Ashok Yadav vs Special Police Establishment Lokayukt

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
1 CRA-920-2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ALOK AWASTHI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 920 of 2015
CNR No.: MPHC020166512015
ASHOK YADAV
Versus
SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT LOKAYUKT
Appearance:
Shri Ajay Bagadia - learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Shri Gajendra Singh Chouhan - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Prasanna Prasad - Advocate for the respondent.
HEARD ON : 16.11.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 19.11.2026
J U D G M E N T
The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant under
Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 /Section 415(3) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short "BNSS, 2023") being
aggrieved by the judgement dated 03.07.2015 passed in Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act), District Dhar in Special Case No. 06/2013,
whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for brevity "PC Act") and sentenced to undergo 02 years' RI in each
section alongwith fine of Rs.1,000/- each and default stipulations.
02. The necessary facts for disposal of this appeal, are that, an offence
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RAIKWAR
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under the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act had been registered against one

Jagdish Chouksey, a relative of complainant Suresh Chouksey, complainant
(PW-1) and that the appellant was associated with its investigation. Initially,
Jagdish Chouksey was under custody and proceedings with regard to bail and
submission of the charge-sheet were going on. As per prosecution story, the
allegation against the appellant is that, the appellant had already taken
Rs.8,000/- in the month of February 2013 and further, demanded an amount
of Rs.5,000/- for submitting the charge-sheet by giving favour in the excise
case registered against Jagdish Chouksey.
03. It was further alleged that Suresh Chouksey (PW-1) submitted a
written complaint before the Lokayukta Department, Indore (Exhibit P-1).
Further, S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) was directed to verify the
allegation levelled in the complaint. On 25.03.2013, Suresh Chouksey,
complainant (PW-1) was provided a voice recorder (Exhibit-P/2) for
recording the conversation regarding demand. Ram Swaroop Gurjar,
Constable (PW-3) was deputed as a shadow witness. Later on, the
complainant (PW-1) met the appellant at the police station and recorded
conversation mentioning bribe of Rs.5,000/-. Furthermore, on 26.03.2013,
the complainant (PW-1) went to the Lokayukta office with the recorder and
filed another written application (Exhibit-P/3). Later on, Atul Shah, Assistant
District Excise Officer (PW-2) and another panch witness participated in the
preliminary proceedings and 10 currency notes of Rs.500/- each were
supplied, their numbers were entered in the preliminary memorandum
(Exhibit P-4) and phenolphthalein powder was applied. Suresh, complainant
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RAIKWAR
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(PW-1) was instructed to tender them only if the appellant demanded the

amount and a second voice recorder was provided to record the conversation.
04. Further, the trap party proceeded to the Police Station, Pithampur.
At that time, the appellant was not in the police station and when the
complainant Suresh Chouksey asked on mobile phone, the appellant said,
"wait, he will come". Later on, when complainant met the appellant and
given bribe money, the appellant took the money and saw the persons who
were coming to catch him on which he started to run away from there and
threw the notes. As per prosecution story, the appellant fall down on the
ground, due to which, he sustained injury, then seizure of the notes from the
spot, comparison of their numbers with the memorandum and a positive
phenolphthalein reaction when the appellant's hands were washed. The
chemical examiner's report is exhibited as P-32.
05. It is stated that on 30.03.2013, the Lokayukta staff allegedly played
the two recorders through an office computer, made compact disc (CD) and
prepared transcripts under memorandum (Exhibits-P/8 and P/9). The
compact discs were referred to as Articles "P" and "Q". S.P.S. Raghav,
Inspector (PW-4) and Naresh Vaishnav, Constable (PW-6) gave evidence
regarding transcription and cop described as a certificate regarding creation
of the discs and transcripts.
06. Following due procedure, a charge-sheet was filed on
23.09.2013. The Trial Court framed charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. The appellant abjured guilt and claimed
to be tried.
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RAIKWAR
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07. The defence of the appellant which he set forth in his statement

recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is that the trap procedure was done
later, the preliminary panchana was prepared on the spot. Neither, he talked
with the complainant nor he called him. Even he has not taken money. The
seizure panchana was falsely prepared, as the tainted notes were not found,
the Lokayukt Team arrange another notes for that purpose. He was taken
from the wall of Flexi Tough Company to the Police Station. In the voice
recorder, the voice was not of the appellant. No procedure was conducted
outside the police station. Suresh Chouksey was not went to the Lokayukt
Office and the complainant come to him. Subsequently, he replied of the
questions, neither the complainant came to him nor he took the money, the
narration regarding fall down and throw the money is false and fabricated.
He never went to the complainant. He said, he sustained injuries being stuck
with a stick by the Lokayukt. Even after making efforts, the Lokayukta team
could not find the currency notes in front of the police station. Hence, they
arranged other currency notes and adopted a false procedure. Lastly, it is
stated that he was forced to write bail application. The certificate (Ex.P.31) is
illegal and the witnesses being government employee, making false
statement to succeed in the prosecution.
08. The prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses viz. Suresh
Chouksey, complainant (PW-1), Atulkumar Shah, Asstt. District Excise
Officer (PW-2), Rajswaroopsingh Gurjar, Inspector (PW-3), S.P.S. Raghav,
Inspector (PW-4), G.P. Dubey, Thana In-charge, Police Station Pithampur
(PW-5), Naresh Vaishnav, Constable (PW-6), Yuvrajsingh Chouhan,
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Inspector (PW-7), Yogendra Dev, LDC (PW-8) and exhibited Ex.P/1 to

Ex.P/42 to bring home the guilt of the appellant. The appellant examined two
witnesses namely Balkrishna Mishra, Head Constable, Police Station -
Pithampur (DW-1) and Sonu Singh (DW-2) in his defence and exhibited
several documents to demonstrate his innocence.
09. The learned Special Judge on the basis of the evidence placed on
record came to hold that appellant did commit the offence for which he was
charged and eventually convicted and passed the sentence, which has already
been mentioned herein above.
10. Shri Ajay Bagadia, Senior Advocate for the appellant has
submitted that the appellant is innocent and he has falsely been implicated in
the present case. He submitted that the substratum of the prosecution case is
absent. Suresh Chouksey (PW-1), whose complaint prompted the
proceedings and who alone allegedly heard and recorded the demand,
completely disowned the prosecution version before the Special Judge. The
trial Court itself recorded in paragraph 21 (pages 17-18) that the complainant
(PW-1) denied approaching Lokayukta, denied the relevant signatures, said
he did not know the appellant and specifically denied that money was
demanded or received. In his cross-examination, he stated that the appellant
had never demanded a bribe. The existence of his photograph on Exhibit P-1
cannot turn repudiated allegations into proof of their truth.
11. That apart, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that owing
to the action initiated by the appellant against Jagdish Chouksey for his
externment, the latter developed animosity towards the appellant and, with a
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view to settling the personal grudge, acted through complainant Suresh

