M/S Pp Plastic And Industries Pvt Ltd vs The Union Of India And 5 Ors

Page No.# 1/13
GAHC010190612022

2026:GAU-AS:6544
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/6110/2022
M/S PP PLASTIC AND INDUSTRIES PVT LTD
A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES
ACT, 2013, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AND PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
BUSINESS AT INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, BONDA, NARENGI, GUWAHATI, PIN-
781026, (ASSAM) AND IS REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR SRI TAPAN GUHA ROY,
RESIDENT OF COAST (1) APARTMENT, FLAT NO. 303, BYE-LANE 16,
JURIPAR PATH, PANJABARI, GUWAHATI-22, P.S. DISPUR, IN THE DISTRICT
OF KAMRUP (M), PIN-781022, ASSAM, CONTACT NO. 9830072078 AND E-
MAIL [email protected].
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS
REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, UDYOG BHAWAN, NEW DELHI-110011
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
DISPUR
GUWAHATI- 781006
3:THE COMMISSIONER OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE
ASSAM
UDYOG BHAWAN
BAMUNIMAIDAM
GUWAHATI - 781021
ASSAM
4:THE DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE

Page No.# 2/13
ASSAM
UDYOG BHAWAN
BAMUNIMAIDAM
GUWAHATI- 781021
5:THE GENERAL MANAGER
DISTRICT INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE CENTRE
KAMRUP (M)
BAMUNIMAIDAM
GUWAHATI- 781021
ASSAM
6:THE CHAIRMAN
STATE LEVEL COMMITTEE

REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN-SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
INDUSTRIES
COMMERCE AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE DEPARTMENT
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
For the Petitioners(s) : Mr. D. Sahu, Advocate

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, Sr. Advocate
Mr. M. Chetia, Govt. Advocate
Ms. N. Devi, Advocate


· Date on which Judgment was reserved : N/A
· Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 12.05.2026
· Whether the pronouncement is of
the Operative Part of the Judgment : No

Whether the full Judgment has been
·
Pronounced : Yes
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. D. Sahu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

Page No.# 3/13
the petitioner. Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel as
well as the learned Dy.SGI assisted by Ms. N. Devi, the learned
counsel appears on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr. M.
Chetia, the learned Government Advocate appears on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 2 to 6.
2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the action
on the part of the respondents in rejecting the petitioner’s claim
under the Central Capital Investment Subsidy Scheme, 2007 to
which the petitioner claims entitlement.
3. The brief facts which led to the filing of the instant writ
petition are that the Government of India had notified the North
East Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy, 2007 dated
01.04.2007 (for short, “the Industrial Policy”). Pursuant to the said
Industrial Policy, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
Government of India (Department of Industrial Policy &
Promotion), issued a scheme for granting incentives towards
capital investment known as the Central Capital Investment
Subsidy Scheme (for short, “the CCIS Scheme”) dated 27.07.2007.
The said scheme was given effect from 01.04.2007.
4. The petitioner being encouraged by the Industrial Policy and

Page No.# 4/13
the incentives announced therein took steps for expansion of its
industrial unit and went into commercial production of the
expanded unit on 29.03.2017.
5. It is the case of the petitioner herein that to avail the benefits
under the CCIS Scheme, various eligibility conditions were set out.
In addition to that, for operationalising the CCIS Scheme,
Operational Guidelines were issued on 07.05.2013. The said
Operational Guidelines stipulated the conditions as well as the
procedure for availing the benefits under the Scheme. For the
purpose of the instant dispute, Clause (vii) of the Operational
Guidelines is relevant, and the same is reproduced hereinunder:
“ (vii) The claims for subsidy under CCIS Scheme of NEIIPP, 2007 have to be
submitted to the concerned DIC in the prescribed Application Forms within one
year from the date of commencement of commercial production. Cases of
delayed registration will be dealt as per the clarification provided vide DIPP
letter No.10(5)/2008-DBA-II/NER dated 25th August, 2008 and letter No.
10/6/2008-DBA II/NER dated 15th March, 2012. In case of units which do not
get themselves registered by 27.07.2007/21.09.2007 due to delayed
notifications of the scheme and have subsequently got themselves registered
latest by 31.12.2008, claims submitted by these units within one year of
registration could be deemed admissible, if State Level Committee (SLC)
deems the case fit for condoning the delay. Any other case for subsequent
waiver will be dealt on case specific basis by DIPP after the SLC recommends
such relaxation, subject to strict proof of commencement of
operation/commercial production. In such cases, final decision rests with

Page No.# 5/13
DIPP.”
6. From a perusal of the above-quoted Clause, it would be
apparent that the claim for subsidy under the CCIS Scheme had to
be submitted to the concerned DIC in the prescribed Application
Forms “ within one year from the date of commencement of
commercial production”.
7. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner went into commercial
production on 29.03.2017. The petitioner filed the application
seeking benefits under the CCIS Scheme on 29.03.2018. The
concerned Respondent Authorities in the Minutes of the Meetings
held on 06.04.2019, 10.10.2019 and 17.08.2022 rejected the
petitioner’s claim for subsidy under the CCIS Scheme on the
ground that the application was filed beyond the period of one
year. It is under such circumstances, the petitioner being
aggrieved, has approached this Court by filing the instant writ
petition.
8. The record reveals that this Court vide an order dated
19.09.2022 issued notice.
9. The record further reveals that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4
have filed a joint affidavit-in-opposition wherein at paragraph Nos.

