Chanda Kochhar vs Central Bureau Of Investigation And Anr

Court
Bombay High Court

CNR No : HCBM010556872023

2026:BHC-AS:45634-DB
WP.6636.2024.doc
5Ajay


IN IN THE THE HIGH HIGH COURT COURT OF OF JUDICATURE JUDICATURE AT AT BOMBAY BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.6636 OF 2024
Chanda Kochhar .. Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr. .. Respondents
....................

Mr. Abad Ponda, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Rohan Dakshini, Ms.
Pooja Kothari, Mr. Nimit Bhimjiyani, Mr. Aditya Upadhyay and Mr.
Parth Khubalkar, Advocates M/s. Rashmikant and Partners for
Petitioner.

Mr. Anil Singh, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Kuldeep Patil, Mr. Adarsh
Vyas, Mr. Digvijay S. Kachare, Mr. Krishnakant Deshmukh, Mr.
Sumitkumar Nimbalkar, Mr. Anay Joshi, Ms. Saili Dhuru, Ms. Saniki
Joshi and Ms. Yukta Sawant, Advocates a/w. Limosine (DLA, CBI)
for Respondent No.1.

Ms. Rajeshree V. Newton, APP for Respondent No.2.
......…...........
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : NOVEMBER 18, 2026.
JUDGMENT:
1. Heard Mr. Ponda, learned Senior Advocate for Petitioner;
Mr. Singh, learned ASG for Respondent No.1 and Ms. Newton, learned
APP for Respondent No.2 – State.
2.
Present Petition under Article 2226 of the Constitution of
India and Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
"CrPC") is filed to quash and set aside sanction order dated 15.05.2023
granted under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(for short “PC Act”) to prosecute Petitioner in CBI Special Case No.874
of 2023 titled as CBI Case No. RCBD1/2019/E/0001/BSFB, New Delhi
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filed by Central Bureau of Investigation (for short “CBI”).
3. Briefly stated, Petitioner was Managing Director of ICICI
bank. On 08.12.2017, Respondent No.1 instituted Preliminary Enquiry
No. PEBD1/2017/E0001 against Petitioner in respect of illegal
gratification received indirectly by her on account of the Bank having
sanctioned loan to Videocon Group of Companies. On 22.01.2019,
Respondent No.1 registered FIR No. RC-BD12019E0001 –
CBI/BS&FC/Delhi under the provisions of Sections 420 and 120B of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of PC Act
against Petitioner.
4. In September 2020, husband of Petitioner was arrested by
Directorate of Enforcement in proceedings initiated under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988 (for short “PMLA”) and his
assets were attached on the basis of predicate offences in the present
FIR registered by Respondent No.1. On 12.02.2021, Petitioner was
arrested under provisions of PMLA and was enlarged on bail by
Special Court. On 25.03.2021 this Court granted bail to husband of
Petitioner observing that there was no loss caused to ICICI Bank on
account of Petitioner’s actions. On 06.07.2022, Petitioner received
summons from Respondent No.1. On 15.07.2022, Petitioner received
notice directing her to appear before Respondent No.1 on 19.12.2022.
Petitioner appeared before Respondent No.1 on 23.12.2022 and she
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was arrested on the ground of non – cooperation. Being aggrieved,
Petitioner filed Writ Petition No.378 of 2023 seeking quashing of FIR
and immediate release from custody of Respondent No.1. This Court
passed order dated 09.01.2023 directing Petitioner and her husband to
be released on interim bail. On 27.03.2023 Respondent No.1
addressed letter to ICICI Bank requesting grant of sanction under
Section 19 of PC Act to prosecute Petitioner for offences under PC Act
which was granted on 15.05.2023. On 28.03.2023 Chargesheet was
filed against Petitioner. Petitioner filed present Petition to challenge
the sanction dated 15.05.2023 on various grounds which are
reiterated hereunder while noting the submissions of her Advocate.
5. Mr. Ponda, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Petitioner
would submit that sanction dated 15.05.2023 under Section 19 of PC
Act was granted pursuant to meeting of the Board of Directors of ICICI
Bank, however the Board of Directors is not the Competent Authority
to grant such statutory sanction to prosecute the Petitioner. He would
submit that Respondent No.1 addressed letter seeking grant of
sanction to the Board of Directors which is not the Competent
Authority to grant sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the PC
Act. He would submit that Competent Authority as contemplated
under Section 19 of PC Act in the Petitioner's case for grant of Sanction
will be the Reserve Bank of India under Section 36AA of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 (for short “BR Act”). He would submit that Board
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of Directors of ICICI Bank failed to allude and identify the provision of
law which empowered them to issue sanction to prosecute Petitioner
under Section 19 of the PC Act.
5.1. He would submit that Petitioner was Managing Director and
Chief Executive Officer of ICICI Bank and prosecuted for conspiring
with other co-accused persons in sanctioning Term Loan of Rs.300
crores to Videocon Group. He would submit that Section 36AA of BR
Act empowers the Reserve Bank of India to remove a Chairman,
Director, Chief Executive Officer or other officer or employee of a
banking company and therefore the Competent Authority to remove
Petitioner is the Reserve Bank of India and not the Board of Directors
of ICICI Bank. He would refer to and rely upon a decision of the
1
Supreme Court in the case of M. Gopalakrishnan Vs. State in support
of this submission.
5.2. He would submit that Section 36AC of the BR Act overrides
the Companies Act and any other law for the time being in force or
ICICI Bank’s own termination policy and Section 35B(1)(b) of BR Act
comes into play, which states that the Reserve Bank of India must
compulsorily approve appointments, re – appointments and
terminations, therefore the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank is not the
sole Competent Authority to remove the Petitioner and instead it is the
sole prerogative of the Reserve Bank of India who is the sole
1 (2009) 3 SCC 681
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Competent Authority to grant sanction under Section 19 of PC Act to
prosecute the Petitioner. He would refer to and rely upon a decision
passed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of
2
K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India in support of this submission. He
would submit that Respondent No.1 themselves addressed letter dated
05.02.2019 to Reserve Bank of India seeking approval for Petitioner’s
termination as Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of ICICI
Bank and therefore the Board of Directors could never have granted
sanction under Section 19 of PC Act. He would submit that sanction
granted by authority not competent to grant such sanction is a
jurisdictional issue required to be examined under Writ jurisdiction of
this Court. He would refer to and rely upon a decision of this Court in
3
the case of Ashok Shankarrao Chavan Vs. State of Maharashtra in
support of this submission.
5.3.
He would submit that the impugned sanction is illegal and
non – est since it fails to specify the offences for which it is granted. He
would submit that sanction under Section 19 of PC Act must pertain to
offences committed under PC Act and there can be no sanction without
specifying the offences committed. He would refer to and rely upon a
decision of this Court in the case of Gahininath Bhimrao Patekar Vs.
4
State of Maharashtra in support of this submission.
2 1991 SCC (3) 655
3 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9434
4 1987 SCC OnLine Bom 443
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5.4. He would submit that sanction and the Board Resolution
merely attribute certain irregularities to Petitioner and the same cannot
amount to offences committed nor does it amount to fulfillment of the
ingredients of offences contemplated under PC Act. He would submit
that sanction as well as the Board Resolution state that Petitioner
received “undue advantage”, however this term only came to be
incorporated in the PC Act after the 2018 amendment and the alleged
offences took place much before coming into force of the 2018
amendment, therefore sanction cannot be granted for offences that did
not exist at the time of its commission and any contrary interpretation
thereto would violate the mandate of Article 20(3) of the Constitution
of India.
5.5.
He would submit that Respondent No.1 failed to forward all
material collected during investigation to the Board of Directors of
ICICI Bank since the material may even tilt the scales of justice in
favour of Petitioner. He would refer to and rely upon a decision of the
5
Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M.M. Rajendran
6
and Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal in
support of this submission.
5.6.
He would submit that Respondent No.1 recorded witness
5 (1998) 9 SCC 268
6 (2014) 14 SCC 295
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statements and filed Chargesheet on 28.03.2023 on the basis of which
sanction was granted, however Respondent No.1 filed Supplementary
Chargesheet on 04.12.2023, perusal of which show that certain
witnesses statements were infact recorded before grant of sanction,
therefore Respondent No.1 concealed and suppressed the same from
the Authority by appending selective information in the first
chargesheet. He would submit that the list of "unrelied upon
documents" furnished by Respondent No.1 in the Trial Court on
13.06.2024 would show that crucial documents pertaining to
ownership of Flat No.45 situated at CCI Chambers, Dinshaw Waccha
Road, Mumbai – 400020 show that the said flat stood in the name of
Petitioner’s husband since 1996 till date, whereas it is Respondent
No.1’s case that the said flat was owned by Videocon Group and was
transferred to Petitioner's husband as illegal gratification which is
prima facie preposterous on the face of record. He would submit that
these documents and many more such documents produced by
Respondent No.1 in the Trial Court were not forwarded to the
Authority neither does the Authority acknowledge receipt of the same.
5.7.
He would submit that though the Authority received certain
material from Respondent No.1, whether the entirety of that material
was put before the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank for consideration
and grant of sanction for prosecution is doubtful since the Minutes of
Meeting of the Board of Directors only record that copy of letter
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addressed by Respondent No.1 was circulated amongst the Board of
Directors. He would submit that Competent Authority cannot grant
sanction merely on the basis of Respondent No.1’s Report as it is an
merely an opinion of the Investigating Officer. He would refer to and
rely upon three decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajesh
7
Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh ; Dablu Kujur Vs. State of Jharkhand
8 9
and State of Rajasthan Vs. Dev Kant Meena in support of this
submission.