Chouksey. It was contended that the complainant, at the instance and behest
of Rajesh Chouksey, submitted the applications (Exhibits P-1 and P-3) and
subsequently participated in the entire trap proceedings. Thus, the
complainant was merely acting as an instrument to execute the pre-planned
design against the appellant, with the ulterior motive of falsely implicating
him in the present corruption case.
12. It is argued that Ramswaroopsingh Gurjar, Inspector (PW-3) was
not an ear-witness to the alleged conversation recorded on 25.03.2013. Para
50 of the impugned judgment, reveals that he was standing at some distance,
did not hear the recorder played there, was not present at transcription and
also relied on what the complainant or investigating officer told him
regarding demand. The conclusion comes here that there had been a demand
is thus an inference or report of information received, not direct evidence of
the appellant's words. It is also contended by learned counsel for the
appellant that evidence of Atulkumar Shah, Assistant District Excise Officer
(PW-2) with regard to the incident of 26.03.2013, at its highest, that he saw
the parties talking and allegedly saw notes being passed. In para 71 of the
impugned judgment does not attribute to Atulkumar Shah (PW-2) any
particular words demanding Rs.5,000/- as bribe. Nor was S.P.S. Raghav
(PW-4) himself a party to the conversations. The statement of Investigating
Officer regarding what he was told by the complainant (PW-1) or
Ramswaroop Gurjar (PW-3) does not independently prove the demand. The
prosecution cannot equate proof of physical contact with currency with proof
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of an illicit bargain.

13. So far as the electronic material is concerned, learned counsel
points to paragraphs 55 and 56 of the impugned judgment, where the trial
Court clearly accepted that Exhibit P-31 did not comply with the directions
in Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473. Learned
trial Court nevertheless treated the voice recordings as supplementary
corroboration. Such a course is contrary to the mandatory statutory mode of
proving copied electronic records, as explained authoritatively in Arjun
Panditrao Khotkar Vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal reported in (2020) 7
SCC 1, especially paragraphs 32, 50 and 57-59 of the judgment.
14. It is also stressed that witness S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) and
Naresh Vaishnav, Constable (PW-6) could speak to handling the recorders or
copying the recordings in the office but neither made the underlying
conversations. The complainant (PW-1), the person said to have operated the
recorder and identified the voices on 30.03.2013, did not authenticate those
alleged conversations in Court. There was no adequate showing on the
findings recorded that the actual primary electronic record was proved
through its appropriate source witness. The transcription memorandum and
copies cannot cure failures regarding authenticity, source and statutorily
required certification. The mere marking of an exhibit does not make
otherwise inadmissible evidence substantive proof of guilt.
15. He has further submitted that learned trial Court used the
phenolphthalein result and alleged recovery to fill a fundamental gap
concerning demand. A positive hand-wash result might indicate contact with
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treated notes, it does not, by itself, identify the reason for contact. The

appellant disputed voluntary receipt from the beginning. The defence version
of forceful tendering and subsequent pursuit, together with the CCTV
evidence of a chase, must be assessed to decide whether a reasonable
alternative explanation survives. The separate currency of Rs.5,000/-
recovered from the flex-printing factory waste and the Police Station
documents were, relevant to the circumstances and credibility of the trap. It
reflects from para 88 of the judgment that a mismatch between the serial
numbers of these separately recovered notes and the trap notes. It is therefore
not correct to assert as a proved fact that these were the identical trap notes.
Nevertheless, the existence of this defence material, the contemporaneous
police records and the alternative account called for an assessment of the
reliability of the trap as a whole.
16. It is contended that learned trial Court particularly in paragraphs 81
to 92, treated the appellant as bound to establish a complete conspiracy,
fabrication of every document and actual substitution of notes before the
prosecution had established the essential foundational facts. The burden was
impermissibly reversed. The appellant could raise reasonable doubt from
cross-examination, the prosecution materials. and the probabilities of the
defence case; the defence was never required to prove innocence beyond
reasonable doubt. Further, the presumption under Section 20 cannot be
applied to the separate offence under Section 13(1)(d).
17. To bolster his argument, he has placed reliance over the judgments
B. Jayaraj Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55, P. Satyanarayana
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Murthy Vs. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152, C.M. Girish

Babu Vs. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779, N. Vijayakumar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu,
(2021) 3 SCC 687, Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4
SCC 731 and Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., 2024 INSC 503.
18. Shri Prasanna Prasad, on the contrary, learned counsel for the
respondent opposed the prayer and supported the reasoning of the trial Court
by submitting that the hostility of the complainant does not legally
extinguish a corruption case. The prosecution is entitled to rely on
independent panch witnesses, reliable official witnesses, physical evidence,
the conduct of the appellant and other circumstances of the case, even where
the complainant has resiled. The Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj
Dutta (Supra) specifically permits proof of demand from other oral,
documentary or circumstantial evidence. It is urged that the handwritten
complaint bearing the complainant's photograph, the pre-trap proceedings
and the subsequent conduct constitute a consistent sequence.
19. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn attention towards
the testimony of Atulkumar Shah (PW-2), the Lokayukta witness who
followed the complainant and appellant, the appellant's alleged attempt to
throw the currency and flee, tally of currency-note numbers and positive
hand-wash and chemical tests. The defence CCTV itself establishes the
appellant at the site of the chase. The prosecution would distinguish between
a witness having personal knowledge of the event and a witness who did not
hear its words, contending that the combined surrounding circumstances
nonetheless furnish a compelling inference of demand and acceptance.
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20. It is also argued that Exhibit P-31 was in fact tendered that the

