AMEER SHAIK, PRAKASAM DT. vs STATE OF TELANGANA, REP. BY P.P., HYD
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
*
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.785 of 2014
Between :
Ameer Shaik ...Appellant
AND
The State of Telangana ...Respondent
th
DATE OF ORDER: 30 SEPTEMBER, 2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
1 Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
Yes/No
the Judgment?
2 Whether the copies of judgment
may be marked to Law
Yes/No
Reporters/Journals
3 Whether HER Lordship wish to see
the fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
___________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
* THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
+ CRIMINAL APPEAL No.785 of 2014
th
% Date: 30 September, 2026
Between :
Ameer Shaik ...Appellant
AND
The State of Telangana ...Respondent
! Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Narayana Gontryala
! Counsel for the Respondent: Sri M. Vivekananda Reddy,
learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1. (2005) 10 SCC 614
2. (2024) 9 SCC 546
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.785 of 2014
(CNR No. HBHC010532752014)
Reserved on: 02.07.2026 Pronounced on: 30.09.2026
Uploaded on: 30.09.2026
Between :
Ameer Shaik ...Appellant
AND
The State of Telangana ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T :
This Criminal Appeal is preferred against the impugned
Judgment dated 30.07.2014 passed in S.C.No.57 of 2012 by the
learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track
Court), Rangareddy District at LB Nagar, whereby the appellant-
accused was convicted for the offence under Section 354 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’), and was sentenced to
undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of five years and to
pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo Simple
Imprisonment for a period of one month.
02. Heard Sri Narayana Gontryala, learned counsel for
the appellant-accused and Sri M. Vivekananda Reddy, learned
Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the record.
03.1. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 21.11.2011
at about 10:14 A.M., the defacto complainant/prosecutrix (PW.1),
who was then studying in the 2nd year at J.B.R. Engineering
College, was present in her classroom writing records. At the
relevant time, the accused, who was working as an Assistant
Professor in the said college, allegedly telephoned PW.1 and
asked her to come to his cabin. Accordingly, she went to his
cabin. It is alleged that the accused initially enquired about her
assignments and internal marks and thereafter touched her
cheeks. Suspecting the accused's improper intentions, PW.1
attempted to leave the cabin and return to her classroom. At that
time, the accused allegedly placed his hands on her shoulders
and subsequently lowered his hands and touched her buttocks,
thereby outraging her modesty.
03.2. Thereafter, PW.1 informed her cousins, friends, the
Vice-Principal, the Head of the Department, and her parents
about the incident. Subsequently, she lodged a written complaint,
which was registered as a case by the concerned police. During
the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the
statements of the witnesses, conducted a panchanama, arrested
the accused, and upon completion of the investigation, filed a
charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable
under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code.
04. Upon appearance of the accused before the learned
trial Court and on consideration of the material available on
record, a charge for the offence punishable under Section 354 of
IPC was framed against the accused. The charge was read over
and explained to him, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried.
05. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined
PW.1 to PW.11 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.3. After closure of the
prosecution evidence, the accused was examined with regard to
the incriminating material appearing against him in the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses. He denied the said incriminating
circumstances and did not adduce any oral or documentary
evidence on his behalf.
06. After hearing both sides, the learned trial Court found
the accused guilty and was convicted for the offence under
Section 354 of IPC, and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous
Imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a
period of one month.
07. Aggrieved thereby, the accused had preferred the
present Criminal Appeal.
08.1. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused submitted
that there is an unexplained delay of about 48 hours in lodging
the FIR. The alleged incident is stated to have occurred on
21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M., whereas the FIR was registered
only at 12:10 P.M. on 23.11.2011. PW.1, in her cross-
examination, admitted that the Police Station could be reached
from the place of occurrence by vehicle within about five minutes.
Therefore, there was no justification for the delay of 48 hours in
setting the criminal law in motion. It was further submitted that
Column No.8 of Ex.P3 FIR merely mentions “complainant delay”
and does not furnish any explanation whatsoever for such delay.
