General Manager (Hr) vs K Poovarasan

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2026 INSC 581
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICATION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.6845 of 2026)
GENERAL MANAGER (HR) & ANR. APPELLANTS
A1 : GENERAL MANAGER (HR)
A2 : DEPUTY REGIONAL MANAGER &
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
VERSUS
K. POOVARASAN RESPONDENT

O R D E R
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal is directed against the impugned judgment
dated 09.09.2025 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in W.A. No. 2693 of 2025, whereby the writ
appeal preferred by the appellants came to be dismissed and the
order dated 16.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court in W.P. No. 25533 of 2019 was affirmed. By the said
order, the learned Single Judge had set aside the order of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2026.05.27
19:14:13 IST
Reason:
dismissal dated 30.10.2018 passed by the appellants and directed
reinstatement of the respondent in service with continuity of
service and other consequential benefits, but without backwages.

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4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
respondent was appointed pursuant to his name having been sponsored
by the Employment Exchange for the post of Temporary Attender. In
the requisition sent to the Employment Exchange, it was
specifically stipulated that the candidate should possess the
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qualification of passing 8 Standard, but should not have passed
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the 12 standard or acquired any higher qualification. However, in
the application submitted to the Employment Exchange, he disclosed
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only that he had passed the 10 standard, despite admittedly being
a graduate. According to learned counsel, this amounted to a clear
suppression of material facts and constituted the foundational
fraud by which the respondent secured consideration for
appointment. It was contended that any subsequent selection,
interview, or appointment would not cure such suppression or confer
any right upon the respondent.
5. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for
the appellants placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Jomom K.K. v. Shajimon P. and Others [ 2025 SCC OnLine SC 711] .
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that
at the time of filling up the attestation form, the respondent had
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disclosed that he had passed the 10 standard and there was no
deliberate suppression on his part. It was further submitted that
the respondent had updated his graduate qualification in another
Employment Exchange and that the sponsorship of his name was made
on the basis of an earlier registration, that too in another

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Employment exchange.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that
during the course of service, the respondent had sought permission
from the appellants to pursue his graduate course and such
permission was granted. According to him, this demonstrated that
the appellants were fully aware that the respondent possessed
qualifications higher than the prescribed limit and therefore, the
appellants could not subsequently contend that the respondent had
secured employment by suppression of facts.
8. In conclusion, learned counsel for the respondent urged that
this Court may take a sympathetic view inasmuch as the respondent
has been in service for a considerable period and his removal from
employment at this stage would visit him and his family with grave
hardship.
9. Having considered the matter in its entirety, though we may
have sympathy for the respondent, the conduct attributed to him and
the settled position of law leave us with no option but to
interfere with the impugned judgment. Public employment must be
made available to all eligible candidates in accordance with the
prescribed qualifications. At this juncture, it would be apposite
to quote the observation of this Court in Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P.
and others (supra) as follows:
“36. We hasten to add that whether or not the action of the
employer to exclude an aspirant from the process of selection (on
the ground that either he is over qualified for a particular post
or has qualifications which, being over and above what is
ordained by statutory rules or rules framed under the proviso to

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Rule 309 of the Constitution, does not match the qualification
specifically required) is justified has to be decided considering
the rules governing the selection, the qualifications prescribed,
the nature of duty to be performed, the nature of service to be
rendered and a host of other factors. It has to be remembered
that at times, the employer’s need to have the right people at
the right place, and not always the higher qualified, has to be
conceded. We know of decisions holding that over-qualification
cannot be a disqualification since such an approach amounts to
discouraging the acquisition of qualifications on the one hand
and on the other, such an approach could be seen as arbitrary,
discriminatory and not in national interest. However, this
principle cannot be put in a straitjacket imposing rigid or
inflexible rules or norms. Lack of public employment
opportunities in sufficient numbers may force even a Master
degree holder to apply for the job of a peon but, if he is
appointed upon his application being favourably considered, what
happens to the aspirants who have not had the means of pursuing
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study beyond the 12 standard? Do they remain unemployed for
ever, if all or majority of the posts of peon are filled upon by
such degree holders? What happens if the Master degree holder, in
pursuit of greener pastures, leaves the post of Peon for a better
and secured higher job commensurate with his qualifications after
a couple of years? Does it not, in such a case, burden the public
exchequer by requiring the employer to initiate a fresh selection
process? Is not the State, as a model employer, obliged to ensure
that the posts of peon are filled up only by those having the
basic qualification, and not by over qualified candidates, for
sub-serving the common good? Does not the State have the
obligation to strive to ensure that all citizens have adequate
means of livelihood? These are questions which no court can
afford to ignore. We end by saying that each case that comes
before the Court has to be decided on its own peculiar facts and
the problem that it presents for resolution and that there can be
no universally accepted rule that every time, a higher qualified
candidate is to be preferred to a candidate who matches the
essential qualification required for the post.
…
38. This Court in Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India (2007) 4
SCC 54 held that if an appointment is illegal, it is non-est in
the eye of law and rendering the appointment a nullity and
principles of equity in a case of such nature would have no role
to play; also that, sympathy should not be misplaced.”
10. In the present case, it is manifest from the communication
dated 20.10.2009 sent by the appellants to the Employment Exchange