recorders were retained by the investigator and Naresh Vaishnav (PW-6)
explained the creation of the compact discs (CDs). The CDs and transcripts
were not the only evidence, the Court may evaluate the trap independently of
them. He has also placed reliance in the cases of M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State
of A.P. reported in (2001) 1 SCC 691 and Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi
Administration) reported in (1980) 2 SCC 390, and Neeraj Dutta (Supra).
21. The State would finally urge that the learned trial court did
consider the defence in paragraphs 81-91. The CCTV footage did not
establish replacement of trap notes; the separately recovered currency was
expressly found to have different serial numbers; there was no demonstrated
personal animus between the trap officers and the appellant; and the proved
chemical reaction was not satisfactorily explained. These are material
submissions that must be addressed, rather than ignored, while deciding the
appeal.
22. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the
record.
23. Based upon the material on record, the question arises for
determination of this appeal is (i) whether the prosecution proved, beyond
reasonable doubt, the alleged demand of illegal gratification by the appellant;
(ii) whether the recorded conversations, CDs and transcripts were legally
admissible and sufficiently authenticated: (iii) whether the evidence relating
to delivery, handling, recovery, chemical examination and conduct
establishes conscious acceptance of illegal gratification; (iv) whether the
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mandatory prescription under Section 20 of PC Act arose and, if so, whether

the defence displaced it on the applicable standard ?
24. The incident occurred in the year 2013. Likewise, the relevant
provisions of Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) and 20 are those operative before
the amendments of 2018. In particular, the pre-amendment Section 13(1)(d)
criminalised obtainment of a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
by corrupt or illegal means, abuse of official position, or obtainment without
public interest. The subsequent statutory reorganisation cannot be used as a
substitute for analysis of the alleged offence as then defined. The electronic-
evidence question is governed by Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act,
1872 applicable to evidence adduced in the 2015 trial.
25. In para 8 and 9 of the judgment B. Jayaraj (Supra), Hon'ble Apex
Court stated that the proof of the accused's demand and knowing acceptance
is central to a charge under the old Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) and that recovery
alone is inadequate. The statutory presumption under Section 20 of PC Act,
is limited to the offences specified in that provision and is not available for
Section 13(1)(d) of PC Act. The case stands approved and explained by the
Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta (Supra), rather than being
displaced merely because circumstantial proof is permitted.
26. Similarly, in the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy (Supra) ,
particularly in para 18 to 21 and para 25 to 26, Hon'ble Apex Court treated
the proof of demand of illegal gratification as essential and drew a distinction
between suspicion and proof. The relevant portion of Para 20 of the
judgment is worth to be quoted here :-
".....mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an
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accused without proof of demand would not establish an
offence...."

27. The settled law was elaborated, not abandoned, in the five-Judge
Constitution Bench decision in the case of Neeraj Dutta (Supra), the excerpts
of the judgment is required to be mentioned as under :-
".....Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a
public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua
non....."
28. The Constitution Bench also held in paragraph 74(f) that if the
complainant dies, becomes unavailable or turns hostile, the prosecution may
establish the fact by other witnesses or circumstantial evidence. No
automatic acquittal follows. The accompanying qualification is decisive: the
Court's discretion to infer demand from circumstances arises only after
foundational circumstances have been proved by admissible and reliable
evidence. The mere existence of incriminating-looking circumstances is not a
licence to bypass the standards governing proof of those circumstances.
29. The subsequent merits in the case of Neeraj Dutta (Supra), says
that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is essential for
conviction under the PC Act. Such demand may be established through
direct or circumstantial evidence. This finding of Hon'ble Apex Court does
not dilute the elementary requirement of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt
30. On the same aspect, the judgment itself explains in paragraphs 11-
14 and 16-19 that under Section 20 of PC Act presumption follows the
foundational facts and does not itself establish their existence. A demand of
money simpliciter, without the proof that it was demanded as illegal
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gratification, cannot suffice, all relied on circumstances must be consistent

with the incriminating hypothesis. These principles require independent
application even after the trap officer or panch witness is believed concerning
aspects of the encounter.
31. As far as the possession of treated notes and voluntary receipt as
bribe is concerned, in para 15 to 23 of the judgment of C.M. Girish Babu
(Supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has given findings that the difference between
possession of tainted notes and voluntary receipt as bribe is concerned, it
reiterated that the statutory burden, when it arises, can be discharged on
preponderance of probabilities through cross-examination and the material
already on record. Para 19 of the judgment is condign to quote here :-
"It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section
20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence
could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the
witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. If
the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick
and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has
proved that the accused received the amount towards
gratification."
32. So far as the voluntarily and knowing acceptance of alleged
demand is concerned, on this aspect, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.
Vijayakumar (Supra) has held that "mere recovery of tainted money,
divorced from the circumstances under which such money and other articles
were found, held, not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive
evidence in the case is not and there is unexplained delay in conducting
phynolphthalein test."
33. Further, Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized the need to prove
voluntary and knowing acceptance and distinguished a finding of recovery
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from proof of demand. In the case of Suraj Mal Vs. State (Delhi

Administration), (1979) 4 SCC 725, Hon'ble Apex Court cautioned that
recovery detached from reliable substantive evidence of a bribery transaction
cannot sustain a conviction. These authorities are not rules rejecting every
trap case; they identify the factual elements which must be established before
recovery becomes incriminating.
34. Subsequently, on the same issue, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
o f Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi (Supra) again discussed the alleged demand,
independent verification and the opportunity for planning money and set
aside the conviction when the prosecution did not establish its case with
sufficient reliability. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are worth to be
mentioned here :-
"26. Since fervent arguments were raised on behalf of the parties
on the aspect of demand of bribe, it would be useful to recapitulate
the relevant position of law on the use of circumstantial evidence
to prove demand of illegal gratification.
27. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta
v. State(Government of NCT of Delhi),1 was called upon to
answer a reference on the question as to whether the
circumstantial evidence can be relied upon to prove the demand of
illegal gratification and whether in the absence of evidence of the
complainant direct/primary, oral or documentary, would it be
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of
a public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the 1 (2023)
4 SCC 731 prosecution. This Constitution Bench traversed the
entire history of the judicial pronouncements on the issue and held
as below: -
“88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
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summarised as under:-
88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the
guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand
of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as
a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either
by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral
evidence or documentary evidence. 88.3. (c) Further,
the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and
documentary evidence. 88.4. (d) In order to prove the
fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification by the public servant, the following
aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-
giver without there being any demand from the public
servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and
receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of
acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case,
there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and
tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of
obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand
for illegal gratification emanates from the public
servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act.

