RAM PAL MEENA vs L I C AN DORS

Court
Rajasthan High Court

[2026:RJ-JP:39143]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5/2015
CNR: RJHC020508342014 | URN: CW / 8U / 2015
Ram Pal Meena S/o Late Ganesh Meena, Bishansinghpura, Tehsil
Amer, Jaipur, Class 3, Record Clerk, S.R. No. 140596, Branch
Office, L.I.C. Jhotwara, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Life Insurance Corporation Of India Through Zonal
Manager, Jeevan Bharti Tower II, 124, Cannat Circus, New
Delhi.
2. Senior Divisional Manager, Divisional Office No. 1, LIC-
Jeevan Prakash, Bhawani Singh Marg, Jaipur.
3. Branch Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Jhotwara,
Jaipur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rajendra Rathore, Adv.,
Mr. Chandra Vikram Singh, Adv. &
Mr. Lokesh Dholpuria, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Puneet, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
25/09/2026
1. Petitioner has challenged the order dated 12.02.2014
issued by the Senior Divisional Manager-cum-Disciplinary
Authority, whereby while treating the suspension period as period
not spent on duty, he has been denied the remaining benefits of
suspension period except subsistence allowance. Petitioner has
also challenged the order dated 22.11.2014 passed by the
Appellate Authority, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner has
been disposed of.
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2. It is stated that the petitioner was initially appointed as
Class-IV employee in the year 1994 in respondent-Life Insurance
Corporation of India. He was thereafter promoted in the year 2006
on the post of Clerk. While he was holding the post of Clerk on
account of alleged involvement in the criminal case, he was placed
under suspension vide order dated 24.08.2009. During suspension
period, he was granted subsistence allowance.
3. It is stated that although, the petitioner was placed
under suspension by the respondents, yet no departmental
enquiry whatsoever was initiated by the respondent-Corporation,
however, the petitioner was kept under suspension during the trial
before the Competent Criminal Court.
4. It is further submitted that pursuant to the criminal
case lodged against the petitioner, which has got nothing to do
with the service related conduct of the petitioner, he was tried by
the Competent Criminal Court, where statements of as many as
20 prosecution witnesses were recorded and more than 20
documents were exhibited by the prosecution in support of the
charge against the petitioner. The defence also produced
witnesses and after examining the evidence on record, the trial
Court acquitted the petitioner of the criminal charges on the
ground that benefit of doubt was given to him due to failure of the
prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
5. After conclusion of criminal trial and judgment of
acquittal, the suspension order was revoked vide order dated
16.01.2014. However, while revoking suspension, it was recorded
that as regards, remaining benefits of suspension period a
separate order shall be passed.
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6. It is the case of the petitioner that thereafter, the
Disciplinary Authority passed order dated 29.01.2014, wherein
powers under Rule 38 (a) of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Staff) Rules, 1960 (for short 'the Rules of 1960') were
exercised and the period of suspension was treated to be as
period spent on duty, accordingly the petitioner was held entitled
for full pay and allowances during the suspension period after
adjusting the subsistence allowance.
7. Soon thereafter, without giving any notice to the
petitioner, the earlier order dated 29.01.2014 was cancelled by the
Senior Divisional Manager and instead thereof the order was
passed under Rule 38 (b) of the Rules of 1960 on 12.02.2014,
wherein it was recorded that although, the suspension period shall
not be treated as break in service, yet petitioner shall not be
granted remaining benefits of pay and allowances to the petitioner
for the said period treating the same as period not spent on duty
(absence period).
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
reason assigned in order dated 12.02.2014 for cancelling the
earlier order dated 29.01.2014 and to withdraw the benefits
earlier granted, is that as per respondents, since the Criminal
Court although acquitted the petitioner of all the criminal charges,
yet such acquittal is based upon granting benefit of doubt and was
not an 'Honourable acquittal'.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
expression 'Honourable acquittal' as mentioned in clause 38(a),
cannot be construed so as to deny benefit of the judgment of
acquittal, for the reason that the presumption of innocence of the
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person is equally restored in the similar manner in both the cases
of acquittal irrespective of the fact that whether the expression
'Honourable acquittal' was specially mentioned in the judgment or
not. Learned counsel submits that it was not a case where the
petitioner was acquitted on any technical ground without
conducting trial, and admittedly, he has faced a full-fledged trial
where all the witnesses and evidence were meticulously examined
by the trial Court. Hence, acquittal in his case cannot be separated
from acquittal in any other case, where after conclusion of trial, an
expression 'Honourably acquitted' might have been used by the
trial Court.
