STATE OF GUJARAT vs MUSTAKBHAI SAVALIBHAI VEPARI
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
R/CR.A/47/2013 (GJHC240436572013) JUDGMENT DATED: 07/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 47 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
୰
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
MUSTAKBHAI SAVALIBHAI VEPARI & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR YUVRAJ BRAHMBHATT ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Appellant(s) No. 1
ABATED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2
HCLS COMMITTEE(4998) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 4
MR. ARSHADSHA S MADAR(14435) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.
3
YAGNESHKUMAR S JOSHI(8074) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 4
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 07/09/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant – State of
Gujarat under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’ for short) against
the judgment and order dated 31.10.2012 passed by the
nd
learned Special Judge (Atrocity) and 2 Additional Sessions
Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Viramgam (hereinafter be referred
to as “the Trial Court), in Special Atrocity Case No.11 of 2011
whereby the Trial Court had acquitted the respondents -
accused from the charges under Sections 325, 323, 504,
506(2) r/w Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
be referred to as the “IPC”) and Section 3(1)(x) of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocity)
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Act, 1989 (hereinafter be referred to as the “Atrocity Act”) .
2. It appears that, vide order dated 17.8.2026 passed by this
Court, the present appeal was abated qua respondent Nos. 1
and 2. Accordingly, the present appeal survives only qua
respondent No. 3.
3. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the
complainant - Bharatbhai Prabhudas Parmar, lodged a
complaint on 31.03.2011, stating that he resides in Viramgam
and works as a daily wage laborer. An ice factory owned by
Mustakbhai Savalibhai is located in his neighborhood, and
adjacent to it is a godown belonging to Yusufbhai Savalibhai
for storing ammonia gas cylinders used in ice manufacturing.
About a week prior to the incident, a gas leak occurred there
for unknown reasons, causing a general panic. Furthermore,
heavy vehicles used for transport to their godown and factory
are frequently parked near the complainant's house in an
obstructive manner.
3.1 On 31.3.2011 at around 3:15 PM, while the complainant
was at home, a 407 tempo truck and a motorcycle were
parked in front of his house, causing an obstruction. When the
complainant asked Mustakbhai and his brother Yusufbhai
regarding the vehicle parking, they got enraged and started
hurling verbal abuses. During the altercation, their nephew
Makbulbhai Ganibhai armed with a sword, Mustakbhai Savali
with a wooden stick, and Yusufbhai Savali holding a pipe
arrived at the scene aggressively. Yusufbhai struck the
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complainant's right palm with the pipe, injuring his index
finger, and delivered a second blow to his back. When the
complainant raised an alarm, his relative Jayaben and other
residents from the neighborhood arrived from nearby and
rescued him from further assault. While leaving, the accused
threatened the complainant and used filthy and abusive
language referring to his caste.
3.2 In view of the above facts, the complainant lodged a
complaint against the accused persons at Viramgam Town
Police Station.
3.3 After completing the investigation of the offence, the
Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet against the
accused before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Viramgam. The said charge-sheet was registered
before that Court as Criminal Case No. 665/2011. However, as
the power to conduct the trial of the said case vested
exclusively with the Special Judge (Atrocity) and Additional
Sessions Court, Viramgam, the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Viramgam, committed the case to the Sessions
Court, Viramgam, under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, where it was registered as Special Atrocity Case
No. 11/2011.
3.4 After the case was committed, the charge was framed
against the accused vide Exh. 11. The statements of the
accused were thereafter recorded vide Exhs. 12 to 14, and the
contents of the charge were read over and explained to them
in accordance with Section 228(2) of the Cr.P.C. As the
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accused denied having committed the offence, the trial was
proceeded with further. To prove its case before the Trial
Court, prosecution has examined 12 witnesses and led 15
documentary evidence.
3.5 After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on
records, the trial Court by impugned judgment and order has
acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against
them.
3.6 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment and order of acquittal the appellant-State has
preferred this Appeal.
4. Heard Mr.Yuvraj Brahmbhatt, learned APP for the
appellant, Mr. Madar, learned counsel for respondent No.3
and Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for respondent No.4.
5. Learned APP has submitted that the order of acquittal
dated 31.10.2012 passed by the Trial Court is contrary to law
and the evidence on record. He has submitted that the Trial
Court ought to have appreciated that the prosecution had
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by cogent, reliable
and trustworthy evidence.