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(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the
bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant
respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a
fact in issue.
In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more would not make it
an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7
of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there
must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver
which is accepted by the public servant which would
make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the
public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in
turn there is a payment made which is received by the
public servant, would be an offence of obtainment
under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way of
an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence
and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the
material on record, the court has the discretion to raise a
presumption of fact while considering whether the fact
of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not.
Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by
the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption
stands.
88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by
letting in the evidence of any other witness who can
again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary

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evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by
circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor
does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned,
on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates
the court to raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward
as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption
has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a
presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is
also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of
fact referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the
former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is
discretionary in nature.”
28. Thus, in addition to answering the primary issue raised in the
matter, the Constitution Bench also went on to hold that in order
to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to
prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent
acceptance, by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
29. Keeping in view the ratio of the above mentioned decision of
the Constitution Bench, we now proceed to discuss the evidence
available on record so as to find out whether the prosecution has
been able to prove beyond all manner of doubt the fact that the
appellant(AO1) demanded and accepted bribe from the
complainant(PW-1)."


35. In this case, Hon'ble Apex Court revisited the Constitution Bench
principles, assessed alleged demand, independent verification and the
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opportunity for planting money, and set aside the conviction when the

prosecution did not establish its case with sufficient reliability.
36. The prosecution rightly invokes M. Narsinga Rao (Supra) and
Hazari Lal (Supra) for the proposition that circumstantial evidence and
competent official testimony may prove relevant facts. No general rule
requires a witness to be disbelieved merely because he is an official. Equally,
the observations in the earlier cases do not dispense with scrutiny of the
actual ingredients of the alleged offence. The case of Neeraj Dutta (Supra)
expressly reconciles the lines of authority, a trial Court must still establish a
sufficiently certain chain from admissible evidence in the particular record.
37. With respect to electronic records, in the case of Anvar P.V.
(Supra), Hon'ble Apex Court discussed that copied or computer-output
electronic evidence is admissible through the mode prescribed by Section
65B of Evidence Act, subject to the distinction for an original primary
electronic record. At this juncture, the observation of Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (Supra) in para Nos. 32, 50 & 57 to 59
is worth to be referred as under :-
"32. Quite obviously, the requisite certificate in sub-section (4) is
unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can
be done by the owner of a laptop computer, a computer tablet or
even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving
that the concerned device, on which the original information is
first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where “the
computer”, as defined, happens to be a part of a “computer
system” or “computer network” (as defined in the Information
Technology Act, 2000) and it becomes impossible to physically
bring such network or system to the Court, then the only means of
proving information contained in such electronic record can be in
accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite
certificate under Section 65B(4). This being the case, it is
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
19 CRA-920-2015
necessary to clarify what is contained in the last sentence in
paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “…if an
electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under
Section 62 of the Evidence Act…”. This may more appropriately
be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,
…”. With this minor clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24
of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited.
50. We may hasten to add that Section 65B does not speak of the
stage at which such certificate must be furnished to the Court. In
Anvar P.V. (supra), this Court did observe that such certificate
must accompany the electronic record when the same is produced
in evidence. We may only add that this is so in cases where such
certificate could be procured by the person seeking to rely upon an
electronic record. However, in cases where either a defective
certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been
demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge
conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to
in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such
certificate be given by such person/persons. This, the trial Judge
ought to do when the electronic record is produced in evidence
before him without the requisite certificate in the circumstances
aforementioned. This is, of course, subject to discretion being
exercised in civil cases in accordance with law, and in accordance
with the requirements of justice on the facts of each case. When it
comes to criminal trials, it is important to keep in mind the general
principle that the accused must be supplied all documents that the
prosecution seeks to rely upon before commencement of the trial,
under the relevant sections of the CrPC.
57. Subject to the caveat laid down in paragraphs 50 and 54
above, the law laid down by these two High Courts has our
concurrence. So long as the hearing in a trial is not yet over, the
requisite certificate can be directed to be produced by the learned
Judge at any stage, so that information contained in electronic
record form can then be admitted, and relied upon in evidence.
58. It may also be seen that the person who gives this certificate
can be anyone out of several persons who occupy a ‘responsible
official position’ in relation to the operation of the relevant device,
as also the person who may otherwise be in the ‘management of
relevant activities’ spoken of in Sub-section (4) of Section 65B.
Considering that such certificate may also be given long after the
electronic record has actually been produced by the computer,
Section 65B(4) makes it clear that it is sufficient that such person
gives the requisite certificate to the “best of his knowledge and
belief” (Obviously, the word “and” between knowledge and belief

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
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in Section 65B(4) must be read as “or”, as a person cannot testify
to the best of his knowledge and belief at the same time.
59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under
Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of
evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar
P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed
(supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot
possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of
the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor (1876)
1 Ch.D 426, which has been followed in a number of the
judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B(4) of the
Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible
only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold
otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose."

38. Thus, the objection cannot be stated simply as "there is no
certificate, therefore, every recording is inadmissible": this case has an
Exhibit P-31 and purported original recorders. The issue is whether those
things actually satisfy one permissible mode of legal proof.
39. The tape-recording cases cited by the trial Court including N. Sri
Rama Reddy Vs. V.V. Giri, AIR 1971 SC 1162 and Ziyauddin Burhanuddin
Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehta reported in AIR 1975 SC 1788, are
relevant to the possible probative use of authentic recorded speech and
accurate transcripts. They do not eliminate the later statutory requirements
governing electronic copies under Sections 65A and 65B of Evidence Act.
Nor does the fact that a transcript appears in a signed panchanama establish
the accuracy or authenticity of the underlying recording in the face of a
serious challenge.
40. Para 21 of the impugned judgment in respect of unproved earlier
demand contains a conspicuous and unequivocal account of the
complainant's testimony. He declined to accept the essential allegations.
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
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During further questioning, he denied the suggested conversations, the