10. Learned counsel submits that even otherwise, Rule 38
(b) of the Rules of 1960 cannot be pressed into service by the
respondents, under the circumstances, where no disciplinary
enquiry whatsoever is conducted by the respondent-Corporation.
11. Learned counsel submits that once the order dated
29.01.2014 was rightly passed by the Competent Authority under
Rule 38(a) of the Rules of 1960, it became functus officio and had
no competence whatsoever to recall its own order by subsequent
order dated 12.02.2014 so as to cancel the earlier order dated
29.01.2014 and that too, without affording any opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the
judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Sanjay Vs.
LIC & Ors. (Writ Petition No.1880/2012, decided on
08.06.2023) , wherein Rules framed by the respondent-
Corporation were interpreted in similar facts and circumstances.
He also relied upon judgment of Dr. Prabhat Kadavat Vs. State
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of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2113/2011,
decided on 06.05.2014) , Food Corporation of India & Ors.
Vs. Ved Prakash Malhotra (LPA-54-2018 decided on
19.12.2025) , Manickan P. Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board
Vidhyuthi Bhavan & Ors. (WP(C) No.26703/2013 decided
on 05.02.2019) as well as judgment of this Court in the case of
Harbajan Singh Vs. Superintendent of Police (S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No.7146/2003, decided on 14.08.2025) . Further he
relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases
of State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Mangat Lal Sidana (Civil
Appeal No.2365/2022, decided on 23.03.2022) and Gurpal
Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan (Writ
Petition (Civil) No.200/2006, decided on 27.11.2012) .
13. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondents
vehemently opposed the writ petition and submitted that there is
no infirmity or illegality whatsoever in impugned order dated
12.02.2014 passed by Senior Divisional Manager, who has rightly
applied Rule 38(b) in its true sense.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that
earlier order dated 29.01.2014 was passed on account of bona
fide error of interpretation of the Rule, as Rule 38(a) was
erroneously applied by the respondents. He submits that
treatment of the period of suspension cannot be similar in all the
cases, where the criminal charges against an employee were
concluded in different manner. The respondent-Corporation while
framing the Rules have consciously laid down different provisions
for different contingencies. In the cases, where sole basis of
suspension was lodging of or pendency of criminal case, the
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remaining benefits of suspension period, on conclusion of trial, are
granted in the context of finality of criminal trial. Learned counsel
submits that Rules are explicitly clear, where while consciously
using the expression 'Honourably acquitted', the person so
benefited by 'Honourable acquittal' has been held entitled to full
pay and allowances, which he would be entitled to had he not
been suspended. He submits that clause (b) is applicable in other
cases i.e. the cases where the acquittal is not based upon the
finding of 'Honourable acquittal'.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that
although, 'Honourable acquittal' has not been defined under the
Rules of respondent-Corporation or in Cr.P.C. or even in BNSS, yet
such term has been interpreted time and again by Hon'ble
Supreme Court by laying down catena of judgments in this regard.
Learned counsel for the respondents heavily relied upon
judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Krishnakant
Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
reported in (1997) 3 SCC 636 , The Deputy Inspector General
of Police & Ors. Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC
598 , Union of India (UOI) & Ors. Vs. Methu Meda reported in
(2022) 1 SCC 1 and Union of India (UOI) & Ors. Vs. Jaipal
Singh reported in (2004) 1 SCC 121 in order to support his
contentions.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted
that as long as the expression 'Honourably acquitted' exist under
the Rules, without challenging the vires of Rules, no benefit
whatsoever can be claimed by the petitioner.
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17. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted
that Rule 38(b) is applicable irrespective of the fact as to whether
departmental enquiry was conducted against the incumbent or
not.
18. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
19. Rules of 1960 have been framed by the respondent-
Corporation in exercise of powers vested in clause (b) and (bb) of
sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation
Act, 1956, with the previous approval of the Central Government.
