MATA BAGLAMUKHI STONE CRUSHER vs THE STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh

2026:HHC:33749
High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.15413 of 2024
a/w CWP Nos.8243, 8559, 8560, 8562, 8673, 8675,
8712, 8713, 8714, 8719, 8745, 8747, 8801, 8802,
8803, 8804, 8818, 8819, 8820, 8821, 8822, 8823,
8942, 8952, 8953, 8954, 8955, 9130, 9141, 9142,
9143, 9326, 9546, 9547, 9873, 10019, 10088,
10255, 10572, 11510, 11848, 11857, 11859, 11860,
11983, 11985, 11986, 13345, 13348, 13363, 13935,
14662, 14663, 14664, 14665, 14666, 15415, 15442
of 2024, CWP Nos.226, 251, 255, 257, 259, 813,
1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1866, 1867, 1869, 2506,
2533, 2998, 3001, 3964, 4270, 4496, 5870, 5871,
5882, 6527, 6529, 6530, 6531, 6533, 6536, 6558,
6559, 6618, 6619, 6759, 6819, 7049, 7129, 7165,
7204, 7212, 7243, 7848, 7850, 8732, 8736, 8749,
9032, 9076, 9356, 9516, 9821, 10066, 11191,
11231, 11232, 11821, 12154, 12167, 12266, 12381,
12825, 15637, 16108, 16998, 17257, 17379, 17433,
17435, 17436, 17438, 19919 of 2025 and CWP
Nos.679, 761, 2075, 2102, 2361, 2659, 4236, 4373,
5057, 5995, 5996 of 2026
Reserved on : 11.05.2026
Decided on : 11.08.2026
Uploaded on: 11.08.2026
1. CWP No.15413 of 2024
M/s Brajesh Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr.
…Respondents.
2. CWP No.8243 of 2024
M/s Shiv Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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2 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
3. CWP No.8559 of 2024
M/s Lakhwinder Singh Stone Crusher Unit 2.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors.
…Respondents.
4. CWP No.8560 of 2024
M/s Lakhwinder Singh Stone Crusher Unit 1.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
5. CWP No.8562 of 2024
M/s Lakhwinder Singh Stone Crusher Unit 3.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
6. CWP No.8673 of 2024
Manjholi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
7. CWP No.8675 of 2024
Om Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
8. CWP No.8712 of 2024
Shivalik Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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3 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
9. CWP No.8713 of 2024
Doon Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
10. CWP No.8714 of 2024
J. B. B. Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
11. CWP No.8719 of 2024
Thakur Rohani Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
12. CWP No.8745 of 2024
M/s Aar Ess Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
13. CWP No.8747 of 2024
Laxmi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
14. CWP No.8801 of 2024
Gupta Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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4 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
15. CWP No.8802 of 2024
Jai Maa Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
16. CWP No.8803 of 2024
Jai Baba Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
17. CWP No.8804 of 2024
Him Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
18. CWP No.8818 of 2024
Bharat Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
19. CWP No.8819 of 2024
M/s Jagdambay Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
20. CWP No.8820 of 2024
Chander Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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5 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
21. CWP No.8821 of 2024
M/s Jai Shanker Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
22. CWP No.8822 of 2024
Thakur Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
23. CWP No.8823 of 2024
Shree Shree Rudra Stone Crusher and Screening Plant.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
24. CWP No.8942 of 2024
M/s Him Flint Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
25. CWP No.8952 of 2024
Shri Krishna Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
26. CWP No.8953 of 2024
M/s Bhakra Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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6 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
27. CWP No.8954 of 2024
M/s Mehta Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
28. CWP No.8955 of 2024
M/s Kamaksha Construction Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
29. CWP No.9130 of 2024
Naina Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
30. CWP No.9141 of 2024
Lakhvinder Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
31. CWP No.9142 of 2024
Shiva Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
32. CWP No.9143 of 2024
Shree Shree Rudra Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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7 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
33. CWP No.9326 of 2024
Thakur Enterprises Unit-II.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
34. CWP No.9546 of 2024
Shiva Stone.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
35. CWP No.9547 of 2024
Luxmi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
36. CWP No.9873 of 2024
Singh Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
37. CWP No.10019 of 2024
Himachal Crushing Co..
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
38. CWP No.10088 of 2024
Ankur Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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8 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
39. CWP No.10255 of 2024
M/s Goldmine Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
40. CWP No.10572 of 2024
M/s Saini Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
41. CWP No.11510 of 2024
M/s Mehta Bajri Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
42. CWP No.11848 of 2024
M/s Kunal Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
43. CWP No.11857 of 2024
Kundlas Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
44. CWP No.11859 of 2024
Bharat Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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9 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
45. CWP No.11860 of 2024
Rama Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
46. CWP No.11983 of 2024
M/s A.T. Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
47. CWP No.11985 of 2024
Om Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
48. CWP No.11986 of 2024
M/s New Randhawa Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
49. CWP No.13345 of 2024
M/s Thakur Enterprises Unit-IV.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
50. CWP No.13348 of 2024
M/s Him Anchal Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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10 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
51. CWP No.13363 of 2024
M/s Building Stretch Crushing Zone.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
52. CWP No.13935 of 2024
Atharv Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited & Ors..
…Respondents.
53. CWP No.14662 of 2024
Omkara Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
54. CWP No.14663 of 2024
Neel Kanth Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
55. CWP No.14664 of 2024
Mohinder Singh and Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
56. CWP No.14665 of 2024
Bitta Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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11 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
57. CWP No.14666 of 2024
Mahadev Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
58. CWP No.15415 of 2024
M/s A.C. Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
59. CWP No.15442 of 2024
Randeep Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
60. CWP No.226 of 2025
Yamuna Mine and Minerals.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
61. CWP No.251 of 2025
Devraj Negi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
62. CWP No.255 of 2025
Himalayan Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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12 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
63. CWP No.257 of 2025
M/s Devraj Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
64. CWP No.259 of 2025
Shirgul Mines and Minerals.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
65. CWP No.813 of 2025
M/s Ishwar Rohal Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
66. CWP No.1172 of 2025
M/s Goel Crushing Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
67. CWP No.1173 of 2025
Rock Lime and Allied Products.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
68. CWP No.1174 of 2025
Balaji Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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13 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
69. CWP No.1175 of 2025
Meera Mine and Minerals Industry.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
70. CWP No.1866 of 2025
M/s Shubhgiri Crushing Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
71. CWP No.1867 of 2025
M/s Shubhgiri Industries.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
72. CWP No.1869 of 2025
M/s Sabgiri Industries.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
73. CWP No.2506 of 2025
M/s Nav Durga Crushing Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board & Ors..
…Respondents.
74. CWP No.2533 of 2025
M/s Jagmohan Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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14 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
75. CWP No.2998 of 2025
M/s K.K. Grit Udyog Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
76. CWP No.3001 of 2025
M/s Jai Shankar Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
77. CWP No.3964 of 2025
M/s Neel Kanth Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
78. CWP No.4270 of 2025
Allstone Mines and Minerals Pvt Ltd.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
79. CWP No.4496 of 2025
Bhushan Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
80. CWP No.5870 of 2025
Krishna Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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15 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
81. CWP No.5871 of 2025
M/s Shri Shiv Shakti Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
82. CWP No.5882 of 2025
M/s Ashutosh Gupta Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
83. CWP No.6527 of 2025
Dinesh Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors.
…Respondents.
84. CWP No.6529 of 2025
Rahul Pathania.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
85. CWP No.6530 of 2025
Rahul Pathania.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
86. CWP No.6531 of 2025
Pawan Kumar.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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16 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
87. CWP No.6533 of 2025
Dharambir Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
88. CWP No.6536 of 2025
Shivam Pathania.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
89. CWP No.6558 of 2025
Sanjay Rana.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
90. CWP No.6559 of 2025
Rajinder Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
91. CWP No.6618 of 2025
M/s Luxmi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
92. CWP No.6619 of 2025
M/s Jai Shree Hari Gram Udyog Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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17 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
93. CWP No.6759 of 2025
Rajat Thakur.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
94. CWP No.6819 of 2025
Ranbir Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
95. CWP No.7049 of 2025
M/s Hari Om Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
96. CWP No.7129 of 2025
M/s Bhatia Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
97. CWP No.7165 of 2025
M/s HSD Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
98. CWP No.7204 of 2025
M/s India Stone Crusher Unit-II.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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18 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
99. CWP No.7212 of 2025
M/s Krishna Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
100. CWP No.7243 of 2025
M/s Shivam Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
101. CWP No.7848 of 2025
M/s Diamond Enterprises.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
102. CWP No.7850 of 2025
M/s Sidhi Vinayak Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
103. CWP No.8732 of 2025
M/s Vipasha Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
104. CWP No.8736 of 2025
M/s Vibhuti Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
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19 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
105. CWP No.8749 of 2025
M/s Manav Stone Crusher and Screening Unit.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
106. CWP No.9032 of 2025
M/s Sada Shiv Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
107. CWP No.9076 of 2025
M/s Nagni Mata Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
108. CWP No.9356 of 2025
Radha Mines.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
109. CWP No.9516 of 2025
Shiv Shakti Stone Crusher Co-Op Ind Society.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
110. CWP No.9821 of 2025
M/s Hare Krishna Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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20 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
111. CWP No.10066 of 2025
M/s Rama Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
112. CWP No.11191 of 2025
M/s Mankotia Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
113. CWP No.11231 of 2025
M/s Nandi Stone Crushing Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
114. CWP No.11232 of 2025
M/s New Nurpur Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
115. CWP No.11821 of 2025
M/s Vee Kay Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
116. CWP No.12154 of 2025
M/s Shiv Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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21 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
117. CWP No.12167 of 2025
M/s Luxmi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
118. CWP No.12266 of 2025
M/s Ashapuri Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
119. CWP No.12381 of 2025
M/s M.G. Mehta Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
120. CWP No.12825 of 2025
M/s Sharma Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
121. CWP No.15637 of 2025
M/s Malhotra Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
122. CWP No.16108 of 2025
M/s Murari Mata Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
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22 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
High Court of H.P.
123. CWP No.16998 of 2025
M/s Maheshwar Stone Washing and Crushing Industries.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
124. CWP No.17257 of 2025
Pammu Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
125. CWP No.17379 of 2025
M/s Himachal Stone Crushing Company.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
126. CWP No.17433 of 2025
M/s Himachal Chemicals and Silicate Works (Unit-II).
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
127. CWP No.17435 of 2025
M/s Himachal Chemicals and Silicate Works (Unit-I).
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
128. CWP No.17436 of 2025
M/s Krishna Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
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23 2026:HHC:33749
CWP No. 15413 of 2025 a/w connected matters
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129. CWP No.17438 of 2025
M/s Him Chemicals and Allied Industries.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr..