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that the minimum qualification prescribed was a pass in the 8
standard and the maximum qualification prescribed was that the
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candidate should not have passed the Intermediate or 12 Standard
or 10 + 2 Examination. The rationale behind prescribing an upper
limit of qualification is both reasonable and equitable, namely, to
provide employment opportunities to persons who, owing to
circumstances of life, could not pursue higher education. The
State, as a model employer, is justified in reserving certain
categories of posts for such persons so that they are not compelled
to compete with more highly qualified candidates against whom they
would ordinarily stand little chance of selection. Such a policy
has consistently been upheld by the Courts. Thus, when the post was
specifically intended for candidates possessing lower educational
qualifications, permitting a person with higher qualifications to
secure such employment would necessarily result in depriving a
genuinely eligible and deserving candidate of the opportunity.
11. Even if it is assumed that there was no deliberate attempt on
the part of the respondent to mislead the authorities at the
initial stage, the fact remains that as per the requisition issued
by the appellants, only candidates not possessing qualifications
higher than the prescribed limit were eligible for consideration.
Once it came to light that on the date his name was sponsored by
the Employment Exchange, the respondent possessed qualifications
beyond the permissible limit, he ceased to be eligible for
consideration itself. Consequently, he could not have proceeded to
the next stage of selection, and any subsequent action taken by the

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appellants would not create any enforceable right in his favour to
continue in service.
12. Another circumstance which weighs against the respondent is
that, while filling up the attestation form, despite a clear
requirement to disclose all educational qualifications acquired
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from school onwards, he disclosed only that he had passed the 10
standard in the year 2012. Had the respondent acted in good faith
and without awareness of the eligibility restriction, there would
have been no reason for him not to disclose his entire educational
record. The omission to do so raises serious doubts regarding his
bona fides .
13. Further, the record indicates that after entering service, the
respondent sought permission from the appellants to pursue
graduation and such permission was granted. This circumstance also
suggests that the respondent intended to project that he did not
possess a graduate degree at the time of entry into service and
that he intended to acquire such qualification only thereafter for
future career advancement. Such conduct reinforces the inference
that the respondent was conscious of the fact that disclosure of
his actual qualification would have rendered him ineligible for
appointment to the post in question.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the
totality of the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The order
dated 16.04.2025 passed by the learned Single judge in W.P. No.
25533 of 2019, as affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 2693

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of 2025 is set aside. Consequently, the order dated 30.10.2018
passed by the appellants dismissing the respondent from service
stands restored.
15. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
.......................J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
........................J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI
MAY 19,2026

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ITEM NO.12 COURT NO.12 SECTION XII
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).6845/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-09-2025
in WA No.2693/2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Madras]
GENERAL MANAGER (HR) & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
K. POOVARASAN Respondent(s)
(FOR ADMISSION)
Date : 19-05-2026 This matter was called for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, AoR
Mr. Anant Gautam, Adv.
Mr. Vibhu Sharma, Adv.
Ms. Likivi K. Jakhalu, Adv.
Mr. Aman Gahlot, Adv.
Mr. Rishi Chauhan, Adv.
Ms. Azal Aekram, Adv.


For Respondent(s) Mr. M. Vijayan, Adv.
Mr. Justin Selvakumar, Adv.
Mr. P. S. Sudheer, AoR
Mr. Rishi Maheshwari, Adv.
Ms. Anne Mathew, Adv.
Mr. Bharat Sood, Adv.
Mr. Jashan Vir Singh, Adv.


O R D E R
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.

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3. The appeal is allowed in terms of the reportable signed order.
4. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(SAPNA BISHT) (ANJALI PANWAR)
COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed order is placed on the file)