Chapter-III of the Rules deals with conduct, discipline and
Appeals. Rule 36 regulates suspension of an employee, whereas
Rule 38 governs treatment of the period of suspension.
20. As the controversy arose around Rules 36 and 38 of the
Rules, 1960, the same are reproduced hereunder:-
" Suspension:
36. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it
is subordinate or any other authority empowered in that
behalf (vide Schedule IV) may place an employee under
suspension-
(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is
contemplated or is pending; or
(b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal
offence is under investigation or trial.
(2) An employee who is detained in custody, whether on a
criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48
hours shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect
from the date of detention, by an order of the appointing
authority, and shall remain under suspension until further
orders.
(3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory
retirement from service imposed upon an employee under
suspension is set aside on appeal or on review under these
rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or
with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall
be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date
of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory
retirement and shall remain in force until further orders.
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(4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory
retirement from service imposed upon an employee is set
aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a
decision of a court of law and the disciplinary authority, on
consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to
hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which
the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement
was originally imposed, the employee shall be deemed to
have been placed under suspension by the appointing
authority from the date of the original order of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to
remain under suspension until further orders.
Provided that no such further enquiry shall be held unless it*
is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed
an order purely on technical grounds without going into the
merits of the case.
(5) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been
made under this rule may at any time be revoked by the
authority which made or is deemed to have made the order
or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate.
Treatment of the Period of Suspension:
38. When the suspension of an employee is held to be
unjustified or not wholly justified; or when an employee who
has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the
disciplinary, appellate, or reviewing authority, as the case
may be whose decision shall be final, [under these rules]*
may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty-
(a) if he is honourably acquitted, the full pay and allowances
which he would have been entitled to if he had not been
dismissed, removed or suspended, less the subsistence
allowance;
(b) if otherwise, such proportion of pay and allowance as the
disciplinary, appellate or reviewing authority may prescribe.
In a case falling under clause (a), the period of
absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on
duty. [In a case falling under clause (b), the period of
absence shall not be treated as a period spent on duty,
but the disciplinary, appellate or the reviewing
authority may, at its discretion, grant leave for the
period to the extent admissible to the employee under
the rules; any period of absence which has not been
treated as period spent on duty or on leave shall not
count as service for any purpose under these Rules but
will not constitute break in service.]
No order passed under this rule shall have the effect of
compelling any employee to refund the subsistence
allowance payable under rule 37."
21. Bare perusal of the above would make it clear that Rule
36 primarily empowers the Competent Authority to place an
employee under suspension under two contingencies, (i) where
disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending, or (ii)
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where a criminal case against him is under investigation or trial. It
further provides for deemed suspension in specified circumstances
including detention in custody for more than 48 hours. The Rule
also confers power upon the Competent Authority to revoke an
order of suspension any time.
22. Facts are almost undisputed that the petitioner was
placed under suspension solely on the ground of his involvement
in the criminal case and admittedly, no departmental enquiry
whatsoever was initiated against him.
23. After conclusion of trial against the petitioner, whereby
the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges, the respondents
revoked the suspension order and even after revocation,
disciplinary enquiry was not initiated. It was mentioned in the
order of revocation dated 16.01.2014 that the decision with
regard to granting remaining benefits of suspended period shall be
taken separately.
24. Thereafter, the order dated 29.01.2014 was issued by
the Competent Authority under Rule 38(a) for treating the entire
suspension period as spent on duty and accordingly, the petitioner
was held entitled for full pay and allowances during the suspension
period. Grievance of the petitioner arose when the subsequent
order dated 12.02.2014 was issued by the Senior Divisional
Manager in order to cancel the earlier order dated 29.01.2014 and
instead of applying sub clause (a) of Rule 38, he exercised powers
under clause (b) of Rule 38 so as to deny the benefit of pay and
allowances to the petitioner during the suspension period except
the subsistence allowance already paid to him.
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25. Contention of learned counsel for the respondents that
earlier order dated 29.01.2014 was resultant of a bona fide
mistake, which crept into the proceedings on account of
misconstruction of the Rules. He emphasised that clause (a) of
Rule 38 is confined to the cases, where the employee was
'acquitted Honourably' by the Competent Criminal Court and in
case, there is no 'Honourable acquittal', in other cases clause (b)
shall apply.