alleged first payment of Rs.8,000/- and the alleged bribe transaction of
Rs.5.000/-. He accepted only that his photograph appeared on the document
annexed as Exhibit P-1. In para 28 of the judgment, learned trial Court
acknowledged that the complainant had rejected the prosecution version in
its entirety. These are facts of the trial judgment itself, not a reinterpretation
of a partly supportive witness.
41. The hostile testimony is not automatically effaced from the record.
A credible and corroborated part may be used and other competent evidence
may replace the complainant's direct account. But the prosecution must still
furnish reliable proof of the demand or relevant offer. Here, the handwritten
complaints Exhibits P-1 and P-3 are utmost prior allegations. The finding
regarding handwriting or photographs look consistent may support a view
concerning their authorship, but it does not show that their contested recitals
are factually true. Where their purported author rejects them, their
substantive contents cannot simply be adopted as direct testimony of the
alleged earlier conversations.
42. In the instant case, the appellant admitted his responsibility for
investigation of the excise case and a possible motive for corruption, not
proof that corruption occurred. The prosecution proved an excise case
involving Jagdish Chouksey (not Suresh Chouksey, who is the complainant
in this case), the defence proved and the trial Court examined documents
concerning opposition to his bail. It is crystal clear from the record that the
appellant had an official connection with the matter. They do not establish
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
22 CRA-920-2015
the proposition that the appellant demanded money in connection with the

same. If this issue can be seen to its root, Sections 34(2) & 59A(ii) of the
M.P. Excise Act, 1915 is relevant to be qouted as under:-
"Section 34(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), if a person is convicted for an offence covered by clause (a) or
clause (b) of sub-section (1) and the quantity of the intoxicant
being liquor found at the time or in the course of detection of the
offence exceeds fifty bulk liter, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but
which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be
less than twenty five thousand rupees but may extend to one lac
rupees.
59A(ii) a person, accused of an offence punishable under Section
49-A or a person not being a person holding a licence under the
Act or rules made thereunder who is accused of an offence
covered by clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 34
with quantity of liquor found at the time or in the course of
detection of such offence exceeding fifty bulk litres shall not be
released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor
has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such
release and in case such an application is opposed by the Public
Prosecutor, unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Provided that no Court shall order for detention of such person in
custody during the course of investigation for total period
exceeding 60 days where it relates to an offence covered by clause
(a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 34 with quantity of
liquor found at the time or in the course of detection of the offence
under Section 49-A and on the expiry of such of 60 days or 120
days, as the case may be, and in the event of the report of
complaint not being filed the accused shall be released on
furnishing bail."

43. The provisions of aforesaid sections make it clear that the accused
cannot be detained in custody for a period exceeding 60 days during
investigation in respect of the offences covered under Section 34(1)(a) or (b)
of the M.P. Excise Act, subject to the statutory conditions. However, the
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
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filing of the charge-sheet within the prescribed period of 60 days does not,

by itself, create any presumption either in favour of or against the grant of
bail. The question of bail is required to be considered on its own merits in
accordance with law. Conversely, if the charge-sheet is not filed within the
stipulated period of 60 days, the accused becomes entitled to seek default
bail, subject to fulfilment of the statutory requirements.
44. An important aspect of the matter appears to have escaped the
notice of the prosecution as well as the trial Court that if the charge-sheet in
the excise case against Jagdish Chouksey had remained pending during the
investigation beyond the statutory period of sixty days, he could have availed
the benefit of default bail, subject to fulfilment of the statutory conditions.
On the other hand, filing of the charge-sheet at the earliest possible
opportunity would not have conferred any such benefit upon him. Thus, the
appellant, who was entrusted with the investigation, was under an obligation
to complete the investigation and file the charge-sheet without unnecessary
delay. Hence, in the circumstance, the appellant was required to file the
charge-sheet at the earliest cannot, by itself, be construed as evidence of an
unlawful demand for gratification. Rather, the prosecution was required to
establish, through cogent and reliable evidence that the appellant had actually
demanded illegal gratification, which cannot be inferred merely from his
official responsibility or the timing of filing of the charge-sheet.
45. As per testimony of S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-4), he has
admitted in para 56 of his statement that in the transcript a word "bhabhi"
was used, even in para 58 of his statement also, it is clearly mentioned that
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
24 CRA-920-2015
out of Rs.5,000/-, Rs.4,000/- was arranged by bhabhi whose name came in

transcript and Rs.1,000/- was arranged by the complainant, but neither any
investigation was carried out on this aspect or that person called bhabhi was
made a witness.
46. The principle of possibility applied in all cases depends on the
field you mean, as it is not an absolute rule in all cases. Learned trial Court
has convicted the appellant believing in transcript, but before conviction of
any person involved in same issue, trial Court should examine that whether
the sample of voice or FSL has been conducted or not, specially where the
appellant himself denied that his voice is not in the tap-recorder. In para 59
of the statement of PW-4, he admitted that no scientific examination was
done for voice recorded in the voice recorder.
47. The record available reflects that the appellant has taken action
regarding externment of one Jagdish Chouksey, for which Jagdish Chouksey
took revenge to the appellant. This is the reason, applications Exhibit-P/1 and
Exhibit-P/3 was made by the complainant Suresh Choksey on the behest of
Rajesh Chouksey, who can be friend or close relative of the complainant. It
also appears that the whole story to trap the appellant was made by Rajesh
Chouksey.
48. In this sequence, para 2 & para 10 of the statement of Atulkumar
Shah (PW-2), is relevant which stated that "2.
लोकायु  काया लय म
लोकायु 

िनर क ी राघव उप थत िमले एवं उ हने वहाँ उप थत राजेश चौकसे से

प &रचय करवाया। ी राघव (ारा बताया *क एक +ेप केस म
चलना म
है। िनर क

ी राघव (ारा दो आवेदन प / मुझे दये जो क आवेदक राजेश चौकसे (ारा उनके
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RAIKWAR
Signing time: 19-Nov-26
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
25 CRA-920-2015