5.8.
He would submit that Competent Authority must apply its
own independent mind and be satisfied that a case for grant of
sanction is made out and if its discretion is affected by extraneous
consideration or under compulsion or coercion to grant sanction. He
would argue that if Authority does not apply its mind and grants
sanction merely for the asking which has happened in the present case,
the sanction so granted is bad in law and ought to be set aside. He
would submit that the sanction must ex – facie disclose that Competent
Authority has considered the material placed before it for grant of
sanction since it is a very drastic action. He would refer to and rely
upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of
10
Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujrat and Central
11
Bureau of Investigation Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal in support of this
7 (2022) 12 SCC 200
8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 269
9 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1401
10 (1997) 7 SCC 622
11 2014 14 SCC 295
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submission. He would submit that Competent Authority i.e. Board of
Directors has in the present case not expressed any prima facie finding
on the basis of material forwarded by Respondent No.1, rather the
impugned sanction is granted merely because Respondent No.1 levied
allegations of irregularities and receipt of undue advantage against
Petitioner in her capacity as Managing Director and Chief Executive
Officer of ICICI Bank which is simplicitor accepted rather obliged by
the Board. He would refer to and rely upon a decision of the Supreme
12
Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Ameerjan in support of
this submission. Both the learned Senior Advocates have taken me
through this decision to which I will advert to later in this Judgment.
5.9. He would submit that sanction as well as Board Resolution in
the instant case both state that there was no wrongful loss caused to
the Bank on account of the 6 loans advanced to Videocon Group and
due process of ICICI Bank’s policy, rules and regulations were duly
followed, while it is Respondent No.1’s case that ICICI Bank suffered
heavy loss as a result of the loans advanced, hence there is a direct
contradiction in the stand taken by the Bank and Respondent No.1. He
would submit that Petitioner was a member of the committees along
with other functionaries and Board members responsible for
sanctioning of only two out of the six loans advanced to Videocon
Group and the entire decision making and loan sanctioning process
12 (2007) 11 SCC 273
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was structured in a way that Petitioner could never have unilaterally
sanctioned any such loan without approval of other members of the
committees, yet Members of the Committees are not indicted in the
present case at all. He would submit that all six loans disbursed to
Videocon Group were duly repaid back to ICICI Bank in 2012 well
before registration of Respondent No.1’s FIR and this is a strong
circumstance which needs consideration. He would submit that the
Adjudicating Authority under PMLA, this Court and Supreme Court
have all confirmed the finding that Petitioner’s husband was not
involved in any money laundering and that the Rs.64 crore allegedly
bribe paid to Petitioner was not linked in any way to the Term Loan of
Rs.300 crore sanctioned to Videocon Group.
5.10.
He would submit that present case falls within the Writ
jurisdiction of this Court since sanction under Section 19 of PC Act
must be granted by the Competent Authority for prosecution to
commence against the accused person. He would submit that the
question of alternative remedy as argued by the prosecution does not
arise and cannot preclude this Court from entertaining the present
Petition. He would refer to and rely upon a decision of the Supreme
13
Court in the case of Maharashtra Chess Association Vs. Union of India
in support of this submission and submit that the question as to
validity of sanction of the Competent Authority if raised, then the
13 (2020) 13 SCC 285
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Court charged with trying the offence must deal with this question at
the threshold. He would submit that absence of a valid Sanction under
Section 19(1) of PC Act goes to the root of prosecution and prevents
Special Court from taking cognizance of offences against the
Petitioner.
5.11. Mr. Ponda has also referred to and relied upon the statutory
scheme of the BR Act, 1949 and more specifically Sections 35-B(1)(b),
36-AA(1), 36-AC and a plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court in
support of his factual and legal submissions that the Board of Directors
of ICICI Bank is not the authority competent to grant sanction in
respect of Petitioner under Section 19 of PC Act, that the impugned
sanction by the Board of Directors is no sanction in the eyes of law,
that the impugned sanction is granted without considering the material
provided by CBI to the Board of Directors, and that it exfacie discloses
non-application of mind. Both the learned Senior Advocates have
referred to and relied upon the aforesaid statutory provisions in great
detail in the course of their respective submissions.
6. PER CONTRA Mr. Singh, learned ASG appearing for
Respondent No.1 - CBI would submit that present Petition is not
maintainable before this Court and on this ground itself the Petition
ought to be dismissed. He would submit that Petitioner was Managing
Director of ICICI Bank and arraigned as Accused No.4 in Special Case
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No.874 of 2023 pending before Special CBI Court, Mumbai for
offences under the Indian Penal Code and PC Act.
6.1.
He would submit that between June 2009 and October 2011
Petitioner in her capacity as Managing Director of ICICI Bank,
sanctioned Rupee Term Loans amounting to Rs.1875 crores to
Videocon Group of Companies. He would submit that she sanctioned
these loans while having knowledge that her husband had business
dealings with Mr. Venugopal Dhoot, Managing Director of Videocon
Group. He would submit that Petitioner failed to comply with
provisions of Chapter 5.2 of the Credit Policy of ICICI Bank which state
that the Chairman and / or Managing Director and / or any Director
who is directly or indirectly concerned or interested in any proposal
should disclose the nature of his interest to the Board and remain
absent during discussions on such proposal since she was one of the
member of the committee that sanctioned two out of the aforesaid six
loans to Videocon Group of Companies. He would submit that after a
loan of Rs.300 crores was sanctioned in favour of M/s. Videocon
International Electronics Ltd., Petitioner received an amount of Rs.64
crores through a company i.e. M/s. NuPower Renewable Ltd. where
her husband was a director. He would submit that Petitioner at that
time was residing in the flat owned by Videocon Group without
consideration and after the aforesaid loans were sanctioned, the said
flat which was valued at Rs.5.25 crore in 1996 was transferred to the
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family trust of Petitioner’s husband for a meagre amount of Rs.11 lakhs
as a quid pro quo.
6.2.
He would submit that CBI prepared a detailed report
including statements of witnesses and placed it before the Board of
Directors of ICICI Bank for seeking grant of Sanction under Section
19(3) of PC Act. He would submit that due to Petitioner’s actions,
wrongful loss of Rs.1033.39 crores was caused to ICICI Bank and after
considering the material on record, Board of Directors of ICICI Bank
held a Board Meeting on 22.04.2023 and accorded sanction to
prosecute the Petitioner. He would submit that the Special Court took
cognizance of offences against Petitioner and other accused persons
and Supplementary Chargesheet dated 04.12.2023 was filed. He
would submit that loans disbursed to Videocon Group were not repaid
out of their own funds, however they were paid out of additional loans
availed from ICICI Bank and these additional loans are still
outstanding to the tune of Rs.1033.39 crores, hence causing wrongful
loss to ICICI Bank.
6.3. He would vehemently argue that Board of Directors is the
Competent Authority to grant Sanction to prosecute the Petitioner. He
would submit that the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank were briefed
about Petitioner’s role and findings resulting from investigation
conducted by CBI in present offence after which a summary of findings
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was circulated to the Board. He would submit that the Board of
Directors of ICICI Bank consulted an eminent jurist whose opinion was
also circulated amongst the Board of Directors and only thereafter the
Board found substance in the allegations of bribery and corruption
against Petitioner which resulted in grant of sanction.
6.4. He would submit that sanction under Section 17A of PC Act
was granted by ICICI Bank and that the language of Sections 17A and
19 of PC Act is identical to the extent of which they identify the
Competent authority to remove the public servant from office. He
would submit that till date, Petitioner failed to challenge grant of
sanction under Section 17A of PC Act.
6.5. He would submit that Petitioner filed Additional Affidavit
dated 04.09.2024 wherein additional grounds outside those raised in
the present Petition are argued afresh which is contrary to law. He
would submit that these grounds ought to have been pleaded and
substantiated in the Writ Petition in the first instance. He would submit
that filing of Additional Affidavit cannot be used to fill the lacunae in
the grounds raised in the Writ Petition. He would refer to and rely
upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh Vs.
14
State of Haryana in support of this submission wherein it is held that
Writ Petitioner must plead and prove the facts by evidence which must
appear from the Writ Petition and if Petitioner fails in this duty then
14 (1988) 4 SCC 534
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Court cannot entertain the Petition. He would submit that the Affidavit
in Rejoinder filed by Petitioner on 04.09.2024 cannot be considered as
pleading to improve the case of Petitioner and can at best be used to
support the pleadings of the Petitioner. He would refer to and rely
upon a decision of this Court in the case of Proctor and Gamble India
15
Limited Vs. Endolabs Limited in support of this submission. He
would submit that Petitioner has in the Petition admitted and accepted
that the sanction Order is issued by the Competent Authority and
therefore she cannot now take a contrary stand in her Additional
Affidavit dated 04.09.2024.
6.6.
He would submit that there is a clear distinction between
absence of sanction and invalid sanction due to non–application of
mind and if such invalidity is challenged it can only be decided at trial
after leading evidence and not at the threshold as argued by the
Petitioner. He would submit that grant of sanction under Section 19(1)
of PC Act is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of the
matter. He would submit that it is trite law that notwithstanding the
allegation that Competent Authority did not grant sanction, the crux of
such prosecution is to determine if there was a failure of justice.
