Pramod Kumar vs Rakesh Kumar Sharma
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010369892026
+ RC.REV. 277/2026 & CM APPL. 53193/2026 (Stay)
PRAMOD KUMAR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sanjay Dewan, Senior
Advocate along with Mr. Anish
Dewan, Mr. Nikhil Goel, Mr.
Atul Kumar, Mr. Ankush
Munjal and Mr. Shivam Arora,
Advocates.
versus
RAKESH KUMAR SHARMA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajender Yadav, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
CAV 379/2026
1. Since learned counsel for the Respondent has entered
appearance, the Caveat stands discharged.
RC.REV. 277/2026
2. The present Revision Petition has been instituted under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“ DRC
Act ”], assailing the Judgment/Order dated 18.04.2026 [“ Impugned
Order ”] passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller (West), Tis
Hazari Court, Delhi [“ learned ARC ”] in ARC No. 06/2020 titled
“Rakesh Kumar Sharma vs. Pramod Kumar”.
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KAUR BHATIA
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
3. Mr. Sanjay Dewan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Petitioner, assails the Impugned Order on two grounds. First , it is
contended that the subject premises had been partitioned amongst the
family members and that the portion forming the subject matter of the
Eviction Petition had not fallen to the share of the Respondent.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that an Application had been
filed by the Petitioner seeking to bring on record the Site Plan
reflecting the partition effected between the Respondent and his
relatives. However, according to the Petitioner, the said Site Plan was
not brought on record. It is contended that this omission is material,
since the Respondent’s entitlement to the specific portion forming the
subject matter of the Eviction Petition is itself disputed.
4. Second, learned Senior Counsel submits that the requirement
pleaded by the Respondent is not bona fide , as his son is gainfully
employed and is already engaged in business. It is contended that the
availability of employment and the business-related documents,
including the GST particulars and Importer Exporter Code placed on
record by the Petitioner, belie the assertion that the premises are
required for the commencement of a business by the Respondent’s
son.
5. No other grounds have been urged by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner.
6. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the Respondent
supports the Impugned Order. On the issue of partition, it is submitted
that the co-owners had issued No Objection Certificates in favour of
the Respondent and that a Site Plan prepared with reference to the
Partition Deed was also placed on record. The Respondent, therefore,
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contends that the challenge to his entitlement in respect of the tenanted
premises is contrary to the record.
7. As regards bona fide requirement, learned counsel submits that
the learned ARC has considered the plea in the context of the material
placed before it and rightly held that the son’s employment or his
earlier business activity does not, by itself, negate the Respondent’s
genuine desire to establish a business for him in the subject premises.
8. It is lastly submitted that no ground warranting interference in
the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court is made out, hence the
present Petition is liable to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS:
9. This Court has heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties at length, and, with their able assistance, perused the
relevant documents as also the Impugned Order.
10. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
11. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
1
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
2 3
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
1
(1998) 8 SCC 119
2
(2014) 9 SCC 78
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12. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
4
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
5
Grover .
13. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
14. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
3
(2022) 6 SCC 30
4
2024:DHC:9322
5
2025:DHC:11285
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upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
16. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined. In
this backdrop, it would be apposite for this Court to extract the
relevant portion of the Impugned Order, which reads as under:
“ (i). LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP:-
17. In the present case the relationship of landlord and tenant has
been disputed by the respondent and though it has not been denied
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rather the same was affirmed during arguments that the respondent
has come into the premises as tenant and the said fact is mentioned
in the leave to defend application of the respondent that he was
approached by the brothers of the petitioner for taking their
premises on payment of sum of Rs. 6 Lakhs, out of which the
respondent paid cash of Rs. 5 Lakh in the year 1992 and for the
remaining Rs. 1 Lakh, he started paying Rs. 400/- p.m. to the
brother of the petitioner and continued to pay the same till the year
2004. Thus, by way of "approbating and reprobating" the
respondent in a way has accepted his tenancy and in so far as his
contention regarding the purchase of the premises from the brother
of the petitioner is concerned, from all his pleadings contained in
his leave to defend, it is very much evident and apparent that the
respondent has not filed even a piece of paper to show that he had
paid any such sum to the brothers of the petitioner or that he has
acquired any permanent right or ownership right over the tenanted
premises. Thus, these mere bald averments of having purchased the
premises without any title documents are wholly useless and
unproductive.