…Respondents.
130. CWP No.19919 of 2025
Khatri Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
131. CWP No.679 of 2026
M/s Bhandral Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
132. CWP No.761 of 2026
M/s Chamunda Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
133. CWP No.2075 of 2026
M/s Akhilesh Enterprises.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
134. CWP No.2102 of 2026
M/s Verma Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
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24 2026:HHC:33749
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135. CWP No.2361 of 2026
M/s Gargacharya Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
136. CWP No.2659 of 2026
Mata Baglamukhi Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors..
…Respondents.
137. CWP No.4236 of 2026
Bahadur Singh Bhalru.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
138. CWP No.4373 of 2026
Harbhajan Singh.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
139. CWP No.5057 of 2026
Gopal Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
140. CWP No.5995 of 2026
M/s Shubh Stone Crusher.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
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25 2026:HHC:33749
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141. CWP No.5996 of 2026
M/s Saini Grit Udyog.
…Petitioner.
Versus
HPSEBL & Ors..
…Respondents.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge.

1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner(s). Mr. Deepak Kaushal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Aditya Chauhan & Mr. Abhishek Verma,
Advocates, Mr. Rishi Tandon, Mr. Shriyek
Sharda, Mr. Ankit Dhiman, Mr. Bhim Raj
Sharma, Advocate, vice Mr. Lokender Paul
Thakur, Mr. Vinod Chauhan, Mr. Rajat
Thakur, Mr. Goverdhan Lal Sharma, Dr. Lalit
Kumar Sharma, Mr. Nitin Thakur, Mr. Ashok
Kumar Tyagi & Mr. Umesh Kanwar,
Advocates for the petitioner(s) in respective
petitions.
For the Respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with Mr.
Yashwardhan Singh Chauhan, Senior
Additional Advocate General, Mr. Sushant
Keprate, Additional Advocate General, for the
respondents-State, in all respective petitions.
Ms. Sunita Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Dhananjay Sharma, Mr. Saurav Upadhyay,
Mr. Mohit Sankhyan and Mr. Jia Negi,
Advocates, for the respondent-HPSEBL in
respective petitions.
__________________________________________________________
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge
For involvement of common question of law and fact in these
petitions, as agreed, are being decided by this common judgment.
2. Petitioner(s) herein are industrial units, registered with
Industries Department, carrying out business of stone crusher, having
been granted/renewed mining lease for industrial unit for extraction of
mines and minerals like stone, boulder, bajri , and sand, etc., in order to
run the stone crusher unit.
3. Petitioners are mainly aggrieved by notification dated
01.09.2023 (Annexure P-4) issued by Department of MPP & Power,
Government of Himachal Pradesh, under Section 11(2) of Himachal
Pradesh Electricity (Duty) Act 2009 (hereinafter to be referred to as
‘Act 2009’) by revising rates of electricity Duty, whereby rates of
electricity Duty levied under Section 3 of Act 2009 for different categories
of consumers have been revised with immediate effect, wherein stone
crushers and mines along with cement industry have been levied
electricity Duty at a revised rate of 25% by increasing previous rate of
Duty of 11%, which was notified as revised rate by the Government of
Himachal Pradesh, circulated vide communication dated 20.07.2017
(Annexure P-3), issued by HP State Electricity Board.
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4. Petitioners are also aggrieved by Notification dated
18.01.2024 (Annexure P-5), issued by Department of MPP & Power,
Government of Himachal Pradesh, whereby exercising the power
conferred under Section 11(2) of Act 2009, rate of electricity Duty with
respect to stone crushers has been revised under Section 3 of 2009 Act
at the rate of 37.50%.
5. Sections 3 and 11 of Act, 2009 read as under:-
“3. Levy of electricity duty on consumption or supply of energy.- (1) There
shall be levied and paid to the State Government on the energy, generated
from any source, consumed by the Board, any licensee, electricity trader or
generating company or supplied by the Board, such licensee, trader or
company to the consumer, a duty to be called the electricity duty, in the
following manner, namely:-
(i) domestic consumers -@ 3%,
(ii) Non domestic non-commercial consumers -@ 3%,
(iii) agricultural/irrigation or allied activities supply
-@ 10%,
consumers
(iv) Commercial consumers -@ 8%
(v) Industrial consumers
(a) small industrial consumers
-@ 9%,
[(b) medium industrial consumers
-@ 15%
(c) large industrial consumers (above 100 KW
-@ 20%]
connected load)
(vi) water pumping supply consumers -@ 10%
(vii) bulk supply consumers -@ 10%,
(viii) street lighting supply consumers -@ 10%,
(ix) temporary metered supply consumers -@ 4%,
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(x) other category of consumers not covered under
-@ 10% and ,
clauses (i) to (ix) above
(xi) In case of electrical energy generated by diesel
-@ 30 paise:
generating sets (or by what so ever mode) for use
of construction of power projects or captive/
standby for own consumption by the licensee or
consumer, electricity duty per unit :
Provided that the percentage mentioned against each categories shall be
applicable on energy charges only (excluding meter rent, service charges etc.).
(2) Nothing in section 3 shall apply to the consumption or sale of electricity
which is-
(a) consumed by the Government of India, State Government or sold to the
Government of India or other Government(s) within the territories of
Indian Union for consumption or sale by that Government or other
utilities engaged in power sector; or
(b) consumed in the construction, maintenance or operation of any railway
by the Government of India or a railway company operating that railway,
or sold to that Government or any such railway company for
consumption in the construction, maintenance or operation of any
railway; or
(c) consumed by a licensee or by consumer generating energy for their own
consumption; provided the capacity of generator does not exceed 10
KW.
(3) For the purpose of computing the electricity duty, the consumption shown
by the meter, starting after the first meter reading date, after the issuance of the
notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 shall be taken into account.
….. ….. ….. ….. …..
11. Power to exempt from payment of electricity duty .- (1) The State
Government may, in public interest, by notification in the Official Gazette,
exempt any licensee, consumer or person from the payment of the whole or
part of the electricity duty for such period and subject to such conditions as may
be specified in such notification.
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(2) The State Government may, by notification, revise the rates of electricity
duty not exceeding 50% at any one time, of the rates specified under section
3.”
6. Petitioners are also aggrieved for not including them in
notifications dated 18.09.2024 (Annexure P-7 & Annexure P-8), issued by
Department of MPP & Power, Government of H.P., whereby rate of
electricity Duty with respect to certain categories including large industrial
consumers above 100 KVA have been reduced from 19 to 16.5% and 19
to 10%, excluding the stone crushers, with clarification that electricity
Duty rate with respect to stone crushers will be as notified vide
Notifications dated 01.09.2023 and 18.01.2024.
7. It is argued on behalf of petitioners that Section 11(2) of Act
2009 provides that State Government can revise the rate of electricity
Duty not exceeding 50% at any one time of rate specified under Section 3
of the Act, but vide notification dated 01.09.2023 and subsequent
notification dated 18.01.2024 (Annexure P4 & Annexure P5), respondents
have increased electricity Duty more than 50% as it has been increased,
within a short period of less than five months from 11% to 37.50%.
8. It has been contended that electricity Duty rate notified vide
communication dated 20.07.2017 at 11% could have only been revised
up to 16.5%, i.e., (11% + 5.5%), as per power conferred upon the State
under Section 11(2) of the Act and therefore, being arbitrary and violative
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of the power conferred upon the State, these Notifications deserve to be
quashed.
9. It has been further contended that the State cannot enhance
the electricity Duty within a short span of period about 5-6 months to
justify its increase in electricity Duty by adding 50% every time. In
alternative, it has been contended that even if presumed that respondents
had power to enhance electricity Duty within a short interval of time, then
also, vide notification dated 01.09.2023, it could have been only 11 to
16.5% and ,thereafter, further enhancement of 50% of 16.5% and in this
manner, it would have been 16.5%+8.25% = 24.75% and on this count
also, it has been contended that impugned Notifications deserve to be
quashed.
10. It has been also contended that Section 11(2) is a perfect
example of vague, unbridled, and unguided power conferred upon the
department to enhance the electricity rate without specifying the period of
interval.
11. It has been further canvassed that petitioners' industrial units
fall in category of large industrial consumers above 100 KW, and in
original notification of rate of Duty in Section 3, they were kept in one
category in Section 3(1)(v)(c) and the electricity Duty on all large
industrial consumers, (above 100 KW connected load) was fixed at
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uniform electricity Duty @ 20% in the year 2009 and in communication
dated 20.07.2017 also, petitioners' stone crusher industrial units were
included in large industrial consumers above 100 KW connected load and
supply voltage not exceeding 33 KV and uniform rate of electricity duty
was fixed at the rate of 11%. However, in notification dated 01.09.2023,
large industries have been again bifurcated in sub-categories and
cement, stone crusher and industrial units carrying business of cement,
stone crusher, and mining query were excluded from large industries and
different rate of electricity Duty was notified chargeable to large
industries, except cement, stone crusher, mines, query, at the rate of
19%, and in case of cement industries, stone crusher, and mines at the
rate of 25%, which is evident from Notification 01.09.2023 (Annexure P-
4), at serial (v)(ii)(iii).
12. It is argued on behalf of petitioners that Section 3 or Section
11 of the Act 2009 does not confer any power on the State to sub-
categorize the categories originally notified under Section 3 of the Act,
and, therefore, segregation of stone crushers from large industries of the
same category is also impermissible under law, being an act done
exceeding the jurisdiction/power conferred upon the State Government by
the Act.
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13. Further grievance raised on behalf of petitioners is that
though vide notification dated 18.09.2024 (Annexure P7 and P8), rates of
electricity duty with respect to large industrial consumers were reduced
from 19 to 16.5% and 19 to 10%, but again, industrial units running
business of stone crusher above 100 KW, availing powers at 11 KW and
22 KW, were excluded by segregating similar large industrial consumers
with 100 KW availing power at 11 KW and 12 KW in different categories.
According to learned counsel, aforesaid omission and commission on the
part of respondents are arbitrary, unconstitutional, and violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India and prayer has been made to quash the
impugned notifications, directing respondent No. 1 to grant the benefit of
reduction of electricity duty like other large industrial power consumers in
the State of Himachal Pradesh with further direction to respondents to
refund or adjust the excess electricity duty charged or collected from the
petitioners industrial units, which has been deposited by them under
compulsion, but with protest.