The unexplained delay, according to the learned counsel, casts a
serious doubt on the prosecution version. Learned counsel further
submitted that there was also a delay in the FIR reaching the
learned Magistrate. As evident from the FIR itself, the learned
Magistrate received the FIR only at 12:45 P.M. on 24.11.2011,
i.e., on the following day. According to the learned counsel, the
delay in lodging the FIR coupled with the delay in forwarding the
same to the learned Magistrate assumes significance in the facts
and circumstances of the case.
08.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the evidence
of PW-1 regarding the circumstances in which the alleged
incident is stated to have occurred is inherently improbable. PW-1
admitted in her cross-examination that lab attendants and
technicians would ordinarily be present in the laboratory.
However, she claimed that none of them was present on the date
of the alleged incident. It was contended that, admittedly, the
alleged incident took place on a working day and the prosecution
has not furnished any reason for the alleged absence of the
laboratory staff on that day. Therefore, the version of PW-1 that
no lab attendant or technician was present on the relevant day is
liable to be viewed with considerable doubt.
08.3. Learned counsel further submitted that, according to
PW-4, PW-1 had given a written complaint on 22.11.2011, which
was immediately forwarded to the Principal with a
recommendation for termination of the services of the appellant,
and consequently the appellant was terminated from the college.
However, PW-4, in her cross-examination, denied having stated
before the Police the relevant portion of her statement marked as
Ex.D-1. It was submitted that, as per Ex.D-1, PW-4 had
forwarded the complaint given by PW-1 recommending
immediate termination of the appellant and that the appellant was
thereafter terminated from the college at her request.
08.4. Learned counsel further submitted that the Principal
of the college is a material witness in the case. According to PW-
1 and PW-4, the first complaint regarding the alleged incident was
given to the Principal. The said complaint, which allegedly
preceded the complaint lodged before the Police, has not been
brought on record by the prosecution. It was contended that the
complaint allegedly given to the Principal is a material piece of
evidence for appreciating the subsequent complaint lodged with
the Police.
08.5. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-11, who
registered the FIR, was specifically questioned in cross-
examination as to why the earlier complaint allegedly given to the
Principal was not taken into consideration. However, PW-11
merely stated that Ex.P-1 was the only complaint given by PW-1.
Thus, there is a material discrepancy between the evidence of
PW-4, who speaks about an earlier complaint given to the
Principal, and the evidence of PW-11, who claims that there was
no earlier complaint. According to the learned counsel,
notwithstanding the materiality of the Principal's evidence, the
prosecution, without offering any explanation, did not examine the
Principal as a witness. An adverse inference under Section 114,
Illustration(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, therefore,
deserves to be drawn against the prosecution.
08.6. Learned counsel further submitted that if the alleged
incident had in fact occurred, the management of the college
would ordinarily have taken appropriate disciplinary action against
the appellant. However, admittedly, no departmental enquiry was
conducted against the appellant and not even a show-cause
notice was issued calling upon him to offer his explanation in
respect of the alleged incident. Though the appellant was stated
to have been terminated from service, the Investigating Officer
did not collect any material to establish that such termination was
on account of the alleged incident. According to the learned
counsel, the absence of any disciplinary proceedings or
contemporaneous material concerning the alleged misconduct
creates a serious doubt regarding the prosecution case.
08.7. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-10, the
Investigating Officer, admitted in his cross-examination that he
had not seized the mobile phones of PW-1 and the appellant and
had not collected their call data. Consequently, there is no
independent or objective evidence to establish that, on the date of
the alleged incident, the appellant had telephoned PW-1 and
called her to his cabin. It was contended that, in the absence of
such material, the prosecution version regarding the alleged
telephone call remains uncorroborated.
08.8. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-10
admitted in cross-examination that, while the witnesses had given
their statements in Telugu, he had recorded their statements in
English, though he admittedly knew Telugu. According to the
learned counsel, this circumstance raises doubt as to whether the
statements recorded by the Investigating Officer truly and
accurately represented the versions given by the witnesses.
Therefore, the statements recorded in English cannot, according
to the learned counsel, be mechanically treated as the actual
statements made by the witnesses.