5.1 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has erred
in holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that, on 31.03.2011 at about 15:15 hours,
the accused persons, in furtherance of their common
intention, quarrelled with the complainant regarding the
parking of trucks and, during the said incident, accused No.2
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inflicted an iron pipe blow on the finger of the complainant,
thereby causing a fracture. Thus, the accused persons
committed offences punishable under Sections 323, 325 and
114 of the IPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court, being improper and contrary to law
and evidence, deserves to be quashed and set aside.
5.2 Learned APP has submitted that PW-8, complainant was
examined at Exh.28 and fully supported the prosecution case
as narrated by him. He has clearly stated as to how the
incident occurred and what was done by the accused persons
at the time of the incident. However, the Trial Court has failed
to properly appreciate the evidence of the complainant and
has discarded and disbelieved his testimony while arriving at
the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused persons had committed the
offences charged against them.
5.3 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court ought to
have appreciated that PW-6 Jayaben Parshotambhai, an
eyewitness, was examined at Exh.24. The said eyewitness fully
supported the prosecution case and corroborated the version
narrated by the complainant in his complaint. She has clearly
stated as to how the incident occurred and what was done by
the accused persons at the time of the incident. However, the
Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate her evidence and
has discarded and disbelieved her testimony while arriving at
the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused persons had committed the
offences charged against them.
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5.4 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court ought to
have appreciated that PW-11- Investigating Officer was
examined at Exh.42 and fully supported the prosecution case.
He also produced the original FIR at Exh.29. Thus, the Trial
Court has committed a grave error apparent on the face of the
record by failing to properly appreciate this material evidence
available on record.
5.5 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court failed to
appreciate that PW-2 Ahemadbhai Aadambhai Kheduvora was
examined at Exh.17 and PW-3 Yakubbhai Kasambhai Chhipa
was examined at Exh.19. Though both the panch witnesses
turned hostile to the prosecution case, they admitted their
signatures on the relevant panchnama. In such circumstances,
the Trial Court ought to have appreciated their evidence in its
proper perspective and considered the other evidence
available on record to ascertain the truth and do complete
justice in accordance with law. The failure to do so has
resulted in an erroneous appreciation of evidence.
5.6 Learned APP has submitted that merely because some of
the witnesses examined by the prosecution did not support
the prosecution case and some of them turned hostile, the
Trial Court ought not to have discarded the entire prosecution
case. The evidence of such witnesses ought to have been
evaluated in the light of the evidence of the Investigating
Officer and the other material evidence available on record.
The prosecution case, when considered as a whole, clearly
establishes the occurrence and the involvement of accused
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No.1. The Trial Court has, therefore, committed a grave error
in discarding and disbelieving the prosecution version and in
arriving at the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons had
committed the offences punishable under the aforesaid
provisions of law.
5.7 In view of the above submissions, learned APP urges
before the Court that the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the Trial Court may be quashed and set
aside.
6. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent
accused has supported the judgment and order of acquittal.
6.1 Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial
Court is legal, just, and proper and has been passed after
thorough appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence available on record. The Trial Court has assigned
cogent, convincing, and well-reasoned findings while
acquitting the respondent–accused, and the same does not
warrant any interference by this Court.
6.2 Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against
the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence led by
the prosecution suffers from material contradictions,
omissions, and inconsistencies, which create serious doubt
about the veracity of the prosecution case. The prosecution
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has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged
offences and has not produced reliable, trustworthy, and
corroborative evidence connecting the respondent with the
commission of the alleged offence.
6.3 It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is further
strengthened by an order of acquittal. Unless the findings
recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal,
or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should be slow in interfering with an order of acquittal.
6.4 It is submitted that the appellant has failed to point out
any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence
in the impugned judgment and order. The findings recorded
by the Trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the
evidence and settled legal principles. The Trial Court has
rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the respondents–
accused, which is a substantive right flowing from the
fundamental principles of criminal law.
6.5 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is
submitted that the present appeal is devoid of merits and
deserves to be dismissed. The impugned judgment and order
of acquittal passed by the Trial Court therefore deserves to be
confirmed.
7. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well
as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for
both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this
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Court are as under:-
Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of
law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
8. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal of
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the
evidence recorded by the Trial Court, it is appropriate to first
examine the facts of the case. That the complainant,
Bharatbhai Prabhudas Parmar, a daily wage labourer residing
in Viramgam, alleged that on 31.03.2011 at about 3:15 PM, a
407 tempo and motorcycle were obstructively parked in front
of his house. When he questioned Mustakbhai Savalibhai and
Yusufbhai Savalibhai about the parking, they abused him and,
along with their nephew Makbulbhai Ganibhai, assaulted him.