26. This Court carefully examined both clauses (a) and (b)
of Rule 38 along with other provisions of the Rules of 1960 and
finds that although, the term 'Honourably acquitted' has been
used in clause (a), yet it is a matter of fact that the term
'Honourable acquittal' has nowhere been defined in the Rules of
1960. Similarly, the aforesaid expression 'Honourable acquittal'
has nowhere been used in Cr.P.C. and BNSS.
27. On close scrutiny of both clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 38
in the context of two contingencies prescribed under Rule 36 for
placing an employee under suspension, this Court finds that clause
(a) of Rule 38 is exclusively related to the cases, where the
employee was placed under suspension due to criminal case and
the benefits are to be paid upon revocation of suspension after
acquittal by the Competent Criminal Court. Whereas, language
employed in clause (b) of Rule 38 makes it clear that it would
apply in the cases not covered by clause (a) of Rule 38. Thus, the
words employed in clause (b) apparently reveals the intent of Rule
making authority that clause (b) shall apply only in the cases,
where there is role of Disciplinary, Appellate or Reviewing
Authority, thus, this clause is confined only to the cases, where
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disciplinary enquiry was initiated by the authorities, however, shall
not apply in the cases, where suspension or deemed suspension
took place on account of detention or where the employee was
facing criminal trial, however, was subsequently acquitted.
28. It is also equally true that although, the expression
'Honourable acquittal' has not been defined either in Code of
Criminal Procedure or in Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, yet
the same has been explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its so
many decisions. In the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
" 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal”
came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal
6
Singh Panchal . In that case, this Court has considered the
impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal
by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that
context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not
entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal,
it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions
“honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully
exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure
or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is
meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the
accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution
evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to
prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can
possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."
29. After relying upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) , Bombay High Court in
the case of Shri Sanjay (supra) examined the extent and scope
of Rule 38 of the Rules of 1960 and thereafter, observed as
under:-
"11. It is not the case that the petitioner has been acquitted
merely on technical grounds. It is a matter of record that
the petitioner has been acquitted after a full-fledge trial and
after full consideration of the prosecution's evidence and
material available on record. No departmental Inquiry was
initiated by the respondents. The respondents have passed
the order refusing grant of full pay and allowances for the
period of suspension of the petitioner on the ground that the
petitioner has been acquitted by extending benefit of doubt
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The last sentence
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"the accused are entitled for acquittal by extending benefit
of doubt" cannot be read in isolation dehors of the other
findings given by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The
said phrase is to be read with other material and evidence
discussed by the learned Trial Court.
12. We have perused the order of acquittal dated
15.01.2004 and we find that with regard to charge against
the petitioner (accused no. 2), a specific point has been
framed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge i.e. points
for determination no. 2, wherein the allegation and evidence
produced by the prosecution has been discussed thoroughly
and specific findings have been given that just because
there were telephonic talks between the petitioner and other
accused and the absence of the petitioner from duty, it
cannot be inferred that the petitioner has supplied Ganja
Seeds to other accused persons. The learned Additional
Sessions Judge answered to the point of determination that
whether the prosecution proved that the petitioner supplied
Ganja Seeds to accused no. 3 therein, in negative. In the
concluding part also, it has been held by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge that the prosecution failed to
establish that the petitioner supplied Ganja Seeds to
accused no. 3. Just because while parting with the
judgment, the learned Additional Sessions Judge in last line
has mentioned that the accused persons, possibly may be in
respect of other accused than the petitioner, are entitled for
acquittal by extending benefit of doubt, it does not mean
that the petitioner has not been acquitted honourably. Just
because the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not use
the word "honourable acquittal", it cannot be said that the
petitioner has not been acquitted honourably. Rather, we
have never came across such words 'honourble acquittal' in
judgments of acquittal in a criminal trial.
13. As held in the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) , since
the petitioner has been acquitted on merit after a full-fledge
trial and after full consideration of the prosecution's
evidence, particularly, when the learned Additional Sessions
Judge recorded the findings that the prosecution failed to
prove charge against the petitioner, it can be said that the
petitioner was honourably acquitted.