08.9. Learned counsel further submitted that the conduct of
PW-1 in not informing her father, PW-3, about the alleged
incident on the very same day is unnatural. Though the alleged
incident is stated to have occurred on 21.11.2011, PW-1 informed
her father only on the following day. According to the learned
counsel, this delay in communicating the alleged incident to her
father assumes significance while assessing the overall credibility
of the prosecution version.
08.10. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-1 had
made contradictory statements regarding the preparation of Ex.P-
1 complaint. In the course of cross-examination, she initially
stated that she had herself scribed Ex.P-1. However, when the
contents of Ex.P-1 were put to her, she denied having scribed the
said complaint. Similarly, she denied having stated in Ex.P-1 that
PW-4 was on leave on the date of the alleged incident. According
to the learned counsel, these material contradictions and
inconsistencies affect the credibility of PW-1.
08.11. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no
consistency in the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-9 with regard
to the events immediately following the alleged incident.
According to PW-1 and PW-2, an oral complaint was given to
PW-5, whereas PW-9 stated that the complaint was given to PW-
5. More importantly, the version of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-9 that
PW-5 called the appellant to his room and that the appellant
tendered an apology is not supported by the evidence of PW-5.
Learned counsel, therefore, contended that PW-2 and PW-9 are
interested/planted witnesses and that their evidence does not
receive independent corroboration from PW-5.
08.12. Learned counsel further submitted that the credibility
of PW-1 is further affected by several circumstances. First, the
statement regarding PW-4 being on leave on the date of the
alleged incident is not found either in Ex.P-1 or in the statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Further, PW-4 herself did not
state in her evidence that she was on leave on the relevant date.
Secondly, PW-1's assertion that no laboratory attendants or
technicians were present on that day is not supported by any
contemporaneous material. Thirdly, the mobile phones of PW-1
and the appellant were not seized and no call detail records were
collected to establish the alleged telephone call.
08.13. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-1 did not
mention in her complaint that PW-2 and PW-9 had come to her
after the alleged incident and that they had thereafter gone to
PW-5. Such omission, according to the learned counsel,
assumes significance because PW-2 and PW-9 subsequently
introduced these circumstances in their evidence. Likewise, the
version of PW-5 that PW-1 came to him along with her cousins is
not supported by his earlier statement to the Police, wherein he
had not stated that PW-1 had come along with her cousins.
These material omissions and improvements, according to the
learned counsel, render the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses unreliable.
08.14. Learned counsel further submitted that the
prosecution case rests substantially upon the testimony of PW-1,
which suffers from material contradictions, omissions and
improbabilities. The unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the
delay in forwarding the FIR to the learned Magistrate, the alleged
suppression of the first complaint, non-examination of the
Principal, absence of departmental proceedings, non-collection of
call detail records, discrepancies regarding the presence of
laboratory staff, inconsistencies in the evidence of PW-1, PW-2
and PW-9, and the alleged improvements made by the witnesses
cumulatively create a reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence
itself and the involvement of the appellant. Hence, learned
counsel submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the
guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 354
IPC beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellant is, therefore,
entitled to the benefit of doubt. Therefore, learned counsel
prayed that the Criminal Appeal be allowed, the Judgment of
conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court be set
aside, and the appellant/accused be acquitted of the offence
punishable under Section 354 IPC.
08.15. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied
upon the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hemraj
1
and others v. State of Haryana wherein it was held at
Paragraph Nos.7 and 8 that:
“ 7. The prosecution case rests on the evidence of
PWs 4 and 5 who are related to the deceased and
who happened to be chance witnesses. Before
scrutinising this evidence and testing its credibility, we
have to advert to certain features in the prosecution
case which make a dent on the reliability of the
prosecution version. They are discussed hereunder:
Two days after the incident i.e. on 5-4-1996, the
investigation was entrusted to PW 10 Inspector, CIA
at the instance of the Superintendent of Police, Jind.
PW 10 stated in cross-examination that he inspected
the place of occurrence and examined the persons
staying near the place of occurrence and recorded the
statements of such persons. The names of those five
persons were given. Then he added that “from their
statements, it was revealed that Hem Raj, Chunnilal
and Omprakash were innocent”. He further stated that
the investigation done by him was verified by DSP.
