AMARBEN W/O DEVABHAI CHAUHAN vs STATE OF GUJARAT
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
R/CR.MA/16400/2016 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/10/2026
(GJHC240552652016)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET
ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 16400 of 2016
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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AMARBEN W/O DEVABHAI CHAUHAN & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR HARDIK A DAVE(3764) for the Applicant(s) No.
1,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,2,20,21,22,23,24,25,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
MR Y J PATEL(3985) for the Applicant(s) No.
1,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,2,20,21,22,23,24,25,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
MR P P MAJMUDAR(5284) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS NIYATI B KATIRA(5095) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
Date : 19/10/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Rule . learned advocates for the respective respondents
waive service.
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2. Considering the controversy involved in the matter, with the
consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the
matter is taken up for final hearing today.
3. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the Code) by this application, the
applicants have prayed to quash the FIR being C.R. No. I-30 of
2016, dated 17.06.2016, lodged before Tankara Police Station, Dist.:
Morbi for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, and 114
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
4. The gravamen of the FIR is that in the year 2013, the de facto
complainant intended to purchase an agricultural land in an
adjacent Taluka of Rajkot District. In January 2013, he visited
Latipar Chowkdi at Tankara, where he met one Babubhai Hirabhai
Japda (resident of Jabalpur) and Bhalabhai Dharabhai Japda
(resident of Tankara). Upon inquiring about roadside agricultural
land, both individuals informed of a parcel of land situated at
Village: Saraya, Taluka: Tankara, belonging to members of the
Dalit community. They represented that the land was currently
under Government custody/dispute, but would be sold upon
release, subject to legal assistance and cooperation. Thereafter,
both individuals accompanied him to inspect the land bearing
Survey No. 1 paiki 6, admeasuring approximately 16 acres. The
intermediaries took the de facto complainant to the village to meet
the original owners and legal heirs. With the explicit consent of all
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family members, Babubhai Japda and Bhalabhai Japda finalized
the transaction in his presence, wherein all heirs agreed that once
the land was released by the authorities, it would not be sold to
any third party. Accordingly, on March 2013, a
registered/notarized Agreement to Sell and a Special Power of
Attorney were executed on a Rs. 100/- stamp paper before Notary
Shri Dhirubha H. Parmar at Rajkot in the presence of the said
intermediaries. Pursuant to the Agreement, an initial sum of Rs.
4,50,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh Fifty Thousand only) was paid to
the legal heirs via account payee cheque. Towards assuming full
responsibility for perfecting title in favor of the de facto
complainant, Babubhai Japda and Bhalabhai Japda demanded an
additional Rs. 18,00,000/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakh only), which was
duly disbursed to them through payment vouchers. On
12.06.2015, the District Collector, Morbi passed an order restoring
the said land to the original owners, and corresponding revenue
entries were mutated at the Mamlatdar Office, Tankara. Despite
repeated requests and reminders calling upon Babubhai Japda,
Bhalabhai Japda, and the legal heirs to honour their contractual
obligations and execute the Sale Deed, the accused evasively failed
to perform their part. Instead of executing the registered
conveyance, the legal heirs issued a formal notice to cancel and
revoke the Special Power of Attorney dated 22.03.2013. Thus, the
legal heirs, acting in active collusion and criminal conspiracy with
Babubhai Hirabhai Japda and Bhalabhai Dharabhai Japda, have
dishonestly induced the de facto complainant to part with Rs.
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22,50,000/- (by cheque and vouchers) alongside substantial cash
sums, acting in clear breach of their contractual obligations and
thus, the accused persons have committed offenses of cheating,
dishonest inducement, and criminal breach of trust and on the said
facts, FIR in question came to be registered.
5. Heard, learned advocate Mr. Y. J. Patel for the applicants,
learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Rohan Shah for the
respondent No. 1 – State and learned advocate Mr. P. P. Majmudar
for the respondent No. 2 - de facto complainant, at length.
5.1 The bone contention of the learned advocate for the
applicants is that the ingredients of the offence alleged against the
present applicants are not at all satisfied.
5.2 The learned advocate for the applicants, at the outset, would
submit that the dispute, is of civil in nature which is being given a
criminal colour.
5.3 It is submitted that the impugned FIR is filed by the de facto
complainant with an oblique and ulterior motive to pressurize the
applicants having failed to obtain any specific order from the from
the Civil Court in Special Civil Suit No. 13 of 2016 filed by the
respondent No. 2, which is filed on 09.02.2016 whereas, the FIR in
question is dated 17.06.2016.
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5.4 The learned advocate for the applicants would further
submit that even a bare perusal of the FIR in question, while no
ingredients of the offence alleged are satisfied at all, the same is
filed after a delay of three years, for which no plausible
explanation is forthcoming on record.
