DERHA vs RADHESHYAM GAUR

Court
Chhattisgarh High Court

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CGHC010188472023 2026:CGHC:45661
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 523 of 2023
1 - Derha S/o. Late Shri Bhupsingh, Aged About 65 Years R/o. Village
Pirchatola, P.O. - Jangalsurajpura, Tahsil Lohra, District Kabirdham
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Khem Singh, S/o. Late Shri Bhup Singh, Aged About 62 Years R/o. Village
Pirchatola, P.O. - Jangalsurajpura, Tahsil Lohra, District Kabirdham
Chhattisgarh.
3 - Champa D/o. Late Shri Bhup Singh, Aged About 55 Years Wd/o. Govind
Ram Verma, R/o. Village Pirchatola, P.O. - Jangalsurajpura, Tahsil Lohra,
District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Radheshyam Gaur S/o. Late Halku Singh Gaur, R/o. Village Pirchatola,
P.O. - Jangalsurajpura, Tahsil Lohra, District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh.
2 - Manohar Lal, S/o. Phulsingh, R/o. Village Pirchatola, P.O. -
Jangalsurajpura, Tahsil Lohra, District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh.
3 - Smt. Dheliya Bai, Wd/o. Maniram, R/o. Near Shivmandir, Shantinagar
(Jacahar Nagar), Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
4 - Shri Luvkush, S/o. Late Maniram, R/o. Near Shivmandir, Shantinagar
(Jacahar Nagar), Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Kabirdham, District Kabirdham
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from CIS)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate along

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with Mr. Indrajeet Singh Thakur, Advocate
For Respondent no. 1
:
Ms. Ankita Goswami, on behalf of Mr. P.K.
Patel, Advocate
For Respondent No. 2
:
Mr. Kishore Narayan, Advocate
For State
:
Mr. Rohan Shukla, Panel Lawyer

Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on board
28.10.2026.
1. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition challenging the order
dated 06.02.2023 (Annexure P/1), passed by the Board of Revenue,
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, Circuit Court at Raipur, in Case No. RN/08/R-B-
121/198/2016, whereby the revision petition preferred by the petitioners
under Section 50 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, has
been rejected. The petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:-
“(A) Set aside/quash the impugned order dated 06.02.2023
(ANNEXURE P/1) of Board of Revenue, passed in RN/08/R-
B-121/198/2016, by which application U/s 50 of the CGLRC
for restoration was rejected and in consequence also set
aside/quash the order dated 08.08.2016 (ANNEXURE P/5) of
Addl. Commissioner, passed in Case No. 559-B/121 Year
2013-14, by which application U/s 35(3) of CGLRC for
restoration was rejected and further setting aside the order
dated 23.09.1998 (Annexure P/2) passed by Addl.
Commissioner in Case No. 249/A-23/95-96 tilted as Bhup
Singh & Ors. Vs. Maniram & Ors and restore the case for
hearing. and/or
(B)That any other relief which this court thinks fit in the
interest of justice & equity.”
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that Lila Bai had
acquired ownership and possession over land admeasuring 6.32 acres,

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bearing Khasra Nos. 8/2, 8/13, 8/21 and 60/6, situated at Village
Pirchatola, Tahsil Kawardha, District Rajnandgaon, pursuant to a decree
passed in a partition suit, and had sold the said land to Maniram Gond, a
member of the Scheduled Tribe, in the year 1975. Thereafter, Maniram
Gond, with the permission of the Collector, sold the land to Bhup Singh,
a non-tribal, by a registered sale deed dated 01.06.1984. An application
challenging the said transaction was rejected by the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Kawardha, vide order dated 03.12.1986. However, in suo motu
revision, the Collector, Rajnandgaon, vide order dated 09.03.1995, set
aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and directed restoration of
the land in favour of the legal heirs of Lila Bai under Section 170-B of the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioners preferred a revision before the Additional Commissioner,
which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 23.09.1998, as the
petitioners remained absent when the matter was called for hearing.
3. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioners thereafter
approached the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Chhattisgarh
Government, by filing an appeal, which was rejected for want of
jurisdiction. Subsequently, they filed W.P.(227) No. 296/2011 before this
Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 15.02.2011, with liberty to
seek restoration of the proceedings before the Additional Commissioner.
Pursuant thereto, the petitioners filed an application under Section 35(3)
of the Land Revenue Code, seeking restoration of the revision dismissed
on 23.09.1998. It was specifically pleaded that the petitioners had
engaged a counsel to represent them and were under the bona fide
belief that he would inform them about the dates of hearing; however, the
counsel neither appeared before the Court nor intimated them about the

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proceedings. The said explanation was supported by an affidavit, which
remained unrebutted. Nevertheless, the learned Additional
Commissioner, vide order dated 08.08.2016, rejected the restoration
application, and the Board of Revenue, vide the impugned order dated
06.02.2023, dismissed the revision preferred by the petitioner.
4. Learned counsel would further submit that both the revenue authorities
have erred in rejecting the restoration application by relying upon the
petitioners’ absence on several dates after the grant of an interim stay,
instead of examining whether sufficient cause existed for their non-
appearance on 23.09.1998. He would submit that the original dismissal
order did not record any finding that the petitioners had deliberately
remained absent after obtaining the interim stay or had intended to
prolong the proceedings. He would also submit that, on the date of
dismissal, notices to certain non-applicants remained unserved and
information regarding the death of one of them had been received;
therefore, appropriate procedural steps could have been taken to
proceed with the matter. The petitioners ought not to be deprived of an
opportunity to contest the revision on merits on account of the alleged
negligence of their counsel, particularly when valuable rights in respect
of the disputed land are involved. On these grounds, learned counsel
prays that the impugned order dated 06.02.2023 passed by the Board of
Revenue and the order dated 08.08.2016 passed by the Additional
Commissioner be set aside and the revision proceedings dismissed for
non-prosecution on 23.09.1998 be restored for adjudication on merits. In
support of his submissions, he would rely upon the judgment dated
01.10.2013 passed by the coordinate bench of this Court in M.A. No.
1002/2006 ( Smt. Preetam Kaur v. Nagar Palika Parishad, Pithaura ).

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5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 would
support the impugned orders passed by the Board of Revenue and the
Additional Commissioner, Durg Division, and submit that after
considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the revenue
authorities have rightly passed the order, which needs no interference.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 also opposed the submission
of the petitioner’s counsel and submitted that the revision filed by the
petitioner before the Additional Commissioner, Durg, was dismissed for
want of prosecution on 23.09.1998; thereafter, till 2008, the petitioner did
nothing and kept silent. In the year 2008, he approached the State
Government by filing his appeal against the order dated 23.09.1998. The
said appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction vide order dated
02.09.2009. Thereafter, after about 2 years, the petitioners filed W.P. 227
(PR) No. 296/2011, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 15.02.2011
with liberty to file a restoration application before the Additional
Commissioner, Durg. The petitioners then filed the restoration application
on 20.07.2011, which was dismissed on 08.08.2016, on the ground that
after obtaining an interim order in the year 1996, the petitioner had not
appeared in the proceedings about 10 times till 1998, and he had not
explained any sufficient reason for his non-appearance in the
proceedings. The Board of Revenue has also dismissed the revision filed
by the petitioner vide order dated 06.02.2023. He would next submit that
the petitioner has failed to give any plausible explanation for his non-
appearance since 1996, and he initiated proceedings for restoration after
about 10 years. Relying upon the judgment of “ Pathapati Subba Reddy
(Died) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) ” 2024
(12) SCC 336, he would submit that the orders passed by revenue

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authorities are strictly in accordance with law and the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the
documents annexed with the petition.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the
material available on record, the following question arises for
consideration: whether the learned Additional Commissioner and the
Board of Revenue have committed any illegality or jurisdictional error in
rejecting the petitioners’ application for restoration of the revision
proceedings dismissed for non-prosecution on 23.09.1998.
9. Before considering the merits of the case, it is necessary to notice the
provisions of Section 35 of the Land Revenue Code, which is as under:
35.Hearing in absence of patry.
“(1) If on the date fixed for hearing a case or proceeding, a
Revenue Officer finds that a summons or notice was not served
on any party due to the failure of the opposite party to pay the
requisite process fees for such service, the case or proceeding
may be dismissed in default of payment of such process fees.
(2) If any party to a case or proceeding before a Revenue Officer
does not appear on the date fixed for hearing after due service of
a notice or summons on him the case may be heard and
determined in his absence or may be dis-missed in default, as the
case may be.
(3) The party against whom any order is passed under sub-
section (1) or (2) may apply within thirty days from the date of
such order or knowledge of the order in case the notice or
summons was not duly served, to have it set aside on the ground
that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from paying the
requiste process fees for service of a summons or notice on the
opposite party or from appearing at the hearing and the Revenue

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Officer may, after notice to the opposite party which was present
on the date on which such order was passed and after making
such inquiry as he considers necessary, set aside the order
passed.
(4) Where an application filed under sub-section (3) is rejected,
the party aggrieved may file an appeal to the authority to whom
an appeal lies from an original order passed by such officer.
(5) Except as provided in sub-section (4) or except where a case
or proceeding before any Revenue Officer has been decided on
merits, no appeal shall lie from an order passed under this
section.”
10. It is not in dispute that the revision preferred by the petitioners against
the order dated 09.03.1995 passed by the Collector, Rajnandgaon, was
dismissed for non-prosecution on 23.09.1998. The petitioners sought
restoration of the said proceedings by filing an application under Section
35(3) of the Land Revenue Code, on the ground that their counsel had
neither appeared before the Court nor informed them about the dates of
hearing. However, the explanation regarding the alleged negligence of
the counsel addresses the reason for their absence on the date when
the revision was dismissed; it does not, by itself, explain why the
petitioners failed to take timely steps to seek restoration after the
dismissal. As reflected from the chronology of events, the petitioners
approached the State Government in the year 2008, and the appeal was
rejected for want of jurisdiction on 02.09.2009. Thereafter, they
approached this Court by filing W.P.(227) No. 296/2011, which was
dismissed as withdrawn on 15.02.2011, with liberty to seek restoration
before the Additional Commissioner. The petitioners thereafter pursued
the restoration application, which came to be rejected on 08.08.2016.
Thus, although the petitioners eventually pursued the remedy indicated

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by this Court, the material question remains whether they have
satisfactorily accounted for the substantial period that elapsed between
the dismissal of the revision in 1998 and their subsequent attempts to
revive the proceedings in the year 2008. The liberty granted by this Court
to seek restoration did not, in itself, condone the earlier delay or
dispense with the requirement of explaining it.
11. The principle that a litigant should not ordinarily suffer for the negligence
of his counsel cannot be applied mechanically, irrespective of the facts
and circumstances of the case. The Court is required to examine not
only the reason for non-appearance on the date of dismissal but also the
conduct of the litigant before and after such dismissal. In Smt. Preetam
Kaur (supra), the coordinate Bench of this Court considered the question
of restoration of proceedings dismissed for default. However, the
applicability of the principle laid down therein must be assessed in the
factual context of the present case. The petitioners cannot claim
restoration as a matter of course merely by attributing their absence to
the negligence of their counsel, particularly when the prolonged inaction
subsequent to the dismissal remains unexplained. The fact that the
explanation regarding counsel’s absence was supported by an
unrebutted affidavit may be relevant to the question of non-appearance
on 23.09.1998, but it does not satisfactorily account for the petitioners’
failure to take appropriate steps for nearly a decade thereafter.
12. The legal position in this regard stands settled by the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra). The
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, although a liberal and justice-
oriented approach may be adopted while considering delay, the
existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercising the

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discretionary power to condone it. The concepts of substantial justice
and a liberal approach cannot be employed to revive stale proceedings
in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Court has
further held that negligence, inaction and want of due diligence are
relevant considerations while deciding whether discretionary relief ought
to be granted. It has been held that:-
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing
'sufficient cause' in deciding application Under Section 5 of the
Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The
decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of
time and may proceed on such assumption creating new
rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal,
Motilal And Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.
MANU/SC/0042/1961 1961:INSC: 213: A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 ha
emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown
by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is
not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay
is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The
court, despite establishment of a 'sufficient cause' for various
reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the
bona fides of the party.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh
Kumar and Ors. v. State of MANU/SC/0217/2014
2014:INSC:197 2014 (4) SCALE 51 Haryana and Ors. wherein
while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if
some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just
or Immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other
persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching
the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity,
equity, sympathy and compassion.

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25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision
vide paragraph 15 went on observe as under:
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained Inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.
(emphasis supplied)
28. The submission of learned Counsel for the Petitioners is
that in somewhat similar situation, delay in filing appeal for the
enhancement of compensation had been condoned by this
Court. He placed reliance upon the case of Dhiraj Singh
(Dead) through Legal Representatives and Ors. v. State of
Haryana and Ors. MANU/SC/0778/2014: (2014) 14 SCC 127.
In this case, delay in filing appeal was condoned as in other
appeals compensation awarded at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq.
yd. was upheld and the proposed Appellants were also held
entitled to the same benefit of compensation at the rate of Rs.
200/- per sq. yd. Instead of Rs. 101/- per sq. yd. As awarded

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but with the rider that they will not be entitled for Interest for
the period of delay in approaching the High Court.
13. Applying the aforesaid principles, the petitioners were required to explain
the prolonged period of inaction following the dismissal of their revision
in 1998. Their subsequent approach to the State Government in 2008,
followed by the proceedings before this Court in 2011, does not, by itself,
explain why they did not seek restoration within a reasonable period after
the dismissal of the revision.
14.
The contention of the petitioners that the revenue authorities ought not to
have relied upon their absence on earlier dates, as the order dated
23.09.1998 did not specifically record such conduct as the reason for
dismissal, is also not sufficient to warrant interference. While considering
an application for restoration, the authority is entitled to examine the
overall conduct of the applicants to determine whether their absence was
bona fide and whether they had pursued the proceedings with due
diligence. In the present case, the petitioners had remained absent on
several dates after obtaining an interim order, and no satisfactory
explanation has been furnished for their prolonged inaction after the
revision was dismissed. Further, the fact that notices to certain non-
applicants remained unserved, or that steps were required to bring the
legal representatives of a deceased non-applicant on record, does not,
by itself, establish sufficient cause for the petitioners’ absence or explain
the subsequent delay in seeking restoration.
15.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the petitioners
have failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay
of approximately 10 years in taking steps to seek restoration of the

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revision proceedings. The plea of negligence on the part of their counsel,
even if accepted for the purpose of explaining their absence on the date
of dismissal, does not explain their subsequent inaction. The learned
Additional Commissioner, vide order dated 08.08.2016, and the Board of
Revenue, vide the impugned order dated 06.02.2023, have declined to
restore the proceedings after considering the petitioners’ conduct and the
reasons advanced in support of their application. In the absence of any
perversity, jurisdictional error or material illegality warranting interference
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court finds no ground
to disturb the concurrent orders passed by the revenue authorities.
16. Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed .
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge

Sagrika