Laldeo Rajak vs KANEKA INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
- Court
- GST Appellate Tribunal
GSTAT
State Bench Delhi
Division Bench Court No. Court I
APL/72/DEL/2026
LALDEO RAJAK .............Appellant
Versus
KANEKA INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED, DIRECTOR, D-1
DISTRICT CENTRE NEW DELHI SAKET DLSOD 110017 .............Respondent
Quorum
Hon’ble Sh. Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal, Vice President
Hon’ble Sh. Rajiv Kapoor, Member (Technical)
Authorized Representative for
Authorized Representative for Appellant
Respondent
Sh. Deepak Suneja Ld. CA along with Ms. Lovey
Singhal and Ms. Sapna Singhal Ld. CAs
Ms. Prerna Singh, Ld. AC
Form GST APL-04A
[See rules 113(1) & 115]
Summary of the order and demand after issue of order by the GST Appellate Tribunal
whether remand order : No
Order reference no. : ZN510071026000269H Date of order : 29/10/2026
1. GSTIN/Temporary ID/UIN - 07AADCK9100F1ZU
2. Appeal Case Reference no. - APL/72/DEL/2026 Date - 10/02/2026
3. Name of the appellant - Laldeo Rajak , [email protected] , 9430299487
Name of the respondant -
1. KANEKA INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED , [email protected] ,
9910588992
4.
1
5. Order appealed against - AD0710240090002
(5.1) Order Type - Refund Order
(5.2) Ref Number - ZD070625009752D Date - 10/06/2025
Personal Hearing - 29/10/2026 08/10/2026 05/10/2026 29/09/2026 25/09/2026
6.
10/09/2026 02/09/2026 03/08/2026 30/07/2026 10/07/2026 26/05/2026
7. Status of Order under Appeal - Confirmed – Order under Appeal is confirmed
Order in brief - (a) The appeal filed by the appellant/ department is dismissed. (b) The
finding recorded in the impugned Order-in-Appeal No. 107/JC/Central Tax/Appeal-
II/Delhi/2025-26 dated 30.04.2025, annulling the OIO dated 22.07.2024 is upheld, for
the comprehensive reasons recorded in this judgment, in substitution of the reasons
recorded in the impugned OIA. (c) It is accordingly held that refund application 1
dated 29.02.2024 was filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section
54(1) of the Act 2017, as extended by Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated
05.07.2022. (d) No order as to costs.
8.
Summary of Order
9. If demand order then whether demand quantified: No
10. For Other orders and Demand orders which are not quantified:
Issues as raised by
proper officer
Issues as determined by
Appellate/Revisional authority
Order by GST
Appellate Tribunal
Erroneous refund As per Order in Appeal Attached
Place :NEW DELHI
Date : 29.10.2026
Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal
Vice- President/ Judicial Member
GSTAT, Delhi State Bench, New Delhi.
2
FINAL ORDER
1. This appeal has been filed by the Department under Section
112(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (Here in
after called “the Act 2017"), pursuant to Review Order No.
443/Pr. Commr./GST-Delhi South/2024-25 dated 30.10.2025
passed by the Principal Commissioner, CGST, Delhi South,
directing the Deputy/Assistant Commissioner to file an appeal
before this Tribunal against Order-in-Appeal No. 107/JC/Central
Tax/Appeal-II/Delhi/2025-26 dated 30.04.2025 (Here in after
called " the impugned OIA") passed by the Joint Commissioner
(Appeals-II), CGST Delhi (Here in after called " the appellate
authority"), to the extent it annulled the finding of the
adjudicating authority that the respondent's refund claim was
time-barred.
2. The impugned OIA had annulled Order-in-Original ("Here in
after called “the OIO dated 22/07/2024") passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, CGST Malviya Nagar Division, whereby a refund
claim of Rs. 39,88,388/- filed by the respondent had been rejected
solely on the ground of limitation.
3. The respondent, M/s Kaneka India Private Limited, 4th Floor,
Unit No. 3, Worldmark 4, Assset Area No. LP-1B-04, New Delhi
– 110037, a registered person under GST (GSTIN
07AADCK9100F1ZU), had received an advance of Rs.
7,11,67,068/- in April 2020, on which it discharged GST of Rs.
3
1,28,10,072/- while filing FORM GSTR-3B for April 2020 on
19.05.2020. A part of the advance, to the extent of taxable value
of Rs. 4,90,09,353/- (involving Rs. 44,10,841/- under CGST and
SGST each, was adjusted against actual supplies in June 2020.
This left an alleged excess payment of Rs. 3,98,8,388/- (CGST
Rs. 19,94,194/- and SGST Rs. 19,94,194/-), for which the
respondent sought a refund under Section 54 of the Act 2017.
4. The chronology of the refund applications, as borne out by the
record, is as follows:
(a) 29.02.2024-original refund application filed (ARN
AA070224107176L);
(b) 12.03.2024 - deficiency memo issued in FORM GST RFD-
03.
(c) 31.03.2024 - fresh application filed after purported
rectification;
(d) 10.04.2024 - second deficiency memo issued for the
same reasons;
(e) 25.05.2024 - third application filed (ARN
AA070524080895T), acknowledged in FORM GST RFD-02 on
10.06.2024;
(f) 01.07.2024 - show cause notice in FORM GST RFD-08(Here
in after called " the SCN”) issued, proposing rejection on the
ground that the claim was time-barred;
4
(g) 17.07.2024 -respondent filed a detailed reply to the SCN; and
5. The SCN dated 01.07.2024 raised two grounds:
firstly, that the refund application dated 25.05.2024 annexed details
pertaining to a period prior to 24.05.2022, said to render the claim
time-barred (expiry of two years) having regard to the "relevant
date" under Section 54 of the Act 2017; and secondly, that complete
supporting documents i.e., advance payment receipt, invoices, bank
statement and GST reconciliation sheet for the relevant period had
not been uploaded.
6. A personal hearing was fixed for 09.07.2024, at which the
respondent did not appear; however, a written reply to the Show
Cause Notice was furnished on 17.07.2024.
7. The adjudicating authority, recorded in the OIO dated 22/07/2024
that the taxpayer's reply dated 17.07.2024 to the SCN is not
admissible; that he had carefully gone through the facts of the
case, and that all documents had been submitted electronically by
the party; that the refund application was filed by the party under
Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017, and pertains to refund of
excess payment of tax for the period of April 2020. He recorded
that the instant refund claim essentially involves consideration of
two issues:
5
(a) whether the refund claim has been filed in time and with the
correct jurisdictional authority, and
(b) whether the party has filed its GSTR-1 (Table-6A) and GSTR-
3B.
8. On the first issue, the adjudicating authority mentioned that the
party filed the said application for refund claim on 25.05.2024,
for the period April 2020, for an amount of Rs. 39,88,388/-. To
analyse whether the claim was filed within time, the adjudicating
authority considered it appropriate to discuss the relevant legal
aspects. It found that Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 provides that
any person claiming refund of any tax and interest, if any paid on
such tax, or any other amount paid by him, may make an
application before the expiry of two years from the relevant date,
in such form and manner as may be prescribed. It then referred to
CBIC notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05 July 2022,
clause (iii) of which excludes the period from the 1st day of
March 2020 to the 28th day of February 2022 for computation of
the period of limitation for filing a refund application under
Section 54 or Section 55 of the Act 2017.
9. The adjudicating authority further recorded that the taxpayer filed
a refund claim on 29.02.2024 but did not enclose the documents
required as per circular No. 125/44/2019-GST dated 18.11.2019
and Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020, and
accordingly deficiency Memo ZJ0703240187674 dated
12.03.2024 was issued; that the taxpayer had to file a fresh refund
6
application on 13.03.2024, but failed to do so. It was recorded
that the taxpayer filed a refund again on 31.03.2024, which is also
time barred and was not accompanied by the documents required
under the said circulars; that the refund application filed by the
taxpayer on 25.05.2024 is also time barred as per Section 54 of
the CGST Act, 2017, which requires every claim for refund to be
filed within two years from the relevant date; that from a plain
reading of the tables, the said refund claim is not filed within time.
10. On the second issue, the adjudicating authority observed
that the party has filed both its returns, GSTR-3B and GSTR-1,
for the period April 2020.
11. It was also recorded that in view of para 8 (of the OIO dated
22/07/2024), the refund amount of Rs. 39,88,388/- is liable to be
rejected, and that the party is not eligible for refund of excess
payment of tax of Rs. 39,88,388/-. In the tabulation, the amount
of refund claimed was shown as Rs. 19,94,194/- under CGST, Rs.
19,94,194/- under SGST and Nil under IGST; refund sanctioned
on provisional basis as Nil; refund amount inadmissible as Rs.
19,94,194/- under CGST, Rs. 19,94,194/- under SGST and Nil
under IGST; and the gross amount to be paid, the amount adjusted
against outstanding demand, and the net amount to be paid as nil.
12. The adjudicating authority disposed of the refund claim as
follows, in brief:
(a) It was recorded that the refund claim dated 29.02.2024, the tax
payer did not enclose documents as per the two circulars (para 8.5
7
of the OIO dated 22/07/2024) referred to in the deficiency memo
dated 12.03.2024, and that the applications dated 31.03.2024 and
25.05.2024 were "also time barred";
(b) it was found, in the respondent's favour, that GSTR-1 and
GSTR-3B for the period had in fact been filed; and
(c) The claimed refund of Rs. 39,88,388/- was held liable to be
rejected and was rejected on the grounds of limitation in entirety
under sub-section (5) of Section 54 of the Act 2017.
13. It is apparent on the face of the OIO dated 22/07/2024 that,
although the adjudicating authority extracted the text of
notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax in the body of the order (at
the paragraph dealing with the applicable law), no computation
was thereafter undertaken applying that notification to the facts,
and no finding, one way or the other was recorded on the specific
submission made by the respondent in its reply.
14. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal before the
appellate authority. The appellate authority found the claim of
refund to be within the limitation prescribed under Section 107(1)
of the Act 2017. In its grounds of appeal, the respondent reiterated
the computation set out in its reply to the Show Cause Notice and
relied upon several judgments of higher courts, including as
recorded in the impugned OIA, a judgment of the Hon'ble Kerala
High Court to the effect that the relevant date for eligibility under
Section 54 is the date on which the original refund application
8
was filed, and not the date of refiling after issuance of a deficiency
memo.
15. By the impugned OIA dated 30.04.2025, the appellate
authority held, in substance, that although the appellant had relied
upon notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax, the adjudicating
authority had not recorded any finding on the respondent's
detailed written submission invoking that very notification, and
had rejected the claim "without considering the reply submitted
by the appellant", which the appellate authority held to amount to
a "violation of principles of natural justice". On this basis, the
appellate authority held the observations of the adjudicating
authority "not sustainable", found the OIO dated 22/07/2024
arbitrary to the extent of non-consideration of the respondent's
submissions against allegations relating to issue of time barred
refund claims, and further noted that the adjudicating authority
had, in any event, "not examined all other aspects to quantify
maximum eligible refund". The appellate authority accordingly
annulled the OIO dated 22/07/2024 and disposed of the appeal in
terms of sub-section (12) of Section 107 of the Act 2017.
16. The impugned OIA was examined in review under sub-
section (3) of Section 112 of the Act 2017 by the Principal
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi South, who, by Review Order No.
443/Pr.Commr./GST-Delhi South/2024-25 dated 30.10.2025,
directed the Deputy/Assistant Commissioner, Division, Malviya
Nagar, to file the present appeal.