Ultimately he filed the final report showing only Kala
as the sole accused. However, as already noticed, all
the four accused mentioned in the FIR were
committed to Sessions and the Sessions Judge
framed charge against all of them under Section 302.
PW 10 did not choose to give all the relevant details
of his investigation. However, the version of this
investigating officer itself casts a cloud on the
1
(2005) 10 SCC 614
reliability of the prosecution case as unfolded by PWs
4 and 5 that four accused were involved.
8. The fact that no independent witness — though
available, was examined and not even an explanation
was sought to be given for not examining such
witness is a serious infirmity in the prosecution case
having regard to the indisputable facts of this case.
Amongst the independent witnesses, Kapur Singh
was one, who was very much in the know of things
from the beginning. Kapur Singh is alleged to have
been in the company of PW 5 at a sweet stall and
both of them after hearing the cries joined PW 4 at
Channi Chowk. He was one of those who kept the
deceased on a cot and took the deceased to hospital.
He was there in the hospital by the time the first IO,
PW 9 went to the hospital. The evidence of the first IO
reveals that the place of occurrence was pointed out
to him by Kapur Singh. His statement was also
recorded, though not immediately but later. The IO
admitted that Kapur Singh was the eyewitness to the
occurrence. In the FIR, he is referred to as the
eyewitness along with PW 5. Kapur Singh was
present in the court on 6-10-1997. The Additional
Public Prosecutor “gave up” the examination of this
witness stating that it was unnecessary. The trial court
commented that he was won over by the accused and
therefore he was not examined. There is no factual
basis for this comment. The approach of the High
Court is different. The High Court commented that his
examination would only amount to “proliferation” of
direct evidence. But, we are unable to endorse this
view of the High Court. To put a seal of approval on
the prosecution's omission to examine a material
witness who is unrelated to the deceased and who is
supposed to know every detail of the incident on the
ground of “proliferation” of direct evidence is not a
correct approach. The corroboration of the testimony
of the related witnesses PWs 4 and 5 by a known
independent eyewitness could have strengthened the
prosecution case, especially when the incident took
place in a public place.”
08.16. Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Allarakha Habib Menon and others v. State
2
of Gujarat , wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.17 to 20 that:
“17. Having carefully sifted through and analysed the
evidence of Demistalkumar (PW 12), we find that he
did not utter a single word about the presence of the
first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon (PW 11) at
the scene of occurrence. He claimed to have picked
up two weapons used by the accused i.e. one big
knife and a gupti and had presented them at the
police station around 9.15 p.m. on the very day of the
incident. He also stated that he did not submit any
report/complaint of the incident because he saw that
someone was already sitting at the police station at
9.15 p.m. for giving the report/complaint.
18. We find it improbable and totally unacceptable
that a police constable had seen the incident and had
2
(2024) 9 SCC 546
also brought the crime weapons to the police station
and yet his statement would not be recorded and the
factum of presentation of weapons would not be
entered in the daily diary (roznamcha) of the police
station. Demistalkumar (PW 12) explained in his
cross-examination that he did not give a report about
the incident because he noticed the presence of
someone at the police station who was sitting there
from 9.15 p.m. to give the report. However, as per the
record, no report was admittedly presented at the
police station by any person from the complainant
side. No police personnel deployed at Anand Town
Police Station corroborated the version of
Demistalkumar (PW 12) that someone had come to
the police station at 9.15 p.m. for giving a report of the
incident.
19. Since the Police Constable, Demistalkumar (PW
12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous
assault had reported at the police station with the
crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as
to why his statement would not have been recorded
immediately on his arrival at the police station. From
the circumstances discussed above, a reasonable
doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the
statement of Demistalkumar (PW 12) would definitely
have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but
his version may not have suited the prosecution case
and that is why, the daily diary entry was never
brought on record. Non-production of the daily diary is
a serious omission on part of the prosecution.
20. There cannot be any doubt that the first version of
the incident as narrated by the Police Constable,
Demistalkumar (PW 12) would be required to be
treated as the FIR and the complaint lodged by
Mohammad Arif Memon (PW 11) would be relegated
to the category of a statement under Section
161CrPC and nothing beyond that. The same could
not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit
by Section 162CrPC. Evidently thus, the prosecution
is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court
and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be
drawn against the prosecution on this count.”
09. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that the accused
had committed a grave offence and that the prosecution had
succeeded in establishing the same before the learned trial Court
beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the learned
trial Court, upon a proper appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence available on record, had rightly convicted
and sentenced the accused for the offence under Section 354 of
the IPC. It was contended that the impugned Judgment does not
suffer from any illegality, irregularity or infirmity warranting
interference by this Court. Therefore, the learned Assistant
Public Prosecutor prayed that the Criminal Appeal be dismissed
and the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial
Court be confirmed.
10. Having regard to the submissions made by the
learned counsel for either side and upon perusal of the entire
record, it is evident that PW1 is the victim girl, who narrated the
incident allegedly occurred on 21.11.2011 after 10:00 A.M. She
stated that she lodged Ex.P1-complaint on 23.11.2011 and that
she was the scribe of the said complaint. However, during the
course of cross-examination, she admitted that she had not
mentioned in Ex.P1-complaint that she had informed the incident
to her classmates. She further admitted that she had not
mentioned in Ex.P1 that she had informed PWs.2 and 9 about the
incident and had also not mentioned the role of PWs.2 and 9.
When Ex.P1 was confronted to her, she stated that she had not
scribed the said complaint. She also admitted that no complaint
was lodged on 21.11.2011 or 23.11.2011.
11. PW2, the cousin brother of PW1, PW3, the father of
PW1, and PW9, another cousin brother of PW1, deposed that
PW1 had informed them about the incident and that thereafter
PW1, PWs.2 and 9 went to the college and reported the matter to
the Vice-Principal, requesting him to take necessary action
against the accused. According to their evidence, the Vice-
Principal called the accused to his room, whereupon the accused
allegedly apologised. However, during the course of cross-
examination, PW2 admitted that he had not stated in his
statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 23.11.2011
that PW1 was weeping while speaking to him over the phone.
12. PW3, in his chief-examination, stated that PW1 had
informed the incident to her classmates. However, during cross-
examination, he admitted that he had not stated in his statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that his daughter had reported the
matter to her classmates. He further stated that, during the year
2011, he was working in the CID Cyber Crimes Wing attached to
the Economic Offences Wing.
13. PW4, the Head of the Department, deposed that, on
coming to know about the incident, the accused was terminated
from service. However, during cross-examination, she admitted
that no letter or proceedings relating to such termination had
been collected by the Investigating Officer.
14. PW5, the Vice-Principal of the college, deposed that
on 21.11.2011, PW1, along with her two cousins, approached him
and narrated the entire incident and that he advised them to
lodge a complaint for taking necessary action against the
accused. During cross-examination, PW5 stated that the Principal
was the competent authority to receive the complaint. He further
admitted that he had not furnished any record or proceedings
relating to the alleged incident or the action taken thereon to the
police.
15. PW6, a classmate of PW1, deposed that on
21.11.2011, between 10:00 A.M. and 10:30 A.M., the accused
telephoned PW1, whereupon she went to meet the accused and,
after returning, was weeping and narrated the entire incident to
her.
16. PWs.7 and 8, who were the Security Officer and
Attender of the college respectively, deposed with regard to the
preparation of the crime details form. PWs.10 and 11, the
Investigating Officers, deposed regarding the investigation
conducted by them and the filing of the charge-sheet. However,
during cross-examination, PW10 admitted that he had neither
seized nor collected the cell phones of the accused and PW1 for
the purpose of verifying whether there had been any
communication between them.
17. Thus, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
when considered in its entirety, discloses certain material
omissions and inconsistencies with regard to the manner in which
the incident was allegedly reported, the persons to whom PW1
initially disclosed the incident, the alleged complaint to the college
authorities, and the subsequent action purportedly taken against
the accused. The absence of the relevant contemporaneous
records and the failure of the Investigating Officer to collect the
mobile phones or verify the alleged telephonic communication
between the accused and PW1 are also circumstances which
require due consideration while appreciating the prosecution
evidence.