6.7. He would submit that evidence led at trial would show the
nature and details of documents placed before the Competent
Authority which included deliberations of the Competent Authority
15 2000 (3) Bom CR 136
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and evidence of the officer who placed such material on record for
grant of sanction as well as Petitioner’s evidence to show whether
other relevant material was placed before the Competent Authority. He
would submit that adjudication on the validity of sanction is to be
determined at trial only where parties may adduce evidence to prove
or disprove that the authority who granted sanction was competent to
do so or otherwise. He would refer to and rely upon a decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Vs. Chairman, Airport
16
Authority of India in support of this submission. He would submit
that the issue as to whether Board of Directors of ICICI Bank are the
Competent Authority to grant sanction is not purely a question of law
and to determine this issue, evidence, documentary and oral will have
to be led at trial and therefore it cannot be decided at the threshold in
proceedings for quashing of sanction as such determination would be
contrary to law and prejudicial to both parties. He would refer to and
rely upon following decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of
17
Parkash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab and State of Madhya
18
Pradesh Vs. Virendra Kumar Tripathi in support of his above
submission.
6.8. He would submit that Petitioner held office of Managing
16 (2012) 1 SCC 532
17 (2007) 1 SCC 1
18 (2009) 15 SCC 533
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Director and hence the power to appoint and remove the Managing
Director vests with the Board of Directors as per Clause 151(a) of
Articles of Association of ICICI Bank. He would submit that Managing
Director is defined under Section 5(h) of BR Act and it states that
Managing Director is elected by Board of Directors by virtue of its
Memorandum of Association and / or Articles of Association. He would
submit that Section 35B(1)(b) of BR Act is concerned with termination
and not removal of Managing Director. He would submit that a
conjoint reading of the above unassailably concludes that Board of
Directors of ICICI Bank was vested with the power to grant sanction for
prosecution and removal of Petitioner as Managing Director.
6.9. He would submit that there is no material placed on record
to show that there is any defect, error, omission or any irregularity in
grant of sanction which may include competency of the authority to
grant sanction and it cannot be fatal unless it results in a failure of
justice and this can only be raised at trial by leading evidence. He
would submit that in order to decide validity of sanction order, it is
necessary to test whether Petitioner was prejudiced by grant of
sanction which is essentially a question of fact and therefore it needs to
be decided at trial. He would submit that since Trial Court has taken
cognizance against Petitioner, this Court ought to leave the question of
validity of sanction open for consideration by Trial Court and
Petitioner cannot question validity of sanction before this Court. He
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would refer to and rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
19
cases of CBI Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal and Parkash Singh Badal Vs.
State of Punjab (supra) in support of his aforesaid submission.
6.10. He would submit that Resolution dated 22.04.2023 passed
by the Board of Directors clearly states that on the basis of allegations
of bribery and corruption, sanction under Section 19 of PC Act is
granted. He would submit that sanction order cannot be vitiated on the
mere ground that offences under which Petitioner is charged with are
not mentioned therein or if there is any irregularity in the sanction
unless it has resulted in failure of justice. He would refer to any rely
upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Fuleshwar Gope
20
Vs. Union of India in support of this submission.
6.11. He would submit that Petitioner’s reliance on PMLA
proceedings against her is completely misplaced since PMLA
proceedings were in respect of receipt of proceeds of crime and
present proceedings pertain to charge of corruption and bribery. He
would submit that Petitioner relies on a Press Note dated 28.03.2018
issued by ICICI Bank justifying sanction of loans to Videocon Group,
however sanction under Section 19 of PC Act is granted subsequently
and only after perusal of the material gathered against the Petitioner.
He would submit that at the time of issuance of Press Note, Petitioner
19 (2014) 14 SCC 295
20 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2610
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was still the Managing Director of ICICI Bank and the Board of
Directors did not possess any material to indict the Petitioner at that
time.
6.12. In support of CBI's case that question of validity of sanction
is to be dealt with at the time of trial and it cannot be decided
summarily at the threshold, Mr. Singh has taken me through the
following decisions / citations :-(i) SKG Pulp and Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd.
21
Vs. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner ; (ii) State of Chhattisgarh
22
Vs. Aman Kumar Singh ; (iii) State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahesh G. Jain
23 24
; (iv) Ashok Tshering Bhutia Vs. State of Assam ; (v) State of Bihar
25 26
Vs. Rajmangal Ram ;(vi) CBI Vs. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal ;
27
(vii) State of Karnataka Vs. S. Subbegowda ; (viii) CBI Vs. Jagat
28 29
Ram ; (ix) CBI Vs. G. Easwaran ; (x) Romesh Mirakhpur Vs. State of
30 31
Maharashtra ; (xi) Sushil Kumar Vs. CBI ; (xii) Padmakar Narhar
32
Deshpande Vs. CBI ;(xiii) Pradeep Singh Jadon Vs. State of Madhya
33 34
Pradesh ;(xiv) S.S. Agnihotri Vs. State of MP ; (xv) Durga Dutt
35
Tripathi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh ; (xvi) Rajeev Kumar Singh Vs.
21 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 436
22 (2023) 6 SCC 559
23 (2013) 8 SCC 119
24 (2011) 4 SCC 402
25 (2014) 11 SCC 388
26 (2020) 17 SCC 664
27 (2023) 17 SCC 699
28 2024 SCC OnLine 3675
29 2025 SCC OnLine SC 643
30 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9552
31 Criminal Writ Petition No.4050 of 2021 decided on 09.06.2023
32 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2073
33 2015 SCC OnLine MP 4930
34 I.L.R [2016] MP 2396
35 2021 SCC OnLine All 1590
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36 37
State of Uttar Pradesh ;(xvii) Magonjoy Thaosen Vs. State of Assam ;
38
(xviii) CBI Vs. Ashok Kumar Raheja ; (xix) T.K. Lathika Vs. Seth
39
Karsandas Jamnadas ; (xx) Securities & Exchange Board of India Vs.
40
Manglore Stock Exchange ; (xxi) Chitra Ramkrishna Vs. Union of
41
India and Anr. ; (xxii) Paul Varghese Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. ;(xxiii)
Director Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr. Vs. Ashok Kumar
42
Aswal and Anr.
7. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the
respective parties and with their able assistance perused the record of
the case. Submissions made by learned Advocates at the bar have
received due consideration of the Court.
8. Petition seeks to challenge grant of sanction for prosecution
of Petitioner under Section 19 of PC Act for allegedly accepting illegal
and improper consideration in her capacity as Managing Director of
ICICI Bank for grant of Rupee Term Loans to Videocon Group of
Companies. The questions formulated for adjudication in the present
Petition are (i) Whether this Court is possessed with jurisdiction to
adjudicate the present matter? ;(ii) Whether the Board of Directors of
ICICI Bank were possessed with power to grant sanction under Section
19(1) of PC Act to prosecute the Petitioner? and (iii) Whether the
36 2021 SCC OnLine All 58
37 2025 SCC OnLine Gau 2464
38 2026 SCC OnLine Del 423
39 (1999) 6 SCC 632
40 (2005) 10 SCC 274
41 2026 SCC OnLine Del 5031
42 (2020) 17 SCC 699
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impugned sanction granted by the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank to
prosecute Petitioner prejudiced her rights in law?
9.
In order to adjudicate the present lis , it is necessary to refer
to and interpret the wordings of Section 19 of PC Act which provide
sanction for prosecution to be issued against the public servant sought
to be prosecuted.
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No
court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
[Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15] alleged to have been committed by
a public servant, except with the previous sanction [save as
otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013],—
(a) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged
offence employed] in connection with the affairs of the
Union and is not removable from his office save by or with
the sanction of the Central Government, of that
Government;
(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged
offence employed] in connection with the affairs of a State
and is not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office.
[Provided that no request can be made, by a person other than a
police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other
law enforcement authority, to the appropriate Government or
competent authority, as the case may be, for the previous
sanction of such Government or authority for taking cognizance
by the court of any of the offences specified in this sub-section,
unless—
(i) such person has filed a complaint in a competent court
about the alleged offences for which the public servant is
sought to be prosecuted; and
(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint under
Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974) 6 and directed the complainant to obtain the
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sanction for prosecution against the public servant for
further proceeding:
Provided further that in the case of request from the person
other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation
agency or other law enforcement authority, the appropriate
Government or competent authority shall not accord sanction to
prosecute a public servant without providing an opportunity of
being heard to the concerned public servant:
Provided also that the appropriate Government or any
competent authority shall, after the receipt of the proposal
requiring sanction for prosecution of a public servant under this
sub-section, endeavour to convey the decision on such proposal
within a period of three months from the date of its receipt:
Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of grant of
sanction for prosecution, legal consultation is required, such
period may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, be
extended by a further period of one month:
Provided also that the Central Government may, for the purpose
of sanction for prosecution of a public servant, prescribe such
guidelines as it considers necessary.
Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1), the
expression “public servant” includes such person—
(a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence
is alleged to have been committed; or
(b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence
is alleged to have been committed and is holding an office other
than the office during which the offence is alleged to have been
committed.]
(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to
whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1)
should be given by the Central Government or the State
Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given
by that Government or authority which would have been
competent to remove the public servant from his office at the
time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)7,—
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special
Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal,
confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of,
or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction
required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of
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that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned
thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on
the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the
sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that
such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on
any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers
of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in
any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.
(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence
of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has
occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have
regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have
been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant
sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes
reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be
at the instance of a specified authority or with the
sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a
similar nature.”
10.
