Anees Ahmad vs Smt Rukaiya Begum And 3 Others
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 6083 of 2026
Anees Ahmad
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Smt Rukaiya Begum and 3 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Jitendra Pratap Singh, Kirti Kumar
Nirkhi, Shobhit Saxena
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Sikandar Raza
With:
Writ-A No.1227 of 2026
(Anees Ahmad vs. State of UP and 5 Others)
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri Jitendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Sri Sikandar Raza, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
landlady.
2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
has been filed assailing the judgment and order dated 18.03.2026 passed
by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 9, Kanpur Nagar, in
Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2023 (Smt. Rukaiya Begum v.
Anees Ahmad), whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent-landlady
under Section 22 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act,
1972') was allowed and the order dated 31.02.2023 passed by the
Prescribed Authority, rejecting the release application instituted under
Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972, was set aside. By the impugned
judgment, the appellate court directed the petitioner-tenant to vacate and
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hand over vacant possession of the disputed shop to the respondent-
landlady within thirty days.
3. Along with the present petition, Writ-A No. 1227 of 2026 (Anees
Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others), filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, has also been taken up for consideration. By the
said petition, the petitioner-tenant has challenged the interlocutory order
dated 26.11.2025 passed by the same appellate court in the aforesaid
appeal, whereby Application No. 40-Ga filed by the respondent-
landlady, seeking permission to bring additional evidence on record, was
allowed. The application sought to place on record an estimate prepared
by an engineer in relation to the expenditure proposed to be incurred on
demolition and reconstruction of the disputed premises. It is relevant to
notice that the application did not purport to have been filed under Order
XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. While allowing the
application, the appellate court referred to Section 34 of the Act, 1972,
which, inter alia, confers upon the appellate authority the power to
receive evidence on affidavits. The petitioner-tenant has challenged the
said order contending that the appellate court could not have permitted
additional evidence to be brought on record without following the
procedure and satisfying the requirements governing admission of
additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
4. Both the petitions arise out of the same release proceedings and
relate to orders passed in the same appellate proceedings. The challenge
raised in Writ-A No. 1227 of 2026 to the order permitting additional
evidence has a direct bearing on the consideration of the impugned
appellate judgment, inasmuch as the appellate court subsequently relied
upon the additional material while allowing the release application. It is,
therefore, appropriate that the validity of the order dated 26.11.2025 and
the challenge to the final appellate judgment be examined together.
Accordingly, both the petitions have been heard together and are being
decided by this common judgment.
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5. The principal controversy arising in the petition challenging the
final appellate judgment relates to the statutory right available to an
original tenant under Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972, where release of the
tenanted building is allowed under Section 21(1)(b) on the ground that it
is in a dilapidated condition and is required for demolition and
reconstruction. The question that arises for consideration is whether,
while allowing release under Section 21(1)(b), the appellate court was
required to examine the proposed reconstruction plan in the context of
the statutory right available to the original tenant under Section 24(2),
and whether any appropriate directions or safeguards were necessary to
ensure that the exercise of such right was not rendered ineffective.
6. The connected Writ-A No. 1227 of 2026 raises a separate but
related question concerning the scope of the appellate court's power to
receive additional evidence. The issue is whether the reference to
Section 34 of the Act, 1972, which provides for receipt of evidence on
affidavit, was sufficient to permit the respondent-landlady to bring the
engineer's estimate on record at the appellate stage, or whether the
admission of such additional evidence was also required to satisfy the
conditions prescribed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The question further requires examination of whether
the procedure contemplated for admission and recording of additional
evidence was duly followed by the appellate court.
Factual Matrix and Pleadings
7. The respondent-landlady instituted proceedings by filing an
application for release under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972, on
24.11.2018, claiming ownership of the property bearing Municipal
Property No. 101/122, Colonelganj, Kanpur Nagar, on the basis of a
registered sale deed dated 16.03.2012. The petitioner was occupying a
shop situated on the ground floor of the said property, measuring
approximately 18 feet × 5.87 feet, at a monthly rent of Rs.100/-.
8. The release application was founded on the assertion that the
building, stated to be about 90 to 100 years old, had become dilapidated
and required demolition and reconstruction. It was further asserted that
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the other tenants occupying shops and portions of the building had
vacated their respective premises or had settled their claims, and that the
shop occupied by the petitioner remained to be vacated to facilitate the
proposed demolition and reconstruction.
9. The petitioner contested the release proceedings by filing a
written statement dated 21.01.2021. It was asserted that he was an old
tenant and that the disputed shop had been allotted to him by the
Additional District Magistrate (Rent Control), Kanpur Nagar, by an
allotment order dated 15.04.1993. The petitioner disputed the alleged
dilapidated condition of the building and denied that demolition and
reconstruction were necessary. It was his case that the disputed shop and
the structure supporting it were in a sound condition and could be
maintained through ordinary repairs.
10. The Prescribed Authority, by its order dated 21.02.2023, dismissed
the release application. Although the relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties was accepted, the Prescribed Authority found that
the respondent-landlady had failed to establish compliance with the
requirements of Rule 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Rules, 1972'). The authority found deficiencies in the
material placed on record concerning the physical condition of the
building, the estimate of expenditure for demolition and reconstruction,
the proposed construction plan and the financial capacity of the landlady
to undertake the proposed work.
11. Aggrieved by the order dated 21.02.2023, the respondent-landlady
preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act, 1972, registered as
Appeal No. 38 of 2023. During the pendency of the appeal, she moved
an application dated 17.11.2025, Paper No. 40-Ga, supported by an
affidavit, seeking permission to bring additional documentary evidence
on record. It was asserted in the application that the documents sought to
be produced, which included an engineering report/estimate relating to
the proposed demolition and reconstruction and the income-tax return
for the assessment year 2018-19 along with the connected filing
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documents, had been prepared or were available prior to the institution
of the release proceedings but could not be filed due to an oversight on
the part of the previous counsel. The documents sought to be brought on
record were enumerated in the accompanying list, Paper No. 40-Ga.
12. The petitioner opposed the application by filing objections. It was
contended, inter alia, that the documents sought to be introduced were
already available with the respondent-landlady and that she had been
afforded sufficient opportunity to produce them before the Prescribed
Authority. The petitioner asserted that the application was an attempt to
fill up the lacunae in the evidence, particularly when the release
application had been dismissed on account of the failure to establish the
requirements of Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972. The genuineness and
reliability of the estimate sought to be brought on record were also
questioned. The appellate court, by order dated 26.11.2025, allowed the
application, referring to the powers available to it under Section 34 of
the Act, 1972, including the power to receive evidence on affidavit, and
observing that the documents sought to be produced were relevant for
proper adjudication of the appeal. Consequently, the documents
enumerated in Paper No. 40-Ga were directed to be taken on record.
13. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order dated 26.11.2025
before this Court by filing Writ-A No. 1227 of 2026. It appears from the
proceedings before the appellate court that the pendency of the said writ
petition was brought to its notice, whereupon the appeal was adjourned
on 16.03.2026 and was taken up again on 18.03.2026. No interim order
had, however, been passed by this Court staying either the operation of
the order dated 26.11.2025 or further proceedings in the appeal. The
appellate court accordingly proceeded to decide the appeal and, by the
impugned judgment and order dated 18.03.2026, allowed the same, set
aside the order dated 21.02.2023 passed by the Prescribed Authority and
directed the petitioner to vacate the disputed shop within thirty days.
14. While allowing the appeal, the appellate court considered the
engineering report dated 31.08.2015, the municipal inspection report
dated 15.10.2017 and the additional documentary evidence permitted to
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be brought on record by its order dated 26.11.2025. On the basis of the
material so considered, it concluded that the building was approximately
90 to 100 years old, was in a dilapidated condition and required
demolition and reconstruction. It further held that the respondent-
landlady had established the requirements of Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972,
relating to the estimate of expenditure, her financial capacity and the
proposed construction plan.
Rival Submissions
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the orders under
challenge in the two petitions on two principal grounds. Firstly, it is
contended that the appellate court committed an error in permitting the
respondent-landlady to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage,
particularly when the appeal had already reached the stage of final
arguments and the evidence sought to be introduced was intended to
overcome the deficiencies in the case noticed by the Prescribed
Authority. Secondly, it is contended that while allowing release under
Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972, the appellate court failed to consider
the statutory right available to the petitioner under Section 24(2) of the
Act, 1972.
16. With regard to the order dated 26.11.2025, learned counsel
submits that Section 34 of the Act, 1972, does not confer an unrestricted
power upon the appellate court to admit additional evidence. It is
contended that the admissibility of additional evidence at the appellate
stage is governed by the principles embodied in Order XLI Rule 27 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that additional evidence cannot
be permitted unless the conditions stipulated therein are satisfied. An
omission or oversight on the part of the previous counsel, it is submitted,
does not by itself furnish a ground for permitting a party to introduce
additional evidence at the appellate stage. Learned counsel further
submits that the respondent-landlady had sufficient opportunity to
produce the estimate relating to the expenses of demolition and
reconstruction before the Prescribed Authority, but failed to do so. The
application for bringing additional evidence on record was moved only
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after the release application had been rejected. The appellate court,
therefore, could not have permitted the respondent-landlady to fill up the
lacunae in her case by introducing evidence at the appellate stage.
17. Learned counsel further contends that the provisions of Sections
21(1)(b) and 24(2) of the Act, 1972, read with Rule 17 of the Rules,
1972, are required to be construed conjointly. According to learned
counsel, before allowing release of a building for demolition and
reconstruction, the authority concerned is required to examine whether
the proposed reconstruction would leave the statutory right of the
original tenant under Section 24(2) capable of being exercised and to
ensure that the proposed construction scheme does not render such right
ineffective.
18. It is further submitted that the appellate court, despite examining
the proposed construction plan and recording findings regarding
compliance with Rule 17, failed to consider whether the proposed plan
made adequate provision for safeguarding the petitioner's right under
Section 24(2). No finding has been recorded as to whether the
respondent-landlady had furnished any undertaking to carry out the
reconstruction within a reasonable period and to ensure that the
petitioner's claim for allotment in the newly constructed building could
be considered in accordance with the statutory provisions.
19. Learned counsel further submits that, during the pendency of the
proceedings, the petitioner-tenant has already been evicted from the
premises in question and the respondent-landlady has demolished the
building. In such circumstances, the question of applicability of Section
24(1) of the Act, 1972, does not arise at this stage, and the statutory right
available to the petitioner under Section 24(2) assumes significance. It
is, accordingly, submitted that appropriate directions be issued to the
competent authority to ensure that the petitioner's statutory right under
Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972, is duly protected and considered in
accordance with law.
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20. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Riazur
1
Rahman Khan v. Second Additional District Judge, Rampur ; Rafeeq
2
Ahmad v. Mohd. Farooq and others ; Karamat Ullah v. District Judge,
3
Kanpur and others ; and Sanjay Bhardwaj @ Bablu v. Dinesh Chandra
4
Gupta and others .
21. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlady, on the
other hand, has supported both the orders under challenge. With regard
to the order dated 26.11.2025, it is submitted that the appellate court
rightly exercised its powers under Section 34 of the Act, 1972, in
permitting additional evidence to be brought on record. The estimate
relating to the expenses of demolition and reconstruction was relevant
for determining compliance with Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972, and its
non-production before the Prescribed Authority was attributable to an
oversight on the part of the previous counsel. The appellate court, having
considered the relevance of the documents and their necessity for proper
adjudication of the appeal, rightly permitted them to be brought on
record.
22. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlady further submits that
the appellate court duly considered the material available on record,
including the engineering report dated 31.08.2015, the municipal
inspection report dated 15.10.2017 and the additional documentary
evidence brought on record pursuant to the order dated 26.11.2025. On
the basis of the aforesaid material, the appellate court rightly concluded
that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required demolition
and reconstruction. The findings recorded by the appellate court
regarding compliance with the requirements of Rule 17 are, therefore,
sought to be sustained.
23. With regard to the petitioner's claim under Section 24(2) of the
Act, 1972, learned counsel for the respondent-landlady submits that the
inquiry under Section 21(1)(b), read with Rule 17, is confined to
1 (2006) 63 ALR 13
2 (2018) 129 ALR 157
3 (2000) 2 ARC 212
4 (2019) 136 ALR 606
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examining the statutory requirements governing release of a building on
the ground of demolition and reconstruction. The right contemplated
under Section 24(2), it is contended, is available to the original tenant to
be exercised before the District Magistrate after demolition and
reconstruction of the building, subject to fulfilment of the conditions
prescribed under the Act and the Rules. It is, accordingly, argued that the
absence of a separate finding regarding the petitioner's claim under
Section 24(2), or of an express undertaking by the landlady in that
regard, would not by itself invalidate the order allowing release,
particularly when the petitioner would remain entitled to pursue the
statutory remedy in accordance with law.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlady does not dispute the
subsequent developments with regard to the premises in question,
particularly that possession thereof has been taken over by the
respondent-landlady and the existing building has already been
demolished. It is submitted that, upon construction of a new building on
the site, the petitioner-tenant would be entitled to invoke the statutory
remedy available under Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972, in accordance
with law. It is, accordingly, contended that the petitioner's statutory
rights, if otherwise available, would remain protected under the aforesaid
provision.
Questions for Determination
25. In the light of the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the
parties and the controversy arising in the two connected petitions, the
following questions arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the appellate court was justified in permitting the
respondent-landlady to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage
by allowing Paper No. 40-Ga, in exercise of its powers under Section 34
of the Act, 1972, and whether such exercise of power was required to
satisfy the conditions prescribed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. If so, whether those conditions were fulfilled
in the present case.
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(ii) Whether the appellate court, while allowing release of the disputed
building under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972, was required to
examine whether the proposed demolition and reconstruction would
frustrate or render ineffective the statutory right available to the original
tenant under Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972.