14. In that view of the matter, we do not find any force in
the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents.
The order dated 13.05.2011 passed by respondent 3
refusing to grant full pay with allowances during the
suspension period of the petitioner is not correct and it does
not stand. Therefore, the communication/order dated
13.05.2011 issued by respondent 3 is hereby quashed and
set aside.
15. Consequentially, the respondents are directed to release
and pay the full pay and allowances payable to the petitioner
from 15.09.2000 to 25.01.2001 (both days inclusive)
alongwith interest @ 6% per annum till its realization. The
Writ Petition is allowed."
30. This Court finds that in Food Corporation of India
(Staff) Regulations, 1971 similar clauses are there in Regulation
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66 (8) (a) and (b) and in that case also the similar question arose
as in this case, that when the Competent Criminal Court while
acquitting the employee did not use the expression 'Honourably
acquitted', then whether the employee would be entitled for full
pay and allowances during suspension period or not. The Punjab &
Haryana High Court in the case of Ved Prakash Malhotra
(supra) observed as under:-
"15. At the outset, we would like to observe that we find
merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellants, that the relevant regulations were required to be
taken into consideration while taking a decision regarding
how the period of absence from duty is to be treated, after
the respondent's acquittal in the criminal case. It is,
therefore, apposite to examine Regulation 66(8)(a) & (b) of
the 1971 Regulations, which is reproduced as under:
"(8) When the suspension of an employee is
held to be unjustified or not wholly justified; or when
an employee has been dismissed or suspended is
reinstated, the disciplinary, appellate or reviewing
authority, as the case may be, whose decision shall
be final, may grant to him for the period of his
absence from duty:
(a) if he is honourably acquitted, the full pay and
allowances other than conveyance allowance to which
he would have been entitled, if he had 7 of 14 LPA-
54-2018 (O&M) not been dismissed or suspended,
less the subsistence grant;
(b) if otherwise, such proportion of pay and
allowances other than conveyance allowances as the
disciplinary, appellate or reviewing authority may
prescribe. In a case falling under clause (a), the
period of absence from duty will be treated as a
period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause
(b) it will not be treated as a period spent on duty
unless the disciplinary, appellate or reviewing
authority, as the case may be, whose decision shall
be final, so directs."
16. Careful perusal of the above regulation would show that
the competent authority is vested with the power to form an
opinion whether the suspension was justified or unjustified
or not wholly justified. If it finds it to be justified then no
benefits are to be granted for the suspension period.
However, in the case where the authority finds it to be
unjustified or not wholly justified, then in the case of
'honourable acquittal' pay and allowance as per Regulation
66 (8) (a) is to be paid and the period of absence from duty
has to be treated as period spent on duty. In the cases
where the acquittal is granted by giving benefit of doubt,
regulation (b) would come into play and it will be open to
such authority to direct the payment of proportional pay and
allowances as it may prescribe. The period of absence will
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not be treated as period spent on duty, unless the
concerned authority so directs.
17. Perusal of the order dated 10.11.2015 (Annexure P-9)
passed by the concerned authority would show that the
decision to treat the period of suspension as period not
spent on duty is based upon the premise that the acquittal
of the respondent vide judgment dated 20.08.2014 was
allowed by giving him the benefit of doubt. By holding that
such acquittal would not come 8 of 14 LPA-54-2018 (O&M)
within the meaning of an honourable acquittal as stipulated
under Regulation 66(8)(a) of the 1971 Regulations, the
authority has observed that in view of the nature of charge
brought against the respondent and since the acquittal in
appeal was by giving him the benefit of doubt, there was no
justification to treat the period of absence as period spent
on duty.
20. Undoubtedly, the power to form an opinion regarding
justification or otherwise of suspension of an employee and
decision regarding treatment of suspension period vests
upon the competent authority, as per Regulation 66(8)(a) &
(b) of the 1971 Regulations, and the same would not be
interfered with as a matter of routine. However, that does
not mean that such opinion or decision, would not be
amenable to judicial review, even if it is found in a given
case that the same is based upon non-application of mind,
incorrect appreciation of facts involved; is arbitrary; or is not
a 'possible view'. That cannot be the correct 13 of 14 LPA-
54-2018 (O&M) import of the law laid down in the case of
Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation supra as
sought to be projected by the Appellants. The powers of the
authority cannot be unbridled and it will always be open to a
Writ Court to examine, if the same warrants interference in
the facts and circumstances of a given case."