From the above it is seen that, the provisions of Section
19(3) and (4) of PC Act do not bar jurisdiction of this Court since
Section 19(3) of PC Act only applies itself to the Court which sits in
appeal, confirmation or revision of the matter. In the present case,
Petitioner has invoked the inherent power under Writ Jurisdiction of
this Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to
seek quashing of the impugned sanction granted by the Board of
Directors of ICICI Bank to prosecute the Petitioner. This Court is not
sitting in appeal, confirmation or revision of any judgment passed by
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the Special Court, instead this Court is called upon to adjudicate
whether the impugned sanction granted by the Board of Directors of
the Bank is valid and deserves to be quashed and set aside in
accordance with law.
11.
It is seen that Section 19(4) directs that absence, errors,
omissions and irregularities in grant of sanction are to be taken up in
the first instance. In the present case, impugned sanction was granted
on 15.05.2023, Special Court took cognizance of the Chargesheet on
12.07.2023 and present Petition is filed on 04.12.2023. Trial is at the
stage of framing of charge.
12. Therefore, it is seen that Petitioner has approached this
Court four months after cognizance was taken by Special Court well
before framing of charge or at the time of evidence, hence fulfilling the
condition of “at any earlier stage in the proceedings” as contemplated
by Section 19(4) of PC Act. A careful reading of Section 19(4) of PC
Act would show that Petitioner seeks to take assistance of Section
19(4)(a) of PC Act by pleading that the Competent Authority which
granted sanction, i.e. Board of Directors of ICICI Bank, did not possess
the power in law and was incompetent to do so leading to grave
failure of justice which severely prejudiced her rights in law. Mr. Ponda
would submit that Petitioner has pleaded this ground in her Additional
Affidavit dated 04.09.2024 which was filed with the leave of this
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Court.
13. Mr. Singh resists this submission by referring to the decisions
of the Supreme Court and Calcutta High Court in the cases of Proctor
and Gamble India Limited (supra) and SKG Pulp and Paper Mills Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) to contend that Petitioner cannot improve her case by
filing the Additional Affidavit especially when there is no such ground
pleaded by her in the Petition. I have perused the Petition and the
exhibits appended thereto. I cannot countenance the submissions of
Mr. Singh, learned ASG since perusal of the decision passed in the case
of Proctor and Gamble (supra) does not discuss a factual scenario
where parties question the jurisdiction of the High Court in cases of
grant of sanction under Section 19 of PC Act and perusal of the
decision in the case of SKG Pulp and Paper Mills (supra) also cannot
come to the assistance of Respondent No.1’s case either since it is seen
that Petitioner in the instant case pleads nullity of sanction in Ground
“K” of the Petition. The impugned sanction granted by the Board of
Directors of ICICI Bank is appended to the Petition at Exhibit “A”, page
No. 34. Therefore, both above decisions referred to by Mr. Singh do
not come to the aid of Respondent No.1 as they stand on a completely
different factual footing from that in the present case. In furtherance to
the above, Additional Affidavit dated 04.09.2024 in the present case
was filed by Petitioner with the leave of this Court. Coupling these
facts with the law laid down by the decisions of the Supreme Court
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and the provisions of the PC Act, Petitioner is not precluded from
raising the question of validity in grant of sanction under Section 19(4)
of PC Act. Therefore this Court is possessed with the jurisdiction to
decide the present issue and I answer this question in the affirmative at
the threshold itself.
14. Further perusal of Section 19(1)(c) of PC Act reproduced
above, would show that sanction for prosecution must be granted to
prosecute the public servant alleged to have committed offences under
PC Act and this sanction must be granted by the authority Competent
to remove him (public servant) from office. It is seen that both the
above requirements are procedural conditions precedent to be met
before the Special Court takes cognizance of the offence against the
accused person.
15. In order to determine whether the Board of Directors was the
Competent Authority to grant sanction, it is trite to consider the fact
that Petitioner was Managing Director of ICICI Bank, a banking
company, which is governed under the provisions of BR Act and
Companies Act, 1956. However since ICICI Bank is registered as a
“Private Sector Bank” in the Official Directory maintained by Reserve
Bank of India, it is necessary to allude to Sections 5(h), 5A, 35B(1),
36AA, 36AC of the BR Act vis-a-vis Section 2(54), 169(1) and 203 of
Companies Act, 2013 and Clause 151(a) of Articles of Association of
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ICICI Bank to understand their application to Petitioner's case. The
above provisions are reproduced hereinbelow for ease of reference:-
Applicable provisions of the BR Act as argued by Petitioner:-
5. Interpretation-
[(h) “managing director”, in relation to a banking company,
means a director who, by virtue of an agreement with the
banking company or of a resolution passed by the banking
company in general meeting or by its Board of directors or, by
virtue of its memorandum or articles of association, is entrusted
with the management of the whole, or substantially the whole
of the affairs of the company, and includes a director occupying
the position of a managing director, by whatever name called:]
5-A. Act to override memorandum, articles, etc.— Save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act,—
(a) the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in the memorandum or
articles of a banking company, or in any agreement executed by
it, or in any resolution passed by the banking company in
general meeting or by its Board of directors, whether the same
be registered, executed or passed, as the case may be, before or
after the commencement of the Banking Companies
(Amendment) Act, 1959; and
(b) any provision contained in the memorandum, articles,
agreement or resolution aforesaid shall, to the extent to which
it is repugnant to the provisions of this Act, become or be void,
as the case may be.]
35-B. Amendments of provisions relating to appointments of
managing directors, etc., to be subject to previous approval of
the Reserve Bank.—
(1) In the case of a banking company—
(a) no amendment of any provision relating to [the maximum
permissible number of directors or] the [appointment or
reappointment or termination of appointment or remuneration
of a chairman, a] [managing director or any other director,
whole-time or otherwise] or of a manager or a chief executive
officer by whatever name called, whether that provision be
contained in the company's memorandum or articles of
association, or in an agreement entered into by it, or in any
resolution passed by the company in general meeting or by its
Board of directors shall have effect unless approved by the
Reserve Bank;
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[(b) no appointment or reappointment or termination of
appointment of a chairman, a managing or whole-time director,
manager or chief executive officer by whatever name called,
shall have effect unless such appointment, reappointment or
termination of appointment is made with the previous approval
of the Reserve Bank.]
[Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section, any
provision conferring any benefit or providing any amenity or
perquisite, in whatever form, whether during or after the
termination of the term of office [of the chairman or the
manager] or the chief executive officer by whatever name
called or the managing director, or any other director, whole-
time or otherwise, shall be deemed to be a provision relating to
his remuneration.
(2) Nothing contained in Sections [268 and 269, the proviso to
sub-section (3) of Section 309, Sections 310 and 311, the
proviso to Section 387, and Section 388] (in so far as Section
388 makes the [provisions of Sections 269, 310] and 311 apply
in relation to the manager of a company) of the Companies Act,
1956 (1 of 1956), shall [apply to any matter in respect of
which the approval of the Reserve Bank has to be obtained
under sub-section (1)].
[(2-A) Nothing contained in Section 198 of the Companies Act,
1956 (1 of 1956) shall apply to a banking company and the
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 309 and of Section 387
of that Act shall, insofar as they are applicable to a banking
company, have effect as if no reference had been made in the
said provisions to Section 198 of that Act.]
(3) No act done by a person [as chairman or a managing or
whole-time director] or a director not liable to retire by
rotation or a manager or a chief executive officer by whatever
name called, shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that
it is subsequently discovered that his [appointment or
reappointment] had not taken effect by reason of any of the
provisions of this Act : but nothing in this sub-section shall be
construed as rendering valid any act done by such person after
his [appointment or reappointment] has been shown to the
banking company not to have had effect.]
36-AA. Power of Reserve Bank to remove managerial and other
persons from office.— (1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied
that in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of a
banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to
the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper
management of any banking company it is necessary so to do,
the Reserve Bank may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by
order, remove from office, with effect from such date as may be
specified in the order, [any chairman, director,] chief executive
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officer (by whatever name called) or other officer or employee
of the banking company.
(2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be made [unless the
chairman, director] or chief executive officer or other officer or
employee concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity
of making a representation to the Reserve Bank against the
proposed order :
Provided that if, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank, any delay
would be detrimental to the interests of the banking company
or its depositors, the Reserve Bank may, at the time of giving
the opportunity aforesaid or at any time thereafter, by order
direct that, pending the consideration of the representation
aforesaid, if any, [the chairman or, as the case may be, director
or chief executive officer] or other officer or employee, shall
not, with effect from the date of such order—
(a) [act as such chairman or director] or chief executive officer
or other officer or employee of the banking company;
(b) in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned
with, or take part in the management of, the banking company.
(3) (a) Any person against whom an order of removal has been
made under sub- section (1) may, within thirty days from the
date of communication to him of the order, prefer an appeal
to the Central Government.
b) The decision of the Central Government on such appeal, and
subject thereto, the order made by the Reserve Bank under sub-
section (1) shall be final and shall not be called into question in
any court.
(4) Where any order is made in respect of 6 [a chairman,
director] or chief executive officer or other officer or employee
of a banking company under sub-section (1), he shall cease to
be 7 [a chairman or, as the case may be, a director], chief
executive officer or other officer or employee of the banking
company and shall not, in any way, whether directly, or
indirectly be concerned with, or take part in the management
of, any banking company for such period not exceeding five
years as may be specified in the order.
(5) If any person in respect of whom an order is made by the
Reserve Bank under sub-section (1) or under the proviso to sub-
section (2) contravenes the provisions of this section, he shall
be punishable with fine which may extend to two hundred and
fifty rupees for each day during which such contravention
continues.