(iii) Whether the right conferred upon the original tenant under Section
24(2) is merely a subsequent statutory remedy to be independently
pursued before the District Magistrate after reconstruction of the
building, or whether its effective preservation is also a relevant
consideration while adjudicating an application for release under Section
21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972.
26. Since the connected petitions arise out of different orders passed at
successive stages of the same appellate proceedings, this Court considers
it appropriate to examine the controversy in a sequential manner. The
Court shall first notice the statutory framework governing the
proceedings, including the provisions regulating the powers of the
appellate authority and the provisions governing release of a building
under Section 21(1)(b), with particular reference to the protection
afforded to the original tenant under Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972. The
Court shall thereafter examine the legality of the order dated 26.11.2025
permitting additional evidence to be brought on record, including the
applicability and requirements of Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, and the extent to which the appellate court could
exercise its powers under Section 34 of the Act, 1972. Finally, the Court
shall consider the effect of the aforesaid conclusions upon the impugned
appellate judgment dated 18.03.2026 and determine the relief to which
the parties may be entitled.
Statutory Provisions
27. The controversy involved in the connected petitions requires
consideration of two distinct, though related, aspects of the statutory
scheme under the Act, 1972. The first concerns the powers of the
appellate authority while hearing an appeal under Section 22,
particularly its power to receive additional evidence. The second relates
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to the release of a building under Section 21(1)(b) and the statutory
protection afforded to the original tenant under Section 24(2). The
relevant provisions are noticed below.
A. Powers of the Appellate Authority and Admission of Additional
Evidence
27. Section 22 of the Act, 1972 provides for an appeal against an order
passed under Section 21 or Section 24. It reads as follows:
"22. Appeal.— Any person aggrieved by an order under Section 21 or Section
24 may within thirty days from the date of the order prefer an appeal against
it to the District Judge, and in other respects, the provisions of Section 10
shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal."
Section 10(2), which is thus made applicable to an appeal under Section
22, provides as follows:
"(2) The Appellate Authority may confirm, vary or rescind the order, or
remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and may also take
any additional evidence, and pending its decision, stay the operation of the
order under appeal on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit."
28. Section 34 of the Act, 1972, which deals with the powers of the
various authorities and the procedure to be followed by them, is also
relevant. The material provisions thereof read as follows:
"34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them.—
(1) The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any Appellate
Authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal
or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil
Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect
of the following matters, namely—
...
(b) receiving evidence on affidavits;
...
(g) any other matter which may be prescribed.
...
(7) The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate or
Revisional authority shall record reasons for every order made under this Act.
(8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes
connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and
shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed."
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29. Section 38 of the Act, 1972, which gives overriding effect to its
provisions over inconsistent provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, reads as follows:
"38. Act to override Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code.—
The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or in
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
30. The provisions governing the production of additional evidence
before an appellate court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are
contained in Order XLI Rule 27, which reads as follows:
"27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.—
(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional
evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if—
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit
evidence which ought to have been admitted; or
(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that
notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within
his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced
by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed; or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness
to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other
substantial cause,
the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or
witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate
Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission."
Order XLI Rules 28 and 29 of the Code further prescribe the manner in
which additional evidence, once permitted, is to be taken and the points
to which such evidence is to be confined.
B. Release on the Ground of Demolition and Reconstruction and the
Tenant's Right of Re-entry
31. In order to appreciate the controversy relating to the petitioner's
right under Section 24(2), it would be appropriate to notice the
provisions governing release of a building on the ground of demolition
and reconstruction. Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972 reads as follows:
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"Section 21. Proceeding for release of building under occupation of tenant.—
(1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that
behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any
specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists,
namely—
...
(b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes
of demolition and new construction."
32. Section 24 of the Act, 1972, which provides for the option of re-
entry by the tenant, reads as follows:
"Section 24. Option of re-entry by tenant.—
(1) Where a building is released in favour of the landlord and the tenant is
evicted under Section 21 or on appeal under Section 22, and the landlord
either puts or causes to be put into occupation thereof any person different
from the person for whose occupation according to the landlord's
representation, the building was required, or permits any such person to
occupy it, or otherwise puts it to any use other than the one for which it was
released, or as the case may be, omits to occupy it within one month or such
extended period as the Prescribed Authority may for sufficient cause allow
from the date of his obtaining possession or, in the case of a building which
was proposed to be occupied after some construction or reconstruction, from
the date of completion thereof, or in the case of a building which was
proposed to be demolished, omits to demolish it within two months or such
extended period as the Prescribed Authority may for sufficient cause allow
from the date of his obtaining possession, then the Prescribed Authority or, as
the case may be, the District Judge, may, on an application in that behalf
within three months from the date of such act or omission, order the landlord
to place the evicted tenant in occupation of the building on the original terms
and conditions, and on such order being made, the landlord and any person
who may be in occupation thereof shall give vacant possession of the
building to the said tenant, failing which, the Prescribed Authority shall put
him into possession and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such
force as may be necessary.
(2) Where the landlord after obtaining a release order under clause (b) of sub-
section (1) of section 21 demolishes a building and constructs a new building
or buildings on its site, then the District Magistrate may, on an application
being made in that behalf by the original tenant within such time as may be
prescribed, allot to him the new building or such one of them as the District
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Magistrate after considering his requirements thinks fit, and thereupon that
tenant shall be liable to pay as rent for such building an amount equivalent to
one per cent per month of the cost of construction thereof (including the cost
of demolition of the old building but not including the value of the land) and
the building shall, subject to the tenant's liability to pay rent as aforesaid, be
subject to the provisions of this Act, and where the tenant makes no such
application or refuses or fails to take that building on lease within the time
allowed by the District Magistrate, or subsequently ceases to occupy it or
otherwise vacates it, that building shall also be exempt from the operation of
this Act for the period or the remaining period, as the case may be, specified
in sub-section (2) of section 2."
33. Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972 prescribes the matters requiring
satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority before an order of release is
passed under Section 21(1)(b) on the ground of demolition and new
construction. It reads as follows:
"17. Application for release on the ground of demolition and new
construction [Sections 21(1)(b) and 34(8)].— Before allowing an application
for release of a building under Section 21(1)(b) on the ground that it is
required for purposes of demolition and new construction, the Prescribed
Authority shall satisfy itself—
(i) that the building requires demolition;
(ii) that a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and
new construction has been prepared;
(iii) that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or
regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law in
that behalf for the time being in force; and
(iv) that the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition
and new construction."
34. The period within which an original tenant may invoke the remedy
under Section 24(2) is prescribed by Rule 20 of the Rules, 1972, which
reads as follows:
"20. Application for re-allotment [Section 24(2)].—
(1) An application by a tenant under sub-section (2) of Section 24 for
allotment of a new building or any one of them shall be made within one
month from the date on which the construction of the building sought to be
allotted is complete.
(2) The application shall also state the extent of the tenant's requirements
regarding accommodation.
