KAMAL KISHORE PAREEK S/O LATE SH. MANMOHAN LAL PAREEK vs SITARAM PAREEK S/O LATE SH. GANGARAM PAREEK

Court
Rajasthan High Court

[2026:RJ-JP:45987]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 22097/2026
CNR: RJHC021055342026 | URN: CW / 46522U / 2026
Kamal Kishore Pareek S/o Late Sh. Manmohan Lal Pareek, R/o
House No. 31/482, Pratap Nagar, Sanganer, Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Sitaram Pareek S/o Late Sh. Gangaram Pareek, (Died
During Proceedings)
1/1 Punit Kumar Pareek, Aged About 55 Years, S/o Late
Sh. Sitaram Pareek
1/2 Smt. Dipti Rawat, Aged About 54 Years, W/o Sh.
Punit Kumar Pareek
2. Smt. Shashi Pareek W/o Late Sh. Sitaram Pareek, (Died
During Proceedings) R/o Wt-02/101, Experien Wind
Chetas, Sector No. 112, Dwarka Expressway, Bajgheda,
Gurgaon, Haryana.
----Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Anirudh Tyagi Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Sandeep Sharma Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
03/11/2026
1. The present writ petition has been preferred by the
petitioner assailing the order dated 16.10.2026 passed by the
learned Rent Tribunal No.2, Jaipur Metro First (hereinafter to be
referred as ‘the Rent Tribunal’), whereby his application under
Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC, raising objections regarding
the jurisdiction of the Executing Tribunal and validity of the
execution proceedings, has been rejected.
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2. Fact, in brief, are that the petitioner is a tenant in
property bearing No. Nagar 31/482, Pratap Sanganer, Jaipur, at a
monthly rent of Rs.9,000/. The respondents instituted an eviction
petition before the learned Rent Tribunal No.1, Jaipur Metro First,
which came to be allowed vide judgment and decree dated
05.08.2025. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner preferred an appeal
before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal. Meanwhile, the
respondents instituted execution proceedings bearing No.12/2026
before the learned Rent Tribunal, which registered the execution
petition and issued notice to the petitioner vide order dated
20.01.2026.
3. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of Rent
Tribunal on the ground that the eviction decree had been passed
by Rent Tribunal No.1 and, in the absence of a lawful transfer
under Sections 37, 38 and 39 CPC, another Tribunal could not
undertake its execution. His application seeking stay of execution
proceedings was dismissed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal
vide order dated 05.05.2026. The petitioner challenged the said
order before this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8990/2026,
which was disposed of as withdrawn vide order dated 25.05.2026,
granting liberty to the petitioner to raise his objections before the
Executing Tribunal in accordance with law.
4. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner filed an application
dated 10.07.2026 under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC,
reiterating his jurisdictional objections and challenging the
recovery warrant issued during the execution proceedings. The
respondents filed their reply and the petitioner submitted a
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rejoinder. In the meantime, the process for transfer of the
execution proceedings to the Tribunal having appropriate territorial
jurisdiction was undertaken vide communication dated
14.07.2026, and the transfer certificate was subsequently received
by the transferee Tribunal. The learned Executing Tribunal, after
considering the objections, rejected the petitioner's application
vide order dated 16.10.2026.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
decree having been passed by Rent Tribunal No.1, its execution
could not have been undertaken by Rent Tribunal No.2 without
following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Sections 37,
38 and 39 read with Order 21 Rule 6 CPC. It was submitted that
no application for transfer of the decree had been filed by the
decree-holders and no valid transfer order had been passed before
institution of the execution proceedings. Since Rent Tribunal No.1
continues to exist, another Tribunal could not assume jurisdiction
merely by registering the execution petition.
6. Learned counsel further submitted that the subsequent
issuance and receipt of the transfer certificate could not
retrospectively validate the coercive proceedings, particularly the
recovery warrant, undertaken before actual transmission of the
execution record. It was argued that the learned Executing
Tribunal failed to independently examine the legality of such
proceedings and mechanically rejected the objections. Learned
Counsel relied upon judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Balvant N. Viswamitra & Others vs Yadav Sadashiv
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Mule (D) through LRS & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 706, in
support of his contentions.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the petitioner had misconstrued the statutory
scheme governing Rent Tribunals. The Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001, is a special enactment containing an independent
mechanism for execution of orders. Sections 13(2), 20 and 21(3)
thereof empower the competent authorities to regulate
distribution of business, provide for execution of orders and permit
the Tribunals to regulate their own procedure without being bound
by the CPC. It was contended that the execution proceedings were
duly transferred and the transfer certificate was received by the
competent Tribunal. The petitioner had failed to demonstrate any
inherent lack of jurisdiction or prejudice warranting interference.
The petition was accordingly opposed.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
9. The sole question involved in the present writ petition
relates to the competence of Rent Tribunal No.2 to entertain
execution petition in respect of an eviction decree passed by Rent
Tribunal No.1. The petitioner's principal contention is founded
upon Sections 37, 38 and 39 read with Order 21 Rule 6 CPC.
However, while dealing with such contention, the special statutory
framework governing the constitution and functioning of Rent
Tribunals under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, cannot be
overlooked.
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10. Upon examination of the scheme of the Act, it would be
evident that Section 13(2) of the Act of 2001 specifically
empowers the State Government, where two or more Rent
Tribunals have been constituted for an area, to regulate the
distribution of business amongst them by a general or special
order. Section 20 provides an independent mechanism for
execution of final orders passed by the Rent Tribunal, while
Section 21(3) expressly stipulates that the Rent Tribunal and the
Appellate Rent Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure
prescribed under the CPC and shall have the power to regulate
their own procedure, subject to the Act and the Rules.
11. A conjoint reading of these provisions makes it evident
that the legislature has consciously provided an independent
procedural mechanism for adjudication and execution of orders
under the Act. Consequently, the provisions governing execution
and transfer of decrees by ordinary civil courts cannot be
mechanically imported into proceedings before Rent Tribunals as
though the CPC were fully applicable to them. The applicability of
any particular provision of the CPC has to be examined in the
context of the special enactment.
12. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any statutory
provision under the Act of 2001 mandating that transfer or
allocation of execution proceedings between competent Rent
Tribunals must invariably follow the entire procedure prescribed
under Sections 37 to 39 and Order XXI Rule 6 CPC. Equally, the
continued existence and functioning of Rent Tribunal No.1 does
not, by itself, prohibit transfer or allocation of execution
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proceedings to another competent Tribunal. Relevant consideration
would be as to whether the Tribunal undertaking execution has
been vested with the requisite authority under the applicable
statutory and administrative arrangement, or not ?
13. In the present case, the execution proceedings were
subsequently transferred, a transfer certificate was issued and the
same was received by the Tribunal entrusted with their further
conduct. The petitioner has not established that such transfer was
contrary to any statutory prohibition , nor could he establish that
the transferee Tribunal lacked territorial or subject-matter
competence. His objection substantially rests upon the fact that
the execution proceedings were initially instituted before Rent
Tribunal No.2 and the transfer certificate was received
subsequently. Such chronology, by itself, does not establish
inherent lack of jurisdiction.
14. It is equally well settled that every procedural
irregularity does not render the proceedings void. The petitioner
has utterly failed to establish that the Rent Tribunal no. 2 lacked
authority to undertake the proceedings in question on the relevant
dates. In the absence of such demonstration, the mere
subsequent transmission of the execution record cannot invalidate
all proceedings undertaken earlier.
15. So far as the challenge to the recovery warrant is
concerned, the petitioner has not demonstrated any independent
jurisdictional infirmity in the issuance thereof. Nor has he
established that the warrant was issued by an authority which was
inherently incompetent to undertake execution under the
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applicable statutory arrangement. The mere fact that the
execution record was subsequently transmitted to another Tribunal
does not, by itself, furnish a ground for automatic cancellation of
the warrant.
16. It is also significant that Section 20(4) of the Act of
2001 requires execution proceedings to be conducted in a
summary manner. The legislative object is to ensure expeditious
implementation of orders passed by the Rent Tribunal. The
interpretation advanced by the petitioner, if accepted in its
absolute form, would result in unnecessary duplication of
execution proceedings and frustrate the object of the special
enactment. Transfer of an execution record between competent
Tribunals does not necessarily require commencement of
execution proceedings afresh, particularly when no statutory
provision mandating such a course has been demonstrated.
17. The petitioner's reliance upon the liberty granted by
this Court vide order dated 25.05.2026 also does not advance his
case. The said order merely permitted him to raise his objections
before the Executing Tribunal in accordance with law. Admittedly,
the petitioner has availed the liberty so granted, and his
objections have been considered and decided by the learned
Executing Tribunal by giving cogent reasonings.
18. The settled legal position is that an executing court
cannot go behind the decree and reopen the adjudication
concluded by the court passing it, except where the decree is a
nullity on account of inherent lack of jurisdiction. In Brakewel
Automotive Components (India) Private Limited vs. P.R.
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Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 SCC 371 , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reiterated the limitations governing the jurisdiction of an
executing court. In the present case, the petitioner has neither
established that the eviction decree is a nullity nor demonstrated
inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal presently entrusted
with its execution.
19. So far as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Balvant N. Viswamitra & Others (supra) relied upon by
learned Counsel for the Petitioner, this court finds that the
aforesaid judgment reiterates the fundamental principle that a
decree without jurisdiction is a nullity, however, the Petitioner has
utterly failed to convince this court with regard to applicability of
the above principle in the facts and circumstances of this case.
20. It is also well settled that scope of interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited and
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by this court is not an appellate
jurisdiction, hence, cannot be exercised merely to substitute the
view of the High Court for that of the subordinate Tribunal. In
Shalini Shyam Shetty & Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil,
(2010) 8 SCC 329 and Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand
Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that interference under Article 227 is warranted only in cases of
patent jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest injustice. In
case, the impugned order is tested on the aforesaid principles, this
Court does not find any jurisdictional error, patent illegality or
perversity in the impugned order. The learned Executing Tribunal
has considered the objections in the backdrop of the statutory
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framework. The petitioner has failed to establish that the transfer
was unauthorised, could he establish that the proceedings
undertaken earlier were inherently without jurisdiction. No ground
warranting supervisory interference is, therefore, made out.
21. Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit,
is hereby dismissed.
22. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
Crt_19/D-A/23/MANOJ NARWANI
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