(6) Where an order under sub-section (1) has been made, the
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Reserve Bank, may, by order in writing, appoint a suitable
person in place of 8 [the chairman or director] or chief
executive officer or other officer or employee who has been
removed from his office under that sub-section, with effect from
such date as may be specified in the order.
(7) Any person appointed as 9 [chairman, director or chief
executive officer] or other officer or employee under this
section, shall—
(a) hold office during the pleasure of the Reserve Bank and
subject thereto for a period not exceeding three years or such
further periods not exceeding three years at a time as the
Reserve Bank may specify;
(b) not incur any obligation or liability by reason only of his
being a 10[chairman, director or chief executive officer] or
other officer or employee or for anything done or omitted to be
done in good faith in the execution of the duties of his office or
in relation thereto.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any
contract, memorandum or articles of association, on the
removal of a person from office under this section, that person
shall not be entitled to claim any compensation for the loss or
termination of office.
36-AC. Part II-A to override other laws.— Any appointment or
removal of a director, chief executive officer or other officer or
employee in pursuance of Section 36-AA or Section 36-AB shall
have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law for
the time being in force or in any contract or any other
instrument.]
Applicable provisions of Companies Act, 2013 as argued by CBI:-
2. Definitions. -
(54) "managing director" means a director who, by virtue of the
articles of a company or an agreement with the company or a
resolution passed in its general meeting, or by its Board of
Directors, is entrusted with substantial powers of management
of the affairs of the company and includes a director occupying
the position of managing director, by whatever name called.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the power to do
administrative acts of a routine nature when so authorised by
the Board such as the power to affix the common seal of the
company to any document or to draw and endorse any cheque
on the account of the company in any bank or to draw and
endorse any negotiable instrument or to sign any certificate of
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share or to direct registration of transfer of any share, shall not
be deemed to be included within the substantial powers of
management;
169. Removal of directors.-
(1) A company may, by ordinary resolution, remove a director,
not being a director appointed by the Tribunal under section
242, before the expiry of the period of his office after giving him
a reasonable opportunity of being heard:
1[Provided that an independent director re-appointed for
second term under sub-section (10) of section 149 shall be
removed by the company only by passing a special resolution
and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard:]
2[Provided further that] nothing contained in this sub-section
shall apply where the company has availed itself of the option
given to it under section 163 to appoint not less than two-thirds
of the total number of directors according to the principle of
proportional representation."
203. Appointment of key managerial personnel.-
(1) Every company belonging to such class or classes of
companies as may be prescribed shall have the following whole-
time key managerial personnel,—
(i) managing director, or Chief Executive Officer or manager
and in their absence, a whole-time director;
(ii) company secretary; and
(iii) Chief Financial Officer :
Provided that an individual shall not be appointed or
reappointed as the chairperson of the company, in pursuance of
the articles of the company, as well as the managing director or
Chief Executive Officer of the company at the same time after
the date of commencement of this Act unless,—
(a) the articles of such a company provide otherwise; or
(b) the company does not carry multiple businesses:
Provided further that nothing contained in the first proviso shall
apply to such class of companies engaged in multiple businesses
and which has appointed one or more Chief Executive Officers
for each such business as may be notified by the Central
Government.
(2) Every whole-time key managerial personnel of a company
shall be appointed by means of a resolution of the Board
containing the terms and conditions of the appointment
including the remuneration.
(3) A whole-time key managerial personnel shall not hold office
in more than one company except in its subsidiary company at
the same time:
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Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
disentitle a key managerial personnel from being a director of
any company with the permission of the Board:
Provided further that whole-time key managerial personnel
holding office in more than one company at the same time on
the date of commencement of this Act, shall, within a period of
six months from such commencement, choose one company, in
which he wishes to continue to hold the office of key managerial
personnel:
Provided also that a company may appoint or employ a person
as its managing director, if he is the managing director or
manager of one, and of not more than one, other company and
such appointment or employment is made or approved by a
resolution passed at a meeting of the Board with the consent of
all the directors present at the meeting and of which meeting,
and of the resolution to be moved thereat, specific notice has
been given to all the directors then in India.
(4) If the office of any whole-time key managerial personnel is
vacated, the resulting vacancy shall be filled-up by the Board at
a meeting of the Board within a period of six months from the
date of such vacancy.
1
[(5)If any company makes any default in complying with the
provisions of this section, such company shall be liable to a
penalty of five lakh rupees and every director and key
managerial personnel of the company who is in default shall be
liable to a penalty of fifty thousand rupees and where the
default is a continuing one, with a further penalty of one
thousand rupees for each day after the first during which such
default continues but not exceeding five lakh rupees.]
Applicable provisions of Articles of Association of ICICI Bank as argued
by CBI:-
151(a).- Subject to the provisions of the said Acts and these
presents, the Board of Directors of the Company shall be
entitled to appoint from time to time, one or more of the Non-
Rotational Directors to act as the Whole time or Executive
Chairman and Managing Director or Part time Chairman or
Whole Time Chairman(hereinafter referred to as the Executive
Chairman) or a Managing Director or Managing Director(s)
and/or Whole-time Director or Whole-time Director(s) of the
Company (hereinafter referred to as the Managing Director) for
such term not exceeding five years at a time as the Board of
Directors may think fit to manage the affairs and business of the
Company and may from time to time (subject to provisions of
any contract between him and the Company) may remove or
dismiss him or them from office and appoint any another in his
place".
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Both the learned Senior Advocates have laboured on the
above legal provisions in support of their respective submissions.
16.
From a collective perusal of the aforementioned statutory
provisions, it is seen that Section 5A of BR Act gives an overriding
effect of the BR Act over the Companies Act, therefore at the outset
itself, it is seen that all provisions of the BR Act pertaining to
termination of officers from banking companies, override those
contained in the Companies Act and therefore alluding to the
provisions of the Companies Act with respect to grant of sanction to
prosecute the Petitioner as argued by Respondent No. 1 cannot come
to the aid of Respondent No.1.
17. The first thrust of Respondent No. 1's argument, as advanced
by Mr. Singh is that the Petitioner can be removed from her office by
the Board of Directors as per the Memorandum and Articles of
Association of the Bank as per the Companies Act, which vests all such
powers in the Board of Directors of the said bank. Reliance is placed
by him on the definition of “ managing director ” in the Companies Act
r/w Section 203 thereof. It is argued that RBI is the Banker's Bank and
Regulatory Authority and it can exercise such power of removal in 3
contingencies only and this power vested with RBI is in addition to and
not in derogation to the powers conferred with any authority under the
Companies Act, 2013 as specified in Section 2 of the BR Act. It is
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argued that both Acts viz. Companies Act and BR Act authorise
appointment of "managing director" by a resolution passed by the
Board of Directors. Respondent No. 1 has therefore justified the
sanction order passed by the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank as
having been correctly passed by them in accordance with law. This
argument of Respondent No. 1 is unacceptable and cannot be
countenanced since it is contrary to the statutory provision envisaged
by Section 5-A of the BR Act. Section 5-A(a) categorically states that
the provisions of the BR Act shall ( emphasis supplied ) have effect
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
memorandum or articles of a banking company ... or in any resolution
passed by the banking company in general meeting or by its Board of
Directors ( emphasis supplied ) ... Section 5-A(b) further provides that
any provision contained in the memorandum, articles, agreement or
resolution aforesaid shall, to the extent to which it is repugnant to the
provisions of the BR Act, become or be void, as the case may be.
18.
If I have to accept Mr. Singh's submissions, it will render
Section 5-A(a) and 5-A(b) and Section 36-AC of the BR Act completely
otiose and redundant.
19. In view of the aforesaid statutory provision, the effect of
Section 35-B(1)(b) therefore comes into play in the present case.
Section 35-B(1)(b) states that no appointment or reappointment or
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termination of appointment of a chairman, a managing or whole-time
director, manager or chief executive officer by whatever name called,
shall have effect unless such appointment, reappointment or
termination of appointment is made without the previous approval of
the Reserve Bank ( emphasis supplied ).
20. The aforesaid provision is fortified further by Section 36-AA
of the BR Act. Section 36-AA(1) categorically states that when the
Reserve Bank is satisfied that in the public interest or for preventing
the affairs of a banking company being conducted in a manner
detrimental to the interest of the depositors or for securing proper
management of any banking company it is necessary to do so, the
Reserve Bank may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order,
remove from office, with effect from such date as may be specified in
the order, any Chairman, Director, Chief Executive Officer by whatever
name called, or other officer or employee of the banking company.
Thus the power of removal vests with RBI and RBI only. Section 36-
AA(2) further categorically states that no order under sub-section (1)
shall be made unless the Chairman, Director or Chief Executive Officer
or other officer or employee concerned has been given a reasonable
opportunity of making a representation to the Reserve Bank against
the proposed order.
21. The aforesaid provisions are extremely critical rather
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squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
They have not been applied / considered by the Board of Directors of
ICICI Bank. There is no sanction order passed by the Competent
Authority which is the RBI. No reasons are given by the RBI for
removal of the Petitioner for that matter for issuing sanction order.
Reasons for removal / sanction order are not recorded in writing by
the RBI. There is no order of removal passed by the RBI with effect
from such date as specified in the order pertaining to the Petitioner
and most importantly if at all any such order is required to be passed
by the RBI, the valuable statutory right of Petitioner to have been given
a reasonable opportunity of making a representation to the RBI against
the proposed order has been lost altogether.
22.