काया लय म
दये थे मुझे दये और कहा *क इ ह
जोर जोर से पढ़कर सुनाईये। उ 


दोन  आवेदन प / म 5ने जोर जोर से पढ़कर सुनाये जसे ी आर.पी. *(वेद एवं राजेश
-1
चौकसे (ारा सुना गया। आवेदन प / 8दश पी जो *क मेरे (ारा पढ़कर सुनाया गया

था जस पर मेरे (ारा ट प भी अं *कत क < गई थी जसके सी से सी भाग पर मेरे

ह तार ह 5 तथा ड  से ड  भाग पर ी *(वेद के ह तार ह 5 । बी से बी भाग पर
" .....
आवेदक सुरेश चौकसे का फोटो लगा है।
10. 10.30
इसके प ?ात् ी राघव के नेतृ Bव म
देप दल लगभग बजे रवाना
, ,
था। वाहन टवेरा था जसम
म 5 अ य पंच सा ी ी *(वेद आवेदक राजेश
हुआ

चौकसे बैठे थे। लोकायु  काया लय से िनकलर राउ माग  होते हुए पीथमपुर चौक < के

पास थे। हमारे सम  आवेदक (ारा ए.एस.आई यादव को फोन से सूिचत *कया
पहुँचे
,
गया क म 5 आ गया तब यादव (ारा बताया गया क अभी वत मान म
वह
हूँ
,
आर.ट .ओ. काया लय इंदौर म
है आप वह ं रहे आते ह  आपको संपक  क Fंगा यह

बात मोबाईल से आवेदक (ारा क < गई थी उसने पीकर चालू करके बात क < थी
" From his statement, it shows that a person
जसके कारण म 5ने यह बाते सुनी थी.
against whom action has already been taken by the District Magistrate for
externment, even after this, the Lokayukt Team / Trap Team went to the spot
of incident taking him i.e. Rajesh Chouksey in their vehicle. Rajesh
Chouksey was a habitual offender, it has also been established in para 25 of
the statement of G.P. Dubey, Thana In-charge, Pithampur (PW-5).
49. The defence has developed a specific case that, while chasing the
appellant, the currency notes used in the trap proceedings allegedly fell from
the possession of a member of the trap team near the boundary wall between
the Police Station and the Flex Printing Factory. Consequently, the said
currency notes could not be recovered from the possession of the appellant
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
26 CRA-920-2015
despite a search conducted by the trap team with the assistance of CCTV

footage and photographs. Further, defence case is that, the trap team arranged
another set of currency notes and prepared a fresh panchnama in that regard.
Meanwhile, while the trap team remained present at the spot along with the
appellant, the alleged missing currency notes were recovered on the next
morning.
50. So far as the testimony of the shadow witness Ramswaroopsingh
Gujrar (PW-3) relating to allegation and verification is concerned, learned
trial Court has considered Ramswaroopsingh Gurjar (PW-3) mentioning that
the PW-3 was not at the complainant's precise location during the alleged
conversation of 25.03.2013. Even, he did not listen to the recorder when the
conversation was allegedly made and he stated that the Investigating Officer
had informed him that a demand was being made. His assertion that a
demand was made consequently cannot carry the same weight as the
testimony of a person who heard the actual words. Any contemporaneous
report he conveyed to S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) may explain why the
trap proceeded, but an investigator's information about a demand is not a
substitute for proof of the demand itself.
51. There is no general prohibition on an inference from proximity,
conduct and reliable contemporaneous events. But here the direct perceptual
premise is absent, PW-3 did not identify the appellant's precise request, its
relationship with the excise investigation, or any words distinguishing bribe
from another payment. His participation in other traps does not make him
unreliable by itself; equally, the fact that he was an official cannot upgrade
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
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what is acknowledged to be indirect information into direct oral proof.

52. So far as the trap-day conversation is concerned, the testimony of
Atulkumar Shah (PW-2) is a material witness. Learned trial Court in para 71
of the judgment reflects that the complainant (PW-1) approached the
appellant outside the police station, money was given, then both were talking
and officers went to apprehend the appellant, being seen, the notes were
thrown as he ran. This account, if believed, is substantial evidence of a hand-
to-hand transfer, flight and recovery. Its probative force must be fairly
recognised. It does not follow, however, PW-2 specifically heard a demand
for illegal gratification. The narration recorded by the trial judge does not
identify any spoken words of such a demand by the appellant at the trap site.
Here, it can be said that an exchange without evidence of its corrupt purpose,
is not the equivalent of the missing ingredient; neither a brief conversation
nor the sudden approach of police officials can by itself establish what was
requested, offered or intended. The same issue has been discussed by
Hon'ble Apex Court in para 16 to 19 of the judgment delivered in Neeraj
Dutta (Supra).
53. It is an illogical point that a police officer must hear every word or
that no corruption conviction is possible without direct evidence. The
question is whether the combination of proven circumstances in this case
excludes reasonable alternatives. The testimony of witness Atulkumar Shah
(PW-2) may establish a suspicious transfer, it cannot establish, simply by
assertion that the amount was "bribe," the missing fact that the appellant
voluntarily accepted the amount as gratification in connection with official
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RAIKWAR
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action.

54. Now, coming to the statements of S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-
4) and Naresh Vaishnav (PW-6) and veracity and authenticity of documents
exhibited as P-31, Articles "P" and "Q" and transcripts, the electronic
materials are central to the trial Court's ultimate conclusion regarding
demand. It distinguishes the defence authority in the case of State of M.P.
Vs. J.B. Singh [AIR 2000 SC 3562] by observing that this case possessed a
voice recorder, shadow witness and other alleged corroboration. In para 52-
59, relying substantially on recorded dialogues and transcriptions to
conclude that demand was established. The legal admissibility and
authentication of those materials thus cannot be treated as a minor or
inconsequential defect. In para 54-58, learned trial Court set out the process
by which S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) took out recorders, connected
them to an office computer, played audio before the complainant and panch
witnesses, prepared transcripts, and caused compact discs to be created with
assistance from Naresh Vaishnav (PW-6). The Exhibit P-31 is described as a
certificate issued in relation to the creation of compact discs and the
transcription process, but in para 56, it finds that the certificate did not
comply with the guidelines of Anvar P. V. (Supra) , this is an express adverse
finding by the trial Court of first instance concerning the asserted method of
electronic proof. Therefore, mere existence of Exhibit P-31, cannot be
characterised either as complete absence of a certificate or as full compliance
with Section 65B of Evidence Act. In the present case, the statutory
conditions had not been followed and satisfied, instead, it treated the
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resulting material as ancillary corroboration and proceeded to rely on it to