18. The respondent has further challenged the partition deed
executed between the family members of the petitioner, however, it
has been very clearly held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in
A.K. Nayar Vs. Mahesh Prasad that:
"... a tenant cannot challenge the family settlement nor can ask the
Court to ignore the document on the ground of its not having been
registered."
19. Thus, neither the tenant has been able to show that he has
acquired any kind of ownership over the premises nor his
allegations of the partition deed being forged and fabricated has
any value in the eyes of law, being a worthless point to be raised.
Further, the partition deed is a registered document and viz-a-viz
any written document a mere oral averments of any party is wholly
insignificant. Further, the law in this regard is very clear that the
tenant cannot dispute the title of the landlord or his successor-in-
interest i.e. he/she is estopped from challenging the ownership or
denying the title of the landlord. The principle is very clear that
once a tenant is always a tenant and therefore, it is not open for
her/him to challenge the title or the ownership of landlord or his
successor-in-interest.
20. To quote the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Rajender Kumar
Sharma Vs. Smt. Leela Wati 155 (2008) DLT 383;
"... it is settled law that for the purpose of Sec. 14 (1) (c) of
Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to
prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of
Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more
than a tenant."
21. The other such contention of the respondent that all the rent
receipts relied upon by the petitioner are forged and fabricated are
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just bald averments because it is rather very easy for anybody to
discredit a document just by making a statement that the same is
forged and fabricated without substantiating anything in this
regard. Particularly, in the case at hand, when the respondent
himself has submitted on affidavit in his leave to defend that he has
been paying charges to the brothers of the petitioners since 2004
and therefrom had confirmed his status as a tenant and now taking
such pleas that the rent receipts are forged, does not make out any
case for him. Moreover, whether or not he has paid any rent after
2004 would not alter his status as such even if in his mind he
assumed himself to be the owner. Thus, this authority is not going
to discard these entire set of rent receipts of different years wherein
the same has been issued to the respondent and allegedly signed by
him.
22. It has also been contested by the respondent that from the
partition it is not clear which shop fell in to the share of which
brother of the petitioner and also that if the partition was effected
in the year 2004 then how come the petitioner was landlord/owner
even before that as per the rent receipts filed by him. However, it is
a settled principle of law that any co-owner can file an eviction
petition against the tenant and thus, even if it is not clear in the
mind of the respondent which shop belongs to which brother, he is
not to be bothered. Thus, there is no requirement of impleading all
the co-owners. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Dhanna Lal Vs. Kalawati
Bai & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC.
23. Hence, so far the existence of the relationship of landlord and
tenant between the petitioner and respondent is concerned, the
same is held to be established in view of the above discussions and
pronouncements and respondent has failed to substantiate anything
contrary.
(ii) BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT:
24. The other requirement is that the premises should be required
for the bonafide need of the landlord/petitioner and it is the case of
the petitioner that the same is required for his sons, so that they can
start their business. However, it is contested in this regard that the
petitioner does not have any bonafide requirement rather, his son
has been employed and has been earning handsomely for which an
application was also filed U/O 8 Rule 1A CPC for bringing on
record subsequent event, wherein GST Number and Importer
Exporter Code of the son of the petitioner.
25. Firstly, in Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini (2005) 12
SCC 778 ; it has already been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
that “whenever landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide
need, the Controller shall presume the need as genuine and
bonafide. Additionally, the burden to refute such presumption
squarely lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the part of tenant
is insufficient.”
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26. Secondly, by bringing on record the abovesaid subsequent facts
which the respondent has pleaded in his leave to defend application
also, what the respondent is trying to prove is that the petitioner
and his son are already engaged in some business but the petitioner
has concealed the fact that his son is gainfully employed and thus
has played fraud upon the court and therefore, this requirement is
not bonafide .
27. It is well settled that a person is not supposed to remain
unemployed till the disposal of the eviction petition. Furthermore,
this Court is of the opinion that there is nothing malafide if the
petitioner wants to help his son to start his own business in the
tenanted premises. Rather, the said requirement seems to be
bonafide as he wants to earn his livelihood and the tenant cannot
stop the landlord from starting any business for livelihood.