Section 36-AC categorically states that any appointment or
removal of a director, chief executive officer or other officer or
employee in pursuance of Section 36-A or Section 36-AB shall have
effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in force or in
any contract or any other instrument. This statutory provision
alongwith Section 5-A(a) and 5-A(b) prima facie answers the
submissions advanced by Respondent No. 1 when it is argued that the
Board of Directors of ICICI Bank have power under the Companies Act
in addition to the statutory provisions of the BR Act. In the Brief
argument note dated 13.10.2026 submitted on behalf of CBI-
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Respondent and argued by Mr. Singh the above submission is stated in
paragraph No. 8.5 thereof. The same stands to be rejected in view of
the aforesaid reasons.
23. The above propositions are further reinforced by Section
36AC of BR Act which more particularly states that in matters of
appointment and termination of Directors, Chief Executive Officer or
any other officer in banking companies, Section 36AA and 36AB shall
have overriding effect over the provisions of the Companies Act or any
other law.
24. Section 36AA of the BR Act explicitly states that when
Reserve Bank of India is satisfied that working of banking company is
to the detriment of investors, Reserve Bank of India may pass a
reasoned order to remove Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, Director
or any other officer from that banking company. Therefore, in the
present case, it is seen that charges under PC Act were levied against
Petitioner for allegedly receiving improper consideration while
exercising her powers as Managing Director of ICICI Bank and
therefore Respondent No.1 sought grant of sanction to prosecute
Petitioner from Board of Directors of ICICI Bank, however power to
remove Managing Director, any Director or officer from the banking
company vested solely with Reserve Bank of India and with no other
body, entity or authority including the Board of Directors of the
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banking company.
25. It is seen that overriding powers granted to Reserve Bank of
India exist in absolute derogation to other laws in force and even
supersedes ICICI Bank’s Memorandum of Association, Articles of
Association, Regulations, Policies or any other such document of like
regard in terms of appointment and termination of the Chairman,
Chief Executive Officer, Director or any other officer in the banking
company, in the present case, ICICI Bank.
26. Mr. Singh, learned ASG on behalf of Respondent No.2 has
forcefully argued that Petitioner herself has averred that Board of
Directors is the Competent Authority in paragraph No.1 of the Petition
and therefore she is precluded from now contending that Board of
Directors is not the Competent Authority to grant sanction to prosecute
her. This is a very naive submission and deserves to be rejected in
limine . I cannot countenance it since it is trite law that no party can
claim estoppel against statutes and it cannot be used to bypass, waive,
or override applicable statutory provisions. Even if a party makes an
admission which is untenable in law, it cannot be blindly accepted
especially if the law speaks to the contrary. In the present case, even
though it may be Petitioner’s averment that Board of Directors is the
Competent Authority, the same has to be read with caution since such
statement is a mere reference to events that took place viz. Board of
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Directors acting as Competent Authority to grant sanction and nothing
more. It is a case of improper drafting by the draftmans of the
Petition. The law however stands as it is. Moreover as discussed
above, since provisions of BR Act clearly override those of the
Companies Act, the Board of Directors is not / cannot be possessed of
jurisdiction to grant sanction under Section 19 of PC Act. Therefore,
Respondent No.1 cannot pounce on the statement / averment of
Petitioner in paragraph No.1 of the Petition without reading the same
in context with the grounds in the Petition.
27. Attention in this regard is drawn to a decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India
(Supra) wherein it was held that the expression “authority competent
to remove” in Section 6(1)(c) of PC Act implies that authority without
whose sanction the public servant cannot be prosecuted and sanction
not granted by such authority will not operate proprio vigore against
the accused person. The relevant paragraph No.45 is reproduced
herein below for reference:-
“45. In Craies on Statute Law, [6th edn., p. 531] it is stated
that “the distinction between a strict and a liberal construction
has almost disappeared with regard to all classes of statutes, so
that all statutes, whether penal or not, are now construed by
substantially the same rules …. They are construed now with
reference to the true meaning and real intention of the
legislature”. The construction which would promote the general
legislative purpose underlying the provision in question, is to be
preferred to a construction which would not. If the literal
meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results
which would defeat the purpose of the Act the court would be
justified in disregarding the literal meaning and adopt a liberal
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construction which effectuates the object of the legislature.
Section 6, with which we are concerned indeed, requires to be
liberally construed. It is not a penal provision but a measure of
protection to public servants in the penal enactment. It indicates
the authorities without whose sanction a public servant cannot
be prosecuted. It is sufficient that the authorities prescribed
thereunder fall within the fair sense of the language of the
section. The expression “the authority competent to remove”
used in clause (c) of Section 6(1) is to be construed to mean
also an authority without whose order or affirmation the public
servant cannot be removed. In this view, the President can be
considered as the authority to grant sanction for prosecution of
a Judge since the order of the President for the removal of a
Judge is mandatory. The motion passed by each House of
Parliament with the special procedure prescribed under clause
(4) of Article 124 will not proprio vigore operate against the
Judge. It will not have the consequence of removing the Judge
from the office unless it is followed by an order of the
President.”
28. When the above proposition is applied to the facts of the
present case, it is clear in my mind that upon uncovering the alleged
irregularities committed by Petitioner in her capacity as Managing
Director of ICICI Bank and in their undying need to prosecute her for
offences under the PC Act, Respondent No.1 ought to have approached
the Reserve Bank of India to seek grant of sanction under Section
19(1) of PC Act to prosecute her rather resorting to seeking sanction
from the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank. There is no doubt that
Petitioner is subject to internal departmental inquiry on the basis of
ICICI Bank’s own rules, regulations and code of conduct, however I am
of the firm unwavering opinion that when prosecution under penal
law, rather anti corruption law i.e. PC Act is concerned, especially
when sanction for prosecution is required to be granted against Bank
officials namely the Managing Director cum C.E.O. of the Bank, the
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law governing banks i.e. provisions of BR Act explicitly bar application
of laws governing companies i.e. Companies Act, then in such cases
where banking companies are concerned, like so in the present case,
the authority of any body constituted under the provisions of
Companies Act, i.e. Board of Directors of ICICI Bank in the present
case, is clearly barred from granting sanction for prosecution under PC
Act and the sole Competent Authority to grant sanction for prosecution
under provisions of Section 19 of PC Act is the Reserve Bank of India in
this case. Therefore I answer this question in the aforementioned
terms.
29.
Next question to be answered is whether this Court is
possessed with jurisdiction to entertain the issue of absence of sanction
and whether absence of sanction would prejudice Petitioner's rights in
law. In this regard, it is necessary to allude to the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the case of Parkash Singh Badal (Supra) and State of
43
Karnataka v. C. Nagarajaswamy both of which discuss the
aforementioned issue and have held thus:-
Parkash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab
“48. The sanction in the instant case related to the offences
relatable to the Act. There is a distinction between the absence
of sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of non-
application of mind. The former question can be agitated at the
threshold but the latter is a question which has to be raised
during trial.”
State of Karnataka v. C. Nagarajaswamy
43 (2005) 8 SCC 370
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“14. Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction
has been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not
is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking
cognizance. But in a case of this nature where a question is
raised as to whether the authority granting the sanction was
competent therefor or not, at the stage of final arguments after
trial, the same may have to be considered having regard to the
terms and conditions of service of the accused for the purpose of
determination as to who could remove him from service.
15. Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine
qua non for taking cognizance of the offence. It is desirable that
the question as regards sanction may be determined at an early
stage. (See Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia [1990 Supp SCC 41 :
1990 SCC (Cri) 611] and Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar
[(2000) 8 SCC 498 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 17 : JT (2000) 8 SC 248] .)
16. But, even if a cognizance of the offence is taken
erroneously and the same comes to the court's notice at a later
stage a finding to that effect is permissible. Even such a plea can
be taken for the first time before an appellate court. (See B. Saha
v. M.S. Kochar [(1979) 4 SCC 177 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 939] SCC
para 13 and K. Kalimuthu v. State [(2005) 4 SCC 512 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1291] .)”
30. From the above, it is seen that when sanction is granted to
prosecute persons under PC Act, and the accused person raises a
question of validity or absence of valid sanction, the same has to be
decided by the Court at the threshold itself. Question as to validity of
sanction can be raised at trial and parties may lead evidence in respect
of such question, however when the question of absence / existence of
valid sanction is raised, then the same has to be decided at the
threshold itself. In the present case, Petitioner has raised a question as
to whether there was a valid sanction to prosecute her in the first
instance. The aforementioned decision explicitly states that sanction
must mandatorily be granted by the Competent Authority in order for
Court to take cognizance of the offence and any question with regard
to the same can be raised at any stage of trial. However, if there is
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absence of sanction from the Competent Authority and if such a
question is raised, then can the submission of CBI to relegate the
Petitioner to trial be accepted by the Court. In my considered opinion
the answer to this question / argument is in the negative. This is in
fact squarely answered by the Supreme Court in the cases of Shankar
44
Moitra v. Sadhna Das in paragraph Nos. 11 and 21 thereof, Abdul
45
Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar in paragraph numbers 1, 6, 7 and 8
46
thereof, and Najappa v. State of Karnataka in paragraph Nos. 7, 10,
18 and 20 to 22 thereof. Absence of a valid sanction would oust the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate or Trial Court or Special Court to take
cognizance of offences to which Section 19 of the PC Act applies. This
is a pure jurisdictional fact. If I have to countenance the submission
advanced by Respondent No. 1 that absence of a valid sanction will
have to be relegated to trial, this will lead to a disastrous consequence.