Makbulbhai was carrying a sword, Mustakbhai a wooden
stick, and Yusufbhai a pipe. Yusufbhai struck the complainant
on his right palm and back, causing injury. Neighbours
intervened and rescued him. While leaving, the accused
allegedly threatened him and used caste-related abusive
language. The complainant thereafter lodged a complaint at
Viramgam Town Police Station.
9. It appears from the deposition of PW-4 that the
respondents had parked their vehicles on the backside of the
complainant’s house. The road adjoining the area known as
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Bharwadi Darwaza was approximately 20 feet wide, and there
was no obstruction caused by the parking of the vehicles.
Sufficient space remained for vehicles to pass easily. Thus,
even from the evidence of PW-4, it is clear that the vehicles
were not parked in front of the complainant’s house, but on
the backside, where there was no window or door.
Considering the deposition of PW-4, read with the evidence of
PW-7, Vasantbhai Prabhudas Parmar, the real brother of the
complainant, and PW-6, all of whom have stated that the
vehicles were parked on the backside and not in front of the
complainant’s house, the cause stated by the complainant for
the alleged incident is not supported by the evidence and
appears to be false.
10. So far as the presence of Vasantbhai Prabhudas Parmar
is concerned, there is a material contradiction. In the
complaint at Exhibit 29, the complainant did not mention that
Vasantbhai Prabhudas Parmar was present at the time of the
incident. However, Vasantbhai Prabhudas Parmar deposed
before the Court as an eyewitness and claimed to have
intervened in the incident. This creates a serious
contradiction which goes to the root of the prosecution’s case.
Further, regarding the injury allegedly sustained by PW-8, the
complainant did not disclose the names of the alleged
assailants while giving the history before the doctor. PW-5,
Dr. Feroz Mohammadsidiq Jamali, has also stated that the
injury could have been caused by a person falling on the
ground. This aspect was specifically admitted by the doctor in
cross-examination. The evidence of PW-5 Dr. Feroz
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Mohammadsidiq Jamali and PW-9, Brijesh Narendrasinh
Sisodiya, therefore, does not conclusively support the
prosecution’s case.
11. The independent panch witnesses have also not
supported the prosecution’s case. Moreover, the prosecution
has failed to establish that the complainant belongs to a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Though a caste
certificate was produced on record, the same was not duly
proved in accordance with law. Even, the officer before whom
the complaint was lodged, admitted in his deposition that
during the course of investigation he had not recorded the
statements of independent witnesses. He also admitted that
certain facts stated by the witnesses before the Court were
not stated before the Investigating Officer during the
investigation. It further emerges from the evidence that there
was an existing dispute regarding the construction of a toilet
by PW-6, the cousin sister of the complainant, on the backside
of the premises. Respondent No.2 had objected to the said
construction by submitting an application before the
Viramgam Municipality, pursuant to which further
construction was stayed. This objection and the stay order
were only three days prior to the incident. Although the
relevant documents were produced on record during the
course of the statements under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the Investigating Officer neither
investigated this aspect nor collected any information from
the Viramgam Municipality regarding the dispute or the
alleged stay.
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12. It is also admitted that the presence of Vasantbhai
Prabhudas Parmar was not mentioned by the complainant
during the investigation. The investigation further revealed
that the respondents’ ice factory was situated behind the
complainant’s residence and that there was no window or
door on the backside facing the road. Thus, the alleged cause
of the incident is not supported by the evidence of the
witnesses, nor has the prosecution established any other
material fact sufficient to prove the guilt of the respondents.
In the absence of proof of the fundamental ingredients of the
alleged offences, the Trial Court rightly passed the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal. No illegality, perversity, or
infirmity can be found in the impugned judgment and order.
13. So far as the allegation under Section 3(1)(x) of the
Atrocities Act is concerned, the prosecution has miserably
failed to establish the essential ingredients of the said offence.
Therefore, upon appreciation of the oral as well as
documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court was justified
in passing the impugned judgment and order.
14. Now, So far as basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of
Atrocity Act is concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus
State Of Kerala reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more
particularly head notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:-
“(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u) - decline to grant anticipatory bail - when can it be said
that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint - held,
'prima facie' is a Latin term that translates to "at first sight" or
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"based on first impression" - expression "where no prima facie
materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR" should be
understood as "when based on first impression, no offence is made
out as shown in FIR or complaint" - this means that when
necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are
not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to
exist prima facie.