28. It is well settled law that landlord cannot be directed to squeeze
himself into a space, which may not be sufficient to meet the
requirement for himself and his son who is dependent upon him for
commercial premises, only to prevent any hardship to the tenant. It
is also not open to the Court or the tenant to dictate terms to the
landlord as to how he adjust himself only to preclude the tenant
from being evicted. When father and son are engaged in business,
one shop may not be sufficient to accommodate the customers and
his son. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Prem Prakash
Malik Vs. Ram Gopal Rajwanshi decided by Hon'ble High Court
in RC (REV.) 344/2011 on 29.08.2012.
29. Even if the petitioner and his son have been working, and the
son is running some business, would it mean there is a complete
embargo upon him now not to start any new business or take up
any new enterprise as the same is fundamental right of a citizen
which is Constitutionally guaranteed. There also cannot be a
ground for rejecting any eviction petition only on the basis that
someone has the GST Number or is running any business in
partnership, as is evident from the documents submitted by the
respondent alongwith his application filed U/o 8 Rule 1-A CPC. In
this regard, it has also been clarified by the petitioner that it can
never be expected from the landlord to keep sitting idle and wait
for result of the eviction petition and instead his son started one
business in partnership, however, the venture was unsuccessful
because of which the GST was cancelled in the year 2020.
30. Further, it has already been held by the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in Smt. Phool Kumari & Ors. Vs. Shyam Bir Tyagi RC
ARC No. 318/2013 dated 01.10.2014 that no triable issue is raised
on the ground if the tenant denies that the landlord is not
unemployed. Similarly, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India in Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chhagan Lal
Sundarji & Co. that “A landlord need not lose his existing job nor
resign it nor reach a level of starvation, to contemplate that he
must get possession of the premises for establishing business.”
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31. In view of the above, no triable issue has been raised qua the
bonafide requirement of the petitioner.”
17. The first objection concerns the partition of the property and the
assertion that the premises in question did not fall to the Respondent’s
share. The Petitioner’s submission is that, although an Application had
been filed to bring the Site Plan reflecting the partition on record, the
Site Plan was not filed. This contention must, however, be considered
alongside the contemporaneous Order dated 21.11.2022. The said
Order records that the Site Plan prepared with reference to the
Partition Deed, together with the No Objection Certificates issued by
the other co-owners, was taken on record and copies were supplied to
the opposite side. Thus, the specific assertion that no such document
was brought on record does not accord with the recital contained in
the Order dated 21.11.2022. The challenge must be examined in the
light of the material available on record, with due regard to the
distinction between the Petitioner’s submissions and the
contemporaneous judicial record. The relevant portion of the Order
dated 21.11.2022 is reproduced hereinbelow:
“21.11.2022
Present: Ld. Counsel for the petitioner along with petitioner.
Ld. Counsel for the respondent along with respondent.
Matter is fixed for production of the concerned documents as per
the application of the respondent in the present matter.
Today, counsel for the petitioner has filed NOCs issued in favour
of the petitioner by the other co-owners of the suit property as well
as the site plan as per the Partition Deed in support of the case of
the petitioner.
Same are taken on record. Copies of the same supplied to the
counsel for the respondent.
Accordingly, at the request of Ld. Counsel for both the parties, put
up for arguments on leave to defend application on the NDOH i.e.
24.01.2023.”
18. Once the relevant Site Plan and the No Objection Certificates of
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the persons between whom the partition had been effected was
available, the tenant cannot question the ownership or claim of the
Respondent with respect to the portion falling to the Respondent’s
share. A general assertion that the subject premises had not fallen to
the Respondent’s share cannot, in the face of the documents recorded
as having been placed on record, as also the no objection of the other
parties between whom the property came to be partitioned,
establish or sustain a plea of perversity or material irregularity in the
Impugned Order. No specific error apparent in the learned ARC’s
treatment of those documents has been demonstrated before this
Court.
19. The legal position concerning the right of a co-owner to
maintain eviction proceedings is also well settled. In India Umbrella
6
Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated that one co-owner may institute eviction
proceedings in respect of property owned jointly, the principle being
founded on the doctrine of agency; the consent of the other co-owners
is ordinarily presumed unless it is shown that they opposed the
eviction. The Court held that a tenant cannot defeat eviction
proceedings merely by insisting that every co-owner be joined. In the
present case, the Respondent’s reliance upon the No Objection
Certificates of the other co-owners further weakens the Petitioner’s
objection, and no material has been shown to establish that the co-
owners opposed the Respondent’s action. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are
satisfied that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well settled
6
(2004) 3 SCC 178
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that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in
the property generally owned by the co-owners. (See Sri Ram
Pasricha v. Jagannath [(1976) 4 SCC 184] and Dhannalal v.