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Explanation.—In this rule, the date of completion of construction has the
same meaning as in the Explanation (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 2."
Challenge to the Order Dated 26.11.2025 Permitting Additional
Evidence
35. Since the validity of the order dated 26.11.2025 permitting
additional evidence has a bearing upon the material considered by the
appellate court while deciding the appeal, it would be appropriate to
examine the challenge raised in Writ-A No. 1227 of 2026 before
proceeding to consider the effect of the additional evidence upon the
final appellate judgment.
36. The power of the appellate authority to receive additional
evidence in an appeal under Section 22 of the Act, 1972 flows from
Section 22 read with sub-section (2) of Section 10. The latter provision
expressly empowers the appellate authority to take additional evidence
while deciding an appeal. Section 34(1)(b), on the other hand, confers
upon the authorities under the Act the power to receive evidence on
affidavits. The two provisions operate in their respective fields and
cannot be treated as interchangeable. The reference made by the
appellate court to Section 34 while passing the order dated 26.11.2025
must, therefore, be examined in the context of the substantive power
available to it under Section 22 read with Section 10(2).
37. The manner in which the power to receive additional evidence is
to be exercised came up for consideration before this Court in Kishan
Kumar Agrawal v. First Additional District and Sessions Judge and
5
others , wherein it was observed that the power conferred upon the
appellate authority to receive additional evidence is not an unrestricted
one and that the principles governing Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of
Civil Procedure are relevant in regulating its exercise.
38. The matter was subsequently examined in detail in Govind Prasad
6
(D) and others v. Mukut Bihari . This Court held that the appellate
authority, by virtue of Section 22 read with Section 10(2) of the Act,
5 1978 SCCOnline All 285
6 Writ-A No. 5095 of 2021 decided on 16.07.2021
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1972, has the power to receive additional evidence, but the exercise of
such power is to be regulated by the principles of Order XLI Rule 27 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the analogy of the said provision.
It was clarified that the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 do not apply
proprio vigore, but furnish the appropriate guiding principles for
exercise of the statutory discretion vested in the appellate authority.
39. The scope of Section 10(2) was further considered in Rajkumar v.
7
Nasir Ahmad and others . This Court held that Section 10(2) is more
liberal than Order XLI Rule 27, but the power to take additional
evidence is confined to receiving evidence supplementary to the material
already available on record. It does not authorise the appellate authority
to assume the role of the court of first instance. Where an issue has not
been adjudicated by the Prescribed Authority for want of evidence, the
appropriate course may be to remand the matter for consideration at the
original stage rather than undertaking a fresh fact-finding exercise at the
appellate stage.
40. The power under Section 10(2), therefore, is not an unrestricted
one. The appellate authority must consider the relevance and nature of
the additional material, the reason for its non-production before the
Prescribed Authority, whether its reception is necessary for effective
adjudication of the appeal, and whether the opposite party can be
afforded an adequate opportunity to meet it. The mere circumstance that
a document may assist a party in overcoming an adverse finding does
not, by itself, either justify or prohibit its admission. The exercise must
be governed by judicial discretion, having regard to the statutory purpose
of the appeal and the requirements of fairness.
41. The principles underlying Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are also relevant in this regard. The provision contemplates
three specified circumstances in which additional evidence may be
received, namely, where evidence which ought to have been admitted
was refused by the court below; where, despite exercise of due diligence,
the evidence was not within the knowledge of the party or could not
7 2024 SCC OnLine All 8132
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A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
have been produced at the relevant stage; or where the appellate court
itself requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for
some other substantial cause. The discretion is judicial in nature and is
not intended to afford a litigating party an unrestricted opportunity to
supplement deficiencies in its case after an adverse decision.
8
42. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, has
explained that the necessity for receiving additional evidence under
clause (b) must arise from the appellate court's own assessment of the
material available on record. The provision cannot be invoked merely to
enable a party to produce evidence which would assist it in securing a
particular result. The principles have also been reiterated in Gobind
9
Singh and others v. Union of India and others, wherein the Supreme
Court emphasised that additional evidence cannot be admitted as a
matter of course or merely to fill gaps in the case of a party.
43. In the present case, the application dated 17.11.2025, Paper No.
40-Ga, was supported by an affidavit of the respondent-landlady. The
explanation furnished was that the documents sought to be produced had
been prepared or were available prior to institution of the release
proceedings but could not be filed before the Prescribed Authority on
account of an oversight on the part of the previous counsel. The
documents included an engineer's report/estimate relating to demolition
and reconstruction and the income-tax return for the assessment year
2018-19, along with the connected filing documents. The petitioner
opposed the application, contending that the documents were already
available with the respondent-landlady and that sufficient opportunity
had been afforded to her to produce them before the Prescribed
Authority.
44. It is true that the explanation relating to an oversight on the part of
the previous counsel, by itself, would not establish that the respondent-
landlady was prevented, despite exercise of due diligence, from
producing the documents before the Prescribed Authority. The
documents were not stated to have come into existence subsequently or
8 . (2012) 8 SCC 148
9 . (2026) 4 SCC 130
18
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
to have become available to the respondent-landlady only after dismissal
of the release application. The explanation so furnished cannot,
therefore, be treated as sufficient by itself to satisfy the requirement
corresponding to clause (aa) of Rule 27 of Order XLI of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
45. The matter, however, does not rest solely upon the explanation
furnished by the respondent-landlady. Section 10(2) of the Act, 1972
confers an independent statutory power upon the appellate authority to
receive additional evidence. The exercise of such power may also be
warranted where, upon examination of the material already available, the
appellate court considers additional evidence necessary for effective
adjudication of the controversy. The engineer's estimate sought to be
introduced has a direct bearing upon the requirement of a proper
estimate of expenditure prescribed under Rule 17(ii) of the Rules, 1972.
Similarly, the income-tax return and the connected documents have a
bearing upon the financial capacity of the respondent-landlady, which is
one of the matters requiring consideration under Rule 17(iv).
46. A perusal of the order dated 26.11.2025 indicates that the
appellate court noticed the rival submissions, considered the application
and the objections filed by the petitioner, and took note of the nature of
the documents sought to be brought on record. It recorded that the
documents were relevant to the controversy and deserved to be taken on
record for proper adjudication of the appeal. The order was, therefore,
not passed merely on the ground that the previous counsel had omitted to
file the documents, but also proceeded upon the appellate court's
assessment of their relevance to the statutory requirements governing the
release application.
47. It is further relevant that, while allowing the application, the
appellate court fixed the matter for 01.12.2025 for rebuttal evidence, if
any, and further arguments. The petitioner was thus afforded an
opportunity to meet the additional material and to dispute its correctness
and evidentiary value. The direction to permit rebuttal evidence was
relevant to ensuring that the admission of additional material did not
19
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
result in an unfair advantage to the respondent-landlady. It is, however,
made clear that the opportunity to rebut evidence does not, by itself,
dispense with the requirement of a lawful basis for its admission. The
order has to be sustained on the basis of the appellate court's statutory
power and the reasons recorded for exercising it.