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 - rejection of
application for anticipatory bail - legal bar - duty of Court - in
present case, an accused may argue that although allegations
levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence
under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on
account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea
for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act,
1989 - however, if accused puts forward case of malicious
prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the
same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution - however, powers
u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of
complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case - thus, if all ingredients
necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint,
then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused -
duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts
with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to
the accused - Courts should not shy away from conducting a
preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in
complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to
constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 - it is expected of courts
to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations
levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients
constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be
independent and without being influenced by the provisions
figuring in complaint/FIR - words "having committed an offence
under this Act" denote that it is only when accusation in complaint
clearly points towards commission of an offence under the Act,
1989 that bar of S. 18 would apply - minimum threshold for
determining whether an offence under the Act has been committed
or not is to ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary
to constitute offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not -
accusation which does not disclose necessary ingredients of
offence on a prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to
bring into operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - in
cases like the one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to
look into materials based upon which complaint has been
registered, in addition to verifying the averments made in the
complaint - if on a prima facie reading of materials referred to in
complaint and complaint itself, ingredients necessary for
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constituting offence are not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not
be applicable - hence, it would be open to Courts to consider plea
for grant pre-arrest bail on its own merits.
(f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) - whether averments in
FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no - in present case appellant is
alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of
reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against
complainant - there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to
indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by
appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC
- from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is
at inimical terms with complainant - his intention may be to malign
or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant
belongs to a Scheduled Caste - offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a
SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member
for reason that he belongs to such community - S. 3(1)(r) of the
Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or
intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or
ST - object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the
reason of their caste status.
(g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r) - expression "intent to humiliate" -
words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r)
of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person
who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation - not every
intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST
community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation - it
is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes
place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to
reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the
"upper castes" over the "lower castes/untouchables", notions of
purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or
intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 - mere fact that
person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST
would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of
accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation -
humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a
psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart -
distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation -
resistance is internal to humiliation - thus, those who are
humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it -
however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition
from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to
margins - this apprehension of opposition and push back from
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dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of
Objects of the Act, 1989 - thus, term humiliation as it appears in S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it
deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation
is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
(h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 - S. 7(1)(d) - Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 -
grant of anticipatory bail - legal bar - it is clear from a plain
reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult
against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the
ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a
maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act - Civil
Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based
offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to enactment
of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for
combating such practices - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus,
be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act - thus, words
"with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST" become
inseparable from underlying idea of "untouchability" which is
sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 - having
regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory
statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima
facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC -
if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute
appellant accordingly - however, complainant could not have
invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is
member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of
transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of
appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant.
15. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir
Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes
375 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3.
Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name
in any place within public view;
10. The expression any place within public view has been
interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in
Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on
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Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this
Court reaffirmed that:
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public
view, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the
accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
taken place at a place within public view.
11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses
were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the
premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does
not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in
any place within public view, which is an essential component of
the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of
the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not
been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded
under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the
caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view.
13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that
the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the
complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses
were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants
and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.
14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the
material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised
on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST
Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie
case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against
the Appellants.
15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked
with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is
equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the
truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or
complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the
complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High
Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the
summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of
the SC/ST Act.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the
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SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to
interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings
initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it
pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in
accordance with law.”
16. Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus
State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi
Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705, Gunjan @ Girija
Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi) reported in 2026 (0)
AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh Versus State Of Telangana
reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC) 2499, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has taken a similar view. In the decision of this Court in the
case of State Of Gujarat Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor
reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been
taken by this Court.
17. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that
unless the basic ingredients required to attract the provisions
of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are proved and
established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held
liable under the said provision. In the absence of the
fulfilment of such basic ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order in favour of the
present respondents.
18. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it
transpires that the respondents-accused has established his
innocence before the learned Trial Court and that, after due
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and
other material placed on record, the learned Trial Court has
rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
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The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are just,
proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law
and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court.
19. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
20. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
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evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find
out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.
21. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43 , which was subsequently re-
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another , reported in [ 2022] 3 SCC 471 ,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the trial Court.
22. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169 , wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
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and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
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testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
23. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
24. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal
is liable to be dismissed.
25. In view of the above, t h e present appeal is devoid of rits
and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed.
The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled.
Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial
Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
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