Kalawatibai [(2002) 6 SCC 16] , SCC para 25.) This principle is
based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for
eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own
right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other
co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-
owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed
in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit was filed
by both the co-owners. One of the co-owners cannot withdraw his
consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The
suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the
date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek
ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution
of the suit; the only exception being when by virtue of a
subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject
the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of
law.”
20. It is equally relevant that the Petitioner’s own case, as noticed
by the learned ARC, was that the Respondent had entered the
premises as a tenant and had allegedly paid certain amounts to the
Respondent’s relatives with a view to acquiring the subject premises.
The learned ARC found that no documentary material had been
produced to substantiate the alleged purchase or to establish the
acquisition of any ownership right by the Petitioner. In the absence of
such material, the bare assertion of purchase does not, by itself,
displace the relationship of landlord and tenant found by the learned
ARC to have been established.
21. It is trite law that having admitted to entering the premises as a
tenant, the Petitioner cannot claim a right to continue in possession by
disputing the title of the very landlord under whom he was inducted
into possession, in the absence of cogent evidence establishing a better
title than that of the landlord.
22. The second objection concerns the bona fide requirement of the
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Respondent, who seeks the premises to enable his son to commence
business. The principal submission is that the son is gainfully
employed and has also been associated with a business, as reflected in
the GST particulars and Importer Exporter Code relied upon by the
Petitioner. The existence of employment or prior business activity,
however, cannot be treated as conclusive proof that the stated
requirement is not genuine. The relevant inquiry is whether, on an
overall assessment of the pleadings and material, the requirement
asserted by the landlord is genuine and bona fide , and not whether the
tenant considers the proposed business necessary or commercially
preferable.
23. In M/s. Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai
7
Prabhulal , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the landlord’s desire
to commence or expand business cannot be rejected merely because
the landlord or members of the family are already engaged in business
elsewhere. The Court observed that it is the landlord’s prerogative to
determine the nature and place of business and that the tenant cannot
dictate what the landlord ought to do. The Court also recognised the
practical reality that a landlord cannot be expected to remain idle
throughout protracted litigation and that subsequent developments
must be assessed pragmatically, particularly where they do not
extinguish the underlying need. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 4. First of all we shall take up the question of bona fide need of
the landlords. So far as the partition of the property and the present
premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there
is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share
of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition
of the family properties. But the question is whether the landlords
7
(2005) 8 SCC 252
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who are the owners of the portion of the building have
substantiated the allegation with regard to the bona fide need or
not. We have gone through the findings of the trial court as well as
that of the Appellate Authority and the High Court and after
closely scrutinising the same, we do not think that the finding
recorded by the appellate court and the High Court can be
interfered with by this Court on the ground of being perverse or
without any basis. The landlords have led evidence to show that
one of their sons who had requisite qualification for starting a
computer institute wants to establish the same at Calicut and others
for extension of their business. The trial court as well as the first
appellate court and the High Court examined the statements of
PWs 2 and 3 and after considering their evidence, the appellate
court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need
of the respondent landlords to start a business at Calicut, is bona
fide and genuine. It was held that it cannot be said that a person
who is already having a business at one place cannot expand his
business at any other place in the country. It is true that the
landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and
Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it
cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the
tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of
the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona
fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the
landlords are already having their business at Chennai and
Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who
can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should
do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord
to choose the nature of the business and the place of business.
However, the trial court held in favour of the appellant tenant. But
the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinising the
evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held
that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the
landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in fact this plea
of either starting business or expanding it at Calicut is nothing but
a sham and it was also pointed out that some of the sons have
multifarious activities and are already established in some other
business and one of the sons i.e. Respondent 9 had already gone to
the United States of America and he has settled there. Therefore,
the need is not bona fide. We fail to appreciate that when two sons
are there and if they want to expand their business at Calicut then it
cannot be said that the need is a sham one. It is not possible for the
landlords and their sons to wait till the disposal of the case. They
have to do something in life and they cannot wait till the appellant
is evicted from the premises in question. It is common experience
that landlord-tenant disputes in our country take a long time and
one cannot wait indefinitely for resolution of such litigation. If they
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want to expand their business, then it cannot be said that the need
is not bona fide. It is alleged that one of the sons of the landlords
has settled in the USA. That does not detract from the fact that the
other sons of the landlords want to expand their business at Calicut.