31. In the case of Methu Meda (supra) , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has again considered the different expressions
used at the time of acquitting an accused in a criminal case and
has thereafter held as under:-
" 10. While addressing the question, as argued the meaning
of expression “acquittal” is required to be looked into. The
expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and
“fully acquitted” are unknown to the Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Penal Code, 1860. It has been developed
by judicial pronouncements. In State of Assam v. Raghava
11
Rajgopalachari , the effect of the word “honourably
acquitted” has been considered in the context of the Assam
Fundament Rules (FR) 54(a) for entitlement of full pay and
allowance if the employee is not dismissed. The Court has
referred to the judgment of Robert Stuart Wauchope v.
12
Emperor , in the context of expression “honourably
acquitted”, Lort-Williams, J. observed as thus : (Robert
12
Stuart Wauchope case , SCC OnLine Cal)
“The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which
is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a
form of order used in courts martial and other extra-
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[2026:RJ-JP:39143] [CW-5/2015]
judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we
accepted the explanation given by the appellant,
believed it to be true and considered that it ought to
have been accepted by the government authorities
and by the Magistrate. Further we decided that the
appellant had not misappropriated the monies
referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the
effect of our judgment was that the appellant was
acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible
for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is
equivalent to what the government authorities term
“honourably acquitted”.”
12. In view of the above, if the acquittal is directed by the
court on consideration of facts and material evidence on
record with the finding of false implication or the finding that
the guilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of
accused as just, it be treated as honourable acquittal. In
other words, if prosecution could not prove the guilt for
other reasons and not “honourably” acquitted by the court,
it be treated other than “honourable”, and proceedings may
follow."
32. In the backdrop of the facts of the present case as well
as on the basis of above principles laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, this Court finds that in the present case,
employee was placed under suspension solely on account of his
implication in criminal case, which ultimately culminated in
acquittal of the petitioner. As observed hereinabove, the Rules of
1960 does not draw a distinction between the 'Honourable
acquittal' and acquittal for any other reason. In any event the
presumption of innocence of the employee stands restored upon
his acquittal and in both the cases, he stands absolved of any
disqualification, if any, attached to the criminal charge.
33. There is yet another aspect of the matter, in the cases,
where an employee upon conclusion of criminal trial is benefited
by Sections 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for
short 'the Act of 1958'), then in that case, notwithstanding the
fact that the employee has suffered conviction, yet all the benefits
related to the service shall be released to him by virtue of
operation of Section 12 of the Act of 1958. Thus, it would be quite
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anomalous and legally untenable situation, where at the one hand
a person like petitioner is there, who has been acquitted of all the
criminal charges, yet the benefits have been withheld by the
respondents narrating his acquittal as not Honourable and while
on the other hand, in spite of there being a sustained conviction in
the record of another employee, yet he was granted benefit of
probation by the Competent Court, he cannot be deprived of the
benefits arising out of his service conditions, including the benefits
during suspension period. Thus, under the circumstances, where
there is no legally sustainable difference between 'acquitted
Honourably' and an acquittal for any other reason, for the purpose
of grant of service benefits, this Court finds that the respondents
have wrongly interpreted Rule 38(a) of the Rules of 1960. The
petitioner is entitled for all the benefits including full pay and
allowances during the aforesaid suspension period.
34. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is
hereby allowed. The order dated 12.02.2014 as well as appellate
order dated 22.11.2014 are hereby quashed and set aside. Earlier
order dated 29.01.2014 is hereby restored. The petitioner is held
entitled for treating the suspension period from 24.08.2009 to
09.01.2014 as period spent on duty for all practical purposes
including full pay and allowance. He shall also be entitled for all
other consequential benefits. The respondents are directed to
make compliance of this order within a period of 60 days from the
date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
35. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
40/Jatin
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