prove the decisive demand.
55. That reasoning cannot be approved if the relied-on exhibits are
copies constituting computer output and the statutory prerequisites remain
unfulfilled. A transcript made from a copied audio file is not an independent
contemporaneous conversation. PW-4 and PW-6 could prove what they
themselves did while creating discs, but they could not by that fact alone
prove either the authenticity of the earlier speech or a valid substitute for
Section 65B of Evidence Act certification of its electronic copies. Treating
the transcript as admissible because it is described as corroborative confuses
the purpose for which evidence is used with the threshold question whether it
can lawfully be used at all.
56. Nevertheless, there is an important additional inquiry. The trial
judgment suggests that the physical voice recorders were held by PW-4 and
were later played. Had the relevant original electronic record contained in an
original device been duly produced and proved through a competent witness,
the primary-record exception recognised in the case of Arjun Panditrao
(Supra) would arise. But the judgment does not identify a satisfactory
judicial finding that the complainant as the alleged maker or operator
authenticated the original recording in evidence. On the contrary, the
complainant (PW-1) denied the very exercise, the shadow witness,
Ramswaroopsingh Gurjar (PW-3) did not hear the exchange and S.P.S.
Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) did not personally participate in the alleged
conversation. Thus, the prosecution made a bridge without having any pillar,
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on the reasons actually recorded, from an original authenticated sound record

to the appellant's supposed demand.
57. In view of the above, even in a simple manner, it cannot be held
that an expert voice comparison is a universal statutory prerequisite or
hostility of the complainant (PW-1) alone makes voice identification
impossible. Specifically, untampered primary recordings can be proved by
suitable evidence, including reliable circumstantial evidence about the
device, source, custody and speaker identification. The difficulty is that the
judgment under appeal assumes satisfactory authentication while
simultaneously recognising a deficient certificate, and uses recorded words as
independent proof despite the disavowal by the person said to have recorded
and identified them.
58. Subsequently, the issues with respect to a certificate issued under
Section 65B of Evidence Act, are not always incurable. In the case of Arjun
Panditrao (Supra), Hon'ble Apex Court recognises that in appropriate cases,
the Court may issue directions for obtaining and producing the requisite
certificate to ensure proper admissibility of electronic evidence. Here,
however, the appellant's conviction is sustainable on the evidence as
recorded and relied on by the trial Court. No subsequently produced valid
certificate or separate admissibility order has been supplied. The Court
cannot presume that such material exists or reconstruct the contents of an
absent original record. The proposed acquittal proceeds on the express
findings in paragraphs 55-56 and the absence of an independently established
incriminating conversation; it is subject to verification against the actual
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32229
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electronic exhibits and any additional evidence lawfully admitted in appeal.

59. Even putting legal admissibility to one side, there is a separate
reliability defect. Exhibit P-8 is a transcription of the alleged initial demand,
Exhibit P-9 relates the trap-day exchange. A transcript can assist a Court
only once the sound source and its accuracy are shown. An audio recording
is not proved by the assertion of the transcriber that the words are audible. In
the face of repudiation by the complainant (PW-1) and the admitted lack of
first hand hearing by PW-3, the copied audio and transcripts cannot safely
serve as the sole decisive link supplying the ingredient missing from oral
testimony.
60. The next question regarding Recovery, phenolphthalein, conduct
and the alternative account is concerned, the recovery evidence is substantial
and cannot be disregarded. The prosecution asserts that the ten notes
matching the preliminary memorandum were found on the ground where the
appellant allegedly threw them, and Exhibit P-32 supports contact with
phenolphthalein. Learned trial Court found Atulkumar Shah (PW-2), S.P.S.
Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) and other trap witnesses credible in relation to
recovery. The defence has not demonstrated, by the separate recovery from
the flex-printing factory that identical serial-numbered trap currency was
recovered elsewhere. The contrary finding at para 88 is a reasoned part of the
judgment.
61. But, the decisive inference remains open. The chemical test
demonstrates contact with tainted notes; it does not explain whether the
contact arose because the appellant knowingly took a bribe, because money
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was forced on him or under some other circumstances. Similarly, the alleged

flight is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance under Section 8 of the
Evidence Act, but flight may occur from consciousness of guilt or alarm,
apprehension, confrontation or fear of harm. Its significance must be
assessed in combination with a duly proved transaction. It cannot be isolated
from the accused's prompt explanation of forcible tendering and a physical
scuffle.
62. The evidence with respect to CCTV recording on 26.03.2013,
produced through defence witness Sonu Singh (DW-2) and its certificate
Exhibit D-21 was considered by learned trial Court in para Nos. 84 and 86
wherein learned Judge accepted the footage displaying the appellant running
with Lokayukta personnel behind him. The footage did not itself show a
substitution of notes nor did it contain a complete view of the alleged
exchange. The footage accordingly neither conclusively proves the defence
account nor conclusively proves the prosecution's assertion that the accused
ran because he had accepted a bribe. Both overstatements must be avoided.
63. As regards the money of Rs.5,000/- was found in the waste area of
the flex-printing factory on the following day is concerned, the defence
relied on information from manager Kiran Shastri and subsequent police
seizure documents, examined in paragraphs 82-91 of the impugned
judgment. The trial Court identified discrepancies, including different note
numbers and rejected the allegation that those notes were the very notes used
in the trap. That finding is not displaced merely because the defence
produced a media report or asserted a wider conspiracy. It is nonetheless
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necessary to distinguish this failure to prove the full defence narrative from