18. On a careful perusal of the above material, the point
that arises for consideration in this Criminal Appeal is whether the
prosecution has established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
appellant-accused committed the offence punishable under
Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and whether the Judgment
of conviction and sentence passed by the learned V Additional
District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Rangareddy
District at L.B. Nagar, in S.C.No.57 of 2012, dated 30.07.2014,
warrants interference by this Court or not.
19. The case of the prosecution rests principally upon the
testimony of PW.1, the alleged victim, with the evidence of PWs.2
to 6 being relied upon with regard to the events which allegedly
transpired immediately after the occurrence. The allegation
against the appellant is that, on 21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M.,
he telephoned PW.1, who was then a student of the college
where the appellant was working as an Assistant Professor,
called her to his cabin, and, after enquiring about her
assignments and internal marks, touched her cheeks and
thereafter placed his hands on her shoulders and touched her
buttocks. There is no dispute that, if the allegation is proved by
reliable and cogent evidence, the same would constitute serious
misconduct attracting the penal provision invoked by the
prosecution. However, the question before this Court is not
whether the allegation is serious, but whether the prosecution has
proved the occurrence and the involvement of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
20. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that
the burden lies entirely upon the prosecution to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is not
required to prove his innocence. Where the evidence adduced by
the prosecution gives rise to reasonable doubt regarding the
occurrence or the participation of the accused, such doubt
necessarily has to go to the benefit of the accused. In the
present case, PW.1 is the principal witness to the alleged
occurrence. Her evidence, therefore, requires careful scrutiny.
Though she stated that the incident occurred on 21.11.2011 and
that she thereafter informed several persons about the incident,
the evidence on record discloses material inconsistencies
regarding the manner in which the incident was reported and the
events immediately following it. PW.1 admitted during cross-
examination that Ex.P.1 complaint did not contain reference to
her informing her classmates, PW.2 or PW.9 about the alleged
incident. She also admitted that the role allegedly played by
PWs.2 and 9 was not mentioned in the complaint. Significantly,
when Ex.P.1 was confronted to her, she stated that she had not
scribed the said complaint, notwithstanding the prosecution case
that Ex.P.1 was the complaint lodged by her. These
circumstances cannot be treated as merely trivial discrepancies
because the complaint constitutes the earliest version relied upon
by the prosecution and the omissions relate to the very sequence
of events immediately following the alleged occurrence.
21. The evidence of PWs.2, 3 and 9 also does not furnish
the required assurance to the testimony of PW.1. PWs.2 and 9,
who are stated to be the cousins of PW.1, deposed that PW.1
informed them about the incident and that they accompanied her
to the college and approached the Vice-Principal. According to
their evidence, the Vice-Principal called the appellant and the
appellant allegedly tendered an apology. However, the evidence
of PW.5, the Vice-Principal, does not satisfactorily corroborate the
aforesaid version in material particulars. Though PW.5 stated
that PW.1 approached him along with her two cousins and
narrated the incident, no contemporaneous record relating to
such complaint or proceedings was furnished by him to the
Investigating Officer. More importantly, the alleged apology by
the appellant, which assumes significance in the prosecution
version concerning the immediate aftermath of the incident, is not
established through any independent or contemporaneous
material.
22. The evidence of PW.4, the Head of the Department,
also requires consideration. PW.4 stated that, on coming to know
of the incident, the appellant was terminated from service.
However, in cross-examination, she admitted that no letter or
proceedings relating to such termination were collected by the
Investigating Officer. The prosecution has thus failed to place
before the Court any documentary material demonstrating that
disciplinary action was in fact initiated against the appellant on
account of the alleged incident. Though the absence of
departmental proceedings by itself may not demolish a criminal
prosecution, in the peculiar facts of the present case, where the
prosecution relies upon the subsequent conduct of the college
authorities, the non-production of the relevant contemporaneous
records assumes significance.
23. Another circumstance which creates doubt relates to
the first complaint allegedly made by PW.1. The evidence of the
prosecution witnesses indicates that PW.1 had approached the
college authorities before lodging the complaint with the police.