9
17. Accordingly, the appellant has preferred this appeal on
following grounds.
a). That the Order-in-Appeal is erroneous in law and facts in so
far as it holds that the refund claims filed by the appellant were
not time-barred under Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 read
with notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022. The
appellate authority has failed to correctly interpret the statutory
provisions governing the computation of the limitation period for
filing refund claims.
b). That the appellant's refund application was originally filed on
29.02.2024, which is beyond the extended time limit prescribed
under Notification No. 13/2022-CentralTax dated 05.07.2022.
The relevant date for computing limitation under Section 54(1) of
the CGST Act, read with Explanation (b) to Section 54(1) of the
Act 2017, is the date of filing of the relevant return i.e., GSTR-
3B.
c). That the appellant, in its submission has deliberately and
misleadingly computed the extended due date for filing refund as
'24.03.2024' by taking 675 days as extended in the terms of the
said notification. Whereas, the taxpayer has not provided any
basis for arriving at the count of days considered as extended and
added in the original due date (19.05.2022). By applying the
taxpayer's own formula for arriving at the extended last date, the
days extended by the virtue of the notification is 650 days
10
(subtracting date of filing of GSTR-3B (i.e., 19/05/2020) from the
cut-off date of exclusion (28.02.2022) as per notification No.
13/2022). Thus, using the correct relevant date (19/05/2020), the
original refund claim filed on 29.02.2024 itself was filed with a
delay of one day, rendering the refund applications time-barred.
d). That the appellate authority, while allowing the appeal on the
ground of limitation, has erred in ignoring this fundamental legal
error in the appellant's calculation and has accepted the
appellant's flawed methodology without scrutiny. The principle
of limitation under GST law is strictly construed, and any
relaxation must be within the four corners of the law. The
appellant's attempt to re-characterize the "due date" is a clear
circumvention of statutory timelines and must be rejected to
protect public revenue.
18. The appellant prayed for
(i) Setting aside Order-in-Appeal No.: 107/JC/Central
Tax/Appeal-II/Delhi/2025-26 dated 30.04.2025
passed by the Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II) of
Central Tax, Delhi to the extent of the grounds of
appeal, as discussed above.
(ii) For passing any other order, as the GST Appellate
Tribunal, Delhi, may deem fit and appropriate in the
matter.
19. In its reply to the appeal, the respondent has raised, the
following sets of submissions:
11
(i) that the appeal is not maintainable, as it travels beyond the
scope of SCN and the OIO which is against settled principles; that
SCN alleged only that refund application 3, filed on 25.05.2024,
was time-barred because the supporting documents uploaded
therewith pertained to a period prior to 24.05.2022, and that the
OIO dated 22/07/2024 proceeded on the footing that refund
applications 2 and 3 were re-filings made beyond the dates by
which the respective deficiency memos required re-filing;
neither, disputed the computation underlying refund
application The appeal, by contrast, for the first time alleges that
the respondent's addition of 675 days to the original due date was
without basis, that only 650 days stood extended under
notification No. 13/2022, and that refund application was
consequently itself filed a day late. Relying on Commissioner of
Customs, Mumbai v. Toyo Engineering India Ltd., 2006 (201)
E.L.T. 513 (S.C.); Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad v.
Cellulose Products of India, 2000 (124) E.L.T. 1133 (CEGAT),
affirmed in Kalpana Chemicals (P) Ltd. v. Collector, 2001 (127)
E.L.T. A165 (S.C.); T.D. Kumar & Bros. v. CIT, Calcutta, [1967]
63 ITR 67 (S.C.); and Dalip Singh v. Union of India, 1987 (31)
E.L.T. 352 (Del.), together with Rule 112 of the CGST Rules,
2017 and Rule 45 of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025, the
respondent submits that the department cannot be permitted to
build, for the first time before this Tribunal, a case never put to
the respondent at the show cause or adjudication stage, and that
12
the appeal, and the review order authorising it, are on this ground
alone not maintainable.
(ii) that original refund application was, in any event, filed
within time under Section 54 read with Notification No. 13/2022-
Central Tax;
(iii) that the re-filing dates of Refund Applications 2 and 3 cannot
be reckoned for computing limitation, the undisputed original
filing date of Refund Application 1 alone being relevant;
(iv) that the two-year period under Section 54(1) of the Act
2017 is directory and not mandatory, since the sub-section
employs the word “may”, and relies on Lenovo (India) Pvt. Ltd.
v. Joint Commissioner of GST (Appeals-1), (2023) 12 Centax
230 (Mad.), and ARS Energy Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional
Commissioner (Appeals), Chennai, (2023) 13 Centax 300 (Mad.).
(v) that the amount claimed was not “tax” but a deposit paid
under a mistake of law, since no taxable supply of service
ultimately materialised against the unadjusted portion of the
advance, and that the limitation under Section 54 does not apply
to such a deposit. Reliance is placed on Rites Ltd. v. Assistant
Commissioner, CGST, W.P.(C) 13543/2023 (Del., decided
28.01.2025); Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Additional
Commissioner, CGST (Appeals-II), (2023) 10 Centax 355 (Del.);
Messrs Aalidhra Texcraft Engineers v. Union of India, 2025 (1)
TMI 50 (Guj.); CCE (Appeals) v. KVR Construction, 2012 (26)
13
S.T.R. 195 (Kar.); and Parijat Construction v. Commissioner of
Central Excise, Nashik, 2018 (359) E.L.T. 113 (CESTAT).
(vi) that the appellant has erred in denying substantive benefits
due to procedural infractions.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
20. On a conspectus of the grounds of appeal and the
respondent's case as recorded in the orders below, the following
issues arose for determination:
I). Whether the Revenue Appeal's challenge to the computation of
the extended due date under Notification No. 13/2022 amounts to
travelling beyond SCN and the OIO dated 22/07/2024, so as to
render the appeal not maintainable."
II). Whether the impugned OIA is sustainable in annulling the OIO
dated 22/07/2024 solely on the ground of violation of the principles
of natural justice, without itself recording any finding on the
question of limitation, and without giving reasons as to why the
computation of the period of limitation by either side is correct or
incorrect?
(III) Whether the refund application(s) filed by the
respondent were within the period of limitation prescribed under
Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 read with Notification No. 13/2022-
14
Central Tax dated 05.07.2022, and, in particular, whether the
respondent's computation of the extended due date as 29.02.2024
is sustainable?
(IV) What is the effect, if any, of the deficiency memos dated
12.03.2024 and 10.04.2024 on the date from which limitation is to
be reckoned?
(V) Whether the amount of Rs. 7,11,67,068/-, paid as GST on the
advance received in April 2020, can be treated as a "deposit" paid
under a mistake of law to fall outside the limitation under Section
54(1) of the Act 2017.
(VI) Whether the two-year period under Section 54(1) of the Act is
a procedural requirement capable of relaxation, or a substantive
statutory condition for refund that Circular No. 37/11/2018-GST
dated 15.03.2018 cannot override?
21. We have heard the parties at length. Ms. Prerna Singh, Ld.
Assistant Commissioner, appeared for and argued the matter on
behalf of the appellant, and Sh. Deepak Suneja Ld. CA along with
Ms. Lovey Singhal and Ms. Sapna Singhal Ld. CAs, appeared for
and argued the matter on behalf of the respondent. We have also
perused the record. Their respective submissions, may be
summarised as follows:
22. On behalf of the appellant, it was strenuously argued by the
Ld. AC that the impugned OIA is erroneous ; that the respondent's
own computation of the extended due date as 24.03.2024, by
15
adding 675 days to the due date of 19.05.2022 before the
authorities , is without basis, since the days extended under the
Notification No. 13/2022, correctly reckoned from the relevant
date of 19.05.2020, comes out to be only 650 days; that applying
this figure, the original refund application dated 29.02.2024 was
itself filed a day beyond the extended due date and was, therefore,
time-barred from its very inception; that the appellate authority
erred in accepting the respondent's methodology without
independent scrutiny, in disregard of the principle that limitation
under a fiscal statute is strictly construed, and any relaxation must
be within the four corners of the law.
23. On behalf of the respondent, it was vehemently argued by
the Ld. Counsel, at the outset, that the appeal is not maintainable,
being founded on a ground that the computation of the extended
due date that formed no part of SCN or the OIO dated 22.07.2024,
both of which had proceeded only on the footing that the re-filed
applications were belated. Without prejudice to this objection, it
was further argued that the original refund application dated
29.02.2024 was in any event filed within limitation, since
notification No. 13/2022 excludes the entire period from
01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and that the relevant date of 19.05.2020
falling within that exclusion window the two-year period could
only commence running from 01.03.2022, expiring on
01.03.2024; that this computation stood corroborated by OIO 2
dated 23.09.2025, in which the appellant's own adjudicating
authority had itself arrived at 01.03.2024 as the extended due
16
date; that the re-filing dates of refund applications 2 and 3, made
pursuant to deficiency memos, could not in any case be reckoned
for limitation, the undisputed date of the original refund
application alone being relevant; that the two-year period under
Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 in any case is directory and not
mandatory; that the amount claimed being unadjusted advance on
which no corresponding supply materialised, is in the nature of a
deposit and not "tax", to which the limitation under Section 54 of
the Act 2017 does not apply; and that procedural infractions
cannot, in any event, be permitted to defeat a substantive
entitlement to refund.
24. These rival submissions are considered, issue-wise, in the
discussion that follows.
25. Issue No I
Whether the Revenue Appeal's challenge to the computation of
the extended due date under Notification No. 13/2022 amounts to
travelling beyond SCN and the OIO, so as to render the appeal
and the review order not maintainable."
26. At the outset , we shall deal with the submissions of the
respondent to the effect that SCN alleged only that refund
application filed on 25.05.2024, was time-barred because the
supporting documents uploaded therewith pertained to a period
prior to 24.05.2022, and that the OIO dated 22/07/2024 proceeded
17
on the footing that refund Applications 2 and 3 were re-filings
made beyond the dates by which the respective deficiency memos
required re-filing; neither, disputed the computation underlying
refund application itself; that the appeal, by contrast, for the first
time alleges that the respondent's addition of 675 days to the
original due date was without basis, that only 650 days stood
extended under notification No. 13/2022, and that refund
application was consequently itself filed a day late; that the
appellant cannot be permitted to build, for the first time before
this tribunal, a case never put to the respondent at the show cause
or adjudication stage, and that the appeal, and the review order
authorising it, are on this ground alone not maintainable.
27. After hearing the parties and going through record, this
tribunal is unable to accept this contention. It is well settled, as
the very authorities relied upon by the respondent establish, and
as reaffirmed in Commissioner of C. Ex., Bangalore v. Brindavan
Beverages, (2007) 5 SCC 388, that a show cause notice is the
foundation on which the department has to build up its case. If the
allegations in the show cause notice are not specific and are on
the contrary vague, lack details and/or unintelligible that is
sufficient to hold that the noticee was not given proper
opportunity to meet the allegations indicated in the show cause
notice. That principle restrains the introduction of a new charge,
classification, or basis of demand never put to the assessee. It does
18
not, however, preclude the appellant from correcting, in a
subsequent appeal, the arithmetic underlying a ground of
rejection that was, in substance, in issue throughout.
28. In the present case, the ground of rejection in both SCN and
the OIO dated 22/07/2024 was, always, that the refund claim was
barred by limitation under Section 54 of the Act 2017. The
computation of the extended due date under Notification No.
