GHULAM RASOOL RATHER AND ORS vs FININCIAL COMMISSIONER (REVENUE) J AND K AND ORS

Page 1 of 16 WP(C) 1789/2023 CM(4171/2023)


HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR

WP(C) 1789/2023 CM(4171/2023).

Reserved on: 07.05.2026
Pronounced on: 02.06.2026
Uploaded on: 03.06.2026
Whether operative part or full
Judgment has been pronounced: Full



1. Ghulam Rasool Rather
S/o Mohammad Sultan Rather
R/o Kursoo Rajbagh Srinagar, Kashmir
2. Mohammad Altaf Rather
S/o Ghulam Mohammad Rather
R/o Kursoo Rajbagh Srinagar, Kashmir
3. Haroon Ahmad Rather
S/o Ghulam Mohammad Rather
R/o Kursoo Rajbagh Srinagar, Kashmir

4. Mst. Shamshada
W/o Mohammad Sidiq Lone
Kursoo Rajbagh Srinagar, Kashmir.
……...Petitioner(s)

Through: Mr. Zahid Khan, Adv.

Versus
1. Financial Commissioner Revenue,
Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar.
2. Tehsildar Sough Srinagar Kashmir.
Patwari Halqa K. P. Bagh, Srinagar.
3. Manzoor Ahmad Rather
S/o Abdul Khaliq Rather
R/o KursooRajbagh, Srinagar.
.……Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. S. M. Saleem, Adv.


CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
02.06.2026

Brief facts:
1. The present writ petition calls in question order dated 25.05.2023 passed
by the learned Financial Commissioner (Revenue), whereby Mutation No.
4813 of Estate KP Bagh, Srinagar, dated 09.12.2004, has been set aside in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 15 of the Land Revenue

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Act. The record reflects that the aforesaid mutation came to be attested on
09.12.2004 and remained unassailed for a considerable period of time.
2. It further emerges that a revision petition came to be instituted before the
learned Financial Commissioner (Revenue) on 24.02.2021 seeking
interference with the aforesaid mutation, thus reflecting a lapse of nearly
twenty years from the date of attestation of the mutation. Upon notice, the
concerned parties appeared before the revisional authority and the matter
was taken up for consideration.
3.
The record also indicates that the predecessor-in-interest connected with
the subject matter of the mutation had not questioned the same during his
lifetime, and that, during the intervening period, third-party rights had
come into existence with respect to the property in question. It is further
borne out that the mutation entries, forming part of the revenue record,
continued to remain in force during this period.
4. The learned Financial Commissioner (Revenue), upon consideration of the
matter, passed the impugned order dated 25.05.2023, whereby the
aforesaid Mutation No. 4813 dated 09.12.2004 came to be set aside. The
order reflects exercise of revisional jurisdiction under the Land Revenue
Act in relation to the said mutation.
5. Aggrieved of the aforesaid order, the petitioners have approached this
Court through the medium of the present writ petition seeking quashment
of the aforesaid order.
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners:
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order is
patently unsustainable in law inasmuch as the revision petition was

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entertained after an unexplained and inordinate delay of nearly two
decades.
7. It was argued that though no specific period of limitation is prescribed for
exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the same is nonetheless required to be
exercised within a reasonable period, which principle has been completely
overlooked by the learned Financial Commissioner.
8.
It was further contended that the revisional authority failed to record any
satisfaction with regard to the enormous delay in filing the revision
petition, particularly when no application seeking condonation of delay
accompanied the revision petition.
9. Learned counsel submitted that respondent No. 4 could not have been
treated as an aggrieved person, more so when his predecessor-in-interest
had never questioned the mutation during his lifetime despite having full
knowledge thereof.
10. It was next contended that the impugned order has been passed without
proper examination of the relevant revenue record and without recording
cogent reasons, thereby rendering the same arbitrary and unsustainable.
11.
Learned counsel further submitted that during the intervening period of
about twenty years, the property in question had changed several hands
and valuable third-party rights had accrued, which aspect has also not been
considered by the revisional authority.
12. It was also argued that mutation entries are fiscal in nature and do not
confer title and, therefore, if respondent No. 4 claimed any substantive
right over the property, the appropriate remedy available was to institute
proceedings before the competent civil court.

