IDREES AHMED KHAN vs UNION OF INDIA TH NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU(NCB), JAMMU

Court
Jammu and Kashmir High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
(Through Virtual Mode)
Bail App No. 260/2025
Pronounced on: 13.11.2026
Uploaded on: 13.11. 2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).
Idrees Ahmed Khan , Age 28 years, S/o
Abdul Hameed Khan, R/o Near Masjid
Sharief Nagbal, Hapatnar, Ps Aishmuqam,
Tehsil Pahalgam, District Anantnag. At
present lodged in District Jail, Amphalla,
Jammu.
Through: Mr. Iqbal Hussain Bhat, Advocate
Vs.
Union of India through NCB, Jammu.
...Respondent(s).
Through: Mr. Vishat Sharma, DSGI with
Mr. Eishaan Dadhichi, Advocate
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
13.11.2026
1. Through the medium of the instant successive bail petition, filed in terms
of provisions of Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (hereinafter referred to as the “BNSS” for short), corresponding to
provisions of Section 439 of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (“Code” for short), bail on behalf of the petitioner/accused in the
case bearing Crime No. 02/2022 registered with NCB Jammu, under
Sections 8/20, 29, 60 of NDPS Act, has been sought on the grounds, inter
alia, that he is a citizen of India and a domicile of the Union Territory of
Jammu and Kashmir, thus entitled to seek enforcement of his
constitutional as well as other statutory rights. That he has been falsely
and frivolously implicated in the aforementioned case, when he is
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innocent. That the complaint filed by the Respondent-Investigating
Agency is pending trial in the Court of learned Special Judge, NDPS
Cases, Jammu (hereinafter referred as “Trial Court” for short), in which
formal charges have been framed against the petitioner and an another,
for the commission of the offences punishable under sections 8/20, 29,
60 of NDPS Act by the learned Trial Court. That out of only six
prosecution witnesses, the Trial Court has been able to examine only
three witnesses produced by Respondent-Bureau so far. That he earlier
filed a bail application before the learned Trial Court seeking bail on the
ground of his long incarceration since date of his arrest on 16.01.2022,
but the same was not allowed by the Trial Court as per its order dated
06.06.2025. That he has been arrested in the case on 16.01.2022 and as
such he has been in custody for about three years and seven months from
the date of framing of the charge against him on 11.03.2023. That three
witnesses are yet to be examined in the case. That the delayed trial
against him has violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. That since he seeks his enlargement in the
case on the ground of his long incarceration and the delay in conclusion
of the trial, as such the bar in terms of provisions of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act does not operate, as has been authoritatively held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled “ Collector of Customs v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira ” reported in 2001 Vol-3 SCC 54 . That it has been
authoritatively held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that since
stringent provisions regarding punishment are provided under the scheme
of NDPS Act, as such the mandatory conditions need to be strictly
complied with, also with quicker adjudication of the cases. That the
petitioner/accused is deeply rooted in the society and as such there is no
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apprehension on his misusing the concession of bail. That he shall abide
by any conditions that may be imposed by this Court.
2. The Respondent-Bureau has, however, resisted the bail petition on the
grounds that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of bail as he
has committed heinous, non-bailable and anti-social offences, out of
which the offence punishable under Section 8/20 NDPS Act in the instant
case carries a maximum punishment of 20 years. That the liberty of an
individual is subject to some reasonable restrictions. That the petitioner-
accused was found in possession of the commercial quantity of narcotic
substance charas and as such does not deserve the concession of bail.
That firstly, the case of the petitioner/accused is hit by the provisions of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act and secondly, without prejudice to the said
fact, he does not deserve the concession of bail in view of the
heinousness of the crime committed by him, being highly anti-social.
That on reliable information received by the Respondent-Bureau on
16.01.2022 at 0900 hours to the effect that two persons, namely, Idrees
Ahmad Khan (petitioner herein) and Mohd Asif Wani, are carrying huge
quantity of narcotic drug in a Tata Sumo bearing registration No. JK03-
8564 from Srinagar to Jammu and are likely to reach at Ban Toll Plaza,
Nagrota, Jammu, on the same day between 1300 hours to 1500 hours.