positive proof by the prosecution of a demand of illegal gratification.
64. The defence record concerning Jagdish Chouksey's bail
application, the excise case diary, the appellant's long service and police-
station entries may not exonerate him, but it contains a plausible explanation
of the official context and the hostility associated with the excise case. It is
not necessary to find a proven conspiracy involving Rajesh Chouksey, the
Lokayukta officers or the factory officer to recognise a reasonable
evidentiary gap concerning the corrupt purpose of the transaction. The trial
court's repeated conclusion that no conspiracy had been proved is not an
answer to that separate question.
65. In para Nos. 81 to 92 of the impugned judgment, learned trial
Court correctly described the presumption in Section 20 as mandatory when
its preconditions are established, relying upon M. Narsinga Rao (Supra). The
error in the impugned reasoning lies in the point at which the burden was
treated as having shifted. Paragraphs 81-82 presumed that the appellant was
obliged to explain the currency as something other than bribe, while the
preceding adjudication of the demand rested substantially on the impugned
electronic recordings and the non-ear-witness account of PW-3. This
amounts to using the Section 20 presumption to fill the missing foundation
on which that presumption itself depends.
66. For the pre-amendment Section 7, the prosecution's first task is to
establish the relevant illegal offer or demand and conscious acceptance by
admissible proof beyond reasonable doubt; a presumption then operates in
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relation to the statutory purpose or reward. The Constitution Bench's

interpretation in Neeraj Dutta (Supra) makes clear that the statutory
presumption of law and a discretionary factual inference are different. A
factual inference may assist proof of demand only when reliable primary
circumstances are affirmatively established. It is not an evidentiary shortcut
by which recovery is first deemed proof of demand and demand is then used
to justify Section 20 presumption.
67. As per principle laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Punjabrao (Supra), the accused needs only establish a probable defence, not
one beyond reasonable doubt. But its later application effectively demanded
a complete reconstruction of a conspiracy, identification of every alleged
alternative currency note, proof of physical assault and proof of falsification
of every memorandum. Whether or not these defence particulars were
established, a reasonable possibility emerging from prosecution evidence can
be sufficient to prevent a guilty finding if it leaves an essential ingredient
unproved. C.M. Girish Babu (Supra), paragraphs 19-21 makes the
independent operation of the prosecution's ultimate burden plain.
68. It is observed that the appellant could later prove his innocence in
investigation and trial is also an unsafe way to assess an incriminating
circumstance. The flight and alleged recovery may call for explanation, but
the accused's inability to prove an affirmative defence can never substitute
for the prosecution's burden of establishing the crime. These failures in the
reasoning are material because the prosecution's strongest direct witness to
the alleged demand, the complainant repudiated its case.
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69. For the charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of

PC Act, the result is a fortiori. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d).
The prosecution had to prove obtainment of pecuniary advantage by corrupt
or illegal means or abuse of position as charged. Without reliably proved
demand or illegal offer and conscious obtainment, mere contact with or
recovery of treated notes cannot establish this separate offence. Reliance
upon Section 20 as an omnibus basis to uphold both convictions therefore
cannot stand.
70. A criminal appeal from conviction obliges the appellate Court to
independently test the material ingredients and the reliability of the evidence.
The Court is not bound to reverse because one witness is hostile, nor to
affirm because the police trap superficially appears complete. It must
evaluate whether the evidence accepted by the trial court, after application of
evidentiary law, crosses the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to
the accused's demand or knowing acceptance of illegal gratification.
71. In the instant case, one group of circumstances is established or at
least strongly supported: the appellant was a public servant. He investigated
the excise case, there was an encounter outside the police station, the trap
witnesses speak to the passing and throwing of treated notes, a chemical test
indicated contact, and the appellant was pursued and ran. Yet the other and
essential part of the prosecution case is not supported by the complainant
(PW-1) itself. Ramswaroopsingh Gurjar (PW-3) did not hear the alleged first
demand, Atulkumar Shah's (PW-2) recorded testimony describes
conversation and passing of money without the particular corrupt demand,
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S.P.S. Raghav, Inspector (PW-4) did not witness the conversations and also

learned trial Court relied upon electronic copies after expressly noticing non-
compliance of the certificate.
72. Taken together, the admissible circumstances are capable of
arousing suspicion that some exchange occurred, perhaps one involving
tainted currency. They do not compel further and indispensable finding that
the appellant demanded or knowingly accepted money as illegal gratification.
The prosecution cannot achieve that conclusion by treating the challenged
transcript as though it were automatically authenticated, or by putting the
appellant to proof of the entire theory of false implication.
73. The Court reiterates that the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta
(Supra) allows circumstantial proof despite the complainant's hostility. This
acquittal is not founded on a contrary proposition. It is founded on the failure
of these particular proven circumstances to establish the corrupt
demand/offer and knowing receipt beyond reasonable doubt. The distinction
separates an acquittal based on legal evidence insufficiency from an incorrect
per se exclusion of every case involving a hostile complainant.
74. In the conspectus of aforesaid deliberations and cumulative
analysis of the evidence available on record, this Court on an independent
appraisal of the material identified in the impugned judgment, finds that the
essential factum of demand of illegal gratification by the appellant -Ashok
Yadav has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has
also not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant voluntarily and
knowingly accepted the disputed Rs.5,000/- as a bribe. The deficiency
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concerning the electronic evidence is of particular significance because the

learned Special Judge employed the transcripts and copied audio as a
decisive link notwithstanding the express concession of non-compliance with
the prescribed certificate requirements. Under Section 65B of Evidence Act
which was required to be produced or exhibited alongwith transcript by the
person who has recorded it, but in this case, the same was not being exhibited
by the person who has procured it.
75. The learned Special Judge, while entitled to rely on competent
official testimony and circumstantial evidence, erred by giving the Section
20 presumption an operation wider than the law permits and by treating
failure to establish the asserted defence conspiracy as a ground to uphold
guilt. The evidence does not supply an adequate independent foundation for
invoking the presumption. Further, no Section 20 presumption is available
for the charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the 1988
Act. The prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt.
76. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 03.07.2015 passed by the Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act), Dhar, in Special Case No. 6/2013, arising
out of Crime No. 72/2013, are hereby set aside. The appellant Ashok Yadav,
S/o Rampal Yadav, stands acquitted from the charges punishable under
Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. The trial Court's direction regarding confiscation of
the cash amount of Rs.5,000/- seized in the case, is upheld.
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77. The appellant is on bail, hence, his bail bond and surety stand

discharged. The appellant is entitled to receive back the fine amount
deposited by him from the learned trial Court, if any.
78. A copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned trial Court
alongwith record for information and necessary compliance.
79. With the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and disposed of.
Pending IAs, if any, stands disposed of.
(ALOK AWASTHI)
JUDGE
Vindesh
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