13/2022 was squarely before the adjudicating and appellate
authorities from the outset indeed, it was the respondent's own
reply to SCN that first placed the 675-day computation and the
resulting due date of 24.03.2024 on record. The department
appeal does not introduce a new species of allegation
unconnected with the SCN or the OIO dated 22/07/2024; it
disputes the correctness of the very notification-based
computation that the respondent itself placed on record, and upon
which the appellate authority proceeded without independent
scrutiny.
29. This is qualitatively different from the fact patterns in Toyo
Engineering, Cellulose Products, and T.D. Kumar & Bros (Relied
by respondent), where an entirely new classification,
characterisation, or basis of demand, never put to the assessee at
any prior stage, was sought to be introduced. Nor does Rule 112
of the CGST Procedure Rules (Here in after called Rules 2017)
or Rule 45 of the GSTAT Rules assist the respondent: those
provisions restrict the production of additional evidence, not legal
19
argument upon facts already on record and undisputed between
the parties; namely, the dates of filing, the relevant date of
19.05.2020, and the terms of Notification No. 13/2022. The
maintainability objection is accordingly rejected.
30. Issue No (II)
Whether the impugned OIA is sustainable in annulling the OIO
dated 22/07/2024 solely on the ground of violation of the
principles of natural justice, without itself recording any finding
on the question of limitation, and without giving reasons as to
why the computation of the period of limitation by either side is
correct or incorrect?
31. Before proceeding to examine the aforesaid issue, it is
apposite to first analyse the distinction between setting aside an
order on the ground of violation of natural justice and
adjudicating the substantive issues arising from the proceedings.
The consequence of a finding of breach of natural justice cannot
be considered in isolation from the nature of the defect found, the
stage at which such defect occurred and statutory powers
available to the appellate authority. More particularly, where the
order under challenge is annulled solely on the ground of
violation of natural justice, the question whether such annulment
can stand without a finding on an independent issue of limitation
requires examination in the light of the settled principles
20
governing the effect of proceedings conducted in breach of
natural justice.
32. In a Constitution Bench decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs. The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments
Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1, while giving the majority
judgment Hon’ble Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud referred to
Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edition, page 97) where the
principle in Latin runs as follows:
"Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex"
The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is
that:
"Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason
of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself."
33. In England there was no common law duty of recording of
reasons. In Marta Stefan vs. General Medical Council, (1999) 1
WLR 1293, it has been held, "the established position of the
common law is that there is no general duty imposed on our
decision makers to record reasons". It has been acknowledged in
21
the Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at page 23
that "No single factor has inhibited the development of English
administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general
obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their
decisions".
34. Even then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal Board,
ex-parte Cunningham reported in (1991) 4 All ER 310, Lord
Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very strongly in favour of
disclosing of reasons in a case where the Court is acting in its
discretion. The learned Master of Rolls said:
“. It is a corollary of the discretion conferred upon
the board that it is their duty to set out their reasoning
in sufficient form to show the principles on which they
have proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane CJ's
observations (in R vs. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ,
ex p Khan (Mahmud) [1983] 2 All ER 420 at 423,
(1983) QB 790 at 794-795), the reasons for the lower
amount is not obvious. Mr. Cunningham is entitled to
know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it
was to which the board were addressing their mind in
arriving at their conclusion. It must be obvious to the
board that Mr. Cunningham is left with a burning
sense of grievance. They should be sensitive to the
fact that he is left with a real feeling of injustice, that
having been found to have been unfairly dismissed, he
22
has been deprived of his just desserts (as he sees
them)".
35. The learned Master of Rolls further clarified by saying:
“. thus, in the particular circumstances of this case,
and without wishing to establish any precedent
whatsoever, I am prepared to spell out an obligation
on this board to give succinct reasons, if only to put
the mind of Mr. Cunningham at rest. I would
therefore allow this application."
36. But, the present trend of the law has been towards an
increasing recognition of the duty of Court to give reasons (See
North Range Shipping Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping
Corporation, (2002) 1 WLR 2397). It has been acknowledged that
this trend is consistent with the development towards openness in
Government and judicial administration. In English vs. Emery
Reimbold and Strick Limited, (2002) 1 WLR 2409, it has been
held that justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties
why one has won and the other has lost. The House of Lords in
Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
(2003) 1 WLR 1763, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn,
on the requirement of reason held, "First, they impose a discipline
... which may contribute to such decisions being considered with
care. Secondly, reasons encourage transparency.
23
37. The position in the United States has been indicated by Our
Hon’ble Apex Court in S.N. Mukherjee Vs Union of India AIR
1990 SC 1984 in paragraph 11 at page 1988 of the judgment. The
Hon’ble Apex Court held that in the United States the Courts have
always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative
authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that
such recording of reasons is required as "the Court cannot
exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the
considerations underlying the action under review".
38. It is well settled law that a quasi-judicial authority disposing of a
claim is required to pass a reasoned, speaking order dealing with the
submissions made before it; the recording of reasons is itself a
requirement of the principles of natural justice.
39. The recording of reasons is the means by which a decision-
maker demonstrates that the submissions made were heard and
weighed, and it is for that reason that the requirement has been
treated as an aspect of natural justice and not as a mere formality.
40. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan,
(2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after a survey of
the authorities, held that reasons serve to guard against
arbitrariness, to promote fairness and transparency, to show that
the authority has applied its mind, to inform the aggrieved party
why he has lost, and to enable the superior forum to exercise its
supervisory or appellate jurisdiction; and that the obligation
extends to quasi-judicial authorities and not only to courts.
24
41. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981, the Hon’ble Apex
Court similarly held that an order of a quasi-judicial authority
must itself disclose the reasons on which it rests. An order that
annuls the decision of a lower authority for breach of the doctrine
of audi alteram partem, but which does not itself reveal why the
appellate authority considered the hearing deficient or how the
dispute is to be decided, fails the very test that the rule is meant
to secure.
42. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in
support of its decision came up for consideration before Hon’ble
Supreme Court in several cases. Initially Hon’ble Supreme Court
recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative orders
and quasi- judicial orders but with the passage of time the
distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and
virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court
in A.K. Kraipak and others vs. Union of India and others reported
in AIR 1970 SC 150.
43. The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord
Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord
Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari,
referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed
out that an order with errors on its face, is a non-speaking order.
(See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report)
44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court always opined that the face of
an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an
25
administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must
speak. It must not be like the `inscrutable face of a Sphinx'.
45. In M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar
Jhunjhunwala and Others, [1962] 2 SCR 339, a Constitution Bench of
the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with an order passed by the Central
Government in exercise of its appellate powers under Section 111(3)
of the Companies Act, 1956. The Hon’ble Court held that there had
been no proper trial of the appeals, since no reasons were given in
support of the order which reversed the decision appealed against, and
observed:
“If the Central Government acts as a tribunal
exercising judicial powers and the exercise of that
power is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution, we fail to see how the
power of this Court can be effectively exercised if
reasons are not given by the Central Government in
support of its order.” (P. 357)
46. The principle applies with greater force to the impugned
OIA in the present case. The appellate authority under the Act
2017 is a statutory quasi-judicial forum whose orders are
amenable to a further appeal before this Tribunal under Section
112 of the act 2017. This Tribunal can exercise that jurisdiction
effectively only if the appellate authority discloses why, it has
reached the conclusion it has reached.
26
47. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and
Others, [1966] 1 SCR 466, the Hon’ble Apex Court declined to
quash an order of affirmance merely for want of reasons, but
distinguished Harinagar Sugar Mills (supra) on the footing that there
the decision appealed against had been reversed without reasons,
there being a vital difference between an order of reversal and an
order of affirmance. Subba Rao J., as he then was, in his concurring
opinion, held the order to be vitiated for want of reasons and
observed:
“In the context of a welfare State, administrative
tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the
necessary concomitants of a Welfare State. But
arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept
of a welfare State itself. Self-discipline and
supervision exclude or at any rate minimize
arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to
disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure
guarantees consideration. The condition to give
reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate
minimizes arbitrariness; it also enables an appellate
or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within
bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable condition of
judicial disposal.” (P. 472)
“If tribunals can make orders without giving
reasons, the said power in the hands of an
27
unscrupulous or dishonest officer may turn out to be
a potent weapon for abuse of power. But if reasons
for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint
on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous
or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to
judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order
will at its best be reasonable and at its worst be at
least a plausible one. The public should not be
deprived of this only safeguard.” (P. 472)
“There is an essential distinction between a court
and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to
look at things objectively, uninfluenced by
considerations of policy or expediency; but an
executive officer generally looks at things from the
standpoint of policy and expediency. The habit of
mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be
expected to change from function to function or from
act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall
be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing
orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least
they should do is to give reasons for their orders.
Even in the case of appellate courts, invariably
reasons are given, except when they dismiss an
appeal or revision in limine — and that is because the
appellate or revisional court agrees with the
28
reasoned judgment of the subordinate court or there
are no legally permissible grounds to interfere with
it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an
appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the
first tribunal is laconic and does not give any
reasons.” (Pp. 472–73)
48. The Hon’ble Lord ship added that where the original
tribunal has given reasons, the appellate or revisional tribunal
may affirm the decision by agreeing with those reasons; what is
essential is that reasons be given by the appellate tribunal,
expressly or by reference to those of the original tribunal.
49. Adverting to case in hand, the impugned OIA is not an order
of affirmance. It sets aside and annuls the OIO dated 22/07/2024.
It neither gives reasons of its own nor adopts any reasoning of the
original authority. It therefore falls on the Harinagar (Supra) side
of the line drawn in Madhya Pradesh Industries (supra).
50. The same question was considered by a Constitution Bench of
Hon’ble Apex Courtin Bhagat Raja v. Union of India [AIR 1967 SC
1606], where the Central Government had exercised revisional
powers under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957. Referring to Madhya Pradesh Industries
(supra) with approval, the Hon’ble Court held:
“The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to
the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Art.
29
227 of the Constitution and of the appellate powers of
this Court under Art. 136. It goes without saying that
both the High Court and this Court are placed under
a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the
revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single
word ‘rejected’, or ‘dismissed’. In such a case, this
Court can probably only exercise its appellate
jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire
records of the case and, after giving a hearing, come
to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will
certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing
with the appeal.” (P. 309)
“After all a tribunal which exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial powers can certainly indicate its mind
as to why it acts in a particular way, and where
important rights of parties of far-reaching
consequences to them are adjudicated upon in a
summary fashion without giving a personal hearing
when proposals and counter-proposals are made and
examined the least that can be expected is that the
tribunals shall tell the party why the decision is going
against him in all cases where the law gives a further
right of appeal.”
30
51. The nature of a reason was explained by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2
SCC 836, in the following terms:
“Reasons are the links between the materials on
which certain conclusions are based and the actual
conclusions.”
52. Under guidance of these citations, we have examined the
impugned OIA. The appellate authority recorded that (a) the
respondent discharged the impugned excess tax on 19.05.2020
and was therefore required to file the refund claim on or before
18.05.2022 in terms of Section 54 of the Act 2017; (b) the claim
was originally filed on 29.02.2024, again on 31.03.2024 after a
deficiency memo dated 12.03.2024, and finally on 25.05.2024
after a deficiency memo dated 10.04.2024, and “appeared to be
delayed by around two years”; (c) the respondent had relied on
Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022 and the
adjudicating authority gave no finding on that submission; (d) the
issue of time bar was conveyed by RFD-08 dated 01.07.2024 and
the respondent’s written reply was not dealt with, which
“amounts to violation of principles of natural justice”; and (e) the
adjudicating authority, apart from the limitation issue, had not
examined the other aspects needed to quantify the maximum
eligible refund. On this basis the OIO dated 22/07/2024 was
annulled and the appeal “disposed of in terms of Section
107(12)”.