PW.5 stated that the Principal was the competent authority to
receive the complaint. However, the Principal, who would have
been a material witness to establish whether any complaint was
made to the college authorities, was not examined by the
prosecution. Further, no such complaint allegedly submitted to
the college authorities was produced before the Court. The
evidence of PW.4, as noticed above, also refers to the complaint
and the consequential action against the appellant. On the other
hand, PW.11, who registered the FIR, stated that Ex.P.1 was the
only complaint given by PW.1. Thus, the prosecution evidence
leaves an unresolved inconsistency regarding the existence and
contents of the alleged earlier complaint. When the principal of
the college is available and the evidence on record indicates that
such witness would have been in a position to throw light on an
important aspect of the prosecution case, non-examination of
such witness and non-production of the relevant
contemporaneous document assume significance, particularly
where the remaining evidence itself suffers from inconsistencies.
24. The delay in setting the criminal law in motion is
another circumstance which cannot be completely ignored. The
alleged incident took place on 21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M.,
whereas Ex.P.3 FIR came to be registered only on 23.11.2011 at
about 12:10 P.M. Thus, there is a delay of approximately two
days. PW.1 admitted that the police station could be reached
from the place of occurrence within about five minutes by vehicle.
Though delay in lodging an FIR in an offence of this nature
cannot, by itself, be treated as fatal to the prosecution, such delay
assumes significance when the prosecution does not offer a
satisfactory explanation and when the evidence otherwise
contains material inconsistencies. In the present case, Column
No.8 of Ex.P.3 merely records "complainant delay" and does not
disclose any specific explanation for the delay. The delay,
therefore, becomes a relevant circumstance while assessing the
overall reliability of the prosecution version. The prosecution has
also not satisfactorily explained the further delay in forwarding the
FIR to the learned Magistrate. The FIR shows that the learned
Magistrate received it only at about 12:45 P.M. on 24.11.2011.
Though such delay, considered independently, may not
necessarily vitiate the prosecution case, it assumes significance
when considered cumulatively with the unexplained delay in
lodging the complaint and the other deficiencies noticed
hereinabove.
25. The Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel
for the appellant, including Hemraj and others v. State of
Haryana and Allarakha Habib Menon and others v. State of
Gujarat , emphasise the importance of examining unexplained
omissions, suppression of material circumstances and non-
production or non-examination of material evidence while
assessing whether the prosecution version inspires confidence.
Another material circumstance is the failure of the Investigating
Officer to collect objective evidence relating to the alleged
telephone call. According to the prosecution, the appellant
telephoned PW.1 and called her to his cabin immediately
preceding the alleged incident. PW.10, the Investigating Officer,
admittedly did not seize the mobile phones of PW.1 or the
appellant and did not collect their call detail records.
26. It is true that the prosecution is not required to collect
every conceivable piece of evidence in every case.
Nevertheless, when the alleged telephone call constitutes the
very circumstance by which PW.1 is stated to have been
summoned to the appellant's cabin, the failure to collect readily
available objective evidence assumes significance, particularly
when the oral evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances
is itself not free from doubt.
27. The evidence relating to the presence or absence of
other persons at the relevant place also creates a circumstance
requiring consideration. PW.1 stated that laboratory attendants
and technicians would ordinarily be present in the laboratory, but
that none of them was present on the relevant day. The alleged
incident took place on a working day. The prosecution has not
placed any material explaining the absence of such staff or
otherwise establishing that no independent person was available
in the vicinity.
28. The evidence of PW.6, a classmate of PW.1, is relied
upon to establish that PW.1 returned to the classroom weeping
after the alleged telephone call and narrated the incident.
However, the material circumstances surrounding this version are
not consistently reflected in the earliest complaint. PW.1 herself
admitted that she had not mentioned in Ex.P.1 the role of PW.6 or
the fact of informing her classmates. Similarly, PW.3 stated that
PW.1 informed her classmates, but in cross-examination he
admitted that he had not stated this fact in his statement under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such omissions, particularly when they relate
to the immediate conduct of the victim following the alleged
occurrence, require due consideration. The evidence of PW.2
also contains an omission concerning the alleged emotional
condition of PW.1 immediately after the occurrence. PW.2
admitted that he had not stated in his Section 161 Cr.P.C.
statement that PW.1 was weeping while speaking to him over the
telephone. Likewise, the prosecution has not satisfactorily
reconciled the different versions of PWs.1, 2, 5 and 9 concerning
the manner in which PW.1 first approached the college authorities
and the presence and role of her cousins at that stage. These
are not isolated discrepancies. They relate to the sequence of
events immediately following the alleged incident and
consequently bear upon the reliability of the prosecution version
as a whole.