14. It has been contended on behalf of petitioners that stone
crusher units have not been specifically categorized a separate industry
unit by HP Electricity Regulatory Commission for the purpose of levying
duty, nor there was any special category assigned to stone crusher units
and as such, electricity Duty as was levievable to other large industry
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consumers shall be levievable to stone crusher industry also and sub-
categorization of stone crushers is not permissible for the State,
particularly when power for classification of consumers vests with HP
Electricity Regulatory Commission under Clause 2.3 in Chapter-II in H.P.
Electricity Supply Code, 2009.
15. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners
that under Section 50 of Electricity Act, 2003, State Commission has
been authorized to specify an Electricity Supply Code for recovery of
charges, intervals for billing of electricity charges etc. and as in
consonance to Section 50 and Section 181(2)(x) of Electricity Act, 2003,
the Himachal Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission has notified HP
Electricity Supply Code, 2009, on 26.05.2009 and as per Chapter II, Rule
2.3, "Classification, tariff and other conditions of supply applicable to each
consumer category shall be fixed by the Commission from time to time
under tariff order” and, therefore, it has been contended that separation of
category of stone crushers from Large Power Industrial Consumers is
beyond the competency of the respondents.
16. Clause 2.3 of H.P. Electricity Code, 2009 referred by counsel
for petitioners provides classification of consumers, which reads as under.
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“ 2.3 Classification of Consumer
The classification, tarrif and other conditions of supply applicable to
each consumer category shall be as fixed by the Commission from time
to time in the Tarrif Order”
17. Clause 1.2.46 of Chapter-I of Himachal Pradesh Electricity
Code, 2009 defines Tariff Order as under:-
“1.2.46 “Tarrif Order” means the order issued from time to time by the
Commission on annual aggregate revenue requirement and retail tariff for the
licensee and consumers respectively.”
18. Section 50 of Electricity Act, 2003 reads as under:-
“ 50. The Electricity Supply Code .-The State Commission shall specify an
Electricity Supply Code to provide for recovery of electricity charges, intervals
for billing of electricity charges, disconnection of supply of electricity for non-
payment thereof, restoration of supply of electricity, measures for preventing
tampering, distress or damage to electrical plant or electrical line or meter,
entry of distribution licensee or any person acting on his behalf for
disconnecting supply and removing the meter, entry for replacing, altering or
maintaining electric lines or electrical plants or meter and such other matters.”
19. Almost identical stand has been taken by both respondents,
i.e., respondent No. 1-State of HP as well as respondent No. 2, H.P.
State Electricity Board (in short ‘Board).
20. It has been stated that petitions are liable to be dismissed, as
challenge has been laid to the fiscal and legislative policy decision of the
State, which is beyond the scope of judicial review, except in cases where
Fundamental Constitutional Rights are violated or gross arbitrariness is
demonstrated for well-established principle of law that Courts should not
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interfere in matters relating to economic and fiscal policy unless there is
apparent violation of fundamental rights or constitutional provisions.
21. It has been contended by learned Advocate General that
impugned notification, increasing the electricity duty from 25% up to
37.50% for stone crusher is a valid exercise of State's power under Act
2009, as it has been levied with objective of generating necessary
revenue for infrastructure development, which is a lawful exercise of
power, squarely within the scope of authority vested in the State by the
legislature, as the amount recovered by way of revised electricity duty will
be used for funding Government initiatives for generating necessary
revenue for infrastructure development in the State and the rates of
electricity duty have been revised in consonance with fundamental rights
and to fulfill the objective enshrined under Articles 47 and 48 of the
Constitution.
22. It has been contended by learned Advocate General that
authority to impose and revise electricity duty, in terms of provisions of
Act 2009, clearly vests in the Government of Himachal Pradesh and
power to levy such duty is within legislative competence of the State and
the subject of electricity falls under Entry 38 in Concurrent List-III of VII
Schedule of Constitution of India and, therefore, challenge laid to
impugned Notifications is completely misplaced and misrepresented.
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23. It has been contended that levy of electricity Duty does not
amount to an unconstitutional interference with the right of business or
livelihood of the petitioners. It has been submitted that there is a rational
and well-founded classification for segregating stone crushers from the
other large industrial consumers, because stone crushers are heavy
electricity consuming entities and their operations have a significant
impact on both power consumption and environment and, therefore, for
high consumption level of energy and environmental cost associated with
their operation, decision to impose a higher duty on stone crushers is
justified.
24. It has been further submitted by learned Advocate General
that fiscal policy decisions often involve differentiated treatment of
industries based on their consumption pattern, environmental impact, or
public resources they utilize, and therefore, such classification is valid as
it is based on intelligible differentia , having reasonable nexus to the object
sought to be achieved, which in this case is equitable revenue generation
and sustainable power infrastructure development.
25. Learned Advocate General has submitted that fiscal
measures are presumed to be in public interest and constitutional, and
petitioners have failed to discharge burden to demonstrate otherwise and,
therefore, impugned notifications cannot be held arbitrary or violative of
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constitutional provisions, particularly keeping in view the consistent stand
of the Courts that economic and fiscal policy should not be interfered with
unless there is a clear violation of constitutional mandate.
26. It has also been canvassed by learned Advocate General
that creation of sub-category of stone crusher, vide Notification dated
01.09.2023 is a policy decision of the State, which is within the scope of
Electricity Duty Act, 2009 and it does not violate or conflict with earlier
order as it applies to a different classification made under different factual
and policy considerations.
27. It has been further submitted by learned Advocate General
that before sub-categorization, stone crushers were levied with electricity
duty as per their categorization under medium and large industrial
consumers, based on the requirement of supply of electricity. However,
keeping in view the nature of business, high consumption of electricity
duty and impact on the environment, all stone crushers have been put in
one and the same category, so as to treat all stone crushers and mines
as a one and same category and it is a intelligible differentia for sub-
classification of stone crushers by excluding them from the other
industries.
28. It has been submitted by learned Advocate General that in
absence of express power to create sub-category or revise the categories
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in various consumers including industrial units, such power can be
considered to have been vested in the State in view of Section 21 of
General Clauses Act, and in terms of the provisions of the said Section of
General Clauses Act, respondent-State is competent to revise, redefine
or redetermine the categories provided under Section 3(1) for the purpose
of determining the electricity Duty to be levied upon them, depending
upon the nature, class and category of the consumer and it also includes
to further bifurcate industrial units into large, medium, or small industries
as well as to segregate stone crushers from other industries for the
purpose of determining the rate of Duty to be levied upon them.
29. Learned counsel for the petitioners to substantiate their plea
that in absence of express power for sub-categorization, segregation of
stone crusher for determining electricity Duty under Section 3 of Act,
2009, from other industrial units is not permissible, have placed reliance
upon pronouncement of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs.
Ajay Singh and Others, reported in ( 1993) 1 SCC 302 , by referring
following paragraph.
“ 26 . It is common ground before us that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act
can be invoked only if, and to the extent, if any, the context and the
scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act so permits. The general power
in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is “to add to, amend, vary or
rescind any notification” etc. In the context of reconstitution of the
Commission, the power to fill any vacancy in the office of a member of the
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Commission is expressly provided in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the
Commission of Inquiry Act. Similarly, the power to discontinue the
existence of the Commission when it becomes unnecessary can be
exercised by issue of a notification in accordance with Section 7 of the Act
which results in rescinding the notification issued under Section 3
constituting the Commission. Thus, the power to rescind any notification
conferred generally in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is clearly
inapplicable in the scheme to the Commissions of Inquiry Act which
expressly provides for the exercise of this power in relation to a
Commission constituted under Section of the Act. The only material
remaining general powers in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act are
the power to “amend” or “vary” any notification. The extent to which the
constitution of the Commission can be amended or varied by filling any
vacancy in the office of a member as provided in the Commissions of
Inquiry Act is also obviously excluded from the purview of Section 21 of
the General Clauses Act which cannot be invoked for this purpose.
27. The surviving question, therefore, is: Whether there is power to
reconstitute the Commission by replacement or substitution of the existing
member, though not provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act by
invoking the residuary power to amend or vary any notification under
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act? In the first place, in a case like the
present where the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act does
provide for amendment and variation of the notification issued under
Section 3 for the purpose of reconstitution of the Commission in the
manner indicated, even that power to amend or vary any notification by
virtue of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act must be taken as
excluded by clear implication in the sphere of reconstitution of the
Commission. Moreover, the power to amend or vary cannot include the
power to replace or substitute the existing composition of the Commission
with an entirely new composition. Shri Shanti Bhushan submitted that the
time specified in the initial notification for completing the task of the
Commission is enlarged by subsequent notification and this is done in
exercise of the general power available under the General Clauses Act to
extend time. This submission does not support the argument of learned
counsel that the general power under Section 21 of the General Clauses
Act is also available to reconstitute the Commission by replacement or
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substitution of its sole member. The aid of Section 21 of the general
Clauses Act for enlargement of time does not conflict with the context or
scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
28. The context as well as the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,
1952 clearly indicate that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
cannot be invoked to enlarge the Government’s power to reconstitute the
Commission constituted under Section 3 of the Act in a manner other than
that expressly provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act. There being no
express power given by the Commissions of Inquiry Act to the appropriate
Government to reconstitute the Commission of Inquiry constituted under
Section 3 of the Act by replacement or substitution of its sole member and
the existence of any such power being negatived by clear implication, no
such power can be exercised by the appropriate Government. The
scheme of the enactment is that the appropriate Government should have
no control over the Commission after its constitution under Section 3 of
the Act except for the purpose of filling any vacancy which may have
arisen in the office of a member of the Commission apart from winding up
the Commission by issuance of a notification under Section 7 of the Act if
the continued existence of the Commission is considered unnecessary.
The vacancy in the office of a member of the Commission may arise for
several reasons, including resignation by the member, when the
Government’s power to fill the vacancy under Section 3(3) of the Act can
be exercised. Even though a case of implied resignation creating an
implied vacancy was set up by the State of Madhya Pradesh before the
High Court, that stand was rightly abandoned before us by Shri Shanti
Bhushan.”
30. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that basic
rule of literal and strict construction of the Act is also applicable in present
case and the power, which has not been conferred under Section 3 of the
Act or any other provision of the Act, cannot be construed to have been
vested in the State by referring Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
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31. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of
the Apex Court in B. Premanand and Others vs. Mohan Koikal and
Others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 266 , by referring following paragraphs:-
“24. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no
interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without
distorting or twisting its language. We may mention here that the literal
rule of interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is
also followed by the lay man in his ordinary life. To give an illustration, if a
person says "this is a pencil", then he means that it is a pencil; and it is
not that when he says that the object is a pencil, he means that it is a
horse, donkey or an elephant. In other words, the literal rule of
interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and we say what
we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will
become impossible, and we will not understand each other. If we say that
a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it is a book,
but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to
communicate with each other. Life will become impossible. Hence, the
meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we
say and we say what we mean.