48. It is necessary in this context to distinguish between taking a
document on record as additional evidence and accepting its contents as
proved. The mere admission of a document does not establish its
genuineness, authenticity or the truth of the facts stated therein. The
evidentiary value of the engineer's report/estimate and the financial
documents was, therefore, required to be assessed by the appellate court
after considering the objections raised by the petitioner and the rebuttal
evidence, if any, adduced by him. The admission of the documents did
not dispense with the requirement of evaluating their evidentiary worth
or recording appropriate findings before placing reliance upon them .
49. The subsequent course of the proceedings is also relevant. After
the order dated 26.11.2025, the appellate court afforded an opportunity
to the petitioner to produce rebuttal evidence and proceeded to hear the
appeal. The appeal was ultimately decided by judgment and order dated
18.03.2026, whereby the appellate court allowed the release application
and directed the petitioner to vacate the disputed premises. The said
judgment is itself under challenge in Article 227 Petition No. 6083 of
2026. Consequently, while examining the legality of the order dated
26.11.2025 in the present writ petition, it would not be appropriate to
undertake an independent appraisal of the evidentiary value of the
documents or to adjudicate upon the correctness of the findings
subsequently recorded by the appellate court. Those matters fall for
consideration in the connected petition challenging the final appellate
judgment.
50. Having regard to the power conferred upon the appellate authority
under Section 22 read with Section 10(2) of the Act, 1972, the principles
governing the exercise of such power, and the reasons recorded in the
order dated 26.11.2025, this Court is not persuaded to hold that the
20
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
appellate court acted without jurisdiction in permitting the additional
documents to be brought on record. The omission to produce the
documents before the Prescribed Authority on account of an alleged
oversight would not, by itself, justify their admission. Nevertheless, the
appellate court was competent to examine whether their reception was
necessary for proper adjudication of the statutory requirements involved
in the appeal. The opportunity afforded to the petitioner to produce
rebuttal evidence was also a relevant consideration in assessing the
fairness of the procedure adopted. The question whether the appellate
court thereafter correctly appreciated the additional material and whether
the findings recorded in the judgment dated 18.03.2026 are sustainable
on the basis of the entire evidence on record shall be examined
separately while considering the challenge to that judgment.
Accordingly, no ground for interference with the order dated 26.11.2025
is made out in Writ-A No. 1227 of 2026.
Statutory Scheme and Interrelationship of Sections 21(1)(b) and 24(2).
51. A reading of Section 24 of the Act, 1972 indicates that sub-
sections (1) and (2) contemplate distinct situations and provide for
different remedies. Sub-section (1) deals with cases where, after
obtaining release of a building and evicting the tenant, the landlord acts
contrary to the purpose for which the release was granted, puts the
building to an unauthorized use, or fails to occupy or demolish it within
the period prescribed therein. In such circumstances, the Prescribed
Authority or the District Judge, as the case may be, is empowered, upon
an application made within the prescribed period, to direct restoration of
the evicted tenant to the building on the original terms and conditions.
Sub-section (2), on the other hand, specifically deals with a situation
where the landlord, after obtaining an order of release under Section
21(1)(b), demolishes the building and constructs a new building or
buildings on its site.
52. In the latter situation, Section 24(2) confers upon the original
tenant a statutory right to apply to the District Magistrate for allotment
21
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of the newly constructed building. The District Magistrate may allot to
the original tenant the new building or, where more than one building
has been constructed, such one of them as the District Magistrate, after
considering the tenant's requirements, thinks fit. Upon such allotment,
the tenant becomes liable to pay rent at the rate of one per cent per
month of the cost of construction, including the cost of demolition of the
old building but excluding the value of the land. The right to seek such
allotment thus arises in consequence of an order of release under Section
21(1)(b), followed by demolition and construction of a new building or
buildings on the site.
53. The time and manner for invoking the remedy under Section 24(2)
are prescribed by Rule 20 of the Rules, 1972, noticed above. The
original tenant is required to approach the District Magistrate within one
month from the date of completion of construction of the building sought
to be allotted and to specify the extent of his requirements regarding
accommodation. The statutory scheme, therefore, contemplates that the
tenant shall exercise the right by making an application within the
prescribed period, whereupon the District Magistrate shall consider the
question of allotment in accordance with Section 24(2) and the Rules.
54. Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972, which governs release of a building
under Section 21(1)(b), also assumes significance in this context. Before
allowing an application for release on the ground of demolition and new
construction, the Prescribed Authority is required to satisfy itself that (i)
the building requires demolition; (ii) a proper estimate of expenditure
over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared;
(iii) a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or
regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority; and (iv) the
landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new
construction. These requirements ensure that an order of release is not
passed without the necessary material establishing the necessity for
demolition and the feasibility of the proposed reconstruction.
55. Section 21(1)(b), Section 24(2) and Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972,
thus operate at different stages of the same statutory process. Section
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21(1)(b) provides the ground on which the tenant may be evicted; Rule
17 prescribes the matters requiring satisfaction of the Prescribed
Authority before release is allowed; and Section 24(2), read with Rule
20, provides the original tenant an opportunity to seek allotment after
demolition and reconstruction have taken place. The right under Section
24(2) is, therefore, not an independent right unconnected with the
proceedings under Section 21(1)(b), but a statutory consequence
attached to an order of release passed on that ground and the subsequent
reconstruction of the building.
56. The statutory arrangement seeks to balance the landlord's right to
obtain release of a building which is in a dilapidated condition and
requires demolition and new construction against the protection afforded
to the original tenant who is required to vacate the existing premises for
that purpose. The tenant is not conferred an automatic right to occupy a
particular portion of the reconstructed building. Nevertheless, the right to
seek allotment under Section 24(2) is a statutory protection and is not
dependent upon the willingness or consent of the landlord. The question
of allotment, upon an application being made in accordance with law, is
to be considered by the District Magistrate having regard to the
requirements of the original tenant.
57. Section 21(1)(b) and Section 24(2), therefore, cannot be
construed in isolation. They are required to be read harmoniously with
Rule 17 so that the statutory right made available to the original tenant
under Section 24(2) is not rendered ineffective by the manner in which
the proposed reconstruction is contemplated. At the same time, such an
interpretation cannot result in transferring to the Prescribed Authority the
power of allotment which the statute has expressly vested in the District
Magistrate. The extent to which the proposed construction plan is
required to be scrutinised at the stage of release, and the nature of the
safeguards that may be necessary to protect the statutory right of the
original tenant, must accordingly be considered in the light of the
judicial pronouncements dealing with these provisions.
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Judicial Precedents on Conjoint Interpretation
58. The interrelationship between Section 21(1)(b), Section 24(2) and
Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972, has been considered by this Court in a
number of decisions. These decisions recognise that the statutory right
available to the original tenant under Section 24(2) is required to be
taken into consideration while examining an application for release on
the ground of demolition and reconstruction.