29. The Court also finds significance in the evidence
concerning Ex.P.1. PW.1 initially stated that she had scribed the
complaint, but when the contents of Ex.P.1 were put to her, she
denied having scribed it. Such inconsistency regarding the
authorship of the first written complaint is material because the
prosecution relies upon Ex.P.1 as the earliest recorded version of
the occurrence. Further, PW.1 denied having stated certain
matters contained in the complaint, including the circumstances
concerning PW.4. Thus, the contents of Ex.P.1 cannot be
accepted mechanically as an unimpeachable contemporaneous
account without reconciling these contradictions in the testimony
of its alleged author.
30. It is also relevant that the prosecution did not produce
the alleged proceedings of the college authorities relating to the
termination of the appellant. PW.4 stated that the appellant was
terminated, while admitting that no such proceedings were
collected by the Investigating Officer. PW.5 also stated that he did
not furnish any record of proceedings to the police. The
prosecution case, therefore, lacks contemporaneous
documentary corroboration regarding the alleged complaint made
to the college authorities, the proceedings said to have followed
the complaint and the alleged termination of the appellant.
31. It is well settled that minor discrepancies which do not
affect the substratum of the prosecution case may be ignored.
However, the discrepancies in the present case cannot, in the
considered view of this Court, be characterised as merely minor
or peripheral. They concern the delay in lodging the FIR and the
absence of a satisfactory explanation therefor; the delay in
forwarding the FIR to the learned Magistrate; the existence and
suppression/non-production of the alleged first complaint to the
college authorities; non-examination of the Principal, who was a
material witness; non-production of the alleged college
proceedings and termination records; inconsistencies concerning
the role and presence of PWs.2 and 9; omissions regarding the
alleged informing of classmates and relatives; the inconsistent
evidence concerning the preparation and authorship of Ex.P.1;
failure to collect the call detail records or mobile phones despite
the prosecution case being founded upon the alleged telephone
call; and the absence of satisfactory independent or
contemporaneous corroboration of the events immediately
following the alleged occurrence.
32. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances
assumes importance. Each circumstance, considered in isolation,
may not necessarily be sufficient to discard the prosecution case.
However, criminal cases are required to be decided on the
cumulative assessment of the entire evidence. When the principal
testimony is attended by material inconsistencies and the
surrounding circumstances do not furnish satisfactory
corroboration, the Court cannot sustain a conviction merely on
the basis of the seriousness of the allegation. The prosecution
was required to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. The evidence on record, in considered view of
this Court, does not attain that degree of certainty.
33. The learned trial Court, while recording the
conviction, appears to have principally relied upon the testimony
of PW.1 and the supporting evidence of the other prosecution
witnesses. However, the material contradictions, omissions and
deficiencies noticed above have not been satisfactorily
reconciled. The learned trial Court was also required to consider
the effect of the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the non-
examination of the Principal, the non-production of the alleged
earlier complaint and college proceedings, and the failure of the
Investigating Officer to collect the call records. However, in an
appeal against conviction, this Court is required to independently
scrutinise the entire evidence on record. On such independent
consideration, this Court finds that the prosecution evidence does
not inspire such confidence as would justify sustaining the
conviction of the appellant.
34. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, this
Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to
establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed
the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC. The evidence
gives rise to a reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence in the
manner alleged and the involvement of the appellant therein. The
appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt.
35. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The
Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 30.07.2014 passed
by the learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast
Track Court), Rangareddy District at L.B. Nagar, in S.C.No.57 of
2012, is hereby set aside. The appellant-accused is acquitted of
the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC by extending to
him the benefit of reasonable doubt. The fine amount, if any, paid
by him shall be refunded to him in accordance with law. The bail
bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any,
shall stand closed.
___________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Date: -SEP-2026
KHRM
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W
PD
JUDGMENT
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.785 of 2014
Date: -SEP-2026
KHRM