5.5 It is further submitted by the learned advocate for the
applicants that power of attorney dated 22.03.2013 was cancelled
by the applicants by giving a public notice issued in the local
newspaper and thus, the complainant was well aware about the
said aspect.
5.6 The learned advocate for the applicants further submitted
that prior to filing of the civil suit, a legal notice was issued by the
de facto complainant to the present applicants, which was replied
by the present applicants on 05.10.2015 through their lawyer and
asked to provide the copy of the Agreement to Sell, which is yet
not provided.
5.7 The learned advocate would submit that while entering into
the Agreement to Sell, the complainant was well aware about the
fact that the land in question was vested under the Government
and certain revenue proceedings were going on. That on
12.06.2015, the District Collector, Morbi passed the order and re-
granted the land in question to the original owners and that, an
Entry being No. 2524 was also mutated in the revenue records. It
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is submitted that pursuant to the same, succession entry came to
be mutated in the revenue records being Entry No. 2529 to which,
the de facto complainant also filed objection, which came to be
rejected and that, vide order dated 25.01.2026, the said entry came
to be certified by the Mamlatdar, Tankara. Thus, the complainant
having lost before the revenue authority, filed the civil suit on
09.02.2016 and thus, having availed all the remedies, present FIR is
filed, which is required to be quashed and set aside as the case
clearly falls within the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in
the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604] .
5.8 Making such submissions, it is urged that present FIR and
the consequential proceedings qua the applicants may be quashed
and set aside as no prima facie case is made out against the present
applicants.
6. Conversely , the learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 - de
facto complainant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
would submit that a prima facie strong case has been made out
against the present applicants from the bare reading of the FIR
itself and that the fact of having entered into Agreement to Sell
with two other persons namely Daudbhai Gulammahmmad
Sandhi (Padhiyar) and Laxmanbhai Virambhai Mer (Odedara) is
also not denied by the present applicants. Under the circumstance,
it is submitted that when a prima facie case is made out, this Court
may not interfere at this stage.
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6.1 It is submitted that it is trite that at the stage of considering
the quashing application, the Court is to conduct a mini trial. It is
submitted that on account of stay granted by the Court,
investigation could not be proceeded further and accordingly,
relying on a decision in Priti Saraf v. State of Nct of Delhi, 2021
(0) AIJEL-SC 67113 = 2021 (16) SCC 142 , it is urged that this
application may not be entertained.
6.2 The learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 submitted
that factum of having received a sum of Rs.4.5 lakh by way of
cheque and Rs.18 lakh by cash is not denied by the present
applicants and thus, having collected a huge amount against the
land, now shirking from their responsibility of entering into the
Sale Deed, in connivance of original accused Nos. 1 and 2 namely
Babubhai Hirabhai Japda and Bhalabhai Dharabhai Japda clearly,
falls within Sections 406 and 420 r/w. Section 114 IPC.
6.3 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the
learned advocate for the de facto complainant would further submit
that as per the settled law of the land, inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code should be used sparingly and with a view
to curb the abuse of process of law. It is submitted that in the case
on hand, a prima facie case is made out against the applicants and
hence, they requested that it is ultimately a matter of trial after
which, the truth could be churned out and hence, these
applications may not be entertained and they urged to be
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dismissed.
7. Heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned
advocates for the parties and carefully gone through the material
placed on record as well as the papers of investigation.
8. Prior to assessing the factual matrix on the touchstone of
criminal jurisprudence, it is apposite to reinforce the settled legal
position governing the scope, ambit, and limits of the inherent
jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the Code. The
jurisprudential parameters regulating the exercise of this
extraordinary power have been authoritatively catalogued by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a long line of precedents, chief among
them being the authoritative in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .
Therein, Hon’ble Supreme Court crystallized seven distinct,
illustrative categories of cases where judicial intervention under
Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution is
necessitated to secure the ends of justice and clip any abuse of the
process of Court. The relevant portion of Paragraph 102 of the said
judgment is extracted below:
“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
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be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give
an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
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a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
8.1 Evaluating the present application on the anvil of the
principles enunciated in Bhajan Lal (supra) , this Court has to
determine whether the allegations in the FIR, even when accepted
at face value, satisfy the essential statutory ingredients of Sections
406 and 420 r/w. Section 114 of the IPC. This Court must ensure
that criminal machinery is not permitted to degenerate into an
engine of harassment where liability under criminal law is
completely absent.
8.2 Allegations in the FIR as well as the affidavit-in-reply reveal
that a huge amount of Rs.22,50,000/- having been handed over to
the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 along with present applicants
and despite such a fact, they are acting contrary to the terms of the
Agreement to Sell and are not agreeing to execute a Sale Deed in
favour of the de facto complainant. Hence, the FIR in question
came to be lodged. However, a perusal of the FIR reveals not an
iota of averment as to how provisions of Section 406 and 420 IPC
are attracted.
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8.3 At this juncture, it is apt here to refer to the decision of the
Apex Court in Radheyshyam and Others v. State of Rajasthan
and Another, 2024 INSC 1064 = 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 76335 ”,
wherein, in a similar situation, the Court observed:
“9. From the bare perusal of the FIR, it is evident that there was
no act of cheating, that is, the complainant was nowhere
fraudulently induced or dishonestly deceived by the appellants. A
commercial transaction took place between the parties during
which the parties consensually agreed for the sale of the property of
the appellants and respondent no. 2 paid the part consideration.
The default in payment of their loan dues on part of the appellants
is not reflective of their deceitful intention towards the
complainant. Mere non-registration of the sale or its refusal cannot
amount to cheating. The delivery of the advance payment towards
consideration was made in furtherance of an Agreement to Sell and
it is not the case of the respondent that he was in anyway deceived
or duped to make such payments to the appellants. It is a civil
dispute and gives rise to the complainant’s right to resort to the
remedies provided under civil law by filing a suit for specific
performance.
10. Additionally, the appellants have also been accused of
committing the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section
406, IPC. This offence is defined under Section 405, IPC as follows:
“Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or
with any dominion over property, dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or
dishonestly uses or disposes off that property in violation of
any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such
trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or
implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such
trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits
“criminal breach of trust”.”
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11. For an offence punishable under Section 406, IPC, the
following ingredients must exist:
i. The accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted
with dominion over property;
ii. The accused had dishonestly misappropriated or
converted to their own use that property, or dishonestly used
or disposed of that property or wilfully suffer any other
person to do so; and
iii. Such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal
should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the
mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract which the person has made, touching the discharge
of such trust.
12. In the present case, the appellants were not entrusted with
any property by respondent no. 2 – complainant. The only delivery
made was of part payment towards an Agreement to Sell between
the parties. The amount paid towards consideration cannot be said
to have been entrusted with the appellants by respondent no. 2.
Additionally, merely because the appellants are refusing to register
the sale, it does not amount to misappropriation of the advance
payment. Since there was no entrustment of property, the offence
of misappropriation of such property and thereby criminal breach
of trust cannot be said to be made out.
13. Therefore, the ingredients of none of the offences alleged in
the FIR are made out against the appellants and thus, no offence
can be said to have been committed by them. The act of the
appellant at best constitutes a civil wrong and does not call for any
criminal action against them. A civil wrong cannot be given a
criminal colour merely to coerce the appellants into registering the
sale. The judicial process cannot be used as a tool to enforce specific
performance of an agreement. Respondent no. 2 has ample remedies
under the civil law and he has already resorted to the same by filing
a civil suit for specific performance which is pending adjudication
before the relevant forum. Thus, such a criminal proceeding cannot
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be allowed to continue.”
8.4 In the case on hand also, on a perusal of the FIR in entirety, it
cannot be said that there is any act of cheating inasmuch as, the
complainant was nowhere fraudulently induced or dishonestly
deceived by the applicants to part with the amount of
Rs.22,50,000/- as alleged in the FIR. The transaction purely of
civil/commercial in nature, took place between the parties and
merely, non-registration of the sale or its refusal, would not
amount to cheating as held by the Apex Court in the case of
Radheyshyam and Others (supra) . It is also evident from the
papers appended along with the application that a civil suit came
to be lodged by the present complainant for specific performance
which is also pending, though was dismissed for default earlier
and subsequently, restored. Thus, delivery of advance payments
in furtherance to Agreement to Sell and when even no case of
complainant having been deceived or duped to make such
payments to the applicants, is made out, is nothing but a civil
dispute, for which, a suit for specific performance is already
preferred by the de facto complainant.
8.5 As far as offence punishable under Section 406 IPC is
concerned, the applicants are not entrusted with any property by
the de facto complainant and the amount paid was against the part
payments towards the Agreement to Sell between the parties
which cannot be termed as entrustment of the property by the
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applicants to the respondent No. 2 and merely, because of the
applicants are refusing to sale the said property, would not
amount to misappropriation of the advance payments under the
Agreement to Sell and thus, having found that there is no
entrustment of property, the offence of misappropriation of such
property, whereby, attracting provisions of offence of criminal
breach of trust cannot be said to be made out. Under the
circumstances the question of invoking Section 114 of the IPC does
not arise.
8.6 As far as the decision in Priti Saraf (supra) , as relied by the
learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 is concerned, the Court
after careful reading of the Complaint / FIR / Charge-sheet
categorically held that it cannot be said that the complaint does not
disclose commission of an offence. It was further held that
ingredients of offence punishable under Sections 406 and 420 IPC
cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the
Complaint / FIR / Charge-sheet and it was categorically observed
that the Complaint / FIR / Charge-sheet indeed revealed the
commercial transaction. Further, held that it is hardly a reason for
holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such
transaction. It was further held that in fact offence of cheating is
committed in the course of commercial transaction and that, the
illustrations have been set out in 415, 418 and 420 of the IPC and in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case, set aside the
judgment of the High Court quashing the FIR.