Indian economy is going global and it is not unlikely that prodigal
sons can return back to the motherland. He can always come back
and start his business at Calicut. On this ground we cannot deny the
eviction to the landlords.
6. In support of the plea of bona fide requirements by the landlords,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondents sought to support the
same by placing reliance on the decision of this Court, in the case
of Ramkubai v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak [(1999) 6 SCC
540] in which it was observed that B was unemployed on the date
of filing of the suit but in the meanwhile started some business and
in that context, Their Lordships held that he cannot be expected to
idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case was
finally decided. It was held that if the eldest son was carrying on
business along with his mother, that does not mean that his need
has not been established for starting his own business.
7. In the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8
SCC 490] it was held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord
has to be seen on the date of the petition and the subsequent events
intervening due to protracted litigation will not be relevant. It was
held that the crucial date is the date of petition. Their Lordships
further observed that the normal rule is that the rights and
obligations of the parties are to be determined on the date of the
petition and that subsequent events can be taken into consideration
for moulding the reliefs provided such events had a material impact
on those rights and obligations. It was further observed by Their
Lordships that it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the
litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting
up during the long interregnum. Therefore, the courts have to take
a very pragmatic approach of the matter. It is common experience
in our country that specially landlord-tenant litigation prolongs for
a long period. It is true that neither can the person who has started
the litigation sit idle nor can the development of the events be
stopped by him. Therefore, the crucial event should be taken as on
the date when the suit for eviction was filed unless the subsequent
event materially changed the ground of relief.
8. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2
SCC 604] Their Lordships observed that the landlord should not be
penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date
for deciding the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the
date of his application for eviction. Their Lordships also observed
that the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying
the landlord relief while litigation at least reaches the final stages.
However, Their Lordships further added that subsequent events
may in some situations be considered to have overshadowed the
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genuineness of the landlord's need but only if they are of such
nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make
it lose significance altogether.
9. Thus, we are of opinion that the view taken by the first appellate
court as well as by the High Court appears to be justified and there
is no reason to take a contrary view of the matter.”
24. Applying the aforesaid principle, the son’s employment or
association with a business does not, without more, render the
Respondent’s stated requirement illusory. A person may seek to
establish an independent business notwithstanding existing
employment or a prior business venture. The fact that a GST
registration or Importer Exporter Code had been obtained is, at its
highest, indicative of business-related activity; it does not, by itself,
establish that the proposed requirement for the tenanted premises is
sham or that the need has ceased to exist.
25. The Respondent’s explanation, as noticed by the learned ARC,
was that the son had entered into a business venture in partnership
while the eviction proceedings were pending, but the venture did not
succeed and the GST registration was cancelled in 2020. The
Petitioner has not demonstrated how this explanation was ignored or
how the documents relied upon necessarily negate the requirement
pleaded in the Eviction Petition. Nor has any material been identified
which establishes that the subsequent business activity completely
eclipsed or extinguished the asserted need. In these circumstances, the
mere existence of the aforesaid documents does not disclose a patent
error in the learned ARC’s conclusion.
26. This Court must also guard against substituting its own
assessment of the commercial wisdom of the proposed business for
that of the landlord. Whether the son should continue in employment,
pursue a business in partnership, or commence an independent venture
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is not a choice that the tenant can dictate. This Court’s concern is
confined to examining whether the requirement is genuine and
whether the finding returned by the learned ARC suffers from an error
warranting revisional interference. On the material identified by the
Petitioner, no such error is made out.
27. The two grounds urged by the Petitioner have thus been
considered in the context of the record and the reasoning adopted by
the learned ARC. It bears reiteration that the revisional jurisdiction
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is not an avenue
for a second appraisal of the evidence or for replacing a plausible view
of the learned ARC with another view. Interference is warranted
where the order is vitiated by a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality,
material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the
record. The Petitioner has not established any such infirmity in the
Impugned Order.
28. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground
to interfere with the Impugned Order in exercise of its limited
revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the present Petition, being devoid
of merit, stands dismissed.
29. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 13, 2026/nd/ma
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