objections
filed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 is as follows:
- 32 -
4.1. Learned counsel would further submit that the report of
the Executive of the BDA even confirms that existence of 8 foot
compound wall and an ACC shed on the land to show that the
petitioner is in physical possession of the property. Documents i.e.,
document Nos.3 and 4 appended to the subject petition would
indicate that the petitioner had been in possession of the property
as on 05.02.2010 . Document No.3 reads as follows:
- 33 -
- 34 -
4.2. The reply given by the BDA on the application filed by the
petitioner under the provisions of the Right to Information Act,
2005, dated 13.04.2026 would also indicate that the petitioner was
in possession of the property. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that in the statement of objections filed in
W.P.No.12383/2023, respondent Nos.2 and 3 had appended a
survey map which depicts that the schedule property is in the
possession of the petitioner. The survey map is dated 11.07.2024.
He would submit that all these factors are ignored by this Court
while passing the order holding that the BDA has already taken
possession of the property. In the light of the said documents
which depict that the petitioner is in possession of the property, the
petitioner has preferred the subject review petition.
5. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 would submit
that the order has reference to the submissions that the BDA has
already taken possession of the property. The petitioner, therefore,
will have to file an appeal as no new ground is made out to
entertain the review petition and that the review petitioner is
wanting to re-argue the entire matter.
- 35 -
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the material on record.
7. Before embarking upon the consideration of the issue on its
merit of entertainment of the review petition or otherwise, it is
necessary to notice the judicial landscape. The review petition is
filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. It reads as follows:
“ORDER XLVII - REVIEW -
1. Application for review of judgment.—
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is
allowed, but from which no appeal has been
preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is
allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the
decree passed or order made against him, may apply for
a review of judgment to the Court which passed the
decree or made the order.”
- 36 -
7.1. Interpretation of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC need not
detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex
4
Court in the case of MALLEESWARI v. K. SUGUNA , while
considering the difference in scope and ambit of appeal and review
under the CPC, observes as follows:
“ …. …. ….
15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be
assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or the rules
having the force of a statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be
assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the
Court. Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the
power of review of the courts. The power of review is
different from appellate power and is subject to the
following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial
decisions:
15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an
appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and
ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC [Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala
Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170].
15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate
powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct
all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court
[Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma,
(1979) 4 SCC 389].
15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47
Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous
decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it
must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927
- 37 -
be allowed to be an appeal in disguise [Parsion Devi v.
Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715].
15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the
correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such
powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the
statute governing the exercise of power [Lily Thomas v.
Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224].
15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its
own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It
constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a
judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be
altered [Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663].
Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of
justice or to correct grave and palpable errors [Shivdev
Singh v. State of Punjab, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 29].
16. To wit, through a review application, an
apparent error of fact or law is intimated to the court, but
no extra reasoning is undertaken to explain the said
error. The intimation of error at the first blush enables
the court to correct apparent errors instead of the higher
court correcting such errors. At both the above stages,
detailed reasoning is not warranted.
17. Having noticed the distinction between the
power of review and appellate power, we restate the
power and scope of review jurisdiction. Review grounds
are summed up as follows:
17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important
matter or evidence is a ground available if it is
demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence,
this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not
be produced by the party at the time, the original decree
or order was passed.
17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record may be invoked if there is something more than a
mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on
the face of the record [Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
Ahmad Ishaque, (1954) 2 SCC 881]. Such an error is a
patent error and not a mere wrong decision [T.C. Basappa
- 38 -
v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905]. An error which has to
be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on
points where there may conceivably be two opinions can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 10].
17.3 Lastly, the phrase ‘for any other sufficient
reason’ means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified in the other two
categories [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC
11].
18. Courts ought not mix up or overlap one jurisdiction
with another jurisdiction. Having noted the appellate and
review jurisdiction of the Court, we will apply these
principles to the impugned order to determine whether
the High Court was within its power of review jurisdiction
or had exceeded it by reversing the findings, as if the High
Court were sitting in appeal against the order dated 23.09.2022.
We appreciate the above tabulated summary of the view taken
in the impugned order while doing so.”
The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment observes that there
are three broad grounds under which review under the CPC can be
sought: discovery of new and important matter or evidence if such
evidence was not within their knowledge despite due diligence;
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other
sufficient reason. The petitioner relies on a error in the impugned
order observing that possession of the property is with the BDA
which contradicts the material on record.
- 39 -
7.2. The Apex Court in its judgment in the case of
PREM
5
PORWAL v. JAGDEESH CHANDRA PRAJAPATI , while
considering the term ‘error apparent on the face the record’ as a
ground for review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC, has held as
follows:
“ …. …. ….