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13. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed upon State of
Gujarat v. Patel Raghav, AIR 1969 SC 1297; Abdul Khaliq Bhat v. State
&Ors. 2017 (6) JKLRJ 434 ; and Ghulam Qadir Bhat &Ors. V. Financial
Commissioner Revenue &Ors. LPA OW No. 33/2017 decided on
24.09.2021.
14. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, it was prayed that the
impugned order dated 25.05.2023 be quashed by issuance of an
appropriate writ.
Submissions on Behalf of Respondents.
15. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 submitted that the present
writ petition is misconceived and not maintainable inasmuch as the
petitioners seek to challenge a remand order which does not finally
determine the rights of the parties. It was argued that the learned Financial
Commissioner has merely directed de novo consideration of the matter so
as to afford opportunity of hearing to all interested parties and, therefore,
no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioners.
16.
It was further submitted that the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be
invoked in matters involving disputed questions of fact, particularly when
the controversy pertains to inheritance and revenue entries and efficacious
alternative remedies are available under law.
17. Learned counsel contended that the mutation in question had been attested
behind the back of respondent No. 4 and without notice to all legal heirs,
thereby rendering the same illegal and void. According to the respondent,
the concerned Tehsildar acted without jurisdiction in attesting the mutation
without conducting proper inquiry and without associating all affected
parties.

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18. It was argued that respondent No. 4 acquired knowledge of the impugned
mutation only recently, whereafter the revision petition was filed without
any undue delay. The delay, if any, was sufficiently explained as limitation
in cases involving fraud and concealment commences from the date of
knowledge and not from the date of the transaction itself.
19. Learned counsel further submitted that fraud vitiates every solemn
proceeding and no person can be permitted to take advantage of an order
obtained by concealment or by excluding necessary parties from the
proceedings.
20. It was next contended that the learned Financial Commissioner, after
examining the material available on record and considering the
submissions of the parties, passed a well-reasoned order directing fresh
consideration of the matter by the competent authority so as to ensure
observance of principles of natural justice.
21. Learned counsel also submitted that mutation entries are only fiscal in
nature and do not confer title and, therefore, no vested or indefeasible right
can be claimed by the petitioners merely on the basis of the mutation
entries.
22.
On the aforesaid grounds, it was prayed that the writ petition being devoid
of merit be dismissed.
23. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Legal analysis
24. The record reveals that Mutation No. 4813 came to be attested on
09.12.2004 and remained unassailed for a considerable period of time.
Respondent No. 4 instituted revision proceedings before the learned

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Financial Commissioner Revenue only on 24.02.2021, i.e., after a lapse of
nearly twenty years.
25. The principal contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the
revisional authority could not have entertained the revision petition after
such an inordinate and unexplained delay. It has further been contended
that no application seeking condonation of delay accompanied the revision
petition and no satisfaction regarding the delay has been recorded by the
revisional authority.
26.
Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has submitted that the
mutation had been attested behind the back of respondent No. 4 and that
the respondent acquired knowledge thereof only recently. It has further
been argued that the impugned order is merely a remand order directing de
novo consideration and, therefore, does not warrant interference in
exercise of writ jurisdiction.
27. It is not in dispute that Mutation No. 4813 was attested on 09.12.2004 and
remained unchallenged until the year 2021, when respondent No. 4
instituted revisional proceedings after nearly twenty years.
28.
The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the
revisional authority could have entertained such a belated
challenge Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation for the delay.
29. Since Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act is directly relevant and
germane to the controversy at hand, therefore, the same is reproduced
hereunder:
“15. Power to revise orders.––(1) The [Financial Commissioner] may at
any time call for the record of any case pending before or disposed of by
any Revenue Officer under 4 [his control].