31
53. What the impugned OIA does not contain is equally telling.
Although limitation was the sole ground of rejection in the OIO
dated 22/07/2024 and the only real dispute between the parties, the
impugned OIA:
(i) does not record whether notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax
applies to the respondent’s refund claim, or how it applies;
(ii) does not compute the period of limitation, the period excluded
by the notification, or the resulting last date for filing, and does not
say whether that date is 24.03.2024 as claimed by the respondent, or
any other date;
(iii) does not state why the respondent’s computation (675 days,
reckoned from 24.04.2020) is correct or incorrect.
(iv) does not decide whether the relevant date for Section 54 of the
Act 2017 is the date of the original application of 29.02.2024 or of
the re-filed applications, and does not identify the judgment of the
Hon’ble High Court of Kerala which was said to support the
respondent, nor examine its applicability; and
(v) does not frame any point for determination, and does not record
any conclusion on whether the refund claim is within time or barred.
54. The impugned OIA is thus an order in which the appellate
authority has given no verdict on the only question in controversy.
It has annulled the OIO dated 22/07/2024 on the sole ground of
violation of the principles of natural justice.
32
55. It cannot be ascertained whether the appellate authority
accepted the respondent’s reading of the notification, rejected it,
or left it open. An order from which neither party nor this tribunal
can discern the mind of the deciding authority, is, in the words of
Hon’ble Justice Subba Rao, one which fails the basic duty to
“disclose its mind”, and the “compulsion of disclosure guarantees
consideration”.
56. The finding of violation of natural justice recorded in the
impugned order does not rest on any discussion of the record. We
have noted that the impugned OIA does not refer to the show cause
notice or to the manner in which the OIO dated 22/07/2024 dealt
with the reply. The record shows that a show cause notice dated
01.07.2024 was issued on the ground of time bar, a personal hearing
was fixed for 09.07.2024, and the respondent filed a reply on
17.07.2024. The OIO dated 22/07/2024 extracts the text of
notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax, but does not apply it to the
facts, and disposes of the respondent’s reply in a single sentence,
“not admissible”, without reasons and without recording any finding
on the computation of limitation placed before it. Tested on the
touchstone of the principles mentioned here in above, the OIO dated
22/07/2024 is vitiated by non-consideration of the respondent’s
reply, and the tribunal agrees with the appellate authority, to that
extent, that the OIO dated 22/07/2024 could not be sustained as it
stood.
33
57. The appellate authority, however did not identify what
opportunity was denied to the respondent; the grievance recorded
in the impugned OIA is in substance that the reply was not
considered. That is a complaint about want of reasons in the OIO
dated 22/07/2024 and is ordinarily to be cured in appeal by the
appellate authority itself examining the reply and deciding the
point, not by annulling the order and leaving the point undecided.
The doctrine of audi alteram partem guarantees a fair opportunity
of being heard; it does not by itself require that every submission
be answered at length, nor does it dispense with the need to
consider whether the alleged infraction has caused prejudice. We
are mindful of the recent decisions of the Hon’ble Apex court and
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi noted in pre -paras, which insist that
a reply on record must be considered and must not be passed over
in silence. That principle is not in doubt, and the tribunal has
applied it both to the OIO dated 22/07/2024 and to the impugned
order. Where, as here, limitation depends on undisputed dates and
a notification, the question is one of computation and
interpretation that the appellate authority was fully competent to
decide on the material before it, and was bound to decide under
sub-sections (11) and (12) of Section 107 of the act 2017.
58. We have further noted that as recorded under the heading
"Personal Hearing" in the impugned OIA, the appellate authority
afforded personal hearing to both parties on 16.12.2024 and
08.01.2025. On 08.01.2025, the respondent herein appeared
through its Chartered Accountant, reiterated the grounds of
34
appeal and specifically pleaded that the refund claim was not
time-barred, relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court
of Kerala on the relevant date for the purposes of Section 54 of
the Act 2017.
59. No one appeared on behalf of the appellant herein (the
respondent before the appellate authority) on either date before
the appellate authority. We are of the considered view that this
non-appearance, though a default on the part of the Department,
did not relieve the appellate authority of its own obligation. The
law on this point is well settled. In Commissioner of Income Tax,
Madras v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai, 1969 AIR 1068,
1969 SCR (3) 818, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, dealing with the
scheme of the Income-tax Act, 1922, held that an appellate body
must dispose of an appeal by making such orders as it thinks fit
on the merits. It must go into the correctness or otherwise of the
points decided by the departmental authorities, and this can be
done only by a decision on questions of fact and law, and not by
merely disposing of the appeal on account of the default of a
party.
60. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the appellate
forum is bound to give a proper decision on questions of fact as
well as law, which is possible only if the appeal is disposed of on
merits. Our own Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in Golden Times
Services Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, W.P.(C) 402-year 2020 decided on
13.01.2020, noted that this principle has been reiterated time and
again by several High Courts. It was held that, in the absence of
35
a party, the appellate forum must proceed to decide the matter on
merits, and cannot defeat the rights of the parties by procedural
wrangles and uncertainties. Although Chenniappa Mudaliar
(supra) and Golden Times (supra) arose in the context of the
Income-tax Act, the principle they lay down applies with equal
force to an appellate authority exercising quasi-judicial powers
under Section 107 of the Act 2017. Such an authority is not a mere
umpire between two contesting parties.
61. The examination and determination of a question of law,
more so a question of limitation going to the root of the claim, is
the duty of the authority itself, and it must be discharged
irrespective of the presence or absence of a party. The absence of
a party may excuse the authority from considering the arguments
that such party might have advanced, but it cannot excuse it from
applying the law to the facts on record. Limitation was the sole
ground on which the OIO dated 22.07.2024 rejected the refund
claim, and the respondent's plea in that regard was specifically
placed before the appellate authority. It was therefore incumbent
upon the appellate authority to analyse Section 54 of the Act
2017, notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022 and
the rival computations, and to record a reasoned finding thereon,
even in the absence of the department.
62. Sub-section (11) of Section 107 of the Act 2017 provides
that the appellate authority shall, after making such further
inquiry as may be necessary, pass such order as it thinks just and
proper, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order
36
appealed against. The said provision, however, expressly
prohibits the Appellate Authority from referring the case back to
the adjudicating authority that passed the decision or order.
Further, sub-section (12) of Section 107 mandates that the order
of the appellate authority disposing of the appeal shall be in
writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision
thereon and the reasons for such decision.
63. The impugned OIA does not do so. It observes that the
adjudicating authority did not examine the other aspects needed
to quantify the refund, but it neither carried out that inquiry itself
under sub-section (11) of section 107 of Act 2017 nor gives any
direction. An annulment made for the reason that the original
authority must look at the matter again is a remand in substance,
which the statute forbids. The observation about the “other
aspects” is in any case beside the point, since a claim held to be
time-barred does not call for quantification, and the OIO dated
22/07/2024 rejected the claim on limitation alone. The impugned
OIA also states that it is disposing of the appeal “in terms of
Section 107(12)”, which prescribes the contents of the order, and
not the power under which the appeal is decided.
64. The consequence is that the OIO dated 22/07/2024 no longer
exists, the impugned OIA decides nothing, and neither the
respondent nor the appellant knows whether the claim is in time.
This is the very situation that the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Raja
(supra) sought to prevent by requiring that a tribunal “tell the party
37
why the decision is going against him”. It is also a situation in which
this Tribunal, in the words of Bhagat Raja, is “placed under a great
disadvantage” in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
65. The question that remains before us is whether the matter
should be remanded back to the appellate authority to pass a
speaking order on the issue of limitation or we should ourselves
decide the matter on merits. Section 113(1) of the Act 2017
empowers this tribunal, after hearing both parties, to pass such
orders as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the
decision or order appealed against, and also to refer the case back
with directions. The power to refer back is discretionary. We are of
the view that a remit is neither necessary nor appropriate in the
present case, for the following reasons:
(i) the only question in controversy is that of limitation under
Section 54(1) of the Act 2017, on which alone the OIO dated
22/07/2024 rejected the claim;
(ii) that question turns on a statutory computation on admitted
facts, namely the relevant date of 19.05.2020, the dates on which the
refund applications were filed, and the text of notification No.
13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022, none of which is in dispute
between the parties;
(iii) the rival computations of the respondent and of the appellant
for are required to be appreciated or additional evidence is required
to decide;
38
(iv) sub-section (11) of Section 107 of the Act 2017 itself forbids the
appellate authority from referring the case back to the adjudicating
authority, so that a remit to the appellate authority would merely
direct it to perform, after further delay, the very duty that it was
bound to perform in the first instance; and
(v) a remit would leave a refund claim undetermined for a further
period, to the prejudice of both sides, without serving any useful
purpose.
We accordingly decline to remit the matter and proceeds to decide
the question of limitation itself, on the material on record, in the
discussion on Issues (iii) and (iv) below.
66. In view of the above, this tribunal holds that the impugned OIA,
in annulling the OIO dated 22/07/2024 solely on the ground of violation
of the principles of natural justice without itself recording any finding
on the question of limitation, and without giving reasons as to why the
computation of the period of limitation by either side is correct or
incorrect, is not a reasoned or speaking order, does not conform
to standards prescribed under sub-sections (11) and (12) of Section 107
of the Act 2017. The finding of the appellate authority that the OIO
dated 22/07/2024 is vitiated for non-consideration of the respondent’s
reply is upheld, but in view of afore discussions, it is apt clear that the
appellate authority erred in annulling the OIO dated 22/07/2024 in its
entirety instead of itself examining and deciding the question of
limitation, which was capable of being determined on admitted facts.
39
67. A bare annulment, without more, leaves the substantive
rights of both the appellant and the respondent hanging in the air
and, in the circumstances of this case, does not sub-serve the
object of Section 107(12) of the Act 2017. We accordingly hold
that while the annulment was justified in principle, but the manner
of disposal requires improvements.
68. ISSUE No III and IV
(III) Whether the refund application(s) filed by the respondent
were within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 54(1)
of the Act 2017 read with Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax
dated 05.07.2022, and, in particular, whether the respondent's
computation of the extended due date as 29.02.2024 is sustainable?
(IV) What is the effect, if any, of the deficiency memos dated
12.03.2024 and 10.04.2024 on the date from which limitation is to
be reckoned?
These two issues are interconnected and hence taken up together.
69. Sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Act 2017 requires an
application for refund to be made "before the expiry of two years
from the relevant date". Clause (h) of Explanation 2 to this
Section 54 of the Act 2017 defines the relevant date, in a residuary
case such as this, as "the date of payment of tax". It is not in
dispute the respondent's own reply having proceeded on this
footing that the relevant date in the present case is 19.05.2020,
40
being the date on which GSTR-3B for April 2020 was filed and
the tax in question was paid. The ordinary period of two years
would, on this footing have expired in May 2022; it may be noted
that even at this stage the record itself is not free of a one-day
discrepancy, the impugned OIA computing the ordinary due date
as 18.05.2022 while the respondent's own reply computes it as
19.05.2022 a discrepancy of no great moment in itself, but
illustrative of the closeness of the dates involved in this matter.