5.2. It may be true that the exercise of review jurisdiction
by the courts takes place on limited grounds, therefore, not to
be a routine exercise. It is nevertheless well settled that review
powers under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908, or inherent review powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution, could be exercised on the grounds permissible for
the purpose. One of the accepted grounds is that the
review of a judgment and order can be undertaken when
there exists an ‘error apparent on the face of record’ or
any other sufficient ground.
5.2.1. An error apparent on the face of record is
thus a ground for invoking the review jurisdiction, and in
a given case where such apparent error exists, reviewing
of the judgment or order becomes imperative. An error
apparent on the face of record is one when in
comprehending such error, elaborate reasoning is not
required. It is one which does not involve debatable
issues.
5.3. In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v.
Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa
Tirumale, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 10], this Court observed in
paragraph 17, ‘an error which has to be established by
long drawn process of reasoning on points where there
may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be
an error apparent on the face of record.’ The observations
5
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1100
- 40 -
in T.S. Balaram, Income Tax Officer, Company Circle IV,
Bombay v. Volkart Brothers, Bombay6, in which the scope
of rectification under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act,
1961 was under interpretation, this Court furthered its
reasoning as to what could be treated as an error
apparent, observing that ‘a mistake apparent on record
must be an obvious and patent mistake and not
something which can be established by a long-drawn
process of reasoning on points on which there may
conceivably be two opinions.’
5.4. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
[Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1
SCC 170], this Court stated that an error apparent on the
face of record must be such an error which strikes on
mere looking at the record. More recent decisions in S.
Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, in S. Murali
Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan [Madhusudhan Reddy v. V.
Narayana Reddy, (2022) 17 SCC 255] and in Arun Dev
Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Limited [Arun Dev
Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd., (2023) 8 SCC
11], similarly explained and reiterated the connotation
‘an error apparent on the face of record’.
5.5. Thus, an error which is self-evident and which
can be detected without resorting to a long-drawn
process of reasoning, is classified as ‘an error apparent
on the face of record’. The error of this kind and nature
justifies the court to exercise its powers of review. The
purpose of exercise of any statutory power and exercise
of all kinds of jurisdictions, in their ultimate analysis, is
to do justice to the party who stands prejudiced or
seriously discounted for its rights by virtue of the
judgment or order affecting such party, by curing the
error committed by the court. When ‘an error apparent on
the face of record’ is noticed or found to exist, the court
should not hesitate to exercise the review powers to set
right the injustice and restore the justice to the aggrieved
party.”
- 41 -
7.3. Yet again, the Apex Court in the case of
STATE OF U.P.
6
v. ANJUMAN ISHAAT-E-TALEEM TRUST observes as follows:
“ …. …. ….
6. Yet again, recently, this Court in Bharti Airtel Ltd. v.
A.S. Raghavendra [Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. A.S. Raghavendra,
(2024) 6 SCC 418] had the occasion to hold as follows:
16. The gist of the aforestated decisions is that:
16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia
if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the
face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is
final, and departure from that principle is justified
only when circumstances of a substantial and
compelling character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and
has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face
of record justifying the court to exercise its power
of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”.
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose
and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in
disguise”.
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner
cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the
6
2026 SCC OnLine SC 998
- 42 -
questions which have already been addressed and
decided.
16.7. An error on the face of record must be
such an error which, mere looking at the record
should strike and it should not require any long-
drawn process of reasoning on the points where
there may conceivably be two opinions.
16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent
decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench
by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for
.”
review
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
On coalesce of judgments rendered by the Apex Court what
would unmistakably emerge is that, a review petition is
entertainable if the order suffers from an error apparent on the face
of the record.
8. In the case at hand, the order dated 30.01.2026 passed in
W.P.No.12383/2023, suffers from an error on the face of the
record, for the reason that this Court has dismissed the petition on
the score that the possession has been taken by the BDA while the
BDA themselves in the documents appended to the statement of
objections observes that the BDA has not taken possession of the
property. This observation comes to be affirmed in the response to
- 43 -
the application filed by the petitioner under the provisions of the
Right to Information Act, 2005. In the light of the aforesaid
submissions and the circumstance that the BDA has not taken the
possession of the property, the impugned order dated 30.01.2026
requires to be recalled.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The review petition is allowed.
b. The order dated 30.01.2026 passed in W.P.No.12383/2023
stands recalled.
c. The matter in W.P.No.12383/2023 is restored to file.
d. Registry is directed to list W.P.No.12383/2023 on
20.11.2026, for further hearing at 02:30 p.m .
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
nvj
CT - MJ