Ashok Kumar Bhalla Alias Ashok Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Others

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

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RFA-1471-2026 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
*
125
RFA-1471-2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 27.08.2026

ASHOK KUMAR BHALLA ALIAS ASHOK KUMAR
…Appellant
Versus

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
…Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL

Present:- Mr. Kanwar Abhay Singh, Advocate (through V.C.)
For applicant/appellant

Mr. Abhishek Yadav, DAG, Haryana

*

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)
CM-3660-CI-2026

1. The applicant through instant application is seeking

condonation of delay of 4847 days in filing the main appeal.
2. The applicant is seeking condonation of delay on the ground of
lack of knowledge of status of the case. The similarly situated landowners
filed appeals which stand allowed by this Court. They are entitled to
compensation at par with similarly situated landowners.
3. Notice in the application for condonation of delay.
4. Mr. Abhishek Yadav, DAG, Haryana who on advance notice is
present in Court accepts notice on behalf of respondent-State.
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.08.31 15:30
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integrity of this document

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RFA-1471-2026 (O&M)
5. Learned State counsel submits that claim of appellant is covered
by judgment of this Court, however, Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that landowner would not be entitled to statutory benefits and interest
for the period of delay.
6. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in “ Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector ”, 2024(12)
SCC 336 various principles governing condonation of delay have been

culled out. Paragraph 26 thereof is reproduced hereunder: -
“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the
law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is

evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to
exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict

sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial
justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3

of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone
the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that
exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various
factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence
and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit
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if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay
in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning
the delay for the reason that the conditions have been
imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory
provision.”


7. The Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) Vs. Karnataka
Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 while taking a stringent
view has held that “sufficient cause" must be shown for the delay throughout
the entire period, administrative lethargy or negligence by State authorities
cannot be treated as sufficient cause. In cases of inordinate delay by State
instrumentalities, Courts must not condone delay mechanically. Public
interest is better served by enforcing limitation strictly to promote
accountability and timely action. Relevant extracts are reproduced as below:-
“258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings
for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it
is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits
of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
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the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and principles
of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles'
hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period
of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear
that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive
delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the
administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the
proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of
the respondent no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of
the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First
Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating that such
grounds are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause" as per
Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the
fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it
had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more
particularly the delay in those cases was supported by
sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very
different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence,
we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by
the High Court.”

8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority Vs. Rameshwar @ Ramesh Chandra Sharma (Dead) Through
Legal Heir & Anr. , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1599 while adverting to the
inordinate delay in filing the appeals before the High Court has held that
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
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delay may be condoned and enhanced compensation may be granted,
however, the beneficiary/acquiring body cannot be saddled with the liability
of statutory benefits and interest. Relevant extracts of the judgment read as:-
“5.2 Even otherwise as rightly observed by the High Court,
the land owners are not entitled to the compensation at
Rs.297/- per sq.yard considering the decision of this Court in
the case of Nanak (Deceased) through LRS. (supra). Nothing
was pointed out that how the case of the land owners was
comparable with that of the case of Nanak (Deceased) through
LRS. (supra). On the contrary with respect to the acquisition of
the year 1982, this Hon'ble Court determined the compensation
at Rs.149/- per sq.yard in the case of Deo Karan & Ors.(supra).
5.3 However, at the same time the acquiring body and the
beneficiary of acquisition shall not be saddled with the liability
of statutory benefits and the interest which may be available
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed period. In
the present case the delay of 22 years can be said to be a
substantial delay. However, as the claimants are held to be
entitled the enhanced amount of compensation, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court can be said to be
justified in condoning the delay. However, at the same time, the
High Court has erred in awarding other statutory benefits and
interest for the delayed period. To saddle with the liability to
pay statutory benefits and interest for the delayed period upon
the beneficiary/acquiring body would be a financial burden
upon the public body and it may increase the project cost which
shall be against the public interests. It cannot be disputed that
the liability towards the statutory benefits and the interest under
the Act, 1984 would be a huge liability considering the interest
at the rate of 15% per annum, solatium, price rise etc.
Therefore, while condoning the delay and enhancing the
amount of compensation at par with other land owners, the
High Court ought not to have saddled the liability upon the
appellant to pay statutory benefits and the interest payable
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed period. To
the aforesaid extent the impugned common judgment and order
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
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passed by the High Court is required to be modified and the
present appeals are required to be partly allowed to the
aforesaid extent.”
[Emphasis supplied]