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(2) The [Divisional Commissioner] may call for the record of any case
pending before or disposed of by any Revenue Officer subordinate to him.
(3) If in any case in which, the [Divisional Commissioner] has called for a
record he is of opinion that the proceedings taken or order made should
be modified or revised he shall report case with his opinion thereon for the
orders of the [Financial Commissioner.]
(4) The Financial Commissioner may, in any case called for by him under
sub-section (1) or reported to him under sub-section (3), pass such order
as he thinks fit:- Provided that, he shall not under this section pass an
order reversing or modifying any proceeding or order of a subordinate
officer affecting any question of right between private persons without
giving those persons an opportunity of being heard.”
30. Though no specific period of limitation is prescribed for exercise of
revisional powers under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act, it is well
settled that such powers are required to be exercised within a reasonable
period. There are catena of judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
which it has been held that even in absence of a prescribed limitation,
revisional powers cannot be exercised after unreasonable delay.
31.
The Apex Court in case titled as H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah” since
deceased by Lrs. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54 has held as under:
"16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of
the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that
a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the

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court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court
should keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of a
litigant for an indefinite period of time.”
32. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that the
impugned exercise of revisional jurisdiction suffers from a fundamental
infirmity inasmuch as it permits the reopening of a mutation which had
attained finality and remained unquestioned for nearly two decades. The
record does not disclose any satisfactory or bona fide explanation for such
prolonged inaction, nor does the impugned order reflect any consideration
of this crucial aspect.
33. Significantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgement supra has
underscored that while adjudicating upon a plea for condonation of delay,
the Court must not embark upon an examination of the merits of the
substantive dispute at the threshold, but is first required to record a clear
and reasoned satisfaction with regard to the bona fides and adequacy of the
explanation offered for the delay. It is only in a situation where the cause
shown by the applicant and the objections raised by the opposite side stand
evenly balanced that the Court may, as a matter of prudence, advert to the
merits of the case for the limited purpose of determining whether such
delay deserves to be condoned. In the present case, the impugned order
does not evince compliance with this settled principle, inasmuch as no
such prior satisfaction has been recorded before proceeding to interfere
with the mutation.

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34. Further, the principle that no court should keep the “Sword of Damocles”
hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time assumes
particular relevance in the present facts. By entertaining a revision after an
extraordinary lapse of time, the settled position flowing from the mutation
has been rendered uncertain and exposed to perpetual challenge. Such an
approach undermines the doctrine of finality and runs contrary to the
principles of public policy and equity which underlie the law of limitation.
35.
The impugned order, therefore, has the effect of unsettling long-standing
revenue entries and reviving stale claims, thereby subjecting the
petitioners to avoidable and prolonged uncertainty in respect of their
rights.
36. Furthermore, the legal position governing the issue at hand was succinctly
elucidated by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case titled as, Joint Collector,
Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsingh Rao , reported as (2015) 3 SCC 695 ,
has also held as under:-
“11. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is
frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain
forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless
uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law.
Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed
for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led
to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a
belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no
cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said
must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the
orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power
must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud.
Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not
extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the
exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a
fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.”

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37. Tested on the touchstone of the law laid down in the judgement supra, the
impugned order cannot be sustained. The exercise of revisional
jurisdiction in the present matter has the effect of reopening a concluded
mutation after an extraordinary lapse of time, without demonstrating any
compelling or legally tenable basis for such intervention. The material on
record reflects that the mutation had remained in force over a long period,
during which the rights emanating therefrom stood recognized in the
revenue record and were acted upon.
38.
In such a situation, the belated invocation of revisional powers, bereft of
any persuasive explanation, disrupts the settled position and ignores the
legal consequence that the passage of time lends a degree of sanctity to
transactions reflected in official records. The impugned order does not
indicate any balancing of equities or consideration of the ramifications of
unsettling long-standing entries. The exercise undertaken, therefore, falls
foul of the principle that discretionary powers of revision cannot be
employed in a manner that revives dormant claims and disturbs rights that
have crystallized over time.
39.
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie
Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy reported as (2003) 7 SCC 667 has
authoritatively held that even in cases where allegations of fraud are
raised, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not unbridled and must
necessarily be undertaken within a reasonable period. The Court
emphasised that the plea of fraud does not dispense with the requirement
of timeliness, and that stale claims cannot be permitted to be agitated
under the guise of revisional powers. For the facility of reference relevant
part of judgment is reproduced as under:

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“ In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable
time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While
exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such
as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable
property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by
subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under
the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act)."
40. There are also a catena of judgments of this Court which have consistently
reiterated that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is subject to the law of
limitation and must be undertaken within a reasonable period, and that, in
the context of Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act, such jurisdiction
cannot be invoked after an inordinate delay merely because no specific
period is prescribed.
41.
This Court while dealing with identical issue in the case titled as, Ayub
Gojar&Ors v. Financial Commissioner reported as 2018 (2) SLJ 992 has
held as under:-
“If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for the exercise of
revisional power, that will not give the authority determining the
matter, the teach to unsettle an order after a long time of 55
years. The power has to be exercised within a reasonable time as
per the law laid down in (2007) 11 SCC 363 and ordinarily it
can be exercised within a period of three years and in no case
beyond a period of five years even where fraud is alleged. The
creation of thirdparty interest in the case, the passage of
considerable time, from the date of the attestation of the
mutations, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers
are the factors that have to be taken into consideration and had
to be given due weight while exercising the revisional powers.”
42. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, it assumes
significance that even though no specific period of limitation is prescribed
for the exercise of revisional powers, such absence cannot be construed as
conferring an unfettered or perpetual jurisdiction upon the authority to

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reopen concluded matters at its own discretion. The law is well settled that
such powers are required to be exercised within a reasonable period, and
the concept of reasonableness acts as an inbuilt limitation on the exercise
of such jurisdiction.
43. In the instant case, the revisional authority has interfered with a mutation
attested in the year 2004 only in the year 2021, after an inordinate lapse of
nearly two decades. Such a delay, by no stretch of imagination, can be
regarded as reasonable. The impugned order does not disclose any
compelling circumstances justifying the exercise of jurisdiction after such
a prolonged period, nor does it reflect any consideration of the effect of
passage of time.
44. The impugned exercise, therefore, effectively treats the absence of a
prescribed limitation as a licence to unsettle settled positions indefinitely,
which is impermissible in law.
45. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this court titled
as RajniKoul v Jt. Financial Commissioner &Ors ., reported as 2023 (1)
SLJ 217 this Court has held as under:-
“The conduct of the petitioner cannot but said to be callous,
remiss and slack, as the petitioner has consciously delayed the
filing of the revision petition from the year 2017. Thus, this
Court has no reason not to follow the dictum of the judgment
passed by this Court in case titled "AyoubGojar& Others"
supra, wherein it has been provided that, "a person who is
slack, callous and remiss in rolling the law in his favour at the
opportune time, can do so after a great deal of time subject to
his whims and caprices and if such a situation is allowed to
prevail, it will open a flood gate for uncalled litigations which
cannot be controlled by the authorities while hearing and
determining the revisions. Such a view, that a person filing a
revision can do so at his will at any moment of time without
spelling out reason as to why he waited for pursuing the action
for such a long time which did not meet the test of reasonability,
will lead to disastrous consequences."

46. The Division Bench of this Court in case titled as, Wali Mohammad
Magrey & Anr v. Ali Mohammad Gujree & Ors ., reported as 2022 (1)