That subsequent to the receipt of the said information and completion of
all pre-requisite legal formalities, the duly constituted and authorized
team, including Shri Bilal Ahmad Wani, Intelligence Officer, and Shri
Bijay Anand Pradhan, IO, left from NCB Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, on the
same day at about 12:00 hours for Ban Toll Plaza, Nagrota, Jammu,
along with NDD Kit. That NCB team reached at Ban Toll Plaza, Nagrota,
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Jammu, on 17.01.2022 at about 1255 hours. That informed vehicle/Sumo
bearing Registration No. JK03-8564 was noticed coming from Srinagar
side at about 14:40 hours, which was signalled to stop. That the driver of
the Sumo disclosed his name as Mohd. Asif Wani S/o Abdul Rehman
Wani R/o Hangalpawa, P/O Sheer, P/S Aishmuqam, Tehsil Pahalgam,
Anantnag, and another person who was sitting inside the middle seat of
the Sumo revealed his identity as Idrees Ahmad Khan (age about 26
years) S/o Abdul Hameed Khan R/o near Masjid Sharief Nagbal,
Hapatnar, PS-Ashmuqam, Tehsil Pahalgam, District Anantnag.
That NCB team during search of the vehicle recovered four
packets wrapped with newspaper and kept in the back side door cavity of
the said Sumo. That charas was found to be contained in the packets.
That the recovered material was tested with NDD Kit, which gave
positive result for charas. That net weight of the recovered Charas was
found to be 03 Kgs without packing material. That the statements of the
petitioner and the co-accused Mohd. Asif Wani were recorded by I.O. in
terms of the provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act. That the
petitioner and the co-accused Mohd Asif Wani came to be arrested
subsequent to the admission of guilt by them. That the petitioner Idrees
Ahmad Khan in his statement under Section 67 NDPS Act, inter alia,
admitted his guilt of trafficking charas. That he disclosed that the seized
narcotic substance i.e. charas was handed over to him by one person,
namely, Nazir Khan S/o Alib Din Khan R/o Anantnag, for being further
handed over to Sirajbhai Gafurbhai Vahora S/o Gafurbhai Vahora R/o
Rahima Nagar, Bhalej Road, Tehsil and District Anand (Gujrat) at
Jammu. That the petitioner/accused also disclosed that he is having
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mobile numbers of co-accused Sirajbhai Gafurbhai Vahora, as he also in
the year 2021 handed over same consignment to him at Jewel Chowk,
Jammu. That during investigation the co-accused Sirajbhai Gafurbhai
Vahora also disclosed under a similar statement that he had come to
Jammu to take delivery of consignment from the petitioner. That after
completion of investigation a complaint was filed before the competent
Trial Court against the petitioner and two co-accused, Mohd Asif Wani
and Sirajbhai Gafurbhai Vahora.
That vide order dated 11.03.2023, the petitioner and the co-
accused Sirajbhai Gafurbhai Vahora came to be charged for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 8/20, 29, 60 NDPS
Act, when the co-accused Mohd Asif Wani was not found involved and
accordingly discharged vide the same order. That formal charges were
framed against the petitioner and co-accused on 11.03.2023, who pleaded
not guilty to the charge and as such the learned Trial Court directed the
Respondent-Investigating Agency to adduce the evidence. That out of six
listed witnesses, three witnesses have been recorded at the trial so far,
who have duly supported and corroborated the prosecution case.
That there is a legal presumption of culpability against the
accused in terms of provisions of Section 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act.
That on the basis of the evidence so far recorded at the proceedings, the
petitioner/accused was found to be directly involved in the commission
of the offences punishable under Sections 8/20, 29, 60 NDPS Act in
relation to the commercial quantity. That the case against the
petitioner/accused attracts the bar in terms of the provisions of Section 37
of the NDPS Act. That in view of the evidence so far recorded at the trial,
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there appear no reasonable grounds of non-involvement of the
petitioner/accused in the case.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating his stand taken in
the bail application, submitted that the petitioner has been falsely and
frivolously implicated in the case when he is innocent and has not
committed the alleged offences. That as per the admitted case of the
Respondent/Bureau, an information was received by it on 16.01.2022 at
09:00 hours to the effect that the petitioner, along with other co-accused
Mohd Asif Wani, is carrying narcotic substance charas in the Tata Sumo
bearing Registration No. JK03-8564 from Srinagar Valley towards
Jammu, but it is astonishing that why they could not be apprehended
earlier during their way before reaching Ban Toll Plaza, Nagrota, Jammu.
He submitted that the mandatory provisions under the NDPS Act have
been observed in breach by the Investigation Bureau. He further
submitted that although complaint in case was filed before the learned
Trial Court on 09.07.2022, yet the charge was framed in the case on
11.03.2023 after a period of more than seven months. He submitted that
the petitioner/accused has been suffering incarceration in the case since
the date of his arrest on 16.01.2022 and as such has been in custody since
last about five years. That the fundamental right guaranteed to the
petitioner as a citizen of India under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India stands denied to him on account of his long incarceration without
the conclusion of the trial when only six witnesses are in the complaint.
He submitted that Respondent-Bureau was directed to lead evidence in
the case when the petitioner/accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and
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up to the disposal of the earlier application by the Trial Court vide its
order dated 06.06.2025, only three witnesses could be examined by the
Investigating-Bureau within a period of two years.
The learned counsel further submitted that it is a settled legal
position, as being reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, that the bar in
terms of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not attracted when an undue
delay occasions in the conclusion of the trial. The learned counsel
submitted that the petitioner/accused is a young boy yet to reach the age
of 30 years and as such his continued detention is likely to spoil his youth.
He further contended that the petitioner is ready to abide by any
conditions that may be imposed by this Court.
The learned counsel, in support of his contentions, placed
reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case
titled “ Dheeraj Kumar Shukla vs. State of UP”, “Rabi Prakash Vs. State
of Odisha ”, “ Satinder Kumar Antiley Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
& Ors .”, “ Union of India vs. K.A. Nazir ”, 2021, 3 SCC 713, “ Hussainara
Khatoon Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar & Patna ”, AIR SC 1360
1979, “ Mohd. Suleman Hanief Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat ”, and
“ Satinder Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. ”
th
decided on 11 July 2022.
5. However, the learned counsel for the respondent, in rebuttal, argued that
the petitioner does not deserve the concession of bail, who is involved in
heinous and anti-social offences punishable under NDPS Act in relation
to the commercial quantity. That a commercial quantity of 3 Kgs of
charas came to be recovered from his possession in the Sumo bearing
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Registration No. JK03-8564 on 06.01.2022 at Ban Toll Plaza, Nagrota,
Jammu, as such, the bar in terms of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is
attracted in the case. He further contended that in view of the evidence
adduced at the trial, there appear no reasonable grounds of non-
involvement of the petitioner in the case. He further contended that the
petitioner/accused, if enlarged on bail, is likely to misuse the concession
by absconding at the trial under the threat of severe punishment
prescribed by the offence under Section 8/20 charged against him. He
further contended that the release of the petitioner/accused shall send a
bad signal to the society with the encouragement of like-minded
criminals.
6. I have perused the instant bail petition, the objections filed in rebuttal and
the scanned copy of the Trial Court record. I have also accorded my
thoughtful consideration to the rival arguments advanced on both the
sides. The order passed by the Ld. Trial Court on the petitioner’s earlier
bail petition, while rejecting the same, has also been perused.
7. As per information received from the learned Trial Court, all the six
witnesses have been examined at the trial of the case, which has been
now fixed for arguments on 20.11.2026.
8. Admittedly, the petitioner/accused has been charged in the case for the
commission of the offences punishable under Sections 8/20, 29, 60
NDPS Act along with co-accused, namely, Sirajbhai Gafurbhai Vahora.
Accused Mohd Asif Wani, however, came to be discharged by the
learned Trial Court vide order dated 11.03.2023.
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9. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court has reason to believe
that undue delay has taken place in the conclusion of the trial, with only
six listed witnesses being the officers/officials of NCB, Jammu, and one
Chemical Examiner of CRCL, New Delhi. The prosecution evidence was
called, by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 02.05.2023 and till the
filing of the instant successive bail petition on 25.09.2025, only three
witnesses out of total six witnesses had been examined at the trial.
10.The petitioner/accused, from the date of his arrest on 16.01.2022, is in
custody in the case. He has accordingly completed about
Five (5) Years
in custody in the case. Admittedly, in view of the offences charged
against the petitioner/accused, the bar in terms of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is attracted in the case. The trial for its conclusion is likely to take
some more time. The petitioner/accused, on the ground of his long
incarceration of five years in the case, deserves to be granted bail subject
to some reasonable terms and conditions.
11.The Court has also gone through the order dated 06.06.2025 passed by
the Trial Court while rejecting the earlier bail petition of the petitioner.
The said earlier application appears to have been rejected mainly on the
ground that the bar in terms of Section 37 NDPS Act is attracted in the
case, as the petitioner is facing trial on the charge of commission of
offences punishable under Sections 8/20, 29, 60 NDPS Act in relation to
commercial quantity. It has also been observed by the learned Trial Court
in the said order that in view of the evidence adduced at the trial till that
date, there appear no reasonable grounds for non-involvement of the
petitioner in the case. The learned Trial Court has also observed in its
order that the petitioner/accused, in view of the punishment carried by the
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offences charged against him and the period of custody till that time, is
not entitled to the concession of bail even under the provisions of Section
479 of BNSS, being more favourable than Section 436-A of the Code.
12.One of the earliest judgments on the concept of speedy trial was
delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara
Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81. In the said
case, the Hon’ble Court deprecated the delay in commencement of trials,
which would apply equally to long pendency of trials. The Court
observed that un-necessarily prolonged detention in prison of under trials
before being brought to the trial, is an affront to all civilized norms of
human liberty. The Court observed as under:
“There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial
system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the
under trial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal
of cases. It is a bad reflection on the legal and judicial system
that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long
number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement
of the trial is bad enough; how much worse could it be when the
delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is
of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that
delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. It is
interesting to note that in the United States, speedy trial is one
of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution provides that:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial."
So also Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides that:
"every one arrested or detained…..shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial."
We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is
not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit
in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by
this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. We have held in
that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every
person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not
enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that
Article that some semblance of a procedure should be
prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be "reasonable,
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fair and just". If a person is deprived of his liberty under a
procedure which is not "reasonable, fair or just", such
deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under
Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental
right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure
prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be
'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy
trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded
as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21.
There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral
and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as to what would
be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of
his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to
be released unconditionally freed from the charge leveled
against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long
period of time and convicting him after such trial would
constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 ?
That is a question we shall have to consider when we hear the
writ petition on merits on the adjourned date….”
13. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee vs. Union of India, (1994) SCC
731, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue of delay in trial in
the following manner:
“……..In substance the petitioner now prays that all under-trials
who are in jail for the commission of any offence or offences
under the Act for a period exceeding two years on account of the
delay in the disposal of cases lodged against them should be
forthwith released from jail declaring their further detention to
be illegal and void and pending decision of this Court on the
said larger issue, they should in any case be released on bail. It
is indeed true and that is obvious from the plain language of
Section 36(1) of the Act, that the legislature contemplated the
creation of Special Courts to speed up the trial of those
prosecuted for the commission of any offence under the Act. It
is equally true that similar is the objective of Words and Phrases,
Section 309 of the Code. It is also true that this Court has
emphasized in a series of decisions that Articles 14, 19 and 21
sustain and nourish each other and any law depriving a person of
"personal liberty "must prescribe a procedure which is just, fair
and reasonable, i.e., a procedure which promotes speedy trial….
Now to refuse bail on the one hand and to delay trial of cases on
the other is clearly unfair and unreasonable and contrary to the
spirit of Section 36(1) of the Act, Section 309 of the Code and
Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. We are conscious of
the statutory provision finding place in Section 37 of the Act
prescribing the conditions which have to be satisfied before a
person accused of an offence under the Act can be released.
Indeed we have adverted to this section in the earlier part of the
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judgment. We have also kept in mind the interpretation placed
on a similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by the
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab10.
Despite this provision, we have directed as above mainly at the
call of Article 21 as the right to speedy trial may even require in
some cases quashing of a criminal proceeding altogether, as held
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak11, release on bail, which can be taken to be embedded in
the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the demand of
Article 21 As we have not felt inclined to accept the extreme
submission of quashing the proceedings and setting free the
accused whose trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time
for reasons already alluded to, we have felt that deprivation of
the personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial would also not
be in consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21. Of
course, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot
be avoided in such cases; but if the period of deprivation
pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by
Article 21 would receive a jolt. It is because of this that we have
felt that after the accused persons have suffered imprisonment
which is half of the maximum punishment provided for the
offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty would be
violative of the fundamental right visualized by Article 21,
which has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article
14 which also promises justness, fairness and reasonableness in
procedural matters. What then is the remedy? The offences
under the Act are grave and, therefore, we are not inclined to
agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that we should quash the prosecutions and set free the
accused persons whose trials are delayed beyond reasonable
time. Alternatively he contended that such accused persons
whose trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time and are
likely to be further delayed should be released on bail on such
terms as this Court considers appropriate to impose. This
suggestion commends to us….”
14.Again, in Umarmia vs. State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while granting bail to an under trial who had been in
custody for about 12 years, observed as under:-
“…..This appeal is filed against the judgment dated 16-6-2010in
Criminal Misc. Sr. No. 44 of 2010 by which the Court of
Designated Judge (TADA) at Porbandar (hereinafter referred to
as “the Designated Court”) rejected the bail application filed by
the appellant under Section 439 Cr P C and Section 20(8) of the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Crime No. I-43 of 1994
was registered under Section 154 Cr P C for the offences
committed under Sections 121, 121-A, 122, 123, 124-B read
with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860, Sections 25(1-A), (1-B)
and 25(1-AA) of the Arms Act, Section 9-B of the Explosives Act,
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act and
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act.
2.The statement of one Suresh recorded under Section 108 of the
Customs Act revealed that explosive substances, powder RDX
boxes, bags containing firearms, 45 bags of weapons, 15 boxes
of RDX and 225 pieces of silver ingots were smuggled into the
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country and taken to Zaroli and Dhanoli Villages of Valsad
District. The first charge-sheet was filed on 12- 1-1995in which
the name of the appellant is found at Serial No. 1 in Column 2
which refers to persons who were absconding. The 11th
supplementary charge sheet was filed on 6-6-2005 wherein it
was mentioned that the appellant was arrested at 1700 hrs on
10-12-2004.

After considering the submissions of both sides, we are of the
opinion that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail for
the following reasons:
A. The prior approval required under Section 20-A(1) of the TADA
Act was not taken from the District Superintendent of Police before
the FIR was recorded.
B .Admittedly, the appellant had been suffering incarceration for more
than 12 years.
C. Only 25 out of 192 witnesses have been examined so far.
D. There is no likelihood of the completion of trial in the near future.
E. Though there is a confessional statement of the appellant recorded
under Section 15 of the TADA, the same cannot be looked into by us in
view of the violation of Section 20-A(1) of the TADA Act.
11. This Court has consistently recognized the right of the accused for
a speedy trial. Delay in criminal trial has been held to be in violation
of the right guaranteed to an accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. (See Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v.
Union of India [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing
Under trial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731: 1995
SCC (Cri) 39] and Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [Shaheen
Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
366] .) The accused, even in cases under TADA, have been released
on bail on the ground that they have been in jail for a long period of
time and there was no likelihood of the completion of the trial at the
earliest. [See Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Paramjit Singh
v. State (NCT of Delhi),(1999) 9 SCC 252: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1156] and
Babba v. State of Maharashtra [Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005)
11 SCC 569 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 118.
12. Though the appellant is involved in serious offences and has
absconded for a period of 10 years before he was arrested in 2004, we
see no reason to confine him to jail as he has already suffered more
than 12 years in custody and the trial may not be completed in the
near future. Taking note of the above, we grant relief of bail to the
appellant subject to the following conditions…….”
15.In the case of Union of India vs. K. A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, a three
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the long
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incarceration as also the effect of rigour of Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA
Act, observed as under:
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions
like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of
the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as
well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be
well harmonized. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant
of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there
is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and
the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a
substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would
safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of
the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for
wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.”
16.In yet another judgment in the case of Ashim alias Asim Kumar Haranth
Bhattacharya vs. National Investigation Agency, (2022) 1 SCC 695, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“9. We have to balance the nature of crime in reference to
which the appellant is facing a trial. At the same time, the
period of incarceration which has been suffered and the likely
period within which the trial can be expected to be completed,
as is informed to this Court that the statement of PW 1/de facto
complainant has still not been completed and there are 298
prosecution witnesses in the calendar of witness although the
respondent has stated in its counter-affidavit that it may
examine only100 to 105 witnesses but indeed may take its own
time to conclude the trial. This fact certainly cannot be ignored
that the appellant is in custody since 6-7- 2012 and has
completed nine-and-half years of incarceration as an under trial
prisoner.
10. This Court has consistently observed in its numerous
judgments that the liberty guaranteed in Part III of the
Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only
due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a
speedy trial is imperative and the under trials cannot
indefinitely be detained pending trial. Once it is obvious that a
timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would
ordinarily be obligated to enlarge him on bail.
11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial
is not consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
While deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not
be avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot
be unduly long. At the same time, timely delivery of justice is
part of human rights and denial of speedy justice is a threat to
public confidence in the administration of justice.”
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17. Again, in the case of Jagjeet Singh & Ors. Vs. Ashish Mishra @ Monu
& anr. 2021 Live Law (SC) 376, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying up
the ratio laid down in K. A. Najeeb’s case (supra), observed that no
accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially
when law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. It has been
further observed that even when statutory provisions expressly bar the
grant of bail after a reasonably long period of incarceration, such
stringent provision will melt down.
18.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saudan Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
(Criminal Appeal No. 308/2022), while deciding a bunch of petitions,
granted bail to the petitioners who were suffering from incarceration
during different periods ranging from 5 to 10/15years.
19.The petitioner also has been suffering detention in the case FIR in
question since last about five years and still the trial of the case is likely
to take some more time to conclude. The alleged co-accused Mohd Asif
Wani stands already discharged at the trial.
20.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled Tapas Kumar Palit vs. State of
Chhattisgarh Crl Appeal No.738/25 decided on 14.02.2025 enlarged the
appellant to bail on account of his continued incarceration. It is profitable
to reproduce the paras 5 to 15:
5. The appellant was arrested on the very same date i.e. 24th
March, 2020. At the end of the investigation charge-sheet came
to be filed.
6. The trial is in progress. Till this date the prosecution has been
able to examine 42 witnesses. The prosecution intends to
examine as many as 100 witnesses. We are conscious of the
Order passed by us taking the view that once the trial
commences and the witnesses are being examined then in
serious crimes like murder, dacoity, rape, etc, the Court
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ordinarily should not exercise its discretion for the purpose of
grant of bail, more particularly, looking into the evidence which
has come on record.
7. However, this is a case in which the appellant is in custody as
an under trial prisoner since 24th March, 2020. He has no other
antecedents.The panch witnesses to the recovery panchnama
have also turned hostile.
8. It’s been now 5 years that he is in judicial custody. The
learned counsel appearing for the State has no idea as regards
the time likely to be consumed to complete the recording of the
oral evidence.
9. In such circumstances, we are left with no other option but to
order release of the appellant on bail. We do not undermined
the seriousness of the crime that has been alleged.
10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear
that howsoever serious a crime maybe the accused has a
fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of
the Constitution.
11. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe as to
why the Public Prosecutor wants to examine 100 witnesses. Who
are these 100 witnesses? We are aware that it is the public
prosecutor who could be said to be in-charge of the trial and he
has to decide who is to be examined and who is to be dropped.
But at the same time, no useful purpose would be served if 10
witnesses are examined to establish one particular fact.
12. The aforesaid results in indefinite delay in conclusion of
trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecutor to wisely exercise
his discretion in so far as examination of the witnesses is
concerned.
13. Where the number of witnesses is large, it is not, in our
opinion, necessary that everyone should be produced. In this
connection, we may refer to Malak Khan vs. Emperor [AIR 1946
Privy Council 16] where their Lordships observed as follows at
page 19:-
“It is no doubt very important that, as a general rule, all Crown
witnesses should be called to testify at the hearing of a
prosecution, but important as it is, there is no obligation
compelling counsel for the prosecution to call all witnesses who
speak to facts which the Crown desire to prove. Ultimately it is a
matter for the discretion of counsel for the prosecution and
though a Court ought, and no doubt will, take into consideration
the absence of witnesses whose testimony would be expected, it
must judge the evidence as a whole and arrive at its conclusion
accordingly taking into consideration the persuasiveness of the
testimony given in the light of such criticism as may be levelled
at the absence of possible witnesses.”
14. In this regard, the role of the Special Judge (NIA) would
also assume importance. The Special Judge should inquire with
the Special Public Prosecutor why he intends to examine a
particular witness if such witness is going to depose the very
same thing that any other witnesses might have deposed earlier.
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We may sound as if laying some guidelines, but time has come to
consider this issue of delay and bail in its true and proper
perspective. If an accused is to get a final verdict after
incarceration of six to seven years in jail as an under trial
prisoner, then, definitely, it could be said that his right to have a
speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution has been
infringed. The stress of long trials on accused persons – who
remain innocent until proven guilty – can also be significant.
Accused persons are not financially compensated for what might
be a lengthy period of pre-trial incarceration. They may also
have lost a job or accommodation, experienced damage to
personal relationships while incarcerated, and spent a
considerable amount of money on legal fees. If an accused
person is found not guilty, they have likely endured many
months of being stigmatized and perhaps even ostracized in
their community and will have to rebuild their lives with their
own resources.
15. We would say that delays are bad for the accused and
extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and for the
credibility of our justice system, which is valued. Judges are the
masters of their Courtrooms and the Criminal Procedure Code
provides many tools for the Judges to use in order to ensure that
cases proceed efficiently.
21.In the backdrop of the aforementioned discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion, that it may meet the ends of justice in case the
petitioner-accused is admitted to bail in the case, subject to some
reasonable terms and conditions.
22.Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the petitioner, namely, Idrees
Ahmad Khan S/o Abdul Hameed Khan R/o Near Masjid Sharief Nagbal,
Hapatnar, PS Aishmuqam, Tehsil Pahalgam, District Anantnag is
admitted to bail in the case Crime No. 02/2022 of NCB, Jammu, subject
to his furnishing of surety and personal bonds each in the amount of
Rs.2/- lacs (the surety bond of Rs. 2 lacs to be furnished by two
persons among the near relatives of the petitioner each liable in the
amount of Rs. 01 lac) respectively to the satisfaction of the learned Trial
Court and the Superintendent of Jail concerned in which he is presently
lodged. The bail order, however, shall be subject to the following
conditions:-
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i. That the petitioner/accused shall remain punctual at the hearings of
the trial case unless exempted for any hearing by the learned trial
court.
ii. That the petitioner/accused shall not repeat the commission of any
crime.
iii. The petitioner/accused shall not leave the limits of India without the
prior permission of the Trial Court
iv. In case the petitioner has a Passport, he shall surrender the same
before the trial court and shall not travel out of the India without
permission of the trial court.
23. The learned trial court shall at liberty to proceed against the
petitioner/accused and his sureties in terms of the provisions of Sections
491 and 492 of the BNSS, in the event of violation of any of the bail
conditions.
24. In case the requisite surety bonds are furnished on behalf of the
petitioner/accused to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, the Court
shall issue a formal release order directing the Superintendent of the Jail
concerned to release the petitioner/accused from his custody in the instant
case Crime No. 02/2022 of NCB, Jammu after obtaining the requisite
personal bond from him to the tune of Rs. 2 lacs.
25.Disposed of.
(MOHD YOUSUF WANI)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
13.11.2026
“Mubashir ”
i. Whether the order is speaking: Yes
ii. Whether the order is reportable: Yes
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