59. In Karamat Ullah, this Court considered the provisions of Section
21(1)(b), Section 24(2) and Rule 17 conjointly. The Court observed that
while examining an application for release under Section 21(1)(b), the
authority concerned cannot altogether overlook the right of re-entry
available to the tenant under Section 24(2). The requirements of Rule 17,
though relating to the proposed demolition and reconstruction, are
required to be considered in the context of the statutory protection
afforded to the original tenant.
60. In the aforesaid case, the proposed construction plan
contemplated utilisation of the site occupied by the tenant for
construction of a latrine, bathroom, fuel storage and a portion of the
courtyard, without making any provision for safeguarding the tenant's
right under Section 24(2). The Court held that the authority concerned
was required to examine the proposed construction plan minutely to
ensure that the tenant's option of re-entry was not defeated or frustrated.
It was further held that where the proposed plan made no provision for
securing that right, the tenant would stand deprived of the statutory
protection which he could otherwise exercise upon completion of the
new construction, and an order of release under Section 21(1)(b) could
not lawfully be made.
61. The question of prescribing a reasonable period for completion of
reconstruction was considered in Riazur Rahman Khan. The Court
noticed that although the Act does not prescribe a general period for
completion of new construction after obtaining possession, the omission
could be addressed by imposing an appropriate condition while allowing
release. Having allowed the writ petition and restored the order of the
24
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Prescribed Authority, the Court directed the landlords to reconstruct the
shop within six months from the date of obtaining possession and to
offer it to the tenants at the rent determined in accordance with Section
24(2) of the Act, 1972.
62. The question of safeguarding the tenant's right under Section
24(2) also arose in Rafeeq Ahmad. In that case, the tenant had objected
that the proposed reconstruction plan did not make any provision for his
re-entry into the newly constructed building. In response, learned
counsel for the landlord relied upon paragraph 27 of the release
application, wherein the landlord had specifically stated that if the tenant
desired to take the newly constructed accommodation on rent, the same
would be offered to him in accordance with law. The Court took note of
the said statement and observed that the undertaking continued to bind
the landlord. In view thereof, the objection that the right under Section
24(2) had not been considered by the courts below was not accepted.
63. The Court also considered the tenant's request for a time-bound
direction for reconstruction and for providing him an opportunity to
occupy one-room accommodation in the reconstructed building. Learned
counsel for the landlord expressed no objection to the imposition of such
a condition. The Court, while dismissing the writ petition, directed the
landlord to complete reconstruction in accordance with the plan
sanctioned by the competent authority within one year from the date of
demolition and to offer one-room accommodation to the tenant at the
prevalent market rate of rent before offering it on sale or rent to any
other person. The decision thus illustrates the relevance of an
undertaking furnished by the landlord and the power of the Court to
impose appropriate conditions for safeguarding the tenant's statutory
interest, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the stand
taken by the landlord.
64. The nature and scope of the right conferred by Section 24(2) were
considered in detail by this Court in Sanjay Bhardwaj @ Bablu and
another. The principal controversy in that case concerned the right of the
legal representatives of a deceased original tenant to pursue proceedings
25
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
under Section 24(2). While examining the statutory scheme, the Court
held that the right of re-entry under Section 24(2) is a consequence of an
order of release under Section 21(1)(b), and that proceedings under
Section 24(2) are to be viewed as a continuation of the proceedings
initiated under Section 21(1)(b). The following observations are
relevant:
"43. The right of re-entry of a tenant under Section 24(2) is therefore clearly a
consequence of the order of release having been passed under Section 21(1)
(b), and the proceedings under Section 24(2) are to be seen in continuation of
the proceedings for eviction under Section 21(1)(b), as per the scheme of the
Act."
"54. In the present case the legislative intent in granting a special privilege or
a lien to the evicted tenant by way of a right to re-entry under Section 24(2) is
clear from a plain reading of the provision which indicates that the right
under Section 24(2) flows from the proceedings initiated under Section 21(1)
(b) in terms of which the tenant had been evicted from the building on the
ground that the same was in a dilapidated condition and was required for the
purpose of demolition and new construction."
"55. The provisions of Section 24(2) and 21(1)(b) are thus required to be read
conjointly and have to be construed with reference to one another so as to
make the same consistent with the object sought to be achieved i.e. providing
a protection to the original tenant who had been evicted solely for the reason
that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required to be
demolished and reconstructed without either the bona fide need of the
landlord being considered or the comparative hardship of the landlord vis-a-
vis the tenant being tested."
"56. A combined reading of the provisions under Section 24(2) with Section
21(1)(b) would clearly show that the proceedings under Section 24(2) are a
continuation of the proceedings for eviction under Section 21(1)(b) and
provide a logical culmination to the said proceedings."
65. The aforesaid exposition makes it clear that the right of re-entry
conferred upon the original tenant under Section 24(2) is a direct
statutory consequence of an order of release passed under Section 21(1)
(b). The proceedings under Section 24(2) are not an independent or
detached remedy arising subsequent to eviction, but constitute a
continuation of the proceedings initiated under Section 21(1)(b) and
26
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
provide a logical culmination to the same. The legislative intent
underlying this arrangement is to afford protection to an original tenant
who is evicted solely on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated
condition and requires demolition and reconstruction, without
examination of the landlord's bona fide need or comparative hardship.
Sections 21(1)(b) and 24(2) must, therefore, be read conjointly and
construed with reference to each other, so that the right conferred upon
the original tenant is not reduced to a matter of discretion of the landlord
or rendered ineffective in the process of demolition and reconstruction.
66. The aforesaid decisions, when read together, indicate that the right
conferred under Section 24(2) has a bearing upon the adjudication of an
application for release under Section 21(1)(b). In particular, Karamat
Ullah directly lays down that the proposed reconstruction plan must be
examined to ensure that the tenant's statutory option is not defeated.
Riazur Rahman Khan and Rafeeq Ahmad further demonstrate that
appropriate conditions relating to the time for reconstruction and the
tenant's opportunity to seek accommodation in the reconstructed
building may be imposed, depending upon the facts and circumstances
of the case.
67. It is, however, necessary to maintain the distinction between the
jurisdiction exercised at the stage of release and the jurisdiction
conferred upon the District Magistrate under Section 24(2). The
Prescribed Authority or the appellate court, while deciding the release
application, does not itself undertake the exercise of allotment
contemplated under Section 24(2). That exercise is to be undertaken by
the District Magistrate upon an application being made by the original
tenant within the time prescribed under Rule 20 of the Rules, 1972. The
obligation at the stage of release is to examine the proposed
reconstruction in the context of the statutory right and to ensure that the
plan does not render the exercise of that right impossible or illusory.
68. Consequently, while the original tenant cannot claim an automatic
right to a particular unit or insist that the reconstructed accommodation
must necessarily be identical in area or dimensions to the premises
27
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
previously occupied by him, the proposed reconstruction cannot be
permitted to proceed in a manner that excludes any meaningful
possibility of his seeking allotment under Section 24(2). The authority
concerned is, therefore, required to examine the plan and the material on
record from this perspective and, where necessary, impose appropriate
conditions to protect the statutory right, without encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to consider and decide the
application for allotment in accordance with law.