25. In this connection, we may also refer to the Mimansa Rules of
Interpretation which were our traditional principles of interpretation used
for thousand of years by our jurists. It is deeply regrettable that in our law
courts today these principles are not cited. Today, our so called educated
people are largely ignorant about the great intellectual achievements of
our ancestors, and the intellectual treasury which they have bequeathed
to us. The Mimansa Rules of Interpretation are one of these great
achievements, but regrettably they are hardly ever used in our law courts.
26. It may be mentioned that it is not stated anywhere in the Constitution of
India that only Maxwell's Principles of Interpretation can be utilised. We
can utilise any system of interpretation which can help to resolve a
difficulty. Principles of interpretation are not principles of law but are only a
methodology for explaining the meaning of words used in a text. There is
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no reason why we should not use Mimansa Principles of Interpretation in
appropriate occasions.
27. In Mimansa, the literal rule of interpretation is known as the “Shruti” or
“Abhida” principle. This is illustrated by the Garhapatya nyaya (in
Mimansa Maxims are known as “nyayas”). There is the vedic verse:
"Aindrya garhapatyam upatishthate", which means "by the Mantra
addressed to Indra establish the household fire”. This verse can possibly
have several meanings viz. (1) worship Indra (2) worship Garhapatya (the
household fire), (3) worship both, or (4) worship either. However, since the
word “garhapatyam” is in the objective case, the verse has only one
meaning, that is, “worship garhapatya”. The word “aindrya” means “by
Indra”, and hence the verse means that by verses dedicated to Indra one
should worship garhapatya. The word “aindrya” in this verse is a Linga, (in
Mimansa Linga means the suggestive power of a word), while the words
“garhapatyam ppatishthate” are the shruti. According to the Mimansa
principles, the shruti (literal meaning) will prevail over the linga (suggestive
power).
28. It is not necessary to go into details, but reference can be made to the
Book Mimansa Rules of Interpretation by K.L.Sarkar which is a collection
of Tagore Law Lectures delivered by him in 1909. According to the
Mimansa Principles, the Shruti Principle or literal rule of interpretation will
prevail over all other principles, e.g., Linga, Vakya, Prakarana, Sthana,
Samakhya etc.”
32. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of petitioners on
judgment of the Apex Court in Industrial Infrastructure Development
Corporation (Gwalior) Madhya Pradesh Limited vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2018) 4 SCC 494 ,
to substantiate the plea that general power under Section 21 of General
Clauses Act has to be understood in the light of subject matter, context
and the effect of relevant provisions of the statute under which
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Notification or order is issued and the power is not available after an
enforceable right has accrued under Notification or order with further
submissions that in present case once the stone crushers have been
treated like other industrial units, cannot be sub-categorized in absence of
any express power vested in the State to sub-categorize or redefine the
categories of industrial units.
33. To substantiate the plea that in absence of power to enhance
more than 50% of electricity duty, the respondents have no authority to
impose/levy electricity duty, as has been imposed under impugned
Notifications dated 01.09.2023 and 18.01.2024 (Annexures P-4 and
Annexure P-5), reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the
petitioners on judgment of the Apex Court in Bimal Chandra Banerjee
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh etc., reported in 1970 (2) SCC 467 , by
referring following paragraph…
“13. No tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the
statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially
authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can
be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred
by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rule making authority. A rule
making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of
the power granted to it.”
34. It has been submitted on behalf petitioners that where there
is no express power for imposition of fee or tax more than 50%, the
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respondents could not have done so. Reliance has been placed on paras
6 and 7 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Ahmedabad Urban
Development Authority vs. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla
and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 2038 , which read as under:-
“6. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr.
Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to
hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority
can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or
fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of
implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that
the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the
authority delegated to it under Act and it will not be proper to bring the
theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in
the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the
case of District Council of Jowai, (AIR 1986 SC 1930) are entirely
different. The exercise of powers by the Autonomous Jaintia Hills
Districts are controlled by the constitutional provisions and in the special
facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee
for the a specific purpose by the autonomous District was justified and
such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable in
the facts of this case or the same should not be held to have laid down
any legal proposition that in matters of imposition of tax or fees, the
question of necessary intendment may be looked into when there is no
express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in
Khargram Panchayat Samiti's case, (1987 (3) SCC 82) also deal with
the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of
administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of
imposing tax and fee.
7. The High Court has referred to the decisions of this Court in Hingir's
case, (AIR 1961 SC 459) and Jagannath Ramanuj's case (AIR 1954 SC
400) and Delhi Municipal Corporation's case (AIR 1983 SC 617) (supra).
It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is
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compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for
the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and
nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used.
We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goswami.
Accordingly, there is no occasion to interfere with the impugned decision
of the High Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no
order as to costs.”
35. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also placed reliance
on paras 12 and 13 of judgment passed by the Apex Court in Kunj
Behari Lal Butail and Others vs. State of H.P. and Others, reported in
(2000) 3 SCC 40 , relevant portion whereof is as under:-
“12. The Government while framing rules under the Bihar Money Lenders
Act, 1938 fixed the upper limit for the loans which the money lenders
could lend though the Act nowhere provided for the fixing of such upper
limit. In Sant Saran Lal v. Parsuram Soha , AIR (1966) SC 1852 it was
held that the rule making power of the Government does not extend to
the fixing of such a limit as it was not empowered by the Act.
13. It is very common for the legislature to provide for a general rule making
power to carry out the purpose of the Act. When such a power is given, it
may be permissible to find out the object of the enactment and then see
if the rules framed satisfy the test of having been so framed as to fall
within the scope of such general power confirmed. If the rule making
power is not expressed in such a usual general form then it shall have to
be seen if the rules made are protected by the limits prescribed by the
parent Act, (See : Sant Saran Lal & Anr. v. Parsuram Sahu AIR 1966 SC
1852. From the provisions of the Act we cannot spell out any legislative
intent delegating expressly, or by necessary implication, the power to
enact any prohibition on transfer of land. We are also in agreement with
the submission of Shri Anil Divan that by placing complete prohibition on
transfer of land subservient to tea estates no purpose sought to be
achieved by the Act is advanced so also such prohibition cannot be
sustained. Land forming part of tea estate including land sub-servient to
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tea plantation have been placed beyond the ken of the Act. Such land is
not to be taken in account either for calculating area of surplus land or for
calculating area of land which a person may retain as falling within
ceiling limit. We fail to understand how a restriction on transfer of such
land is going to carry out any purpose of the Act. We are fortified in
taking such view by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India Ors., [1981] 1 SCC
166 whereby sub-section (1) of section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 was struck down as invalid insofar as it
imposed a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a
building or a portion only of such building which was within the ceiling
area. The provision impugned therein imposed a restriction on
transactions by way of sale, mortgage, gift or lease of vacant land or
buildings for a period exceeding ten years, or otherwise for a period of
ten years from the date of the commencement of the Act even though
such vacant land, with or without building thereon, fell within the ceiling
limits. The Constitution Bench held (by majority) that such property will
be transferable without the constraints mentioned in sub-section (1) of
Section 27 of the said Act. Their Lordships opined that the right to carry
on a business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
carried with it the right not to carry on business. It logically followed, as a
necessary corollary, that the right to acquire, hold and dispose of
property guaranteed to citizens under Article 19(l)(f) carried within it the
right not to hold any property. It is difficult to appreciate how could a
citizen be compelled to own property against his will though he wanted to
alienate it and the land being within the ceiling limits was outside the
purview of section 3 of the Act and that being so the person owning the
land was not governed by any of the provisions of the Act. Reverting
back to the case at hand, the learned counsel for the State of Himachal
Pradesh has not been able to satisfy us as to how such a prohibition as
is imposed by the impugned amendment in the Rules helps in achieving
the object of the Act.”
36. By referring paragraph 21 of judgment of the Apex Court in
Union of India and Others vs. S. Srinivasan, reported in 2012 (7) SCC
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683 , learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that power of
authority cannot be exercised beyond the scope of power conferred by
the Statute and in case power is exercised beyond the scope of
provisions of the Act, the exercise of such power becomes ultra vires, as
the exercise of power must be in consonance of the provisions of the Act,
because the basic test is to determine and consider the source of power,
which is relatable to exercise of such power and, therefore, it has been
contended that Notifications, which are not in accordance with provisions
of the Statute, are not sustainable.
37. Learned Advocate General, to substantiate the plea that
present petitions are not maintainable and liable to be dismissed, has
placed reliance on judgment passed by the Apex Court in Raja
Jagannath Baksh Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another,
reported in AIR 1962 SC 1563 by referring para 21, which reads as
under:-
“21. That leaves one more question to be considered. Mr. Goyal argues that
the Act is confiscatory in (character and must be struck down as being a
colorable piece of legislation, and in support. of this argument he
suggests that the rates prescribed by the Schedule are so heavy that the
assessees would virtually have to part with their properties within a short
time in order to bear the burden of the tax. This plea raises the question
as to whether a taxing statute can be challenged on the ground that the
burden of tax imposed by it is unreasonably high or excessive. We have
already seen that the provisions of Art. 31(2) cannot be invoked in
challenging the validity of a taxing statute on the ground that the tax
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levied is unreasonably high and we have also noticed that if the taxing
statute does not contravene any other fundamental right guaranteed by
part III, it would normally be treated as a valid law by whose authority tax
can be collected without infringing Art. 31(1). Though the validity of a
taxing statute cannot be challenged merely on the ground that it imposes
an unreasonably high burden, it does not follow that a taxing statute
cannot be challenged on the ground that it is a colourable piece of
legislation and as such, is a fraud on the legislative power conferred on
the Legislature in question. If, in fact, it is shown that the Act which
purports to be a taxing Act is a colourable exercise of the legislative
power of the Legislature, then that would be an independent ground on
which the Act can be struck down. Colourable exercise of legislative
power is not a legitimate exercise of the said power and as such, it may
be open to challenge. But such a challenge can succeed not merely by
showing that the tax levied is unreasonably high or excessive, but by
proving other relevant circumstances which justify the conclusion that the
statute is colourable and as such, amounts to a fraud.”
38. Learned Advocate General has also placed reliance on the
judgment of Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhola
Nath Sharma (dead) by Lrs and Others , reported in (2011) 2 SCC 54 ,
by referring following paras:-
“25. The definition of the expressions "local authority" and "person interested"
are inclusive and not exhaustive. The difference between exhaustive and
inclusive definitions has been explained in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G.
College of Technology (1995) Supp 2 SCC 348 in the following words:
(SCC p. 356, para 19)
“19 …..A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by
using the word `means' or the word `includes'. Sometimes the words
`means and includes' are used. The use of the word `means'
indicates that "definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other
meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in
definition". (See : Gough v. Gough (1891) 2 QB 665 (CA) Punjab
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Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682, SCC p. 717, para 72. ) The
word `includes' when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression
defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify
according to their natural import but also those things which the
clause declares that they shall include. The words "means and
includes", on the other hand, indicate "an exhaustive explanation of
the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be
attached to these words or expressions". [See: Dilworth v.
Commissioner of Stamps 1899 AC 99 (Lord Watson); Mahalakshmi
Oil Mills v. State of A.P. (1989 1 SCC 164, SCC p. 170 para 11] The
use of the words "means and includes" in Rule 2 (b) would,
therefore, suggest that the definition of `college' is intended to be
exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational
institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2 (b) and other
educational institutions are not comprehended. Insofar as
engineering colleges are concerned, their exclusion may be for the
reason that the opening and running of the private engineering
colleges are controlled through the Board of Technical Education
and Training and the Director of Technical Education in accordance
with the directions issued by the AICTE from time to time."
26. In Bharat Cooperative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Employees Union (2007) 4
SCC 685, this Court again considered the difference between the
inclusive and exhaustive definitions and observed: (SCC p. 695, para 23)
“23 …..When in the definition clause given in any statute the word
"means" is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively.
When the word "means" is used in the definition it is a "hard-and-
fast" definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the
definition can be assigned to the same. On the other hand, when the
word "includes" is used in the definition, the legislature does not
intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative
but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its
ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it
matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise.
Therefore, the use of the word "means" followed by the word
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"includes" in the definition of "banking company" in Section 2(bb) of
the ID Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the
definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies
which fall within the purview of the definition and no other."
39. By referring pronouncement of Apex Court in State of A.P.
vs National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. and Others, reported in
2002 5 SCC 203 , learned Advocate General has submitted that a grant of
power in general terms, standing by itself would, no doubt, be construed
in wider sense, but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the
same enactment by the application of context and even by considerations
arising out of what appears to be general scheme of the Act, with further
submissions that power to define categories and revise the classification
of categories in the Act 2009, has to be seen in the light of the Scheme of
the Act, which empowers the State to levy different rate of electricity duty
on different kind of consumers. Relevant paras referred by learned
Advocate General read as under:
“List II, Entries 53 and 54, how to be read
22. We now come to the question on the interpretation of Entry 53 in List II of
Seventh Schedule. It provides for taxes on the consumption or sale of
electricity. The word 'sale' as occurring in Entry 52 came up for the
consideration of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing
Co.India Ltd. Vs. The Belgaum Borough Municipality 1963 Supp.(2) SCR
216. It was held that the act of sale is merely the means for putting the
goods in the way of use or consumption. It is an earlier stage, the
ultimate destination of the goods being "use or consumption". We feel
that the same meaning should be assigned to the word 'sale' in Entry 53.
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This is for a fortiorari reason in the context of electricity as there can be
no sale of electricity excepting by its consumption, for it can neither be
preserved nor stored. It is this property of electricity which persuaded this
Court in Indian Aluminium Co. case to hold that in the context of
electricity, the word 'supply' should be interpreted to include sale or
consumption of electricity. Entry 53 should therefore be read as “taxes
on the consumption or sale for consumption of electricity”.
23. With these two things in mind, namely, that electricity is goods, and that
sale of electricity has to be construed and read as sale for consumption
within the meaning of Entry 53, the conflict, if any, between Entry 53and
Entry 54 ceases to exist and the two can be harmonized and read
together. Because electricity is goods it is covered in Entry 54 also. It is
not disputed that duty on electricity is tax. Tax on the sale or purchase of
goods including electricity but excluding newspapers shall fall within
Entry 54 and shall be subject to provisions of Entry 92A of List I. Taxes
on the consumption or sale for consumption of electricity within the
meaning of Entry 53 must be consumption within the State and not
beyond the territory of the State. Any other sale of electricity shall
continue to be subject to the limits provided by Entry 54. Even purchase
of electricity would be available for taxation which it would not be if
electricity was not includible in the meaning of the term “goods”. A piece
of legislation need not necessarily fall within the scope of one entry
alone; more than one entry may overlap to cover the subject-matter of a
single piece of legislation. A bare consumption of electric energy even by
one who generates the same may be liable to be taxed by reference to
Entry 53 and if the State Legislature may choose to impose tax on
consumption of electricity by the one who generates it, such tax would
not be deemed to be a tax necessarily on manufacture or production or a
duty of excise, as held by Constitution Bench in Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills
Ltd., Birlanagar, Gwalior Vs. State of M.P. 1962 Supp.(1) SCR 282. A
mere consumption of goods (other than electricity), not accompanied by
purchase or sale would not be taxable under Entry 54 because it does
not provide for taxes on the consumption and Entry 53 does not speak of
goods other than electricity. Thus in substance Entries 53 and 54 can be
and must be read together and to the extent of sale of electricity for
consumption outside the State, the electricity being goods, shall also be
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subject to provisions of Entry 92A of List I. This, in our opinion, is the
best way of reading the two entries. In C.P. Motor Spirit Act re ., AIR 1939
FC 131, it was held that two entries in the lists may overlap and
sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is
then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about
harmony between them. The Court should strive at searching for
reasonable and practical construction to seek reconciliation and give
effect to all of them. If reconciliation proves impossible the overriding
power of Union Legislature operates and prevails. Gwyer, C.J. observed:
(AIR p. 7)
"A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would
no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified
by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the
implication of the context, and even by considerations arising out
of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act."
And again he said” AIR p. 8)
"[A]n endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial
Committee have said, by having recourse to the context and
scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two
apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries
together and by interpreting, and, where necessary, modifying the
language of the one by that of the other. If needed such a
reconciliation should prove impossible, then and only then, will
the non-obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail."
In Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. The State of W.B. , 1962 Supp (3)
SCR 1, the Constitution Bench has held that the same rules of
construction apply for the purpose of harmonizing an apparent
conflict between two entries in the same list.”
40. By referring paras 53 to 62 of the pronouncement of the Apex
Court in Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Electricity
Inspector & ETIO and Others, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 447 , it has
been contended that the Act 2009 is a valid Act and, therefore, by virtue
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of powers conferred under Sections 3 and 11(2) of Act 2009, the
impugned Notifications cannot be held overstepping of limits of power
conferred upon the State in issuing the impugned Notifications. Referred
paras are as under:-
Constitutional scheme and the vires issue
“53. Article 245 of the Constitution of India vests the Parliament with power of
legislation on all matters enumerated in List I and also the matters
enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of
India. The State Legislature, however, has the exclusive right to legislate
matters specified in the Entries contained in List II.
54. Federal supremacy no doubt recognizes that the State's power to
legislate with regard to any matters in List III would be subject to any Act
of the Parliament; however, Clause (3) of Article 246 of the Constitution
of India gives the legislature of the State an exclusive power with respect
to any matters in List II, subject to restriction imposed in the entry itself,
as for example, Entries 1, 2, 12, 13, 17, 22, 23, 24, 32 and 33. Entry 53
of List II does not contain any such restriction and has not been made
subject to any of the entry made in List I or List III.
55. Various entries in the three Lists provide for the fields of legislation. They
are, therefore, required to be given a liberal construction inspired by a
broad and generalize spirit and not in a pedantic manner. A clear
distinction is provided for in the scheme of the Lists of the Seventh
Schedule between the general subjects of legislation and heads of
taxation. They are separately enumerated. Taxation is treated as a
distinct matter for purposes of legislative competence vis-`-vis the
general entries. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 248 of the Constitution of
India also manifests the aforementioned nature of the entries of the List,
and, thus, the matter relating to taxation has been separately set out.
The power to impose tax ordinarily would not be deduced from a general
entry as an ancillary power. In List II, entries 1 to 44 form one group
providing for the legislative competence of the State on subjects
specified therein, whereas entries 45 to 63 form another group dealing
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with taxation. We, however, do not mean to suggest that in regard to the
validity of a taxation statute, the same, by itself, would be a determinative
factor as in a case where the Parliament may legislate an enactment
under several entries, one of them being a tax entry.
56. A bare perusal of Entry 53 of List II and Entry 38 of List III, however,
clearly suggests that they are meant to operate in different fields.
57. In National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd, (2002) 5 SCC 203, this Court has
clearly held that: (SCC p. 225, para 26)
"The power of the State Legislature to enact law to levy tax by
reference to List II of the Seventh Schedule has two limitations:
one, arising out of the entry itself, and the other, flowing from the
restriction embodied in the Constitution."
Entry 53 does not contain any such restriction and, thus, Clause (3) of
Article 254 of the Constitution of India will have no application in the
instant case.
58. Legislative competence of the State of Tamil Nadu to legislate the
impugned Act is beyond any dispute. It cannot, therefore, be said that
the State's action in enacting the Act suffers from colourable exercise of
any power. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the State has not over-
stepped its limits of power. [See K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo and Others
v. The State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1 and R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer,
Gujarat and Others v. Ajit Mills Limited and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 98]
59. In the decision of this Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1962 SC 1563], it has been held: (AIR p. 1572, para
21)
“21... Though the validity of a taxing statute cannot be challenged
merely on the ground that it imposes an unreasonably high burden,
it does not follow that a taxing statute cannot be challenged on the
ground that it is a colourable piece of legistation and as such, is a
fraud on the legislative power conferred on the legislature in
question. If, in fact, it is shown that the Act which purports to be a
taxing Act is a colourable exercise of the legislative power of the
legislature, then that would be an independent ground on which the
Act can be struck down. Colourable exercise of legislative power is
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not a legitimate exercise of the said power and as such, it may be
open to challenge. But such a challenge can succeed not merely
by showing that the tax levied is unreasonably high or excessive,
but by proving other relevant circumstances which justify the
conclusion that the statute is colourable and as such, amounts to a
fraud."
60. Entry 53 of List II provides for a taxation entry; whereas Entry 38 of List
III provides for a non-taxation entry dealing with general aspects of
electricity excluding taxation. The 1998 Act empowers the Commission
only to fix the electricity tariff or the charges for consumption of
electricity. The legislation made by the State is independent of actual
tariff of electricity charges. Tariff would mean a cartel of commerce and
normally it is a book of rates.[BSES Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 195, SCC at p.
208)
61. Article 254 deals with methods of resolving conflict between the law
made by the Parliament and law made by the State in respect of the
matters enumerated in the concurrent list. In M.P. Vidyut Karamchari
Sangh v. M.P. Electricity Board [(2004) 9 SCC 755], it was held: (SCC p.
767, para 28)
“28 Recourse to the said principles, however, would be resorted to
only when there exists direct conflict between two provisions and
not otherwise. Once it is held that the law made by Parliament and
the State Legislature occupy the same field, the subsequent
legislation made by the State which had received the assent of the
President of India indisputably would prevail over the parliamentary
Act when there exists direct conflict between two enactments. Both
the laws would ordinarily be allowed to have their play in their own
respective fields. However, in the event there does not exist any
conflict, the parliamentary Act or the State Act shall prevail over the
other depending upon the fact as to whether the assent of the
President has been obtained therefor or not. (See Bharat Hydro
Power Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Assam)"
62. The 2003 Act is, thus, not repugnant to the 1948 (sic 1998) Act.”
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41. It would also be relevant to refer following paras of
pronouncement of Apex Court passed in Authorized Officer, Central
Bank of India vs. S. Shanmugavelu, reported in 2024 (6) SCC 641 ,
which read as under:-
“94 The principle of "reading down" a provision refers to a legal interpretation
approach where a court, while examining the validity of a statute,
attempts to give a narrowed or restricted meaning to a particular
provision in order to uphold its constitutionality. This principle is rooted in
the idea that courts should make every effort to preserve the validity of
legislation and should only declare a law invalid as a last resort.
95. When a court encounters a provision that, if interpreted according to its
plain and literal meaning, might lead to constitutional or legal issues, the
court may opt to read down the provision. Reading down involves
construing the language of the provision in a manner that limits its scope
or application, making it consistent with constitutional or legal principles.
96. The rationale behind the principle of reading down is to avoid striking
down an entire legislation. Courts generally prefer to preserve the intent
of the legislature and the overall validity of a law by adopting an
interpretation that addresses the specific constitutional concerns without
invalidating the entire statute.
97. It is a judicial tool used to salvage the constitutionality of a statute by
giving a provision a narrowed or limited interpretation, thereby mitigating
potential conflicts with constitutional or legal principles.
98. In B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in (1999) 9 SCC 700,
this Court observed that the principles such as “Reading Down” emerge
from the concern of the courts towards salvaging a legislation to ensure
that its intended objectives are achieved. The relevant observations read
as under: - (SCC pp. 764-64, para 81)
“81.. It is also well settled that first attempt should be made by the
courts to uphold the charged provision and not to invalidate it
merely because one of the possible interpretations leads to such a
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result, howsoever attractive it may be. Thus, where there are two
possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the other
upholding, the latter should be adopted. For this, the courts have
been endeavouring, sometimes to give restrictive or expansive
meaning keeping in view the nature of legislation, maybe
beneficial, penal or fiscal etc. Cumulatively it is to subserve the
object of the legislation. Old golden rule is of respecting the
wisdom of legislature that they are aware of the law and would
never have intended for an invalid legislation. This also keeps
courts within their track and checks individual zeal of going
wayward. Yet in spite of this, if the impugned legislation cannot be
saved the courts shall not hesitate to strike it down. Similarly, for
upholding any provision, if it could be saved by reading it down, it
should be done, unless plain words are so clear to be in defiance
of the Constitution. These interpretations spring out because of
concern of the courts to salvage a legislation to achieve its
objective and not to let it fall merely because of a possible
ingenious interpretation. The words are not static but dynamic. This
infuses fertility in the field of interpretation. This equally helps to
save an Act but also the cause of attack on the Act. Here the
courts have to play a cautious role of weeding out the wild from the
crop, of course, without infringing the Constitution. For doing this,
the courts have taken help from the Preamble, Objects, the
scheme of the Act, its historical background, the purpose for
enacting such a provision, the mischief, if any which existed, which
is sought to be eliminated. …” (Emphasis supplied)
99. A similar view was reiterated by this Court in its decision in Calcutta
Gujarati Education Society & Anr. v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn. & Ors.
reported in (2003) 10 SCC 533, wherein this Court observed that the rule
of “Reading Down” is only for the limited purpose of making a provision
workable so as to fulfil the purpose and object of the statute. The
relevant observations read as under: (SCC p. 552, para 35)
“35.The rule of “reading down” a provision of law is now well
recognised. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different
name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing out the
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creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of
“reading down”, however, it is not open to read words and
expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial
legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited
purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in
harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used
keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfil its purposes.”
…” (Emphasis supplied)
100. Thus, the principle of ‘Reading Down” a provision emanates from a very
well settled canon of law, that is, the courts while examining the validity
of a particular statute should always endeavour towards upholding its
validity, and striking down a legislation should always be the last resort.
“Reading Down” a provision is one of the many methods, the court may
turn to when it finds that a particular provision if for its plain meaning
cannot be saved from invalidation and so by restricting or reading it
down, the court makes it workable so as to salvage and save the
provision from invalidation. Rule of “Reading Down” is only for the limited
purpose of making a provision workable and its objective achievable.”
42. Following paras of the judgment of Apex Court in Allahabad
University and Others vs. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) and Others,
reported in 2024 (20) SCC 23 are also relevant to be referred, which read
as under:
“On the principle of reading down
32 Examining the reasons assigned by the High Court for reading down
Regulation 10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations would necessitate an
understanding of what the principle of ‘reading down’ is all about.
Precedents on ‘reading down’ of a provision are legion and only a few of
them are referred to here.
33. In CST v. Radhakrishan (1979) 2 SCC 249, this Court held: (SCC p. 257,
para 15)
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“15. … In considering the validity of a statute the presumption is in
favour of its constitutionality and the burden is upon him who attacks
it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional
principles. For sustaining the presumption of constitutionality the
court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,
matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be conceived. It must always be
presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if
any, is based on adequate grounds. It is well settled that courts will
be justified in giving a liberal interpretation to the section in order to
avoid constitutional invalidity. These principles have given rise to
rule of reading down the sections if it becomes necessary to uphold
the validity of the sections. ” (emphasis supplied)
34. Hon’ble P.B. Sawant, J. (as His Lordship then was) in his concurring
judgment in DDC v. DDT Mazdoor Congress 1991 S9pp (I) SCC 600
captured the rule of “reading down” as follows: (SCC pp. 728-29, para
255)
“255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting
the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used,
firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its
unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two
interpretations are possible — one rendering it constitutional and the
other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The
unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the
legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the
provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons
its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and
ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intentions of the
legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the
provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However,
when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language
and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend
it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and
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conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the court to
remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to
the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the
remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortion that
course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the situations further
where the doctrine can never be called into play is where the statute
requires extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of
the court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its
jurisdiction to do so.” (emphasis supplied)
35. Hon’ble K. Ramaswamy, J. (as His Lordship then was), in a separate
concurring opinion, had the occasion to consider authorities on statutory
interpretation and observed: (DTC Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp (1)
SCC 600, SCC pp. 762-63, paras 323-24 & 326
“323. In Craies Statute Law (7th edn., Chapter 5 at page 64) it is
stated that where the words of an Act are clear, there is no need for
applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely
presumptions in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The safer and
more correct course of dealing with the question of construction is to
take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning
without in the first place referring to cases. Where an ambiguity
arises to supposed intention of the legislature, one of the statutory
constructions, the court propounded, is the doctrine of reading
down. Lord Reid in Federal Steam Navigation Co. v. Department of
Trade and Industry [(1974) 2 All ER 97, 100] (as also extracted by
Cross Statutory Interpretation, Butterworths' edition, 1976 at page
43 in proposition 3) has stated thus:
‘’… the Judge may read in words which he considers to be
necessarily implied by words which are already in the statute
and he has a limited power to add to, alter or ignore statutory
words in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible,
absurd or totally unreasonable, unworkable or totally
irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.’
324. At p. 92 of the Cross Statutory Interpretation, the author has
stated that:
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‘The power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words is an
extremely limited one. Generally speaking it can only be
exercised where there has been a demonstrable mistake on
the part of the draftsman or where the consequence of applying
the words in their ordinary, or discernible secondary, meaning
would be utterly unreasonable. Even then the mistake may be
thought to be beyond correction by the court, or the tenor of the
statute may be such as to preclude the addition of words to
avoid an unreasonable result.’
Therefore, the Doctrine of Reading Down is an internal aid to
construe the words or phrase in statute to give reasonable meaning,
but not to detract, distort or emasculate the language so as to give
the supposed purpose to avoid unconstitutionality.

326. It is, thus, clear that the object of reading down is to keep the
operation of the statute within the purpose of the Act and
constitutionally valid. ” (emphasis supplied)
36. The question of “reading down” a provision arises if it is found that the
provision is ultra vires as it stands. This is the law laid down in
Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. State of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458.
37. An instructive passage is found in B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P.
(1999) 9 SCC 700, reading thus: (SCC pp. 764-65, para 81)
“81. … Thus, where there are two possible interpretations, one
invalidating the law and the other upholding, the latter should be
adopted. For this, the courts have been endeavouring, sometimes to
give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in view the nature of
legislation, may be beneficial, penal or fiscal etc. Cumulatively it is to
subserve the object of the legislation. Old golden rule is of
respecting the wisdom of legislature that they are aware of the law
and would never have intended for an invalid legislation. This also
keeps courts within their track and checks individual zeal of going
wayward. Yet in spite of this, if the impugned legislation cannot be
saved the courts shall not hesitate to strike it down. Similarly, for
upholding any provision, if it could be saved by reading it down, it
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should be done, unless plain words are so clear to be in defiance of
the Constitution. These interpretations spring out because of
concern of the courts to salvage a legislation to achieve its objective
and not to let it fall merely because of a possible ingenious
interpretation. The words are not static but dynamic. This infuses
fertility in the field of interpretation . This equally helps to save an Act
but also the cause of attack on the Act. Here the courts have to play
a cautious role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course,
without infringing the Constitution. For doing this, the courts have
taken help from the Preamble, Objects, the scheme of the Act, its
historical background, the purpose for enacting such a provision, the
mischief, if any which existed, which is sought to be
eliminated……….” (emphasis supplied)
38. In State of Rajasthan v. Sanyam Lodha (2011) 13 SCC 262, this Court
was considering whether absent a challenge to the law/rule, the same
could be read down. Answering in the negative, Hon’ble R. V.
Raveendran, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the bench held:
(SCC p. 269, para 12)
“12. It is true that any provision of an enactment can be read down
so as to erase the obnoxious or unconstitutional element in it or to
bring it in conformity with the object of such enactment. Similarly, a
rule forming part of executive instructions can also be read down to
save it from invalidity or to bring it in conformity with the avowed
policy of the Government. When courts find a rule to be defective or
violative of the constitutional or statutory provision, they tend to save
the rule, wherever possible and practical, by reading it down by a
benevolent interpretation, rather than declare it as unconstitutional
or invalid. But such an occasion did not arise in this case as there
was no challenge to the validity of Rule 5 and the parties were not at
issue on the validity of the said Rule. We are therefore of the view
that in the absence of any challenge to the Relief Fund Rules and an
opportunity to the State Government to defend the validity of Rule 5,
the High Court ought not to have modified or read down the said
Rule.”
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39. Caution has been sounded in Subramanian Swamy v. Raju (2014) 8
SCC 390 in the following words: (SCC p. 420, para 61)
“61. Reading down the provisions of a statute cannot be resorted to
when the meaning thereof is plain and unambiguous and the
legislative intent is clear. The fundamental principle of the ‘reading
down’ doctrine can be summarised as follows. Courts must read the
legislation literally in the first instance. If on such reading and
understanding the vice of unconstitutionality is attracted, the courts
must explore whether there has been an unintended legislative
omission. If such an intendment can be reasonably implied without
undertaking what, unmistakably, would be a legislative exercise, the
Act may be read down to save it from unconstitutionality. The above
is a fairly well-established and well-accepted principle of
interpretation which having been reiterated by this Court time and
again would obviate the necessity of any recall of the huge number
of precedents…”
40. On the question as to whether harshness of a provision could afford
reason for reading down the same, we find that a three-Judge bench of
this Court in Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v, Shanmugavelu
(2024) 6 SCC 641 speaking through Hon’ble J.B. Pardiwala, J. has held
as follows: (SCC pp. 706-707, paras 100-102)
“100. Thus, the principle of ‘Reading Down’ a provision emanates
from a very well-settled canon of law, that is, the courts while
examining the validity of a particular statute should always
endeavour towards upholding its validity, and striking down a
legislation should always be the last resort. “Reading Down” a
provision is one of the many methods, the court may turn to when it
finds that a particular provision if for its plain meaning cannot be
saved from invalidation and so by restricting or reading it down, the
court makes it workable so as to salvage and save the provision
from invalidation. Rule of ‘Reading Down’ is only for the limited
purpose of making a provision workable and its objective
achievable.
101 . The High Court in its impugned order resorted to reading down
Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules not because its plain meaning
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would result in the provision being rendered invalid or unworkable or
the statute’s objective being defeated, but because it would result in
the same harsh consequence of forfeiture of the entire earnest-
money deposit irrespective of the extent of default in payment of
balance amount.
102. However, harshness of a provision is no reason to read down
the same, if its plain meaning is unambiguous and perfectly valid . A
law/rule should be beneficial in the sense that it should suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. The harsh consequence of
forfeiture of the entire earnest-money deposit has been consciously
incorporated by the legislature in Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules
so as to sub-serve the larger object of the SARFAESI Act of timely
resolving the bad debts of the country. The idea behind prescribing
such a harsh consequence is not illusory, it is to attach a legal
sanctity to an auction process once conducted under the SARFAESI
Act from ultimately getting concluded.” (emphasis supplied)
41. Thus, what follows from the above authoritative discussions is this.
Whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a primary
legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it, a presumption of
constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the courts
would ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being
declared ultra vires; however, there could be situations where the
subordinate legislation (like a rule or a regulation) is challenged on the
ground of excessive delegation or is itself violative of the
enabling/primary legislation under which it is framed or even breaches
constitutional guarantees.
42. “Reading down” of a provision is a subsidiary rule of interpretation of
statutes, which the courts tend to employ in situations to save the
subordinate legislation like a rule or a regulation, wherever possible and
practical, by reading it down by a benevolent interpretation, rather than
declaring it as unconstitutional or invalid. However, it has been clarified
that it is to be used sparingly, and in limited circumstances. Additionally,
it is clear that the act of reading down a provision, must be undertaken
only if doing so can keep the operation of the statute “within the purpose
of the Act and constitutionally valid” .
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43. Following paras of the judgment of Apex Court in M/s. Devi
Das Gopal Krishan etc. v. State of Punjab and Others, reported in AIR
1967 Supreme Court 1895 are also relevant to be referred, which read
as under:
“(12) Nor does the decision of this Court in The State of Madras v. Gannon
Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd. lend support to the argument so widely
advanced by the learned counsel. That case has nothing to do with the
fixation of rates of taxes. There section 6(1) of the Madras General
Sales Tax Act, 1939, as amended by Madras Act 25 of 1947, provided
that no tax will be payable on any sale of goods specified in the
schedule to it. Section 6(2) of that Act authorised the State Government
to amend the schedule by notification. The amendment of the Schedule
by the State Government was challenged on the ground that section
6(2) was invalid as it was a delegation of the essential power of
legislation ,of the State Government. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking
for the Court, in rejecting that contention, observed thus :
“Now, the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the
legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating
to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons
on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged
in respect of different classes of goods, and the like."
It is not necessary to scrutinize the correctness of this statement, having
regard to the decisions relied upon, for this Court in 1965-2 SCR 477:
(AIR 1965 SC 1107) accepted it, but made it clear that such a power to
fix the rates must be supported by some reasonable guidance given
under the Act whereunder the said power was conferred. Nor the
observations of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in the said decision speaking
for the minority, lend support to the contentions of the respondents.
13. The decision in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of
Bombay, 1961-1 SCR 341: (AIR 1961 SC 4) raised the question
whether section 6(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
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Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVII of 1948), which enabled the Government to fix
the rent payable by a tenant within the maximum limits prescribed
thereunder, was valid. When it was argued that it was bad because of
excessive delegation, this Court sustained it on the basis of a legislative
policy disclosed by Section 12(3) of the Act.
14. In Union of India v. Messrs. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal, 1960-2 SCR 627:
AIR 1960 SC 475) this Court rejected the contention that caluse 11B of
Iron and Steel (Control of Production & Distribution) Order, 1941,
whereunder the Central Government was authorised to issue notification
fixing the maximum price of steel, was void on the ground of excessive -
delegation, as it found that the said clause only further canalized the
policy disclosed in Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.
15. Further citation is unnecessary, for the principle of excessive delegation
is well settled and the cases are only illustrations of the application of
the said principle. The law on the subject may briefly be stated thus :
“The Constitution confers a power and imposes a duty on the
legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule
of conduct. Obvi- ously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of
another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State,
it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying
aspects of a complex situation.It must necessarily delegate the
working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But
there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An
overbur- dened legislature or one controlled by a powerful
executive may unduly overstep the limits of delegation. It may not
lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and
general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance
of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive
to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for
itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement
of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or
in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a
Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an
impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits.
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But the said liberal on struction should not be carried by the Courts
to the extent of always trying to discover a dormaint or latent
legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on
executive authorities. It is the duty of the Court to strike down
without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the
executive by the legislature.”
See 1961-1 SCR 341 at pp. 356-357: (AIR 1961 SC 4 at pp.11-
12.”
44. Following para of the judgment of Apex Court in Kartar
Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569 is also relevant
to be referred, which reads as under:-
“130. It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws
offend several important values. It is insisted or emphasised that laws
should give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen and also
judges for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. More so
uncertain and undefined words deployed inevitably lead citizens to
"steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked".
45. To consider the plea that power of classification of consumer
is only with HPREC, it would be relevant to refer definition of Tariff Order,
regarding which HPREC is competent for classification of consumer
under Clause 2.3, referred supra .
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46. As per definition of Tariff Order in Clause 1.2.46 in Chapter-I
of Himachal Pradesh Electricity Supply Code, 2009, Tariff Order means
the order issued from time to time by the Commission on annual
aggregate revenue requirement and retail tariff for the licensee and
consumers respectively.
47. The determination of tariff in the tariff order by the Electricity
Regulatory Commission is a cost/charge payable by the consumers for
purchasing electricity for its consumption, whereas tariff is determined by
Regulatory Commission under HP Electricity Supply Code, 2009 read
with relevant provisions of Electricity Act, 2003, whereas concept of levy
of electricity Duty for consumption and supply of electricity under HP
Electricity (Duty), 2009 is altogether different. It is a Duty imposed/levied
by the State by exercising the power under Entry 53 (List II) of the
Constitution, which empowers the State to levy tax for consumption
and/or supply of electricity. Tariff mainly relates with cost of production
and the rate on which electricity can be sold by different entities to
different categories of the consumers.
48. Categorization of consumers by the Regulatory Commission
is not for the purpose of levy of tax, but for purpose of determining ‘Tariff’
chargeable for supply/sale of electricity to the consumers by the Board,
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licensee, electricity trader, or generating company, or by one entity to
another.
49. The levy of tax/electricity Duty is over and above the Tariff
determined by the Electricity Regulatory Commission.
50. Therefore, plea of the petitioners regarding impermissibility of
classification of consumers by the State with reference to provisions of
Section 3 of the Act, 2009, for power conferred on HP Electricity
Regulatory Commission for classification of consumers, is misconceived
and not sustainable.
51. The State has a right for classification of consumers as well
as reclassification of consumers for the purpose of determining levy of
electricity Duty at different rates from different kind of consumers.
52. There may be a general classification of large industrial
consumers, but depending upon the peculiar nature of industry or other
relevant factors, there is no inhibition to the State to redefine classification
or to categorize different industrial units by way of sub-classification,
based on intelligible differentia .
53. Perusal of provisions of Sections 3 and 11 of the Act 2009 as
well as Clause 2.3 and Clause 1.2.46 of H.P. Electricity Supply Code
2009, it is evident that categorization by the Regulatory Commission in
the Tariff order are for the purpose of fixation of retail tariff for the licensee
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and consumers respectively, whereas classification under Section 3 of
the Act 2009 is altogether for different purpose, i.e., for levying electricity
Duty/taxes on the consumption or supply/sale of electricity/energy. Tariff
is a charge/cost for the sale/supply of electricity by ‘A’ to ‘B’. Electricity
duty/tax on consumption is on the tariff determined by the Regulatory
Commission. Therefore, plea of the petitioners that for the purpose of
Section 3 of the Act 2009, the State has no authority to re-classify or de-
classify the categorization or to sub-classify by creating a class within
class, on account of provision for classification of consumers by
Regulatory Commission, is not sustainable, as both classifications are for
different purpose in two different fields.
54. Though, it has been concluded that the State has a right to
reclassify, declassify or create a sub-class within a class under Act 2009
for the purpose of levying duty/tax on consumption or supply or sale of
electricity duty, however, provisions contained under Section 11(2) of the
Act 2009, empowering the State Government to revise rates of electricity
duty not exceeding 50% at any one time of the rates specified under
Section 3 of the Act, 2009, are vague, uncertain, unbridled, unguided, and
arbitrary as Section 11(2) of the Act 2009 does not specify minimum
interval of period for enhancing duty at the rate of 50% of rate specified at
any one time.
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55. For absence of necessary guiding principles, there is
possibility of casualty as has happened in present case, because vide
Notification dated 18.01.2024 (Annexure P-5), rate of electricity duty
leviable on stone crusher was enhanced from 25% to 37.50%, i.e., 50%
of rate specified under Section 3 existing at the time of issuing the
Notification dated 18.01.2024, but the said increase is within period of
about 5 months because earlier enhancement from 11% to 25% was
notified, vide Notification dated 01.09.2023 (Annexure P-4). As a result
within five months, Electricity Duty has been enhanced from 11% to
37.50%, which is 240%.
56. At the time of issuing Notification dated 01.09.2023
(Annexure P-4), the existing rate of electricity duty leviable on stone
crusher industry was 11%, as circulated vide communication dated
20.07.2017 (Annexure P-3). The increase in the electricity duty was made
after about 6 years from 11% to 25%. Now, though there is a sufficient
interval of time between determination of electricity duty levied in 2017
and revision of electricity duty levied vide Notification dated 01.09.2023,
but here also the enhancement is more than 50% of the existing rate
which is more than 118%. This enhancement is beyond the competence
of the State, as it exceeds cap of 50% of rate existing at the time of
revision of rate of electricity duty on 01.09.2023.
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57. It is settled law that vague and uncertain provisions of law
conferring unguided and unbridled powers on the authority to take a
decision arbitrarily are liable to be quashed. But we are of the view that
the Act empowers the State to levy electricity duty on consumption of
supply of electricity and first portion of Section 3 of the Act, 2009 confers
such power on the State and power to revise electricity duty under
Section 11(2) of the Act, 2009 is extension of power to levy duty on
consumption of electricity and conferring such power on the State
Government is not violative of any constitutional provision, nor in conflict
with the aim and object of enacting Act 2009, rather it has direct nexus
with the object sought to be achieved by enacting Act 2009.
58. Though, as has been rightly pointed out by learned counsel
for the petitioners that there is ambiguity in heading of Section 11 of the
Act, 2009, which states that Section 11 deals with ‘power to exempt from
payment of electricity Duty’, however, Section 11(2) of the Act, 2009 has
to be read separately, as it confers power on the State to revise the rates
of electricity duty and revision of rates includes decrease or increase of
rate of electricity Duty. Section 11(1) confers power upon the State to
exempt any licensee, consumer or person from payment of whole or part
of electricity duty for period specified in the Notification issued for such
purpose in Official Gazette is also a power, which can be included in
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power to revise the rates of electricity Duty, but in a different manner and
for a specified period, bringing it as zero, however, it does not amount to
general revision of rates of electricity duty, dealing with all classes of
consumers.
59. However, despite ambiguity in heading of Section 11 of the
Act, 2009, the provisions of Section 11(2) cannot be quashed or declared
unconstitutional on this ground, as both Sub-Sections, i.e., Sections 11(1)
and 11(2) of the Act, 2009, can be related to each other and otherwise
also, ambiguity in heading of Section 11 of the Act, 2009 cannot be a
reasonable ground to strike down provisions of Section 11(2) of the Act,
2009, because, as already discussed supra, the revision of rates of
electricity duty is within ambit and scope of the purpose of the enactment
as well as power conferred under Section 3 of the Act, 2009 to levy
electricity duty on consumption/supply and sale of electricity.
60. However, we are of the considered opinion that Section 11(2)
deserves to be modified to include specific provision, providing definite
guiding principles with definite interval of period with definite rates at
which revision of rates of electricity duty may be specified by the State
Government by issuing appropriate Notification. It shall definitely help in
dealing with situations like the present one and to avoid abuse of power
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by issuing notification of enhancement of electricity duty within a period of
about 5 months, revising the rate of electricity duty from 11% to 37.50%.
61. Revision also includes reduction in electricity duty and,
therefore, under Section 11(2) of the Act, 2009, the State Government is
also empowered to reduce the electricity duty. It is also evident from the
Notifications issued in the year 2009, Electricity Duty was 20%, but in
2017 Electricity Duty was reduced from 20% to 11%. Reduction in duty
does not have adverse impact on the consumers and, therefore, in case
of reduction of electricity duty to any extent, it is only the State
Government which will be affected for loss of income and, thus, as the
State Government has to determine any reduction of duty, the absence of
any prescribed limit may be permissible because it is the State
Government, which on reduction shall itself bear the consequences.
62. However, in case of enhancement of electricity duty, the
consumers are adversely affected and, therefore, there is necessity of
guiding principles to be contained in the Act/Rules or otherwise
prescribed by the State Government, exercising its duty in accordance
with law to levy electricity duty, which includes enhancement or reduction
of electricity duty under the power of revision. It is also apt to record here
that State Government may reserve its right to revise the electricity duty
in deviation of rates determined in the guiding principles in extraordinary
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expressed situations and/or public interest specifically stated, if so
warranted in the given facts and circumstances of the case.
63. The guiding principles can also be provided by suitably
modifying provisions of Section 11(2) of the Act, 2009, making it subject
to the manner as specified in the Rules, dealing with issue of revision of
electricity duty or by providing such guidelines in general Rules framed to
give effect to the provisions of the Act exercising the power under
Sections 15 and 16 of the Act, 2009.
64. Till the time appropriate, suitable amendment is carried out
or/and Rules are framed, we are of the considered opinion that instead of
striking down Section 11(2) of the Act, 2009, it would be appropriate to
issue certain directions to deal with the subject matter in interregnum.
Accordingly, hereby, we direct that power to enhance under the power to
revise, provided under Section 11(2) of the Act, 2009, read with Section 3
of the Act shall be exercised in following manner:-
Period after
Maximum
enhancement
Calculation as
example regarding
Rate of electricity
previous
determination of
duty if enhanced
maximum
enhanced rate of
levy of duty every
year by taking base
after expiry of
period specified in
levy of duty.
Column 1.
electricity duty
existing at base
year initial point of
time as 10%.
0 - 10% 10%
After 1 year 5% 10.5% 10.5%
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After 2 year 10% 11.02% 11%
After 3 year 15% 11.57% 11.5%
After 4 year 20% 12.14% 12%
After 5 year 25% 12.75% 12.5%
After 6 year 30% 13.38% 13%
After 7 year 35% 14.05% 13.5%
After 8 year 40% 14.75% 14%
After 9 year 45% 15.49% 14.5%
After 10 year 50% 16.26% 15.0%
65. Even as per existing provisions, enhancement from 11% to
25%, vide Notification dated 01.09.2023, is exceeding limit of 50%, which
can maximum could have been revised by the State at any time from 11%
to 16.5%, i.e., 11%+5.5% = 16.5% and, thereafter, vide Notification dated
18.01.2024, it may have been enhanced from 16.5% to 16.5%+8.25% to
the extent of 24.75%. The enhancement from 11% to 25% was notified in
September, 2023, which has been assailed in December, 2024, i.e., after
10-11 months from the date of Notification dated 18.01.2024. Therefore,
levy of electricity duty in present cases shall be governed by applying
electricity duty @ 16.05% from 01.09.2023 and 24.75% from the date of
Notification dated 18.01.2024 and revision of electricity duty hereinafter
shall be governed in terms of aforesaid directions till the appropriate
suitable amendment is carried out by the State and/or guiding principles
are incorporated and/or relevant Rules are framed or modified in
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aforesaid terms or in any manner, as deem fit by the State Government,
but with certain specific provisions guided by certain specific, clear,
unambiguous principles framed in consonance with settled law of the
land.
66. Before parting, it would be relevant here to refer certain
principles for determining rate of tax in ancient India, references whereof
we find in Shanti Parva in Mahabharata, Manu Smriti, Kautilya's
Arthashastra, and other ancient text like Smritis and Samhitas. Old texts
recognize power of Ruler to levy tax, which enables the Ruler to perform
his functions of welfare of the people, and right of traders/people to retain
the fruits of their trades/earnings to get adequate reward for their hard
work. Further, that Ruler should never overtax, and Taxation should never
be detrimental to the spontaneous growth of tax base. In these texts,
examples of Leech, Bee, and Calf have been referred to understand the
rate of tax, which should be imposed by the Ruler. By giving example of
Leech, Calf, and Bee, it has been propounded that rate of tax should be
determined by the Ruler like Leech, Calf and Bee, who draw only very
small quantities from their respective source, i.e., blood, milk, and honey,
in such a manner that amount drawn is always so small that it is never
detrimental to the growth of the source. It has been pronounced in the old
texts that Ruler should not destroy his own roots and the roots of his
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subjects by excessive greed, because the Ruler destroying his own roots
and roots of his subjects, makes himself and his people to suffer.
Excessive taxation destroys tax base and it causes self-destruction.
67. All of the West is not the best, similarly, all Old is not the
Gold. Where all of the West is not junk, there all Old is also not obsolete.
We should churn the best from the West as well as extract the Gold from
the Old by discarding the waste from the old as well as the West, and
march forward with new creation by manifestation of a Neo society with
modern mechanism by taking the best from Old as well as the New for
evolving the system for development of all.
68. In this era also, the ancient guiding principles are very much
relevant. Taking into consideration basic principles of determination of
rate of tax, respondents are expected to levy electricity Duty in such a
manner which shall not be highly excessive-exorbitant so that it never
pinches to the industrial consumers, but at the same time, they shall also
contribute funds, required for functioning of Government and welfare of
the people.
69. Excess payment, if any, made by petitioners to Electricity
Duty shall be adjusted against further electricity Duty preferably within
one year as far as possible. Any shortfall shall also be recovered in same
fashion.
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Petitions are disposed of in aforesaid terms, so also the
pending applications, if any.
(Vivek Singh Thakur),
Judge.
(Ranjan Sharma),
Judge.
th
11 August, 2026
(Susheel)
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