9. The Supreme Court vide judgment dated 23.04.2025 passed in
Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 896 has
reiterated that applications seeking condonation of delay ought to be
considered by adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach. It has been
observed that the discretion vested in the Courts under the law of limitation
should be exercised to advance substantial justice, and that a technical or
pedantic approach should not defeat the adjudication of disputes on their
merits. Relevant extracts of the judgement read as:-
“9. Implementing in letter and spirit, the observations made
as above, i, e., a liberal approach in condonation of delay, we
notice that this Court in quite a few judgments has condoned
substantial delay. We may refer to some of them. In Dhiraj
Singh v. State of Haryana The Court observed that even
though there was long delay in filing the appeals, it was a
case of compulsory acquisition and there had been a
difference in the amount of compensation granted to some
land losers vis-a-vis others. References were also made to
Market Committee Hodal v. Krishan Murari wherein delay of
3240 days arising from the same acquisition has been
condoned. In Huchanagouda v. Assistant Commissioner and
Land Acquisition Officer., this Court, taking into account the
poverty and illiteracy of the land loser, condoned the delay of
more than 2000 days. It was observed that equities had to be
balanced by ensuring that the determination of market value
relates back to the preliminary notification - making sure that
there is no prejudice to the acquiring authorities, as also no
undue advantage to the land loser. In other words, the
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appellants who approached the Court with delay, would not
be granted interest for such period.
10. In Executive Engineer, Nimna Dudhna Project Selu,
District Parbhani, Maharashtra v. State of Maharashtra, this
Court held that the Body acquiring land cannot be saddled
with the liability of paying interest for the period of delay in
preferring the appeals. The order of the High Court, which
granted interest also for five and half years' delay, was
modified to such an extent that interest shall not be payable
for delay. [See also Ningappa Thotappa Angadi v. Special

Land Acquisition Officer.]
11. In all judgments referred supra, the common thread that
can be observed is that delay is not a reason to deny the land
losers their compensation, which is just, fair and reasonable
for the land they have lost.
12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech Services
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., with reference to Coffee Board,
Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commission of Commercial Tax,
Karnataka that while the State has the power of eminent
domain, the owner of a land can only be divested thereof in
accordance with the procedure established by law after
appropriately compensating them. This is in view of Article
300 A and 31A of the Constitution of India.”


10. The Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Vidhya
Devi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725 while adopting a liberal approach
in condoning the delay in appeals preferred by landowners in land
acquisition matters, has deprecated a hyper-technical approach. It has been
observed that having regard to the beneficial nature of land acquisition
jurisprudence and the rights involved the matters ought to be adjudicated on
their merits rather than being rejected on technical ground of delay. The

parameters laid down by the Court are reproduced below: -
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
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RFA-1471-2026 (O&M)
“47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this
Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2
SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of delay
and laches of the appellant in moving the court is also
liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be
raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if
the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It
will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay
arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction

to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975)
1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
[Emphasis supplied]
--- ---
49. Similarly, this Court in its decision in Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 held that:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would
be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
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delay are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course
not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course

or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
[Emphasis supplied]
--- ---
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the
right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires
that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness
and non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases
of acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in
approaching the court, while a significant factor, cannot
override the necessity to address illegalities and protect right
to property enshrined in Article 300A. The court must
balance the need for finality in legal proceedings with the
need to rectify injustice. The right of an individual to
vindicate and protect private property cannot be brushed
away merely on the grounds of delay and laches.”


11. Learned counsel for the appellant on being confronted with the
judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) ,
Shivamma (Dead) (supra) , New Okhla Industrial Development Authority
(supra) , Suresh Kumar (supra) and Urban Improvement Trust (supra)
expressed his inability to controvert that in view of inordinate delay, the
appellants are not entitled to statutory benefits and interest.
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
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12. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court reveals that liberal approach in case of application of a landowner
seeking condonation of delay in land acquisition matter should be adopted.
The Court has approved condonation of delay of more than 20 years. Cases
of landowners must not be treated at par with other cases. Delay irrespective
of number of years ought to be condoned.

13. In the wake of statement of both sides and afore-cited
judgments, application for condonation of delay stands allowed and delay in
filing enclosed appeal is hereby condoned.

RFA-1471-2026 (O&M) (MAIN CASE)

1. The appellant through instant appeal under Section 54 of Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 is seeking setting aside of award dated 08.05.2013
whereby Ld. Additional District Judge, Gurgaon did not award claimed
amount of compensation.
2. Notice of motion.
3. Mr. Abhishek Yadav, DAG, Haryana who on advance notice is
present in Court accepts notice on behalf of respondent-State.
4. On the request of both sides, the appeal is taken up for
adjudication.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that issue involved
herein is squarely covered by judgment dated 05.09.2017 passed by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Nos. 8024-8074 of 2017 .
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6. On being asked, learned State counsel concedes that appellant’s
claim is squarely covered by aforesaid order.

7. The appeal is hereby allowed in terms of judgment dated
05.09.2017 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Nos. 8024-
8074 of 2017 . It is made clear that appellant shall not be entitled to interest
for the delayed period i.e. 4847 days and statutory benefits.

8. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
27.08.2026

SDK

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

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integrity of this document