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8.6.1 However, as observed herein above, the facts are totally
different herein. There is not an iota of averment in the FIR
impugned herein with regard to the fact as to how, the
complainant was induced to part with the payment pursuant to
the Agreement to Sell and thus, however he was cheated. Thus,
when there is no fraudulent or dishonest entrustment by the
applicants under the circumstance, the said decision would be of
no help to the complainant.
8.7 In Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of
Kerala and others, (2015) 8 SCC 293 in Paragraph 12, the Apex
Court held that every breach of contract would not give rise to an
offence of cheating. Only in those cases breach of contract would
amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the
very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later, the
same cannot amount to cheating. In other words, for the purpose
of constituting an offence of cheating, the complaint is required to
show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where
allegations are made about failure on part of the accused to keep
his promise, in absence of a dishonest intention at the time of
making the initial promise, no offence under Section 420 of IPC is
made out. In the instant case, nothing such a sort prima facie
appears on record to substantiate such a fact.
8.8 Further, in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and Others v. State
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of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 73929 : 2024 (10
SCC 690 , the Court held that both offences viz. offence of cheating
viz-a-viz the criminal breach of trust are independent and distinct.
Two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of
facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two provisions of the
IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive
without each other;
8.9 Moreover, though, the aspect of delay can be gone in to
during trial however, considering other attended circumstances
delay also hits to the root of the case as held in the case of Kishan
Singh (Dead) Through LRs v. Gurpal Singh and Others, (2010) 8
SCC 775, the filing of belated FIR without any plausible
explanation would amount to abuse of process of law. The Apex
Court has, in no uncertain terms, observed that:
“In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has to
look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such
an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing
such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an
afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such
cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the
reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the
Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the
other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of
wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations
by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The
court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an
FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of
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a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in
long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view
that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and
circumstances of the case.” (Para 22)
8.10 There is an absolute lack of material demonstrating any
criminality involved in the case on hand as only bare allegations
without any proof therefor, are made in the FIR and that, the
dispute appears to be solely of civil nature to which, criminal
colour is tried to be given.
8.11 Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [AIROnline 2025 SC 956] synthesized the
jurisprudence governing Section 482 of the Code and formulated a
strict four-step analytical framework to evaluate petitions seeking
the quashing of criminal trials at their inception. The framework
dictates:
“ 20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity
of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the
power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC:
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused
is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the
charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is
sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions
contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn
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the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, has not been refuted by the
prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it
cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would
result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not
serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial
conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such
criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing
justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which
would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial...”
8.12 Applying the aforementioned four-step test to the facts on
hand, the case put up by the applicants is of unimpeachable
quality rulling out the factual assertions contained in the FIR and
the material, as such, cannot be justifiably refuted by respondents.
The same cannot be lightly brushed aside by a Court of law, even
at the preliminary stage of quashing.
8.13 Further, in the decision in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia &
Another etc. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others Others,
AIR 1988 SC 709 , the Court held as under:
“ The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution
at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be
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R/CR.MA/16400/2016 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/10/2026
(GJHC240552652016)
applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted
allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is
also for the court to take into consideration any special
features which appear in a particular case to consider
whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to
permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis
that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and
where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate
conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely
to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,
the court may while taking into consideration the special
facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may
be at a preliminary stage. A case of breach of trust may be
both a civil wrong and criminal offence. But there would be
certain situations where it would predominantly be a civil
wrong and may or may not amount to criminal offence. The
instant case is one of that type where, if at all, the facts may
constitute a civil wrong and the ingredients of the criminal
offence are wanting”. (Para 7)
(emphasis supplied)
9. In view of the distinct absence of the essential ingredients
required to attract Sections 406 and 420 and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860, forcing the applicants to endure a full-fledged criminal
trial, would be an exercise in futility, more particularly, the facts
on hand constitute civil wrong lacking ingredients of afore-stated
offences.
10. As a necessary corollary, this application succeeds and is
hereby allowed. FIR being C.R. No. I-30 of 2016, dated 17.06.2016,
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(GJHC240552652016)
lodged before Tankara Police Station, Dist.: Morbi for the offences
punishable under Sections 406, 420, and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 with all consequential criminal proceedings flowing
therefrom, stands quashed and set aside qua the present applicants
only.
10.1 Rule is made absolute in the aforementioned terms.
10.2 It goes without saying that above observations are made for
deciding the present application only, which shall have no bearing
on any other litigation between the parties and the same shall be
decided on its own merits.
10.3 Direct service is permitted.
[ P. M. Raval, J. ]
hiren/20tss191026
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