70. Central importance to this appeal is notification No.
13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022, issued under Section
168A of the Act 2017, clause (iii) whereof "excludes the period
from the 1st day of March, 2020 to the 28th day of February 2022
for computation of period of limitation for filing refund
application under Section 54 or Section 55 of the said Act." This
notification extended to refund claims under GST law, the benefit
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's orders in In Re: Cognizance for
Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of
2020, by which the Hon'ble Supreme Court, taking Suo-motu
cognizance of difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,
extended limitation prescribed under any general or special law
in respect of all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings for the
period 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 (orders dated 23.03.2020,
08.03.2021, 27.04.2021, 23.09.2021 and 10.01.2022).
71. It must be emphasised that notification No. 13/2022 does
not permit the limitation clock to run through the specified
window; at the very least, no part of the period from 01.03.2020
41
to 28.02.2022 can be reckoned against the applicant. Where, as
here, the relevant date itself falls within the excluded window
(19.05.2020 lies between 01.03.2020 and 28.02.2022), two
methods of giving effect to the exclusion are conceivable: first, to
exclude only the days that would otherwise have run between the
relevant date and the end of the excluded window, and to add that
number of days to the normal due date; or, second, since no part
of the two-year period had even commenced running before the
exclusion came to an end, to treat the full period of two years as
commencing only from the day following the end of the excluded
window, namely 01.03.2022. Which of these two methods
correctly gives effect to the notification, on the facts of this case
is examined further below after considering the parties' respective
submissions and the manner in which the appellant’s own
subsequent order has dealt with the point?
72. The respondent's own tabulation in its reply to SCN dated
17.07.2024 (reproduced in tabular form at paragraph below,
computes the period of extension not from the relevant date of
19.05.2020, but from 24.04.2020, i.e., the date on which the
advance itself was stated to have been received, arriving at a
figure of 675 days and consequently, an extended due date of
24.03.2024. This is a departure from the respondent's own
identification, a few lines earlier in the very same reply, of
19.05.2020 as the relevant date under clause (h) of Explanation 2
to Section 54 of the Act 2017. As will appear more fully at
paragraphs below, the respondent before this tribunal has
42
abandoned this computation and advanced a materially different
case on the point; the correctness of the resulting figure, and the
effect of this change in stance, are accordingly examined together.
73. Before examining the rival computations placed before the
lower authorities, it is necessary to set out the statutory provisions
that govern the limitation for filing a refund claim under the Act,
since the entire controversy turns on their correct application.
74. Rule 89 of the Rules 2017 prescribes FORM GST RFD-01
and the documents required to accompany a refund application.
Rule 90 of the Rules 2017 governs scrutiny: sub-rule (2) requires
an acknowledgment in FORM GST RFD-02 within 15 days
where the application is complete; sub-rule (3) requires
communication of deficiencies in FORM GST RFD-03, upon
which the applicant is required to file a fresh application after
rectification. By notification No. 15/2021-Central Tax dated
18.05.2021, a third proviso was inserted in Rule 90(3) of the
Rules 2017 which is as under:
"Provided also that the time period, from
the date of filing of the refund claim in FORM GST
RFD-01 till the date of communication of the
deficiencies in FORM GST RFD-03 by the proper
officer, shall be excluded from the period of two years
as specified under sub-section (1) of section 54, in
respect of any such fresh refund claim filed by the
applicant after rectification of the deficiencies."
43
75. This read with paragraph 12 of circular No. 125/44/2019-
GST dated 18.11.2019 which clarifies that a refiled application is
to be treated as a fresh application but must nonetheless be filed
within two years of the relevant date constitutes the statutory
machinery for computing limitation where a deficiency memo
intervenes.
76. Before the appellate authority, and again before us, the
respondent has relied upon decisions of various Hon’ble Superior
Courts for the proposition that, where a refund application is
followed by a deficiency memo, the date of the original
application and not the date of the refiled application is to be
treated as the relevant reference point for computing limitation.
This line of authority is well established.
77. In M/S Durgambika Traders vs The Union of India on 14
November 2025, The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in W.P.
5131/2024, held that;
“ii) The petitioner is reserved liberty to file a
fresh/new refund application along with relevant
documents within a period of 6 weeks from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.
iii) It is further directed that pursuant to the
petitioner filing fresh/new refund application along
with relevant documents before the respondents, the
respondents shall construe/consider/treat the
fresh/new refund application to be filed by the
44
petitioner as if the same was filed on 03.05.2023 on
which date the first refund application was filed by
the petitioner and by excluding the entire period from
03.05.2023 till the date of filing the fresh/new refund
application for the purpose of limitation under
Section 54 of the CGST Act.
iv) Along with fresh/new refund application, the
liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to file
pleadings/documents etc., in support of his claim.
v) Pursuant to the petitioner filing the fresh/new
refund application, the concerned respondent shall
consider the refund claim of the petitioner and pass
appropriate orders together with the claim of interest
put forth by the petitioner in accordance with the
provisions contained in Section 54 of the CGST Act
read with Rule 89 of the CGST Rules as expeditiously
as possible within a period of three months from the
date of petitioner filing fresh/new refund
application.”
78. The Hon’ble Jammu & Kashmir High Court in a case M/S
Hallmark vs Jammu and Kashmir Goods and Services on 25
September 2024, W.P(C) 2025/2020) has held that;
“18. What is held by a Division Bench of the High Court of
New Delhi in paragraph-25 of WP(C) 871/2022, decided on
45
09.08.2023, in case, titled as, National Internet Exchange of
India vs Union of India & ors., is relevant to reproduce
hereunder:
"25. As noted above, in terms of Section 54(1) of the
CGST Act, an application is required to be made in
the prescribed form and manner before two years
from the relevant date. It is clear that the petitioner
had complied with the said requirement inasmuch as
it had filed an application for refund on 31.10.2019
in the "form and manner" as prescribed in the CGST
Act and the CGST Rules. Thus, in terms of Section
54(1) of the CGST Act, the period of limitation would
stop running notwithstanding that the proper officer
required further documents or material to satisfy
himself that the refund claimed was due to the
petitioner."
19. Similarly, what is held by a Division Bench of the High
Court of New Delhi in paragraphs-27, 28 & 29 of WP(C)
3550/2023, decided on 06.04.2023, in case, titled as, Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Union of India & ors., is also
relevant to reproduce hereunder:
"27. It is pointed out that the Adjudicating Authority had
proceeded on the basis that it had communicated the
deficiencies in Form GST RFD 03 on 31.01.2020
46
electronically and the said deficiency was resolved
after the expiry of two years as stipulated in Section
54 of the CGST Act. The Adjudicating Authority had
referred to Rule 90(3) of the Rules and had proceeded
on the basis that the said Rule provides for filing of a
fresh refund application after rectification of
deficiencies. And, the date for filing the fresh
application was required to be considered for the
purpose of limitation.
28. We are of the view that Rule 90(3) cannot be applied in
the manner as sought to be done by the Adjudicating
Authority. Merely because certain other documents
or clarifications are sought by way of issuing a
Deficiency Memo, the same will not render the
application by a taxpayer as non est. 10 WP(C)
2025/2020
29. If the application filed is not deficient in material
particulars, it cannot be treated as non est. If it is
accompanied by the "documentary evidences" as
mentioned in Rule 89(2) of the Rules, it cannot be
ignored for the purposes of limitation. The limitation
would necessarily stop on filing the said application.
This is not to say that the information disclosed may
not warrant further clarification, however, that by
itself cannot lead to the conclusion that the
47
application is required to be treated as non est for the
purposes of Section 54 of the CGST Act. It is
erroneous to assume that the application, which is
accompanied by the documents as specified under
Rule 89(2) of the Rules, is required to be treated as
complete only after the taxpayer furnishes the
clarification of further documents as may be required
by the proper officer and that too from the date such
clarification is issued."
79. The Hon’ble high court of Karnataka recently in a case titled
Homag India private limited vs joint commissioner. (Writ petition
27378 /2025) has held as under;
“5. In the instant case, the undisputed material on
record will indicate that the petitioner initially filed a
refund application on 04.07.2024 which was well
within the prescribed period as contemplated under
Section 54(3) of the CGST Act and it was that date on
which the petitioner filed the refund application has
to be considered for the purpose of computing period
of limitation and not subsequent revised refund
application filed by the petitioner pursuant to the
deficiency memo issued by the respondents, which is
clearly incorrect and consequently, the said finding
recorded by the respondents is erroneous and matter
deserves to be quashed.”
48
Therefore, it is clear that a rectified application filed thereafter is a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the original claim.
80. We respectfully agree with and adopts the principle
underlying this line of authority. A genuine, bona fide
rectification of deficiencies carried out pursuant to a deficiency
memo does not give rise to a fresh cause of action or a fresh
limitation period; it relates back to and is treated as a continuation
of, the original application.
81. However, the doctrine of relation-back recognised in this
line of authority operates only where the original application was
itself filed within the period of limitation prescribed under
Section 54(1) of the act 2017, as extended by notification No.
13/2022. In each of the decisions referred to above, the assessee's
original application was admittedly within time, and it was only
the subsequent, deficiency-memo-driven application that the
department sought, erroneously, to treat as the relevant date for
limitation. The doctrine of relation-back cures the effect of an
intervening deficiency memo upon an otherwise claim not barred
by limitation; it cannot cure an antecedent infirmity in the
limitation of the original claim itself.
82. This distinction is reinforced by the settled position of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that limitation periods under special
fiscal statutes are to be strictly construed and are not ordinarily
susceptible to relaxation on equitable grounds, however marginal
the delay. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5
49
SCC 536, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that a claim for refund of duty under a fiscal statute must be
made, and can only be made within the four corners of that statute
and cannot be pursued outside the statute on general principles of
equity or under the ordinary law of limitation.
83. In another matter Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU,
Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd.,
(2020) 19 SCC 681, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where
a special statute prescribes its own limitation without expressly
conferring a power to condone delay beyond it, neither the
authorities under that statute nor even a High Court in writ
jurisdiction can extend that period, as doing so would render the
specific statutory limit otiose. This principle is reflected also in
the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P)
Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791, and in Singh Enterprises v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, (2008) 3 SCC 70 both holding
that where a taxing statute is a complete code prescribing a
specific period, with at best a limited power of condonation, the
authorities constituted under it cannot travel beyond that period
by resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has further held, in VKC Footsteps India (P) Ltd.
v. Union of India, (2021) 4 SCC 705, that a refund under GST
law is in the nature of a statutory concession, to be claimed strictly
in accordance with the conditions, form and procedure prescribed
by the statute itself.
50
84. Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is precisely such a provision,
a complete code prescribing a specific two-year period for filing
a refund application, without conferring on any authority,
including this tribunal, a power to condone delay beyond that
period. It follows that if on a correct computation the very first
application in a given case was filed even a day beyond the
prescribed period (as extended by notification No. 13/2022), that
delay is not curable by this tribunal, and no doctrine of relation-
back or continuation doctrine can be invoked to treat that first,
time-barred application as if it were within time.
85. Applying the above framework both sides agreed that the
relevant date under Explanation 2(h) to Section 54 is 19.05.2020,
being the date on which the respondent discharged the impugned
excess tax while filing FORM GSTR-3B for April 2020. The
dispute is confined entirely to the correct computation of the
extended due date after applying the exclusion under notification
No. 13/2022.