In my opinion, once the validity of a sanction order is questioned at the
inception and such validity relates to absence of a valid sanction, the
same will have to be considered at the threshold in order to determine
whether there is a valid sanction or not. Questions regarding the
validity of a sanction order should be considered at the earliest stage
and ideally prior to taking of cognizance. This is the plea in the
present Writ Petition. The public servant cannot be compelled to go
through a trial / prosecution in the case of a sanction which is void ab
44 (2006) 4 SCC 584
45 (2000) 8 SCC 500
46 (2015) 14 SCC 186
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initio in the absence of a valid sanction. This is so because it is a well-
settled proposition of law that an issue of inherent lack of jurisdiction
must be raised and the Court should consider it at the earliest possible
stage to save harassment to the public servant and also to save
valuable judicial time.
31. Hence I am of the clear opinion that postponing a question
regarding the validity of a sanction order to a later stage at trial would
allow a public servant to be put to the ignominy of a trial that might
later be vitiated on the grounds of the sanction order being held to be
invalid. Adopting such a course would effectively defeat the very
purpose of the bar on cognizance under Section 19 of the PC Act. The
effective purpose of Section 19 of the PC Act is to prevent a public
servant from being harassed with vexatious prosecution and with the
safeguard for the innocent.
32. Though Mr. Singh has laboured extremely hard in
attempting to convince me that the judgments of the Supreme Court in
the case of Parkash Singh Badal , Dinesh Kumar and Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal be considered by me as settled law and the issue of validity
of sanction be relegated to trial, I am unable to accept his submission
in view of the authoritative view of a three-Judge Bench in the case of
Abdul Wahab Ansari (supra) . Also, it needs to be noted that the
present case is a case of absence of valid sanction as has been argued
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by the Petitioner. The issue of want of valid sanction in my opinion
goes to the root of the matter and goes to the jurisdiction which the
Court is required to decide as a question of law.
33. In the case of Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka (supra) , it is
held that a valid sanction under Section 19(1) is a condition precedent
to the competence of the Special Judge to take cognizance and to try
the accused. It is further held that when the sanction is not one
granted by the Competent Authority, the Court trying the offence has
no jurisdiction and the trial is non est , and the question may be raised
at any stage. In an earlier decision in the case of State of Goa v. Babu
47
Thomas , it was held that absence of a valid sanction under Section
19(1) goes to the very root of the prosecution, the provision
prohibiting any Court from taking cognizance of the specified offences
against a public servant except with the previous sanction of the
Competent Authority.
34. The aforesaid reasoning governs the facts of the present case
in hand. Sanction which is issued by the Board of Directors which has
no power to remove the Petitioner is prima facie void from the
beginning and nothing which has come afterwards can validate such
sanction.
47 (2005) 8 SCC 130
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35. The thrust of Respondent No. 1's argument rests upon the
decision in the case of Parkash Singh Badal (supra) . However, both the
learned Senior Advocates representing the rival parties have argued
that the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) was itself considered
48
by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Ameerjan ,
and in that decision the Supreme Court held that the decision in
Parkash Singh Badal (supra) was not an authority for such a broad
proposition that it cannot save a sanction which is a nullity by reason
of total non-application of mind. In the case of Ameerjan (supra) , the
Supreme Court held that where the sanctioning authority has not
applied its mind at all and has acted only upon the conclusion of the
investigating agency, the same cannot be sustained. Similar is also the
position in the present case when the sanction order issued by the
Board of Directors on 15.05.2023 and the precursor application letter
dated 27.03.2023 seeking sanction issued by Respondent No. 1 a/w
CBI Report as contained in the Extract of the minutes of the 291st
meeting of the Board of Directors held on 27.03.2023 are seen by the
Court. Both the documents are appended as Exhibits "A" (page No. 36)
and Exhibit "A1" (page No. 38) to the Petition. The sanction letter
dated 15.05.2023 does not give any reasons whatsoever and merely
refer to the CBI Report and letter. Interestingly both the above
documents state that there is no financial loss caused to the Bank
48 (2007) 11 SCC 273
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which has been the Bank's stand all throughout. On reading the
aforesaid two documents, it is clearly reduced that there is absolutely
no application of mind or reasons given by the Board in the sanction
order to prosecute the Petitioner.
36.
In the present case, Petitioner's case is not that the sanction
granted by the Board of Directors is defective, but it is argued that the
said sanction is invalid in law and a nullity in law because the
authority which has granted it does not have the power to grant it. It
is Petitioner's case that the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank do not
have rather never had the power to remove her from the post of
Managing Director at all, and therefore the sanction order dated
15.05.2023 issued by the Board of Directors cannot be a valid sanction
under Section 19(1)(c) in the first instance and it is therefore non est ,
void, and a nullity. This is precisely the ground pleaded by the
Petitioner in ground (K) of the Petition. In my opinion, it is a pure
question of law to be decided by the Court at the threshold.
37. In view of the above, it is argued by the Petitioner that there
is no sanction at all in the eyes of law and therefore the stage of
Section 19(3) has not reached. Though both the sides have also argued
on submissions relating to failure of justice, I need not detain myself
any further in view of my above observations and findings with those
submissions any further since in view of the aforesaid findings, I have
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come to the definite conclusion that there is a clear absence of valid
sanction in the present case. Absence of valid sanction being a
jurisdictional fact goes to the root of the matter and is an issue of law
to be decided at the threshold. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, power to remove the Managing Director and Chief
Executive Officer of the ICICI Bank exclusively belongs to and is in the
domain of the Reserve Bank of India alone under Section 36-AA of the
BR Act, a power which Section 36-AC places above any other law,
contract and instrument, and which Sections 5-A(a) and 5-A(b) r/w
35-B(1)(b) confirms by requiring the Reserve Bank of India's previous
approval for terminating or ending the appointment of such an officer.
In that view of the matter, Board of Directors of ICICI Bank cannot be
the authority competent to remove the Petitioner, and therefore accord
sanction for prosecution and hence the document of sanction for
prosecution issued by the Board dated 15.05.2023 is not a valid
sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act. It is seen that there is
no statutory provision which confers power on the Board of Directors
to issue such a sanction. Such power of the Board has not been
identified in the sanction which has been issued, nor in the Board
resolution which has been passed by the said Board, nor in the CBI's
request letter issued to the Board of Directors, copy of which is
extracted in the Board Resolution, and neither in the CBI's affidavit-in-
reply nor in their written submissions. Further, once it is the case of the
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Bank itself that there was no financial loss whatsoever caused to the
bank, then in the background of such a stance adopted by the Bank,
the indictment of the Petitioner cannot be sustained. This is a very
important stance of the Board reproduced in the sanction order as well
as its Extract of the Minutes of Meeting. The CBI cannot therefore
approbate and reprobate at the same time in such facts.
38.
Once the CBI itself records the alleged Competent Authority's
submissions that the rules and policies of the bank were not
contravened whatsoever in disbursement of the 2 loan amounts to
Videocon Group of Industries by the Committee of which Petitioner
was one of the Members and that no wrongful loss whatsoever was
caused to the bank, then the impugned sanction order by the Board of
Directors is even otherwise unsustainable in law. Petitioner was not
the sole member of the Committee which granted the two loans to
Videocon Group of Industries.
39. It is trite law that sanction is the basis of prosecution of
accused person under Section 19 of PC Act and absence of such
sanction, makes the entire trial non est in the eyes of law. In the
present case it is seen that Petitioner raised a question on the
properness of the sanction granted. Petitioner was the Managing
Director of ICICI Bank, a banking company governed by the provisions
of the BR Act and Respondent No.1 seeks to prosecute Petitioner for
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offences under the PC Act which admittedly requires grant of sanction
from the Competent Authority. However, as I have held above, the
Board of Directors of ICICI Bank is not the Competent Authority to
grant sanction since it is a body constituted under the provisions of
Companies Act, 1956 whose power is specifically overruled by the
provisions of the BR Act which have been discussed and enumerated
herein above. Since sanction in the present case is granted by an
incompetent authority, such sanction ipso facto becomes illegal and a
nullity as a result of which cognizance taken by the Special Court of
the offence under the PC Act is illegal and deserves to be set aside.
40.
Perusal of the impugned sanction and Extract of Board
Resolution would show that only the letter addressed by Respondent
No.1 and its Report was circulated to the Board of Directors and the
material so collected by Respondent No.1 was never placed before the
Board of Directors for its perusal and consideration for grant of
sanction under Section 19 of PC Act. Attention is drawn to the case of
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) wherein it was held that grant of
sanction is not a mere idle formality but a sacred procedure to be
followed which shows that the Competent Authority granted sanction
to prosecute under Section 19. The relevant paragraph Nos.15 and 16
(wherein substantial legal propositions have been summarized for the
exercise of sanction) of the above decision in the context of grant of
sanction and parameters to be considered is reproduced below for ease
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of reference:-
“15. Consideration of the material implies application of mind.
Therefore, the order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the
sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other
material placed before it. In every individual case, the
prosecution has to establish and satisfy the court by leading
evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning
authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same. If
the sanction order on its face indicates that all relevant material
i.e. FIR, disclosure statements, recovery memos, draft charge-
sheet and other materials on record were placed before the
sanctioning authority and if it is further discernible from the
recital of the sanction order that the sanctioning authority
perused all the material, an inference may be drawn that the
sanction had been granted in accordance with law. This
becomes necessary in case the court is to examine the validity of
the order of sanction inter alia on the ground that the order
suffers from the vice of total non-application of mind. (Vide
Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. R. [(1947-48) 75 IA 30 :
(1948) 61 LW 257 : AIR 1948 PC 82] ; Jaswant Singh v. State of
Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124 : 1958 Cri LJ 265] , Mohd. Iqbal
Ahmed v. State of A.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 172 : 1979 SCC (Cri)
926] , State v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani [(1996) 4
SCC 472 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 755] , State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal
Bhatti [(2009) 17 SCC 92 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 949] , Satyavir
Singh Rathi, ACP v. State [(2011) 6 SCC 1 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri)
782] and State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain [(2013) 8 SCC
119 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 515 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 85] .)