Page No.# 6/13
4 and 7 it was mentioned that the petitioner did not submit the
application within one year from the date of commencement of
commercial production of its expanded unit. It was stated at
paragraph No. 13 of the said affidavit that the petitioner submitted
th
the claim application belatedly, i.e., on the 366 day from the date
of commencement of commercial production of the expanded unit.
10. The question which arises in the instant proceedings is as to
whether the filing of the application by the petitioner seeking
benefits under the CCIS Scheme was delayed by one day,
inasmuch as it is an admitted fact that on 29.03.2017, the
petitioner went into commercial production of its expanded unit
and filed the application on 29.03.2018.
11. This Court has duly heard the learned counsels appearing on
behalf of the parties and has given an anxious consideration to the
materials on record.
12. The question, as to whether, the petitioner submitted the
application belatedly has to be ascertained on the basis of the
Operational Guidelines, more particularly, Clause (vii) which has
already been quoted hereinabove.

Page No.# 7/13
13. From a perusal of Clause (vii) of the Operational Guidelines, it
would transpire that the prescribed application is required to be
filed “ within one year from the date of commencement of
commercial production”. The question, therefore, arises as to what
the above quoted phrase connotes.
14. This Court finds it pertinent to take note of the judgment of
Haru Das Gupta Vs. State of West
the Supreme Court in the case of
Bengal reported in (1972) 1 SCC 639 , wherein the Supreme Court
was dealing with the question as to whether an order of detention
was passed within a period of three months from the date of
detention. The Supreme Court explained as to what the term
“within” connotes at paragraph Nos. 4 and 5 of the said judgment.
The said paragraphs, being relevant for the purpose of the instant
proceedings, are reproduced hereinunder:
“ 4. The question is when can the period of three months from the date of
detention be said to have expired. When a period of time running from a given day
or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the
question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of
the first-mentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the
context and to the purpose for which the computation has to be made. [Halsbury’s
Laws of England, (3rd. Edn.) Vol. 37, p. 92]. There is, however, a volume of
authority in England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a
specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from
computation and the day on which such action is taken is to be included. As early

Page No.# 8/13
as 1840, Parke, B, laid down this rule in Young v. Higgon. In Badcliffe v.
Bartholomen Wills, J., relying on Williams v. Burgess and Hardy v. Ryle held that a
complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, filed on June 30, in
respect of an act alleged to have been committed on May 30, was “within one
calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise”. He held so on the
principle that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to be
excluded while computing the period within which under the Act the complaint had
to be filed. In Williams v. Burgess, the statute directed warrants of attorney to be
filed “within twenty-one days after their execution”, and it was held that a warrant
executed on the 9th day of the month would be regarded as having been filed in
proper time if filed on the 30th, the day of execution being one which had to be
excluded. On the other hand, in a case where a settler by a settlement, dated May
13, 1892, conveyed real estate upto and to the use of the trustees upon trust
thereinafter declared and it was thereby declared that they should stand possessed
of the said premises during the term of twenty-one years from the date thereof
upon trust to apply the rents and profits as therein mentioned and it was further
declared that the trustees should at the expiration of the said term of twenty-one
years sell the said premises and pursuant to the said trust for sale the trustees
contracted to sell the real estate on June 20, 1913, it was held that the term of
twenty-one years commenced from the midnight of May 12, 1892, and therefore,
the trust was not void for remoteness on the ground of exceeding a term of
twenty-one years from its creation. (See English v. Cliff)
5. These decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction between a term
created within which an act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an
act. The rule is well-established that where a particular time is given from a certain
date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded.
(See Goldsmiths Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company). This rule was
followed in Cartwright v. Maccormack where the expression “fifteen days from the
date of commencement of the policy” in a cover note issued by an insurance
company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to

Page No.# 9/13
commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Damson Bentley & Co.
Ltd. a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment,
where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident,
being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chadman
and In re North, Ex parte Wasluck) Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a
period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to
exclude the first day and to include the last day. [See Halsbury’s Laws of England,
(3rd Edn.). Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95.] There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of
construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here.”
15. The above principle of law as laid down by the Supreme Court
clearly shows that when a particular period is given from a certain
day within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be
excluded. The said principle laid down by the Supreme Court in
Haru Das Gupta (supra)
was followed by the Supreme Court in later
judgments in the case of Saketh India Ltd. & Others Vs. India
Securities Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 1
reported in as well as in the case of
Econ Antri Ltd. Vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Another reported in
(2014) 11 SCC 769 .
16. This Court also finds it relevant to take note of the judgment
of the Supreme Court in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v.
Dinanath Sharma reported in (2000) 8 SCC 649 wherein the
Supreme Court was dealing with the limitation for filing an election
petition in terms with Section 81(1) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the said