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SLJ 45, has held that a revision petition under Section 15 of the Land
Revenue Act, when preferred by an aggrieved party, is subject to the law
of limitation, and any earlier contrary view has been expressly declared as
not laying down good law. For the facility of reference the relevant part of
the judgement is reproduced as under:
“Now that we have come to a definite conclusion that a revision
arising out of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act under
Section 15 thereof, initiated at the instance of an aggrieved
party, would attract the law of limitation, the judgments of the
learned Single Benches, which hold to the contrary,
expressing conflicting view, would continue to baffle the
revenue authorities and the legal practioners. Those
judgments, obviously, do not lay down a good law and,
therefore, need to be, and are, declared so. Some of these
judgments, which have come to our notice are mentioned
herein: (i) Mst. Akhtara v. State of J&K &ors., 2009(I) SLJ
20; (ii) Sukhdev&anr. v. Financial Commissioner &ors., 2005
(II) SLJ 716 (to the extent it holds so); and (iii) Mst. Azizi v
Mst. Fata, 2003 (II) 599 (to the extent it relates to and deals
with the point in question).”
Conclusion
47. In light of the settled legal position emerging from the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, it is manifest that the
absence of a prescribed period of limitation for the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction does not confer unfettered or indefinite authority upon the
concerned forum. Such powers are inherently circumscribed by the
requirement of being exercised within a reasonable time, which must be
determined in the context of the statutory framework, the nature of rights
involved, and the surrounding circumstances of each case.
48. The consistent judicial view underscores that belated invocation of
revisional jurisdiction is impermissible, particularly where the delay
remains unexplained or unjustified. Entertaining such stale claims would
not only undermine certainty and finality in legal proceedings but also
disrupt settled rights, including those of third parties that may have

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crystallized over time. The law does not countenance a situation where
concluded matters are reopened after inordinate delay, thereby unsettling
the legal order.
49. It is equally well established that even allegations of fraud do not grant an
indefinite extension for the exercise of revisional powers. Such jurisdiction
must still be invoked within a reasonable period from the date of discovery
of the alleged fraud. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of
statutory limitations and would amount to an abuse of the discretionary
powers vested in the authority.
50. Accordingly, any attempt to exercise revisional jurisdiction after an
inordinate and unexplained lapse of time, particularly beyond the
ordinarily accepted period of three to five years, cannot be sustained in
law. The principles of reasonableness, finality, and legal certainty must
prevail, and any deviation therefrom would be contrary to the established
doctrine governing the exercise of such powers.
51. In the present case, admittedly, the mutation in question had attained
finality in the year 2004, whereas the revision petition came to be filed
only in the year 2021. The learned Financial Commissioner has neither
adverted to the question of delay nor recorded any finding as regards
sufficiency of cause for entertaining the revision petition after nearly two
decades.
52. Moreover, the record reflects that, during the intervening period,
substantial rights had accrued and third-party interests had come into
existence—an aspect which has not been adverted to by the revisional
authority.

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53. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction after such an inordinate lapse of
time required the recording of compelling and cogent reasons, which are
conspicuously absent in the impugned order.
54. The revisional authority, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction after
an inordinate lapse of time, was required to record cogent reasons
justifying interference with a mutation which had remained operative for
about twenty years. The impugned order, however, does not reflect any
such consideration.
55.
Furthermore, the impugned order does not reflect due consideration of the
doctrine of laches and acquiescence. A party who has remained indolent
for an extended period, despite having the opportunity to assert his rights,
cannot be permitted to revive stale claims to the prejudice of others who
have acted upon the existing state of affairs.
56. This Court also finds that the direction for de novo consideration, in the
facts and circumstances of the present case, amounts to indirectly reviving
a time-barred claim. Such a course of action defeats the very principle of
finality and encourages avoidable litigation.
57.
The plea of fraud, as raised by respondent No. 4, has also not been
substantiated by any cogent material on record. A mere bald allegation of
fraud, without specific particulars and supporting evidence, cannot be
made the basis for unsettling a long-standing mutation. The revisional
authority ought to have insisted upon strict proof before invoking such a
serious ground.
58. Additionally, the impugned order does not balance the competing equities
between the parties. While the claim of respondent No. 4 has been
entertained after a prolonged delay, the prejudice likely to be caused to the

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petitioners and third parties has not been evaluated, thereby rendering the
decision inequitable.
59. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid infirmities clearly demonstrates that
the impugned order suffers from legal as well as procedural improprieties,
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
60. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and order dated 25.05.2023
passed by the learned Financial Commissioner Revenue is quashed.
Mutation No. 4813 dated 09.12.2004 shall stand restored.
61.
Disposed of along with connected applications, if any.

(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
Srinagar
02.06.2026
Sakeena




Whether the judgment is speaking: Yes
Whether the judgment is reportable: Yes

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