16. In view of the above, the legal propositions can be
summarised as under:
16.1. The prosecution must send the entire relevant record to
the sanctioning authority including the FIR, disclosure
statements, statements of witnesses, recovery memos, draft
charge-sheet and all other relevant material. The record so sent
should also contain the material/document, if any, which may
tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the basis of
which, the competent authority may refuse sanction.
16.2. The authority itself has to do complete and conscious
scrutiny of the whole record so produced by the prosecution
independently applying its mind and taking into consideration
all the relevant facts before grant of sanction while discharging
its duty to give or withhold the sanction.
16.3. The power to grant sanction is to be exercised strictly
keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available
to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.
16.4. The order of sanction should make it evident that the
authority had been aware of all relevant facts/materials and had
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applied its mind to all the relevant material.
16.5. In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish
and satisfy the court by leading evidence that the entire relevant
facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and the
authority had applied its mind on the same and that the
sanction had been granted in accordance with law.”
41.
None of the aforesaid legal propositions which are
summarized have been followed by the Board of Directors of ICICI
Bank while allowing sanction to prosecute the Petitioner neither the
order of sanction makes it so evident that there was application of
mind to all relevant material. In the present case, neither was the
authority that granted such sanction to prosecute competent to do so
but further it only had the opportunity of perusing the letter and a
Report addressed by Respondent No.1 for seeking grant of sanction to
prosecute the Petitioner. Therefore there is an inherent lack of
application of mind on part of the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank as
they ought to have called for the supporting material , if any, collected
by Respondent No.1 in pursuance of its investigation of Petitioner. It is
seen that no material disclosing commission of offences under the PC
Act was placed before the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank and
sanction was granted only on the basis of allegations contained in the
letter addressed by Respondent No.1 and the Report circulated by CBI
mechanically without giving any reasons whatsoever, hence such
sanction cannot be termed as sanction under Section 19 of PC Act,
therefore it can be said that there never was any sanction issued to
prosecute Petitioner for offences under the PC Act.
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42. It is seen that there is total non compliance of the directions
laid down in paragraph Nos.15 and 16 of the aforementioned decision
which has inevitably led to severe prejudice of Petitioner’s rights in law
and hence leading to a total failure of justice. There is not an ounce of
evidence to show that the sanctioning authority considered any
material collected by Respondent No.1, if any, in its investigation of
Petitioner. There is not a whisper of any discussion on the evidence
against Petitioner, if any, neither in the Minutes of Meeting of Board of
Directors nor in the sanction granted therefrom, instead a mere
conjecture and allegation is stated therein which cannot form a
reasonable basis to prosecute the Petitioner even otherwise.
43. The aforementioned position is further reinforced by the law

laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ameerjan (supra)
wherein it was held that before passing order granting sanction for
prosecution, the entire material collected against the accused must be
placed before the Sanctioning / Competent authority for grant of
sanction. The relevant paragraph No.10 thereof is reproduced below
for ease of reference:-
“10. For the aforementioned purpose, indisputably, application
of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority is imperative.
The order granting sanction must be demonstrative of the fact
that there had been proper application of mind on the part of
the sanctioning authority. We have noticed hereinbefore that
the sanctioning authority had purported to pass the order of
sanction solely on the basis of the report made by the Inspector
General of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta. Even the said report
has not been brought on record. Thus, whether in the said
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report, either in the body thereof or by annexing therewith the
relevant documents, IG Police, Karnataka Lokayukta had placed
on record the materials collected on investigation of the matter
which would prima facie establish existence of evidence in
regard to the commission of the offence by the public servant
concerned is not evident. Ordinarily, before passing an order of
sanction, the entire records containing the materials collected
against the accused should be placed before the sanctioning
authority. In the event, the order of sanction does not indicate
application of mind as (sic to) the materials placed before the
said authority before the order of sanction was passed, the same
may be produced before the court to show that such materials
had in fact been produced.”
44. The words of the Supreme Court deserve reiteration in the
present case as it is seen that the impugned sanction clearly shows no
application of mind on the part of the alleged Competent Authority
save and except mere mention of allegation against Petitioner engaging
in bribery and corruption. The sanction order does not discuss witness
statements neither does it allude to exhibits or documents that point to
Petitioner’s complicity in the offences under the PC Act. It is seen that
the impugned sanction is granted merely on the basis of Respondent
No.1’s report, letter seeking grant of sanction and unsubstantiated
allegation of bribery and corruption, therefore interference of this
Court is warranted in the facts of the present case.
45. In addition to the above, in the present case, Board of
Directors of ICICI Bank is not the Competent Authority to grant
sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of PC Act, instead it is the
Reserve Bank of India which ought to have granted such sanction.
Attention in this regard is drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in
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49
the case of Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi Vs. State of Bhopal wherein it
was held that no Court can take cognizance of the offences in question
without a legal sanction and trial conducted in pursuance of such
illegal cognizance is null and void. The relevant paragraph is
reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:-
“9. The learned counsel for the petitioners invited our
attention to Sections 190, 191, 192, 529 and 530 of the
Criminal Procedure Code and submitted that in certain
circumstances the Code drew a distinction between
“jurisdiction” and “taking cognizance”. The whole fabric of the
argument of the learned counsel was founded on this
distinction. Assuming, however, that in certain cases one
Magistrate may take cognizance and another Magistrate may try
an accused person, it is difficult to appreciate how any court can
try the petitioners of these cases in the absence of a sanction in
view of the mandatory provisions of Section 6 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947. If no court can take cognizance of the
offences in question without a legal sanction, it is obvious that
no court can be said to be a court of competent jurisdiction to
try those offences and that any trial in the absence of such
sanction must be null and void, and the sections of the Code on
which the learned counsel for the petitioners relied have really
no bearing on the matter. Section 530 of the Code is really
against the contention of the learned counsel, for it states, inter
alia, that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law to try
an offender, tries him, then the proceedings shall be void.
Section 529(e) is merely an exception in the matter of taking
cognizance of an offence under Section 190 sub-section (1)
clauses (a) and (b); it has no bearing in a case where sanction is
necessary and no sanction in accordance with law has been
obtained.”
46. As a sequitur to this position, the Special Court ought not to
mechanically have taken cognizance of the chargesheet in Petitioner’s
case and instead ought to have carefully perused the impugned
sanction to understand whether the authority that granted it was
competent to do so in law in the present case. In view of the above
49 (1957) 1 SCC 338
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findings, the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank is not the Competent
Authority to grant the sanction and that power vests with the RBI.
Further whether the sanction showed application of mind and due
consideration of the material placed before it while deciding grant of
sanction for prosecution on perusal would show that there is no
discussion whatsoever of the material placed before the sanctioning
Authority nor any reasons assigned by the Sanctioning Authority for
grant of sanction. In the present case, the Special Court did neither,
causing great prejudice to Petitioner’s rights in law. Though it is true
that trial has not commenced, the very fact that cognizance is taken
on the basis of the impugned defective sanction itself nullifies all past
and future procedure followed by the Special Court. Nullity of sanction
goes to the root of prosecution's case in proceedings under the PC Act
as it is a jurisdictional foundational fact and it would stand on the
same pedestal as an absent sanction.
47. In view of the aforementioned findings and observations, it is
writ large on the face of record that the impugned sanction dated
15.05.2023 is illegal and deserves to be set aside on the grounds that
the authority that granted the same is not the Competent Authority
and it completely failed to apply its mind to the material, or lack
thereof, placed before it while granting sanction thereby warranting
interference of this Court. In that view of the matter, the sanction
order dated 15.05.2023 is unsustainable in law being a nullity and is
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quashed and set aside. Writ Petition is allowed in the above terms and
in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) as prayed for in the Petition
which read thus:
“(a) issue appropriate writ(s), order(s) and/or directions(s)
whereby this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to Quash the
Sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
dated 15.05.2023 to prosecute the Petitioner in Case No.
RCBD1/2019/E/0001/BSFB, New Delhi;
(b) Issue appropriate writ(s), order(s) and/or directions(s)
whereby this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to and
consequentially quash and set aside the consequential actions
taken pursuant to the Impugned Sanction Order by the Learned
Special Court for CBI at Greater Bombay in CBI Special Case No.
874 of 2023 titled as CBI CASE NO. RCBD1/2019/E/00001
Versus M/s. Videocon International Electronics Ltd. & Ors”
48. Writ Petition is allowed and disposed.

[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
49.
After this Judgement is pronounced, Mr. Patil, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1 – CBI persuades the
Court to grant stay to the present Judgement for a period of eight (8)
weeks to enable the Respondent No.1 to challenge the legality and
validity of this Judgement. I have considered the request made by Mr.
Patil, however in view of the reasons which are given in the aforesaid
Judgement, the said request for grant of stay stands declined.
[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
Digitally signed
by RAVINDRA
MOHAN
AMBERKAR
Date:
2026.11.18
14:11:05 +0530
RAVINDRA
MOHAN
AMBERKAR
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