Scope and Effect of the Statutory Protection under Section 24(2)
69. Before examining the application of the aforesaid principles to the
facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to notice the underlying
object of rent-control legislation. Such legislation seeks to regulate the
relationship between landlords and tenants by providing protection
against arbitrary eviction, while at the same time recognising the
legitimate rights and interests of property owners. The statutory scheme
is intended to maintain a balance between the landlord's right to enjoy
and develop his property and the tenant's interest in securing protection
against eviction except in accordance with the grounds and procedure
prescribed by law. The provisions of the Act, 1972 are, therefore,
required to be construed in a manner which gives meaningful effect to
the safeguards incorporated therein, without unduly restricting the rights
conferred upon the landlord.
70. The protection afforded to a tenant under the Act, 1972 does not
operate as an absolute restriction upon the landlord's right to recover
possession. The legislature has recognised that circumstances may arise
where the condition of a building necessitates its demolition and
reconstruction. Section 21(1)(b) accordingly enables the landlord to seek
release of a building which is in a dilapidated condition and is required
for demolition and new construction. At the same time, the legislature
has made a specific provision in Section 24(2) for the benefit of the
original tenant who is evicted on that ground, by conferring upon him a
statutory right to seek allotment in the newly constructed building. The
28
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two provisions thus reflect a legislative balance between the landlord's
right to undertake reconstruction and the original tenant's statutory
protection.
71. The significance of Section 24(2) lies in the fact that eviction
under Section 21(1)(b) is ordered for a purpose which contemplates
demolition of the existing building and construction of a new building on
its site. The statutory process of demolition and reconstruction is not
intended, by itself, to deprive the original tenant of the opportunity
expressly made available to him under Section 24(2). The provision thus
preserves the original tenant's statutory right to seek accommodation in
the reconstructed building, subject to his making an application within
the prescribed period and the District Magistrate considering his
requirements in accordance with law. It is, however, necessary to bear in
mind that the provision does not confer an automatic right to reoccupy
the same premises or to obtain a particular reconstructed unit. The
question of allotment remains within the jurisdiction of the District
Magistrate.
72. A statutory right cannot be construed in a manner that renders its
exercise illusory. Where the legislature has conferred upon the original
tenant a right to seek allotment in the newly constructed building, the
statutory scheme must receive an interpretation which enables that right
to be meaningfully exercised. If the proposed reconstruction is examined
exclusively from the standpoint of the physical feasibility of demolition
and construction, without taking into account the protection expressly
conferred upon the original tenant, an important aspect of the legislative
scheme would remain unaddressed. The requirement is not that the
tenant must be assured allotment of the same premises or of
accommodation identical in area or dimensions. It is that the proposed
reconstruction should not be conceived or permitted in a manner which,
from the outset, renders the statutory right under Section 24(2) incapable
of effective exercise.
73. In this view of the matter, the right under Section 24(2), though
exercisable before the District Magistrate after completion of
29
A227 No. - 6083 of 2026
construction, cannot be regarded as wholly detached from the
proceedings under Section 21(1)(b). The actual claim for allotment is
undoubtedly to be considered by the District Magistrate in accordance
with the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules. Nevertheless,
the preservation of the statutory right is a relevant consideration at the
stage of release itself. The authority considering release must, therefore,
examine the proposed reconstruction in the context of the right available
to the original tenant and consider whether any appropriate condition or
safeguard is necessary to ensure that the exercise of that right is not
frustrated. Such an interpretation gives effect to both provisions without
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to consider
and decide the application for allotment in accordance with law.
74. Section 24(1) of the Act, 1972 provides an additional safeguard to
a tenant who has been evicted pursuant to an order under Section 21 or
Section 22 of the Act. It contemplates situations where, after obtaining
possession, the landlord does not utilise the building for the purpose for
which it was released, puts another person in occupation contrary to the
representation made before the Prescribed Authority, or otherwise puts
the building to a use different from the purpose for which release was
granted. The provision also specifically deals with a building which was
proposed to be demolished but is not demolished within two months
from the date of obtaining possession, or within such extended period as
the Prescribed Authority may allow for sufficient cause.
75. In such circumstances, Section 24(1) enables the evicted tenant to
seek restoration of possession of the building on the original terms and
conditions, by making an application within three months from the date
of the relevant act or omission. The provision thus seeks to ensure that
an order of release is not utilised by the landlord for a purpose different
from the one on the basis of which eviction was sought and granted. It
operates as a statutory safeguard against misuse of the order of release
and preserves the tenant's remedy where the landlord fails to fulfil the
purpose for which possession was obtained.
30
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76. Section 24(2), on the other hand, contemplates a different
situation. It applies where the landlord, after obtaining a release order
under Section 21(1)(b), demolishes the existing building and constructs a
new building or buildings on its site. In such a situation, the original
tenant is conferred a statutory opportunity to seek allotment of the newly
constructed building, or such one of them as the District Magistrate may
consider appropriate having regard to the tenant's requirements. The
provision also prescribes the basis on which rent is payable by the tenant
and makes the newly constructed building subject to the provisions of
the Act, subject to the conditions stipulated therein.
77. A conjoint reading of Section 24(1) and Section 24(2) indicates
that the legislature has contemplated two distinct eventualities arising
out of an order of release granted under Section 21. Where the landlord
fails to undertake demolition within the prescribed period, or otherwise
acts contrary to the purpose for which the building was released, the
remedy available to the evicted tenant is governed by Section 24(1).
Conversely, where the landlord proceeds with demolition and constructs
a new building on the site, the statutory protection available to the
original tenant is governed by Section 24(2). The two provisions,
therefore, operate in their respective fields and together form part of the
statutory arrangement intended to protect the original tenant while
recognising the landlord's right to demolish and reconstruct the building.
78. It is, therefore, evident that the statutory protection under Section
24 is not confined to a remedy against an eventual failure on the part of
the landlord to comply with the purpose of release. In a case falling
under Section 21(1)(b), the legislature has also expressly recognised the
interest of the original tenant in the newly constructed accommodation.
Although the actual claim for allotment under Section 24(2) is to be
considered by the District Magistrate in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, the existence of such a statutory right cannot be rendered
meaningless by an interpretation of the provisions governing release
which altogether disregards the tenant's interest in the proposed
reconstruction.
31
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79. At the same time, the statutory scheme does not require the
Prescribed Authority, while considering an application under Section
21(1)(b), to adjudicate in advance the tenant's entitlement to allotment
under Section 24(2), which is a matter falling within the jurisdiction of
the District Magistrate. The consideration at the stage of release and the
determination of the tenant's claim for allotment after reconstruction are
distinct stages. Nevertheless, the proposed reconstruction must be
examined in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole, so that the
right expressly conferred upon the original tenant under Section 24(2) is
not rendered illusory. Such an interpretation preserves the respective
jurisdictions of the authorities under the Act while giving meaningful
effect to the protection intended by the legislature.