86. The respondent's computation, as placed before the
adjudicating authority in its reply dated 17.07.2024 to SCN, and
reproduced by the respondent itself at paragraph 17(e) of its reply
to the appeal filed before this tribunal, was as follows:
S. No. Particulars Date
1 Period of refund April 2020
2 Advance received on 24.04.2020
51
S. No. Particulars Date
Date of payment of tax (relevant date under
3
19.05.2020
Section 54)
4 Original due date (2 years from relevant date) 19.05.2022
Period excluded by Notification No. 13/2022-
01.03.2020 to
5
CT
28.02.2022
Days extended (computed by respondent from
6
675 days
24.04.2020 to 28.02.2022)
7 Extended due date (4 + 6) as per respondent 24.03.2024
8 Date of filing of original refund application 29.02.2024
87. On this computation, the original application dated
29.02.2024 was sought to be shown as within time, on the footing
that 675 days stood added to the normal due date of 19.05.2022
by virtue of notification No. 13/2022. The flaw in this
computation, as pointed out in the grounds of the appeal itself, is
that the count of "675 days" at serial no. 6 is reckoned not from
the relevant date of 19.05.2020, which the respondent itself
records at serial no. 3 of the very same table, but from 24.04.2020
i.e., the date of receipt of the advance, a date that has no statutory
relevance to the computation of limitation under Section 54 of the
Act 2017. Reckoned consistently from the relevant date, the
appellant computes the exclusion at 650 days, yielding an
52
extended due date at or about the end of February 2024,
dangerously close to, rather than comfortably beyond, the date on
which the original application was in fact filed.
88. Confronted with this challenge, the respondent has not,
before this tribunal, defended the computation extracted as
mentioned here in above. Instead, in the same reply to the appeal,
it has advanced an altogether different computation, which may
be summarised as follows:
89. It was agitated by the respondent that without prejudice to
its objection as to maintainability, the original refund application
was even on merits, filed well within the period prescribed under
Section 54 of the Act 2017 read with Notification No. 13/2022 ;
that the relevant date under clause (h) of Explanation (2) to
Section 54 is the date of payment of tax, namely 19.05.2020, and
the ordinary two-year period would accordingly have expired on
19.05.2022 ; that notification No. 13/2022 excludes in its entirety
the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for computing the
limitation period, so that no part of that window can be reckoned
against the applicant ; that since the relevant date of 19.05.2020
itself falls within this exclusion window, the statutory clock could
commence running only from 01.03.2022, the day following the
end of the exclusion, and the respondent thereby became entitled
to a full fresh period of two years computed from that date ; that,
applying the settled rule of computation that the first day is
excluded and the last day included, a period of two years
commencing on 01.03.2022 expires on 01.03.2024, so that the
53
original application filed on 29.02.2024 was filed before, and
within, the extended period , relying on Tarun Prasad Chatterjee
v. Dinanath Sharma, MANU/SC/0635/2000, and Larsen &
Toubro Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST & CX, 2022-VIL-553-
CESTAT-KOL-ST ; that the appellant's contrary computation of
"650 days", arrived at by counting only the overlap between the
relevant date and the end of the excluded window and adding that
figure to the normal due date, proceeds on an artificial and
truncated reading of the notification No. 13/2022 , which does not
permit a part-exclusion of the specified window but mandates that
it be excluded in its entirety; and that, on a correct application of
the notification No. 13/2022, the original refund application dated
29.02.2024 was filed within time, and the contrary computation
in the appellant is liable to be rejected.
90. This change of stance does not, by itself, either advance or
defeat the respondent's case. It is well settled principal that there
can be no estoppel against a statute and that a concession or for
that matter a shifting position, on a question of law binds neither
the party who has taken it nor the tribunal before whom it is taken
[Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 SCR 303
(Constitution Bench)], and the line of authority following it.
Limitation under a taxing statute goes to the jurisdiction of the
authority to entertain the claim at all, and it is the bounden duty
of this tribunal to reckon it correctly in terms of law, uninfluenced
by the manner in which either side has, at different stages of the
proceedings, chosen to compute it.
54
91. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through
LRs v. Rajmani, 2025 INSC 478, has reiterated that it is the duty
of every court to ascertain whether a lis has been initiated within
the time prescribed by law, this being a question that may be
raised, and must be answered, at any stage, even where the parties
themselves have not raised it. These principles apply with equal
force to the converse situation presented here where an applicant's
own change of stance cannot be permitted either to defeat, or by
itself to establish, an entitlement that depends purely on the
correct application of Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 and
notification No. 13/2022 to admitted facts.
92. We accordingly proceed to determine for itself which of the
two methods of applying Notification No. 13/2022, discussed
hereinabove, is correct on the particular facts of this case. For this
purpose, the last date for filing the refund application is first
computed on the earlier stand of the respondent before the
authorities below.
(a) The relevant date being 19.05.2020, the original due date, two
years therefrom, is 19.05.2022. The respondent counted the
period of exclusion from 24.04.2020, the date of receipt of
advance, till 28.02.2022, and arrived at 675 days. Adding 675
days to 19.05.2022 gives 24.03.2024 as the last date for filing
the refund application.
(b) The appellant counted the days not from the date of advance,
which has no relevance for the purposes of Section 54 of the
55
Act 2017, but from the date of payment of tax, i.e., 19.05.2020,
till 28.02.2022, which comes to 650 days. Adding 650 days to
19.05.2022 gives 28.02.2024 as the last date for filing the
refund application.
(c) Thus, on the earlier stand of the appellant, the last date, i.e.
28.02.2024, falls short of the date of filing of the original
application, i.e. 29.02.2024, by one day, whereas on the earlier
stand of the respondent the application is within time by 24
days.
93. The Ld. counsel for the respondent has now taken the plea
that, in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation , Suo Motu
Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020, decided on 10.01.2022 (2022-
VIL-03-SC; (2022) 3 SCC 117), the refund application of the
respondent is within limitation. In this regard, he has submitted
as under:
(a) Our attention is drawn to paragraph 5(I) of the said
judgment, wherein it has been held that the period from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the
purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general
or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings. He submits that; besides notification No. 13/2022-
Central Tax, the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
56
is also applicable to the facts of the present case, the Act 2017
being a special law.
(b) Attention is further drawn to paragraph 5(IV) of the said
judgment, wherein it has been mentioned that the period from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in
computing the periods prescribed under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and any other laws
which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting
proceedings. He submits that the Act 2017 comes under the
category of "any other laws".
(c) It was submitted since the relevant date in the present case
is 19.05.2020, which falls within the exclusion window, the
balance period of limitation, in terms of paragraph 5(II) of the
said judgment, shall become available with effect from
01.03.2022, and the period of limitation shall accordingly start
reckoning from 01.03.2022.
94. For ready reference, paragraph 5 of the said judgment In Re:
Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (S upra), containing the
directions relied upon by the respondent, is reproduced in full
hereunder:
5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned
counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health
and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we
57
deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with
the following directions:
I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in
continuation of the subsequent orders dated
08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed
that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall
stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may
be prescribed under any general or special laws in
respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation
remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become
available with effect from 01.03.2022.
III. In cases where the limitation would have expired
during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022,
notwithstanding the actual balance period of
limitation remaining, all persons shall have a
limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the
event the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater
than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
IV. It is further clarified that the period from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded
in computing the periods prescribed under Sections
23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation
58
Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws,
which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting
proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or
tribunal can condone delay) and termination of
proceedings.
95. The computation of the respondent, on this footing, is as
follows:
S. No. Particulars Date / Figure
Relevant date (date of payment of tax, GSTR-3B for
1
19.05.2020
April 2020)
Normal due date (2 years from relevant date) under
2
19.05.2022
Section 54(1)
3 Period excluded under Notification No. 13/2022-CT 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022
Yes (19.05.2020 falls
Whether the relevant date falls within the excluded
4
within 01.03.2020-
window
28.02.2022)
Date from which a fresh, full period of two years is to
01.03.2022 (day following
5
be reckoned, since no part of the period could run
end of exclusion)
before expiry of the exclusion
Extended due date (2 years from 01.03.2022; first day
6
01.03.2024
excluded, last day included)
59
S. No. Particulars Date / Figure
Date of filing of original refund application (Refund
7
29.02.2024
Application 1)
Within limitation (one day
8 Position
before the extended due
date)
96. Per contra, the learned AC appearing on behalf of the
appellant has submitted that the appellant stands by its stand that
650 days are to be computed from the date of payment of tax, i.e.,
from 19.05.2020, and that the last date for filing the refund
application fell on 28.02.2024, so that the application of the
respondent, filed on 29.02.2024, is barred by limitation. She has
further submitted that, since the respondent has now changed the
algorithm, in response to even changed formula, the application
of refund moved by the respondent is time barred. Ld. AC for the
appellant in support of her claim has relied upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in M/s
MC Wane India Private Limited v. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Others , Writ Petition No. 26816 of 2024, decided on 11.03.2026
(2026:APHC:13141) In order to rebut the claim of the respondent
even on his changed stand she argued that even if the respondent
has changed his stand, the application of the respondent for refund
is still barred by limitation, as the period of limitation, in terms of
the said judgment, expires on 27.02.2024. The relevant part of the
60
judgment of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court is
reproduced hereunder:
"7. It is the admitted case of both sides that the
relevant date, under Section 54, for the present case,
is 29.08.2021. In the normal course, the application
would have to be filed on or before 28.08.2023,
inasmuch as the period of limitation, under Section
54, is two years from the relevant date.
8. The Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as
well as the notification, mentioned above, clearly
stipulate that the period from 01.03.2020 to
28.02.2022 should be excluded while including the
period of two years mentioned in Section 54. In the
present case, the period of limitation would
commence only from 29.08.2021. However, this
would mean that the period from 29.08.2021 to
28.02.2022 would have to be excluded. Once this
period is excluded, the limitation would commence
only from 28.02.2022. In such circumstances, the last
date for filing the application would be 27.02.2024."
97. We have heard the parties at length and have also taken care
of the judgments relied upon by the rival parties. At the outset, it
is clear that the respondent has changed the mechanism of
61
quantification visa vis his earlier stand. During the arguments the
respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and has computed the period afresh from 01.03.2022,
expiring after two years on 29.02.2024. The appellant has taken
the stand of 650 days before this bench and has relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court only to rebut
the changed stand of the respondent.
98. We have taken care of the submissions taken by rival parties
on the earlier as well as on the later stand, w.r.t. the modalities of
assessment. This Tribunal is here for justice, and for the
implementation of the exclusion period in terms of the desired
intent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for
Extension of Limitation as well as the desired intent of
Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax in its letter and spirit.
99. In such matters, the principle of estoppel does not apply.
Estoppel operates against a party and not against the court or
tribunal, and it cannot stand in the way of the correct
determination of a pure question of law. In Satyendra Kumar v.
Raj Nath Dubey , 2016 SCC OnLine SC 478 (decided on
06.05.2016), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying upon Mathura
Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy , (1970) 1
SCC 613 has held that the principle of estoppel operates against
the parties and not against the court, and that nothing comes in
the way of a competent court deciding a pure question of law
correctly. In National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner
of Income Tax , (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC) the Hon'ble Apex Court
62
has further held that a question of law arising on the facts already
on record may be entertained by the appellate authority although
it was not raised before the authorities below, the object being the
determination of the correct liability in accordance with law. The
principle that there is no estoppel against a statute has already
been noticed at pre paras.
100. The controversy whether the entire window of exclusion is
to be excluded and the period of two years reckoned afresh after
it, or only a part of the days is to be added to the original due date,
is a pure question of law on admitted facts.
101. After hearing the parties at length, we find substance in the
arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent. The Hon'ble
Apex Court has categorically mentioned in paragraph 5(III) of its
judgment In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (S upra)
that where the limitation would have expired during the period
between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022, all persons shall have a
limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022, or the longer
balance period, if any. Meaning thereby, this period of 90 days is
applicable only where the period of limitation had expired within
the exclusion window.
102. In the present matter, this is not the case as the period of
limitation as per section 54 of the Act 2017 commenced only from
the date of payment of tax, i.e., 19.05.2020, and the normal period
of two years was not to expire within the exclusion window.
Accordingly, paragraph 5(I) of the judgment In Re: Cognizance
for Extension of Limitation (S upra)is applicable, and the entire
63
period till 28.02.2022 stands excluded. The same result follows
from notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022,
which excludes the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 in
computing the period of limitation under Section 54 of the Act
2017, the relevant date of 19.05.2020 falling within that window
as well. The last date for filing the refund application is arrived at
as here in after discussed.
103. Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 provides for an application
for refund to be made before the expiry of two years "from the
relevant date". Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which
applies to the Act 2017, provides that for the purpose of excluding
the first in a series of days or any period of time, the word "from"
is to be used, and, for the purpose of including the last, the word
"to". Thus, the day, which is the relevant date, i.e. 19.05.2020,
from which the period is to be reckoned, is to be excluded, and
the period must be reckoned from the next day, i.e. 20.05.2020.
Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 embodies the same
principle.
104. The entire period from 20.05.2020 till 28.02.2022 being
excluded as no part of the two years had run and the balance
period of limitation which, in terms of the judgment in Re
Cognizance (Supra), became available with effect from
01.03.2022. The period of two years is, therefore, to be reckoned
with 01.03.2020 (In terms of notification 13/22) as its first day
and 28.02.2022 being the last day of the exclusion.
64
105. Under Section 3(66) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a
year means a year reckoned according to the British calendar. The
two years beginning on 01.03.2022 thus comprise the period from
01.03.2022 to 29.02.2024, both days inclusive (365 days and 366
days, i.e. 731 days in all), the next day, i.e. 01.03.2024, being the
corresponding date on which the period of two years stands
completed. The last date for filing the refund application is,
accordingly, 29.02.2024, in terms of notification No. 13/2022-
Central Tax as well as paragraphs 5(I) and 5(II) of the judgment
of the Hon'ble Apex Court In Re: Cognizance for Extension of
Limitation (S upra)and thus the application filed by the respondent
on that date is within time.
106. With due respect, the judgment of the Hon'ble Andhra
Pradesh High Court in M/s MC Wane India Private Limited
(supra) is not applicable to the case in hand, and the contention of
the appellant based thereon cannot be accepted. The Hon'ble
Andhra Pradesh High Court judgement is not applicable in view
of paragraphs 5(II) and 5(III) of the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation
(S upra), under which the balance period becomes available only
with effect from 01.03.2022.
107. The method of fresh reckoning is also corroborated by the
record. While passing OIO 2 dated 23.09.2025 (rejecting refund
application 4, Annexure U to the respondent's reply before this
tribunal), the Ld. adjudicating authority itself tabulated its own
computation, reproduced by the respondent in its reply, as under:
65
Sr.
Particulars Date
No.
1 Period of Refund April 2020
2 Advance received on 24 April 2020
3 Date of payment of tax 19 May 2022
Period excluded by Notification No.
1 March 2020 to 28
4
13/2022 - Central Tax dated 05 July 2022
February 2022
Extended due date Considering the
5
Notification No. 13/2022 - Central Tax
01 March 2024
dated 05 July 2022
Date of filing of original refund
6
application filed by the applicant, as
25 May 2024
treated by the Adjudicating Authority
This computation, made by the adjudicating authority independently of
the stand later taken by the respondent in its reply, treats the window
as excluded in its entirety and places the extended due date at the
beginning of March 2024.
108. In view of the above, we hold as under:
66
(a) The refund application 1, filed on 29.02.2024, being the last
day of the period of limitation, was filed within the period
prescribed under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 as extended in
terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and
notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax. Issue (III) is answered
accordingly, in favour of the respondent.
(b) Once the refund Application No. 1 is held to have been filed
within the prescribed period of limitation, the question of
limitation in respect of refund Applications Nos. 2 and 3, filed
pursuant to the deficiency memos dated 12.03.2024 and
10.04.2024, respectively, would no longer survive as a matter of
practical consequence, the original application having been held to
be within time.
109. Issue no V
Whether the amount of Rs. 7,11,67,068/-, paid as GST on the
advance received in April 2020, can be treated as a "deposit" paid
under a mistake of law to fall outside the limitation under Section 54(1)
of the Act 2017?
AND
Issue no VI
Whether the two-year period under Section 54(1) of the Act is a
procedural requirement capable of relaxation, or a substantive
67
statutory condition for refund that Circular No. 37/11/2018-GST dated
15.03.2018 cannot override?
These two issues are taken up together.
110. We shall now advert to the contentions of the respondent to
the effect that the amount claimed was not “tax” but a “deposit”
paid under a mistake of law, since no taxable supply of service
ultimately materialised against the unadjusted portion of the
advance, and that the limitation under Section 54 of the Act 2017
does not apply to such a deposit. Reliance is placed on Rites Ltd.
v. Assistant Commissioner, CGST, W.P.(C) 13543/2023 (Del.,
decided 28.01.2025); Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v.
Additional Commissioner, CGST (Appeals-II), (2023) 10 Centax
355 (Del.); Messrs Aalidhra Texcraft Engineers v. Union of India,
2025 (1) TMI 50 (Guj.); CCE (Appeals) v. KVR Construction,
2012 (26) S.T.R. 195 (Kar.); and Parijat Construction v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, 2018 (359) E.L.T. 113
(CESTAT).and that the appellant has erred in denying substantive
benefits due to procedural infractions.
111. We have taken care of the submissions and citations relied
upon by the respondent.
112. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent cannot be
accepted for two-fold reasons. Firstly, on the respondent's own
pleaded facts, GST on the advance of Rs. 7,11,67,068/- was
discharged at the time the advance was received in April 2020 in
68
the manner the Act 2017 required of a person receiving an
advance for services. That payment was, at the moment it was
made, a valid discharge of tax properly leviable and collected
under the provisions of the Act 2017. A part of the advance, to
the extent of taxable value of Rs. 4,90,09,353/- (involving Rs.
44,10,841/- under CGST and SGST each) was adjusted against
actual supplies in June 2020. It was not, unlike in Rites Ltd. and
the authorities cited alongside it, a payment made in respect of a
transaction never eligible to tax, or made under a mistaken belief
as to the existence of any liability whatsoever. It became
refundable only later, and only to the extent that no corresponding
supply eventuated against part of the advance.
113. That is precisely the contingency Section 54(1) of the Act
2017 itself addresses in referring to “any tax… paid by him” and
“any other amount paid by him”: the sub-section is not confined
to payments made outside the taxing provisions, but extends, on
its own language, to tax validly paid in the first instance and
refundable upon a subsequent event. Secondly, and in any case,
characterising the amount as a “deposit” does not assist the
respondent, since Section 54(1) is itself the exclusive statutory
gateway through which “any other amount paid” must be
claimed, within the very same two-year period; the provision does
not carve out a separate, unlimited period for amounts falling
outside the strict definition of “tax”.
69
114. To hold otherwise would permit an applicant to escape the
limitation the Hon’ble Parliament has prescribed for the
generality of refund claims merely by re-characterising the claim,
a result the statutory language does not support and which would
render the words “or any other amount” in Section 54(1) of the
Act 2017 itself otiose.
115. The respondent has relied upon certain judgments for the
proposition that the limitation prescribed under Section 54(1) of
the Act 2017 does not apply to an amount deposited under a
mistake. We have perused each of them. We find that, in every
one of them, the amount retained by the department was either
not leviable to tax at all or was not paid as tax, interest or penalty
under the statute. The facts of those relied upon judgements are
materially different from the facts of the present case, as
discussed hereinafter.
116. In Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Additional
Commissioner, CGST (Appeals-II), (2023) 10 Centax 355 (Del.),
W.P.(C) 6793/2023, decided on 18.09.2023, the petitioner had
been engaged by the Surat Municipal Corporation to prepare a
Detailed Project Report for a Metro Rail Project. It raised an
invoice dated 11.08.2017 for Rs. 19,04,520/-, inclusive of GST
of Rs. 2,90,520/- at 18%. The recipient paid Rs. 16,14,000/- but
did not pay the GST. The petitioner deposited Rs. 2,90,520/- with
the GST authorities through FORM GSTR-3B for August 2017.
It was thereafter informed that, under notification No. 12/2017-
70
Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, the services were “not
chargeable to GST”. Its refund application in FORM GST RFD-
01 filed on 02.05.2022 was rejected as beyond two years.
117. The Hon’ble High Court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation
Ltd (Supra) recorded that there was no dispute that the refund was
payable and held that GST had been deposited on an erroneous
belief that the services were chargeable to tax. The relevant
extract is contained in following paras;
“12. Article 265 of the Constitution of India
proscribes any levy or collection of tax except by
authority of law. Concededly, GST is not payable by
the DMRC in respect of the service of preparation of
Detailed Project Report for respondent no.3. Thus,
the amount of ₹2,90,520/- deposited by the DMRC on
an erroneous belief that payment for services
rendered by it were chargeable to tax, cannot be
retained by the respondents.
13. It is well settled that GST is an indirect tax.
The burden of such tax is inevitably borne by the final
recipient. In the present case, respondent no.3 would
be liable to reimburse the GST chargeable on
services availed by it. But since GST is not payable in
71
respect of such services, respondent no.3 has not paid
the said amount.
14. The period of limitation for applying for a
refund as prescribed under Section 54 of the CGST
Act, would not apply where GST is not chargeable
and it is established an amount has been deposited
under a mistake of law.
15. In view of the above, we set aside the
impugned order dated 24.02.2023 as well as the
refund rejection order dated 04.07.2022 and direct
the respondents to process the DMRC's claim for
refund of ₹2,90,520/-.”
118. In substance, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi held in Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (Supra) that GST being an indirect
tax whose burden is borne by the final recipient and the services
being outside the levy, the amount deposited under a mistake of
law could not be retained by the Revenue, and the limitation in
Section 54 did not stand in the way.
119. In the cited case the services were not chargeable to GST at
all by virtue of a notification, so that GST was not payable in law
and its retention offended Article 265 of the Constitution. The
ratio of the judgment is expressly tied to the condition that GST
“is not chargeable”. In the case in hand, the services of the
respondent are taxable, GST on the advance was payable on its
receipt and was duly paid as tax through the statutory return, and
72
the amount became refundable only upon a subsequent event,
namely, non-materialisation of supply against a part of the
advance.
120. In Aalidhra Texcraft Engineers v. Union of India, 2025 (1)
TMI 50 (Guj.), R/Special Civil Application No. 14554 of 2024,
decided on 12.12.2024, the petitioner, a manufacturer of textile
machinery, had imported inputs and capital goods on 33 Bills of
Entry during May 2019 to March 2020 and availed ITC of
integrated tax of Rs. 2,48,28,300/-. Under a wrong impression,
arising from a mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B, that
excess credit of Rs. 40,00,000/- had been availed, it deposited that
sum on 13.11.2020 in FORM DRC-03 [Paras 4 and 5]. On
verification of its records in January–February 2024, it was found
that there was no corresponding tax liability for 2019-20; the
petitioner filed FORM GST RFD-01 on 30.03.2024 and the
Department closed the matter in FORM GST ASMT-12 on
24.04.2024. The refund was thereafter rejected as time-barred on
14.06.2024. The respondents themselves averred that the
payment was not recovered as tax but was a voluntary payment.
121. The Hon’ble High Court in Aalidhra (Supra) recorded that
it was not in dispute that the amount was deposited by mistake,
voluntarily, and was “neither towards any tax, interest or penalty.
The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under;
“15. Having considered the rival submissions made
by both the learned advocates, it is not in dispute that
73
the petitioner deposited amount of Rs.40,00,000/- by
mistake on 20.11.2020 voluntarily which was neither
towards any tax, interest or penalty. ………………”
“16. In view of above analysis made in the aforesaid
judgment which is squarely applicable to the facts of
the case, more particularly when the petitioner has
deposited voluntarily the amount of Rs. 40,00,000/-,
the same would not be covered by the provisions of
Section 54 of the GST Act and the same is required to
be refunded by the respondent authorities as the same
could not have been rejected on the ground of
limitation under Section 54(1) of the GST Act.
However, the petitioner will not be entitled to any
interest on such amount as the same was deposited
voluntarily by mistake and therefore, the respondents
to refund the amount of Rs.40,00,000/- deposited by
the petitioner.
17. In view of the foregoing reasons impugned
order dated 14.6.2024 passed by the respondent
No.2 rejecting the refund application of the
petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside and the
respondent shall refund the amount of
Rs.40,00,000/- which was deposited by the
petitioner by mistake on 20.11.2022 within a
74
period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of
copy of this order. Rule is made absolute to the
aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.”
122. In substance, the Hon’ble High Court, relying on its earlier
decisions held that a voluntary deposit made by mistake, not paid
towards tax, interest or penalty, is outside Section 54 of the Act
2017, that the refund could not be rejected on the ground of
limitation under Section 54(1), and that no interest was payable.
This judgment, too, is distinguishable on facts in hand. In cited
case, the amount there was a voluntary DRC-03 deposit made on
a mistaken belief that ITC had been wrongly availed; there was
in truth no liability, and the sum was not deposited towards tax,
interest or penalty, as the authorities themselves averred whereas
in the present case, the amount is GST on a taxable advance,
discharged as tax through FORM GSTR-3B, and the respondent’s
own case is that it is “tax” refundable under Section 54. There
was no mistaken belief as to the existence of liability when the
tax was paid; the liability on the advance was real at that time.
123. In Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) v. KVR
Construction, 2012 (26) S.T.R. 195 (Kar.), the assessee had paid
Rs. 1,23,96,948/- as service tax under a mistaken notion. It was
not denied by the Department that the construction services were
exempt from service tax by virtue of a circular dated 17.09.2004,
on account of the nature of the institution for which the
construction was made, so that the Department could not have
75
demanded the payment. The assessee used Form-R to claim
refund, and the Revenue invoked the limitation in Section 11B of
the Central Excise Act, 1944.
124. The Hon’ble High Court in KVR Construction (Supra) laid
down that, once there was no compulsion or duty to pay, the
amount paid under a mistaken notion “would not be a duty or
‘service tax’ payable in law”, and that “there was no authority for
the department to retain such amount”. Para 23 is reproduced
below;
“23. Now we are faced with a similar situation where
the claim of the respondent/assessee is on the ground
that they have paid the amount by mistake and
therefore they are entitled for the refund of the said
amount. If we consider this payment as service tax
and duty payable, automatically, Section 11B would
be applicable. When once there was no compulsion
or duty cast to pay this service tax, the amount of Rs.
1,23,96,948/- paid by petitioner under mistaken
notion, would not be a duty or “service tax” payable
in law. Therefore, once it is not payable in law there
was no authority for the department to retain such
amount. By any stretch of imagination, it will not
amount to duty of excise to attract Section 11B.
Therefore, it is outside the purview of Section 11B of
the Act.”
76
125. In substance, the Hon’ble High Court in KVR Construction
(Supra) held that the amount of Rs. 1,23,96,948/- was not duty or
service tax payable in law, that the Department had no authority
to retain it, that it could not be treated as duty of excise so as to
attract Section 11B, and that the claim was outside the purview of
that section. The said decision does not assist the respondent. In
the present case, GST on the advance was leviable and would
have been recoverable by the Department had the respondent not
paid it. Further, that decision turned on the scope of Section 11B
of the Central Excise Act, 1944, whereas the present claim lies
under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017, which expressly covers “any
tax” and “any other amount paid by him”.
126. In Parijat Construction v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Nashik, 2018 (359) E.L.T. 113 (Bom.), Central Excise Appeal
No. 306 of 2016 with C.E.A. No. 16 of 2017, decided on
13.10.2017, the appellant had provided “Commercial or
Industrial Construction” service to the Mumbai Educational Trust
during May 2006 to November 2007 for construction of an
administration and Core Course building. The Hon’ble High
Court recorded that the appellant, “under the bona fide belief that
the transaction attracts Service Tax”, paid the tax “without
collecting the same from the customer” and deposited it to the
credit of the Central Government. On 11.03.2008, it claimed
refund of Rs. 12,62,900/- on the ground that the services were for
77
institutions established solely for educational, religious,
charitable, health, sanitation or philanthropic purposes and were
exempt under C.B.E. & C. Circular No. 80/10/2004-S.T. dated
17.09.2004. The claim was rejected as time-barred by the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal.
The Hon’ble High Court held as under;
“5. We are of the view that the issue as to whether
limitation prescribed under Section 11B of the said
Act applies to a refund claimed in respect of service
tax paid under a mistake of law is no longer res
integra. The two decisions of the Division Bench of
this Court in Hindustan Cocoa (supra) and
Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. M/s. SGR
Infratech Ltd. (supra) are squarely applicable to the
facts of the present case.
6. Both decisions have held the limitation prescribed
under Section 11B of the said Act to be not
applicable to refund claims for service tax paid
under a mistake of law. The decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Collector of C.E.,
Chandigarh v. Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills
(supra) relied upon by the Appellate Tribunal has
in application Section 11B, limitation made an
exception in case of refund claims where the
78
payment of duty was under a mistake of law. We
are of the view that the impugned order is
erroneous in that it applies the limitation
prescribed under Section 11B of the Act to the
present case where admittedly the appellant had
paid a Service Tax on Commercial or Industrial
Construction Service even though such service is
not leviable to service tax. We are of the view that
the decisions relied upon by the Appellate Tribunal
do not support the case of the respondent in
rejecting the refund claim on the ground that it was
barred by limitation. We are, therefore, of the view
that the impugned order is unsustainable.
7. We accordingly allow the present appeals and
quash and set aside the impugned order, insofar as
it is against the appellant in both appeals. We fully
allow refund of Rs. 8,99,962/- preferred by the
appellant. We direct that the respondent shall
refund the amount of Rs. 8,99,962/- to the
appellant within a period of three months. There
shall be no order as to costs.”
127. This judgment in Parijat Construction case (Supra) is also
distinguishable on facts and on law. There, the services stood
exempt under a departmental circular, so that no service tax was
79
payable at all; the appellant paid on a mistaken view of law and
never collected the amount from its customer. Here, the services
are taxable, the respondent collected and paid GST in accordance
with the Act, and the refund arises only on a post-payment event.
128. On a comparison, in every aforementioned judgment relied
upon by the respondent, the Department was holding an amount
which was either (i) not leviable to tax at all, by reason of a
notification, exemption or circular, or (ii) not paid as tax, interest
or penalty under the Act, so that its retention was without
authority of law within Article 265 of the Constitution of India.
In the present case, GST was leviable on the advance and was
discharged as tax through the statutory return; the amount became
refundable only on partial non-supply; and the respondent itself
claimed refund under Section 54 of the Act 2017. The principle
that limitation does not bar the refund of an amount collected
without authority of law therefore has no application.
129. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC
536, already noticed above , a Constitution Bench of nine Judges
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered claims for refund of
duty founded on an illegal levy or on payment under a mistake of
law, and held that the refund provisions of the Central Excise Act,
1944 and the Customs Act, 1962 (Section 11B and Section 27
respectively) constitute a complete and self-contained scheme;
that such claims must be made in the manner and within the
period prescribed by the statute; and that they cannot be pursued
80
by way of a suit or a writ petition on the principles of Section 72
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 or the general law of limitation,
the only exception being a claim founded on the
unconstitutionality of the very provision under which the levy
was made. Section 54 of the Act 2017 is the corresponding
provision for refund under the GST law, and the claim of the
respondent is not founded on the unconstitutionality of any
provision of the Act 2017.
130. The respondent's submission, grounded in circular No.
37/11/2018-GST dated 15.03.2018, and in Mangalore Chemicals
& Fertilizers Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner, 1991 Supp (1) SCC
439, Formica India Division v. Collector of Central Excise, 1995
Supp (3) SCC 552, and Sambaji v. Gangabai, (2008) 17 SCC 117,
that procedural lapses cannot be permitted to defeat a substantive
right, is well-founded as a general proposition , and this Tribunal
has itself applied a kindred principle in holding that the
adjudicating authority's failure to deal with the respondent's reply
to SCN violated natural justice. But the principal cuts no further
than that.
131. The two-year period in Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is not
a “procedural” prescription of the kind addressed in the
authorities relied upon a rule of practice or form governing the
manner of exercising an otherwise available right, but a
81
substantive statutory condition of eligibility for refund, enacted
by Parliament and repeatedly held to be such by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, as discussed above. Circular No. 37/11/2018-
GST speaks to non-withholding of refunds for “minor procedural
lapses or non-substantive errors”; It does not talk of substantiative
compliance like limitation for claiming refund. This submission,
therefore, does not assist the respondent on the question of
limitation.
CONCLUSION
132. For the reasons recorded above:
(i) the impugned OIA, in annulling the OIO dated 22/07/2024
solely on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice,
without itself recording any finding on the question of limitation,
was not a reasoned or speaking order and did not conform to the
standards prescribed under sub-sections (11) and (12) of Section
107 of the Act 2017;
(ii) the relevant date for the respondent's refund claim is
19.05.2020;
(iii) the correct extended due date, after applying the exclusion
under notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022 fell
within the excluded window i.e.,29.02.2024;
82
(iv) the respondent's original refund application (refund
Application 1) dated 29.02.2024 was filed on the last day of the
extended period of limitation, and was not barred by limitation;
(v) refund Applications 2 and 3 relate back to, and are a
continuation of, the original, timely refund application 1, and the
deficiency memos dated 12.03.2024 and 10.04.2024 have no
independent bearing on limitation (Issue IV); and
(vi) the amount claimed does not fall outside Section 54 of the Act
2017 merely because it is described as a deposit, and the two-year
period under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is a substantive
condition of eligibility and not a mere procedural requirement.
(Issues V and VI); this finding does not, however, affect the
outcome, since the claim is, in any event, within the statutory
period.
ORDER
133. In view of the foregoing:
(a) The appeal filed by the appellant/ department is dismissed.
(b) The finding recorded in the impugned Order-in-Appeal No.
107/JC/Central Tax/Appeal-II/Delhi/2025-26 dated 30.04.2025,
annulling the OIO dated 22.07.2024 is upheld, for the
comprehensive reasons recorded in this judgment, in substitution
of the reasons recorded in the impugned OIA.
83
(c) It is accordingly held that refund application 1 dated
29.02.2024 was filed within the period of limitation prescribed
under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017, as extended by Notification
No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022.
(d) No order as to costs.
Announced in the open court.
(Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal)
Vice President/Judicial Member
(Rajiv Kapoor)
Technical Member Centre
GST Appellate Tribunal, Delhi State Bench, New Delhi.
Place: New Delhi
Dated: 29.10.2026
84