Page No.# 10/13
provision, referred to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
and observed that when a period is delimited by a Statute or a
Rule which has both a beginning and an end, and the word “from”
is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded
and the last day is to be excluded when the word “to” is used. It
was also categorically observed that in order to exclude the first
day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the
period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by a fixed
period. It was observed that the said aspect was intended to
obviate difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to parties.
Paragraph Nos. 12 and 14 of the said judgment, being relevant,
are reproduced hereinunder:
“ 12. Section 9 says that in any Central Act or regulation made after the
commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the
purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use
the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or
any period of time, to use the word “to”. The principle is that when a period is
delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word
“from” is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if
the last day is to be included the word “to” is to be used. In order to exclude the
first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of
limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to
obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties. For
instance, if a policy of insurance has to be good for one day from 1st January, it
might be valid only for a few hours after its execution and the party or the
beneficiary in the insurance policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim,

Page No.# 11/13
unless 1st January is excluded from the period of computation.

14. By Section 81(1), the legislation fixes the period for filing election petition and
at the same time states that no elector or candidate shall file election petition
before the date of election of the returned candidate and if there are more than
one returned candidates at the election and dates of their election are different,
the later of those two dates. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
contended that if the date of election of the candidate is excluded from computing
the period of limitation of 45 days, the period of limitation would be extended by
one day and, therefore, it is against the mandate of the statute. It was also
contended that the filing of the application on the date of election of the returned
candidate cannot be considered as a valid presentation of petition as envisaged in
the section. We do not think that any such interpretation is possible by a conjoint
reading of Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951 and Section 9 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897. The first day for the period of limitation is required to be excluded for
the convenience of the parties and if the declaration of the result is delayed or is
done late in the night, the candidate or elector would hardly get any time for
presentation of the election petition. Law comes to the rescue of such parties to
give full forty-five days’ period for filing the election petition. Nevertheless, any
petition presented on the date of election of the returned candidate would be
certainly within the period of limitation as it is a presentation on the date of
election of the returned candidate.”
17. Taking into account the above principles, it is the opinion of
this Court that in terms with Clause (vii) of the Operational
Guidelines as quoted herein above, the Application Form had to be
filed “within one year from the date of commencement of
commercial production”, which would mean that the date of

Page No.# 12/13
commencement of commercial production has to be excluded while
computing the period of one year.
18. Accordingly, in the instant case as the date of commencement
of commercial production was 29.03.2017, the period of one year
would commence from 30.03.2017. Therefore, the petitioner
having filed the application on 29.03.2018, this Court is of the
opinion that the said application was filed within the period of one
year from the date of commencement of commercial production of
the petitioner’s expanded unit.
19. Considering the above, the instant writ petition stands
disposed of with the following observations and directions:
(i) The application filed by the petitioner on 29.03.2018 was
well within the period prescribed in Clause (vii) of the General
Operational Guidelines for Registration of Industrial Units and
Procedure for Handling Subsidy Claims under the Central
Capital Investment Subsidy (CCIS) Scheme of NEIIPP, 2007.
(ii) The impugned Minutes of the Meetings dated 06.04.2019;
10.10.2019 and 17.08.2022 insofar as the same relate to the
petitioner are interfered with.

Page No.# 13/13
(iii) The Respondent Authorities, more particularly the
Principal Secretary, Industry and Commerce Department,
Government of Assam, as well as the respondent No. 6, are
directed to consider the application filed by the petitioner on
29.03.2018 claiming benefits under the CCIS Scheme.
(iv) This Court has not decided as to whether the petitioner is
entitled to the said benefits under the CCIS Scheme. The
same shall depend upon the necessary verification to be
carried out by the concerned Respondent Authorities.
However, for the sake of clarity, it is observed and directed
that the application filed by the petitioner was well within the
period prescribed in Clause (vii) of the General Operational
Guidelines for Registration of Industrial Units and Procedure
for Handling Subsidy Claims under the Central Capital
Investment Subsidy (CCIS) Scheme of NEIIPP, 2007.
(v) The exercise directed hereinabove to be conducted by the
respondents be completed preferably within a period of 6 (six)
months from the date on which a certified copy of the instant
judgment is served upon the respondent No. 2.
JUDGE
Satyam Sharma
Digitally signed by Satyam Sharma
Date: 2026.05.14 12:07:19 +05'30'
Comparing Assistant