Application of the Statutory Principles to the Present Case
80. In the present case, the appellate court has examined the material
relating to the age and physical condition of the building, including the
engineering report dated 31.08.2015 and the municipal inspection report
dated 15.10.2017. It has also considered the estimate of the proposed
demolition and reconstruction, the financial capacity of the respondent-
landlady and the proposed construction plan. Upon consideration of the
aforesaid material, the appellate court has recorded a finding that the
building was in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and
reconstruction.
81. The appellate court has further examined the requirements
prescribed under Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972 by framing separate points
for determination. While considering the requirement relating to the
proposed expenditure and the financial capacity of the landlady, it has
taken into account the estimate prepared by S.K. Construction, the
income-tax return details and the bank account particulars placed on
record. It has also considered the financial circumstances brought out
from the pleadings of the parties and, upon such consideration,
concluded that the respondent-landlady possessed the financial capacity
to undertake demolition and reconstruction of the building.
32
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82. Similarly, while examining the requirement under Rule 17(3), the
appellate court has considered the proposed construction plan prepared
by Khan Associates. Relying upon the decision in Ram Shankar v.
10
District Judge, Faizabad and Others , it has held that Rule 17 requires a
plan duly prepared in accordance with the applicable local laws and
regulations, and does not insist upon a plan already sanctioned by the
local development authority. On examination of the plan placed on
record, the appellate court recorded a finding that the requirement under
Rule 17(3) stood satisfied.
83. The appellate court, therefore, has not proceeded merely on the
basis of the assertion of the respondent-landlady. It has examined the
relevant documentary material and the rival submissions in relation to
the statutory requirements governing release under Section 21(1)(b) of
the Act, 1972. The findings recorded on the condition of the building, the
estimate of demolition and reconstruction, the financial capacity of the
landlady and the proposed construction plan demonstrate that the
appellate court has independently considered the requirements
prescribed under Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972. It has accordingly
concluded that the Prescribed Authority had not correctly appreciated the
material on record while rejecting the release application.
84. The submission regarding the statutory protection available to the
petitioner under Section 24 of the Act, 1972 also requires consideration
in the context of the scheme of the aforesaid provision. As noticed
hereinbefore, Section 24(1) and Section 24(2) contemplate distinct
eventualities arising after possession of the building is obtained pursuant
to an order of release. Section 24(1) provides a remedy to the evicted
tenant in the event of the specified acts or omissions on the part of the
landlord, including failure to demolish a building within the prescribed
period where possession has been obtained for that purpose. Section
24(2), on the other hand, provides an opportunity to the original tenant to
seek allotment in the newly constructed building where the landlord,
10 1998 (1) ARC 282
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after obtaining release under Section 21(1)(b), demolishes the existing
building and constructs a new building or buildings on its site.
85. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that
the protection under Section 24 is intended to operate at the stage
contemplated therein, upon the occurrence of the relevant subsequent act
or omission. The remedy under Section 24(1) becomes available where
the landlord fails to fulfil the purpose for which possession was obtained
or otherwise acts in the manner contemplated by that provision.
Likewise, the right under Section 24(2) becomes relevant where,
following demolition, a new building or buildings are constructed on the
site. The actual claim for allotment under the latter provision is required
to be considered by the District Magistrate in accordance with the
statutory procedure.
86. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the requirements
governing the grant of release under Section 21(1)(b), read with Rule 17
of the Rules, 1972, and the statutory remedies made available to the
original tenant under Section 24. The former provisions require the
authority to satisfy itself regarding the necessity of demolition, the
estimate of the proposed expenditure, the preparation of a plan in
accordance with the applicable requirements and the financial capacity
of the landlord. The latter provision deals with the consequences arising
after possession has been obtained and the subsequent conduct of the
landlord. The right available under Section 24 cannot, therefore, be
construed as introducing an additional requirement for release which is
not prescribed under Section 21(1)(b) or Rule 17.
87. The fact that the actual claim for allotment under Section 24(2) is
to be considered at a subsequent stage does not mean that the statutory
right of the original tenant is either extinguished or rendered ineffective
by an order of release. Equally, the provision does not confer an
automatic right upon the tenant to continue in possession of the existing
premises or to obtain a particular reconstructed accommodation as a
condition precedent to the grant of release. The tenant's entitlement is
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subject to the conditions prescribed under Section 24(2), including
making an application within the prescribed period, and is required to be
considered by the District Magistrate having regard to the tenant's
requirements.
87. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner, including Rafeeq
Ahmad (supra) and Riazur Rahman Khan (supra), have also been
considered in the context of the statutory protection available to the
original tenant. Appropriate undertakings or conditions relating to
reconstruction may be considered by the competent court having regard
to the facts and circumstances of an individual case. However, such
safeguards cannot be elevated into an inflexible statutory requirement,
compliance with which must invariably precede the grant of release
under Section 21(1)(b). The absence of a specific finding regarding an
undertaking or a condition relating to the future allotment of
accommodation under Section 24(2), by itself, does not invalidate an
otherwise sustainable order of release.
88. In the present case, the appellate court has examined the material
relating to the proposed demolition and reconstruction and has recorded
affirmative findings regarding the requirements prescribed under Rule 17
of the Rules, 1972. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any of these
findings suffer from perversity, disregard of material evidence or an
error of law warranting interference in exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the appellate judgment does not
separately adjudicate the petitioner's eventual entitlement under Section
24(2) cannot constitute a ground for setting aside the order of release,
particularly when such entitlement is required to be considered by the
District Magistrate at the appropriate stage.
89. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
appellate court has duly examined the material on record and the
requirements prescribed under Rule 17 of the Rules, 1972 before
allowing the release application under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, 1972.
No jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest illegality has been
35
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demonstrated in the findings recorded by the appellate court. The
petitioner's statutory protection under Section 24 does not furnish an
independent ground to invalidate the order of release, the remedies
contemplated therein being available in accordance with the
circumstances and conditions prescribed by the statute. Consequently, no
ground is made out for interference in exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion and Operative Directions
90. For the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that the
petitioners have failed to demonstrate any illegality, jurisdictional error
or perversity in the orders under challenge warranting interference in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India.
91. Both the petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
92. It is, however, clarified that dismissal of the present petitions shall
not preclude the petitioner-tenant from invoking the statutory remedy
available under Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972, at the appropriate stage,
upon fulfilment of the conditions prescribed therein. Any such claim or
application shall be considered by the competent authority concerned
independently and in accordance with law, without being influenced by
the dismissal of the present petitions.
93. The observations made in this judgment shall not be construed as
an expression of opinion on the petitioner's entitlement to the benefit of
Section 24(2) of the Act, 1972, which shall be determined by the
competent authority in accordance with the applicable statutory
provisions.
94. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
November 17, 2026
Sushma
Digitally signed by :-
SUSHAMA YADAV
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad