MOHAN NAIK vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- Decided on
- 13-03-2026
<div> Crl.A.No.824 of 2023 <br /> <b>R</b><br /> IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU <br /> TH<br /> DATED THIS THE 13 DAY OF MARCH 2026 <br /> PRESENT <br /> THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA <br /> CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 824 OF 2023 <br /> <br /> BETWEEN: <br /> <br /> 1. MOHAN NAIK <br /> S/O GOVINDA NAIK, <br /> NOW AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS, <br /> R/O AMMANAPURA, <br /> AVVERAHALLI POST, <br /> KAILANCH HOBLI, <br /> RAMANAGARA TALUK. <br /> RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562159 <br /> [Now in Judicial Custody] <br /> <br /> 2. APPU NAIK <br /> S/O VINOD KUMAR, <br /> NOW AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS, <br /> R/O AMMANAPURA, <br /> AVVERAHALLI POST, <br /> KAILANCH HOBLI, <br /> RAMANAGARA TALUK. <br /> RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562159 <br /> [Now in Judicial Custody] <br /> <br /> …APPELLANTS <br /> (BY SRI K.A. CHANDRASHEKARA, ADVOCATE) <br /> <br /> AND: <br /> <br /> 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA <br /> BY RAMANAGARA WOMEN POLICE STATION <br /><br /> 2<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> RAMANAGARA-562159. <br /> REPTD BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, <br /> HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA <br /> BENGALURU-560001. <br /> <br /> 2. M/S. GOWRI BAI <br /> W/O MANJU NAIK <br /> R/O AMMANAPURA <br /> AVVVERAHALLI POST <br /> KAILANCH HOBLI, <br /> RAMANAGARA TALUK. <br /> RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562159 <br /> <br /> AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 29.07.2025 <br /> <br /> …RESPONDENT <br /> (BY SRI B. LAKSHMAN, HCGP FOR R1; <br /> R2 SERVED, UNREPRESETED) <br /> <br /> THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) <br /> OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE <br /> THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE <br /> DATED 28-03-2023/31-03-2023 PASSED IN S.C. NO.26/2022 BY <br /> THE III ADDL., DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE RAMANAGARA <br /> CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS HEREIN FOR THE OFFENCE <br /> PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 376-D IPC; AND ETC. <br /> THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED <br /> ON 18.02.2026, COMING ON FOR ‘PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, <br /> THIS DAY, THE COURT, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: <br /> CAV JUDGMENT <br /> 1. The appellants prefer this appeal under Section 374(2) of <br /> the Code of Criminal Procedure, aggrieved by the judgment of <br /> th st<br /> conviction and order on sentence dated 28 /31 March, 2023, <br /><br /> 3<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> passed in SC No.26 of 2022 by the III Additional District and <br /> Sessions Judge, Ramanagara convicting the appellants for the <br /> offence under sections 376-D IPC and sentenced them to undergo <br /> 25 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-<br /> each in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple <br /> imprisonment for one year. <br /> 2. In the present judgment, I would like to withhold the name <br /> of the victim lady in view of the provisions of Section 228A IPC <br /> and in pursuance of the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court <br /> in STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. SHREE KANTH SHEKARI (AIR <br /> 2004 SC 4404). The prosecutrix hereinafter referred to as "the <br /> victim”. <br /> 3. The facts, as unfolded by the prosecution, in short <br /> conspectus, is that on 16.06.2021 at about 5.30 p.m., the accused <br /> Nos.1 and 2 are alleged to have visited the house of C.W.1, the <br /> victim. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused were <br /> under the influence of alcohol at the relevant point of time, <br /> immediately upon entering the house, they are stated to have <br /> bolted the main door from inside and closed the windows, thereby <br /><br /> 4<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> preventing any possibility of outside intervention. Both the <br /> accused, having common intention, committed forcible sexual <br /> intercourse upon the victim one after the other, thereby attracting <br /> the offence punishable under Section 376D of the Indian Penal <br /> Code. Further, the accused attempted to strangulate the victim, <br /> thereby causing injuries and committing an act amounting to an <br /> offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. <br /> 4. During the course of investigation, the statement of the <br /> victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal <br /> Procedure before the jurisdictional Magistrate on 21.06.2021. The <br /> accused were apprehended and remanded to judicial custody. <br /> Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid the <br /> charge sheet before the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge <br /> and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramanagara, which, after taking <br /> cognizance of the offences, committed the matter to the Court of <br /> Sessions by order dated 08.02.2022. Upon receipt of the <br /> committal records, the Sessions Court secured the presence of the <br /> accused and, after hearing both sides, framed charges against <br /> accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections <br /><br /> 5<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 376D and 307 of the Indian Penal Code on 17.11.2022. The <br /> accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. <br /> 5. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the <br /> prosecution examined in all 20 witnesses as PWs1 to 20, marked <br /> Exs.P1 to P30 and eight material objects as MOs.1 to 8. After <br /> closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the <br /> accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were <br /> recorded, wherein the incriminating circumstances appearing <br /> against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses were <br /> put to them. The accused denied all such circumstances as false. <br /> Further the accused No.1 has stated that, <br /> £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀİè AiÀiÁgÀÆ <br /> ¨ÁrUÉUÉ E®è. £Á£ÀÄ Hj£À°èzÁÝUÀ ¥ÉÆÃ°ÃgÀÄ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV ºÉÆqÉzÀgÀÄ. <br /> 7-8 ¥ÉÃ¥Àj£À°è ¸À» ºÁQ¹PÉÆAqÀgÀÄ. £Á£ÀÄ AiÀiÁgÀ ªÉÄà &ÉAiÀÄÆ PÀA¥ÉèAmï <br /> The accused No.2 has stated that, <br /> PÉÆnÖ®è . £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀİèzÁÝUÀ <br /> ¥ÉÆÃ°Ã¸ÀgÀÄ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV 2 ¢ªÀ¸À ºÉÆqÉzÀgÀÄ, SÁ° ¥ÉÃ¥Àgï ªÉÄà &É ¸À» <br /> They did not choose to adduce any defence <br /> ºÁQ¹PÉÆAqÀgÀÄ. <br /> evidence. <br /><br /> 6<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 6. The trial court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties <br /> and after scrutinizing and assessing the evidence on record, <br /> convicted and sentenced the appellants herein for the offence <br /> punishable under Section 376-D IPC and sentenced them to <br /> undergo 25 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of <br /> Rs.1,00,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to undergo <br /> simple imprisonment for one year and has acquitted for the <br /> offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Being aggrieved by <br /> the impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the <br /> appellants have preferred this appeal. <br /> Submissions of Counsel for the Accused/Appellants: <br /> 7. Sri Veeranna G. Tigadi, learned counsel appearing for the <br /> appellants vehemently contended that the impugned judgment of <br /> conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is <br /> contrary to law, facts and probabilities of the case. It is submitted <br /> that the Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence <br /> on record in its proper perspective and has erroneously convicted <br /> the appellants under Section 376-D IPC. <br /><br /> 7<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 8. It is further submitted that the conviction is primarily based <br /> on the solitary testimony of PW4-victim, whose evidence, <br /> according to the learned counsel, is riddled with material <br /> contradictions and inconsistencies. Though it is a settled principle <br /> that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the <br /> prosecutrix, the same must be of sterling quality and must inspire <br /> confidence. In the present case, the evidence of PW-4 does not <br /> meet that standard. <br /> 9. The learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court <br /> to the material admissions elicited in the cross-examination of <br /> PW-4, wherein victim has stated that victim does not know the <br /> accused. Victim has further deposed that victim is aged about 50–<br /> 60 years, married, having three married sons and grandchildren. <br /> More importantly, victim has admitted that victim had not seen <br /> the faces of the persons who allegedly committed the offence and <br /> has even stated that the persons present before the Court are not <br /> the persons who committed rape on her. These admissions, <br /> according to the learned counsel, strike at the root of the <br /> prosecution case and demolish the identification of the accused. <br /><br /> 8<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 10. It is also contended that though PW-4 stated that her <br /> statement was recorded in the police station, Ex.P-3 reflects that <br /> written information was submitted; however, victim has not <br /> affixed her LTM on the said document. This discrepancy creates <br /> serious doubt about the very genesis of the complaint. <br /> 11. The learned counsel further submits that the prosecution <br /> examined as many as 20 witnesses to prove its case. Out of them, <br /> PWs3, 9, 10, 14 and 15 were cited as independent witnesses to <br /> corroborate the testimony of PW-4. However, all these material <br /> witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. In the <br /> absence of corroboration from independent witnesses, the <br /> conviction solely on the shaky testimony of PW-4 is unsustainable. <br /> 12. With regard to the medical evidence, it is contended that <br /> PW-13, the Doctor, has deposed that the history given was of <br /> “misbehavior by two persons with hands.” On examination, no <br /> external injuries were found on the body of PW-4; there was no <br /> disfigurement on her face and no signs indicative of forcible sexual <br /> intercourse. The learned counsel would submit that the medical <br /> evidence does not corroborate the allegation of gang rape. Even <br /><br /> 9<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> the FSL report does not support the prosecution case. There is <br /> also inconsistency regarding who accompanied PW-4 to the <br /> hospital, as the version of PW-13 is not in consonance with that of <br /> PW-12. <br /> 13. It is further contended that the essential ingredients of <br /> Section 375 IPC have not been established, and much less the <br /> additional requirement under Section 376-D IPC of common <br /> intention and participation of more than one accused in the <br /> commission of gang rape. Mere use of the expression “rape” by <br /> PW4, without proof of the foundational facts constituting the <br /> offence, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 376-<br /> D IPC. At the highest, the allegations, even if taken at face value, <br /> may attract an offence under Section 354 IPC, but certainly not <br /> the offence of gang rape. <br /> 14. The learned counsel would also place reliance on Exhibits P-<br /> 30 and P31 to contend that accused No.1 had earlier lodged a <br /> complaint in Crime No.121/2021 before Ramanagara Rural Police <br /> against PWs 14 and 15 for offences under Sections 324, 504 and <br /> 506 read with Section 34 IPC. It is submitted that due to prior <br /><br /> 10<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> enmity and ill-will, the appellants have been falsely implicated in <br /> the present case, and this aspect has not been properly <br /> appreciated by the learned Sessions Judge. <br /> 15. It is further argued that the Trial Court has acquitted the <br /> appellants of the charge under Section 307 IPC, holding that the <br /> prosecution failed to prove the said offence. Having disbelieved <br /> the prosecution case in respect of one serious charge, the learned <br /> Judge ought to have exercised similar caution while appreciating <br /> the evidence for the charge under Section 376-D IPC. <br /> <br /> 16. The learned counsel submits that the entire prosecution case <br /> is doubtful from its inception and appears to be an afterthought, <br /> possibly the result of deliberation and previous animosity. The <br /> learned Trial Judge, without extending the benefit of doubt to the <br /> appellants, has proceeded on presumptions and has misapplied <br /> the legal principles governing criminal jurisprudence. <br /> 17. It is finally contended that in criminal law, the burden is <br /> always on the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable <br /> doubt. In the present case, the prosecution has miserably failed to <br /><br /> 11<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> discharge that burden. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to <br /> the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal. <br /> Submissions on behalf of the respondent-State: <br /> 18. Per contra, Sri B. Lakshman, learned High Court <br /> Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, would <br /> stoutly support the impugned judgment of conviction and order on <br /> sentence and contend that the same is legal, proper and based on <br /> sound appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record. <br /> 19. It is submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has <br /> meticulously examined the entire material placed before the Court <br /> and has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has <br /> proved the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt for <br /> the offence punishable under Section 376-D IPC. <br /> 20. He would further contend that the evidence of PW-4, the <br /> victim, is natural, cogent and trustworthy. It is a settled principle <br /> of law that the testimony of the prosecutrix stands on par with <br /> that of an injured witness and, if found reliable, can form the sole <br /> basis for conviction without the necessity of corroboration. In the <br /><br /> 12<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> present case, PW-4 has clearly narrated the manner in which the <br /> accused came to her house and committed the offence. Nothing <br /> substantial has been elicited in her cross-examination to discredit <br /> her core version regarding the commission of the offence. <br /> 21. It is further submitted that minor discrepancies or omissions <br /> in the evidence of a rustic witness cannot be magnified to discard <br /> the entire prosecution case. The learned Trial Judge has rightly <br /> observed that trivial contradictions, which do not go to the root of <br /> the matter, cannot be made a ground to extend benefit of doubt <br /> to the accused. <br /> 22. With regard to the contention that certain independent <br /> witnesses have not supported the prosecution, the learned High <br /> Court Government Pleader would submit that merely because <br /> some witnesses have turned hostile, the prosecution case does <br /> not fail, particularly when the testimony of the victim is clear and <br /> consistent. The evidence of a hostile witness need not be rejected <br /> in toto and can be relied upon to the extent it supports the <br /> prosecution case. <br /><br /> 13<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 23. As regards the medical evidence, it is submitted that <br /> absence of external injuries is not fatal to the case of the <br /> prosecution in an offence of rape, especially when the victim is a <br /> grown-up woman. The medical evidence in the present case does <br /> not rule out sexual assault. The history noted by the Doctor and <br /> the findings on examination are consistent with the version of PW-<br /> 4. It is well settled that medical evidence is corroborative in <br /> nature and when the ocular testimony of the victim is trustworthy, <br /> minor inconsistencies in medical evidence do not discredit the <br /> prosecution case. <br /> 24. It is further contended that the ingredients of Section 376-D <br /> IPC are clearly made out from the evidence on record. The victim <br /> has specifically deposed about the involvement of more than one <br /> accused acting in furtherance of their common intention. The <br /> learned Trial Judge, after proper analysis of the evidence, has <br /> rightly recorded a finding that the offence of gang rape stands <br /> proved. <br /> 25. With regard to the alleged prior complaint filed by accused <br /> No.1, it is submitted that the same has no bearing on the present <br /><br /> 14<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> case. The defence theory of false implication on account of prior <br /> enmity is a mere bald suggestion without any substantive <br /> evidence. The learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the said <br /> defence as an afterthought. <br /> 26. It is also contended that the acquittal of the appellants for <br /> the offence under Section 307 IPC does not in any manner dilute <br /> the prosecution case with regard to the offence under Section <br /> 376-D IPC. Each charge has to be independently assessed on the <br /> basis of evidence available, and the learned Sessions Judge has <br /> done so in accordance with law. <br /> 27. Finally, he submitted that the impugned judgment reflects <br /> proper appreciation of evidence and correct application of legal <br /> principles. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are neither <br /> perverse nor contrary to the material on record so as to warrant <br /> interference by this Court in an appeal against conviction. <br /> Accordingly, sought for dismissal of the appeal. <br /> 28. Upon hearing the rival contentions urged by the learned <br /> counsel for the appellants and the learned HCGP for the State, and <br /><br /> 15<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> upon perusal of the oral and documentary evidence available on <br /> record, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal: <br /> (i) Whether appellants/accused have made out a <br /> case to interfere with the impugned judgment <br /> conviction and order on sentence passed by <br /> the trial Court? <br /> (ii) What Order? <br /> 29. My answer to the above points is as under: <br /> Point No.1: in affirmative <br /> Point No.2: as per final order <br /> Regarding Point No.1: <br /> 30. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments <br /> advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. I have carefully <br /> perused the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, <br /> including the original records secured from the Trial Court. Being <br /> an appellate Court under Section 374(2) of the Cr.PC, this Court is <br /><br /> 16<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> duty-bound to re-appreciate the evidence in its entirety and arrive <br /> at an independent conclusion. <br /> 31. In order to attract Section 376-D IPC, the prosecution must <br /> establish not merely the commission of rape, but also the <br /> participation of more than one person acting in furtherance of a <br /> common intention. The statutory requirement is not satisfied by <br /> proving the act of sexual assault alone; it must be demonstrated <br /> through clear, cogent and convincing evidence that each accused <br /> was present and actively involved in the commission of the <br /> offence, sharing a common intention. The evidence on record <br /> must, therefore, unequivocally establish both the presence and <br /> participation of the accused in the alleged occurrence. Before <br /> adverting to the appreciation of evidence in the present case, it is <br /> necessary to revisit the settled principles laid down by the Hon’ble <br /> Supreme Court regarding the evidentiary value to be attached to <br /> the testimony of a prosecutrix in cases of sexual assault, <br /> particularly where the prosecution case rests substantially, if not <br /> entirely, on her evidence. It is well settled that the testimony of <br /> the victim of a sexual offence stands on a higher pedestal and, if <br /><br /> 17<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> found to be trustworthy and credible, can form the sole basis for <br /> conviction without the necessity of corroboration. At the same <br /> time, such testimony must be evaluated with due care, caution <br /> and sensitivity, keeping in view the overall circumstances of the <br /> case. <br /> 32. The law is equally well settled that oral testimony may <br /> broadly be classified into three categories, namely: (i) wholly <br /> reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor <br /> wholly unreliable. In cases falling under the first category, the <br /> Court may safely base a conviction on the testimony of a single <br /> witness without corroboration. In cases falling under the second <br /> category, the testimony is to be rejected outright. However, it is in <br /> the third category—where the witness is neither wholly reliable <br /> nor wholly unreliable—that the Court must exercise greater <br /> circumspection. In such cases, as a rule of prudence, the Court <br /> looks for corroboration in material particulars, either through <br /> direct or circumstantial evidence, before recording a finding of <br /> guilt. <br /><br /> 18<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 33. In RAI SANDEEP v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) reported in <br /> (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Court found totally conflicting versions of <br /> the prosecutrix, from what was stated in the complaint and what <br /> was deposed before Court, resulting in material inconsistencies. <br /> Reversing the conviction and holding that the prosecutrix cannot <br /> be held to be a ‘sterling witness’, the Courtm at paragraph 22 of <br /> the judgment, has opined thus: <br /> “ 22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling <br /> witness’ should be of a very high quality and calibre <br /> whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The <br /> court considering the version of such witness should be in <br /> a position to accept it for its face value without any <br /> hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the <br /> status of the witness would be immaterial and what would <br /> be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by <br /> such a witness. What would be more relevant would be <br /> the consistency of the statement right from the starting <br /> point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness <br /> makes the initial statement and ultimately before the <br /> court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of <br /> the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any <br /> prevarication in the version of such a witness. The <br /> witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-<br /> examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it <br /> may be and under no circumstance should give room for <br /><br /> 19<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons <br /> involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version <br /> should have co-relation with each and every one of other <br /> supporting material such as the recoveries made, the <br /> weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the <br /> scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said <br /> version should consistently match with the version of <br /> every other witness. It can even be stated that it should <br /> be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial <br /> evidence where there should not be any missing link in <br /> the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of <br /> the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of <br /> such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other <br /> such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a <br /> witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version <br /> can be accepted by the court without any corroboration <br /> and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be <br /> more precise, the version of the said witness on the core <br /> spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other <br /> attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and <br /> material objects should match the said version in material <br /> particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence <br /> to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting <br /> materials for holding the offender guilt of the charge <br /> alleged. ” <br /> 34. In KRISHAN KUMAR MALIK v. STATE OF HARYANA reported <br /> in (2011)7 SCC 130, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that <br /><br /> 20<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> although the victim's solitary evidence in matters related to sexual <br /> offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold an accused guilty, <br /> the conviction cannot be sustained if the prosecutrix's testimony is <br /> found unreliable and insufficient due to identified flaws and <br /> lacunae. It was held thus: <br /> “ 31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused <br /> guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary <br /> evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the <br /> same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely <br /> trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling <br /> quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the <br /> prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already <br /> been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her <br /> evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be <br /> relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said <br /> offences. <br /> 32. Indeed there are several significant variations <br /> in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section <br /> 161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. Thus, <br /> it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated <br /> independently, which they could have done either by <br /> examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were <br /> present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction. <br /> The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a <br /> witness was not examined and later given up by the <br /><br /> 21<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> public prosecutor on the ground that victim been won <br /> over by the appellant. ” <br /> 35. The entire oral and documentary evidence on record has <br /> been re-appreciated, as is required in an appeal against <br /> conviction. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the <br /> appellants is that the conviction is based solely on the testimony <br /> of PW-4, the victim, and that her evidence is not of such quality as <br /> to inspire confidence. It is urged that material contradictions and <br /> admissions elicited in her cross-examination go to the root of the <br /> prosecution case, particularly with regard to identification of the <br /> accused. It is well settled that the testimony of a prosecutrix, if <br /> found credible and trustworthy, can form the sole basis of <br /> conviction and does not require corroboration as a matter of rule. <br /> The evidence of the victim stands on par with that of an injured <br /> witness. However, where the testimony suffers from inherent <br /> improbabilities, material inconsistencies or serious doubts <br /> regarding identification of the accused, the Court is duty-bound to <br /> scrutinize the same with greater circumspection. <br /><br /> 22<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 36. In the present case, PW-4 has narrated in her examination-<br /> in-chief that accused Nos.1 and 2 entered her house, bolted the <br /> doors and windows, gagged her and committed forcible sexual <br /> intercourse one after the other. Victim has also spoken about an <br /> attempt to strangulate her. Her statement under Section 164 <br /> Cr.PC. marked as Ex.P-27, is stated to be consistent with her <br /> version before the Court. However, in the cross-examination, <br /> certain significant admissions have been elicited. Victim has stated <br /> that victim did not know the accused earlier. More importantly, it <br /> is brought on record that victim has deposed that victim had not <br /> seen the faces of the persons who allegedly committed the offence <br /> and that the persons present before the Court were not the <br /> persons who committed rape on her. Such an admission, if read in <br /> its plain terms, strikes at the very foundation of identification. <br /> Identification of the accused is a foundational fact in a criminal <br /> trial, and where the same is rendered doubtful, the entire <br /> prosecution case stands on a fragile footing. <br /> 37. The prosecution has examined as many as twenty <br /> witnesses. PWs3, 9, 10, 14 and 15, who were cited as <br /><br /> 23<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> independent witnesses, have not supported the prosecution case. <br /> Though it is true that the evidence of hostile witnesses need not <br /> be rejected in toto, in the present case, their evidence does not <br /> lend any meaningful corroboration to the testimony of PW-4. <br /> 38. The medical evidence also requires careful consideration. <br /> PW-13, the Doctor, has deposed that the history furnished was <br /> one of “misbehavior by two persons with hands.” On examination, <br /> no external injuries were found on the body; there was no <br /> disfigurement and no definite signs suggestive of forcible sexual <br /> intercourse. While it is trite that absence of injuries is not by itself <br /> fatal to a prosecution for rape, especially in the case of a grown-<br /> up woman, the medical evidence must at least not contradict the <br /> ocular testimony. In the present case, the medical evidence does <br /> not positively corroborate the allegation of gang rape. The FSL <br /> report also does not provide any conclusive support to the <br /> prosecution version. <br /> 39. Another aspect that merits attention is the discrepancy <br /> relating to the lodging of the complaint. Though PW-4 has stated <br /> that her statement was recorded at the police station, Ex.P-3 is <br /><br /> 24<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> shown as written information, and it is contended that victim has <br /> not affixed her LTM on the said document. The genesis of the <br /> complaint, therefore, assumes significance in the backdrop of the <br /> defence plea of false implication due to prior enmity. <br /> 40. The defence has also placed reliance upon Exs.P-30 and P-<br /> 31 to demonstrate that accused No.1 had earlier lodged a <br /> complaint in Crime No.121/2021 against certain prosecution <br /> witnesses. Though prior enmity by itself cannot be a ground to <br /> discard the prosecution case, it assumes relevance where the <br /> prosecution evidence is otherwise shaky and doubtful. The <br /> learned Trial Judge has acquitted the appellants of the offence <br /> under Section 307 IPC on the ground that the prosecution failed to <br /> establish the same beyond reasonable doubt. While it is true that <br /> each charge must be independently assessed, the overall <br /> appreciation of evidence must be consistent and guided by the <br /> cardinal principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond <br /> reasonable doubt. <br /> 41. On perusal of complaint-Ex.P3 dated 17.06.2021 registered <br /> in Crime No.64/2021 of Ramanagara Women Police Station, it is <br /><br /> 25<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> seen that the complaint was lodged at about 11.45 am on <br /> 17.06.2021. Exhibit P21 is the First Information Report. In <br /> Exhibit P3, victim-PW4, has narrated that at about 5.30 p.m. on <br /> 16.06.2021, the accused came to her house, asked for food and, <br /> treating them like her children, victim served food. Thereafter, <br /> under the influence of alcohol, they allegedly molested her by <br /> touching her breasts and committed sexual assault. Victim has <br /> further stated that when she screamed, they attempted to <br /> strangulate her and at that time, one Jayasimha Naik (her uncle’s <br /> son), rushed and rescued her, and subsequently Ramaswamy and <br /> Kumar assaulted the accused and saved her. Victim was taken to <br /> the hospital at midnight. She has also alleged that the accused <br /> were involved in illegal activities and sale of liquor and sought <br /> protection. <br /> 42. Ex.P5 is the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC on <br /> 21.06.2021 before the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) & <br /> JMFC, Ramanagara. Exhibit P14 indicates that FSL report was <br /> pending at the relevant time. Exhibit P20 is the FSL <br /> acknowledgment spoken to by PW17. <br /><br /> 26<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 43. The appellants were charged for the offences under Sections <br /> 307 and 376-D IPC. Section 307 IPC contemplates an act done <br /> with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances <br /> that, if death had been caused, the act would amount to murder. <br /> Section 376-D IPC requires proof that a woman was raped by one <br /> or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of <br /> common intention. <br /> 44. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the <br /> appellants is that the very identity of the accused is doubtful. In <br /> paragraph No.15 of her cross-examination she has stated that <br /> gÉÃ¥ï ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä §AzÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄÄRªÀ£ÀÄß D ¢£ÀªÀÇ £ÉÆÃr®è, EªÀvÀÆÛ £ÉÆÃr®è. <br /> CªÀgÀ£ÀÄß F ¢£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ°è £ÉÆÃrgÀÄwÛÃgÉÆÃ JAzÀgÉ CªÀgÀÄ EªÀgÀ®è <br /> PW-4 has clearly stated that victim has not identified the <br /> J£ÀÄßvÁÛgÉ . <br /> accused either on the date of incident or before the Court. In <br /> paragraph No.17, victim has stated <br /> ¥ÉÆÃ°¸ÀgÀÄ K£ÀÄ §gÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀgÉÆÃ <br /> The victim does not know the <br /> CzÀPÉÌ £Á£ÀÄ ¸À» ªÀiÁrzÉÝ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj.<br /> contents of Ex.P1-complaint. These admissions are material in <br /> nature. Identification of the accused is a foundational fact and <br /><br /> 27<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> when the victim herself disowns identification, the substratum of <br /> the prosecution case becomes doubtful. <br /> 45. PW-13, the Doctor, examined the victim at 2.58 a.m. on <br /> 17.06.2021. He has deposed that the history given was of <br /> “misbehaviour by two of her relatives” and that no external <br /> injuries were found. PW-4 herself has stated that victim has not <br /> sustained any injuries. The absence of injuries, though not always <br /> fatal, assumes significance in the present case in view of the <br /> allegation of forcible gang rape and attempted strangulation. <br /> <br /> 46. PW19-Dr. Geetha, has not examined the victim. Victim has <br /> merely identified the handwriting and signature of Dr. Mamatha, <br /> who allegedly examined the victim. Dr. Mamatha has not been <br /> examined. Thus, the medical evidence is not proved in accordance <br /> with law through the author of the document. This omission <br /> affects the evidentiary value of the medical records. <br /> 47. The final FSL opinion-Exhibit P19 indicates that seminal <br /> stains were detected on Item No.3 and that possibility of recent <br /> sexual intercourse could be concluded. However, the prosecution <br /> has not established that MOs1 to 8 (including undergarments) <br /><br /> 28<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> belonged to the victim. PW-12 has deposed that victim procured <br /> eight objects from the victim and sealed them, but during the <br /> evidence of PW-4 and PW-12, M.O. Nos.1 to 8 were not shown. <br /> They were marked for the first time during the evidence of PW-18. <br /> This creates serious doubt about the proper identification and <br /> proof of material objects. <br /> 48. PW6-Dr. Syed Nadeem, examined accused No.1 and issued <br /> wound certificate Ex.P7. Though police records indicate arrest on <br /> 17.06.2021, Ex.P7 shows that accused No.1 was examined on <br /> 22.06.2021 and the injuries were noted as five days old. Column <br /> No.9 of Ex.P7 (history of injuries) is left blank. PW-6 has admitted <br /> that he has not mentioned the history of assault. This <br /> inconsistency in arrest and medical examination dates casts doubt <br /> on the prosecution version regarding arrest and alleged assault by <br /> <br /> public.<br /> 49. The order sheet of the committal Court reveals that accused <br /> No.2 was produced on 17.06.2021 and accused No.1 on <br /> 22.06.2021. However, PW-7 has deposed that he arrested both <br /> accused on 17.06.2021 and produced them before higher <br /><br /> 29<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> authorities. The alleged arrest report is not produced. The <br /> Investigating Officer (PW-18) has not explained these <br /> discrepancies. Such inconsistencies in arrest and production <br /> before Court go to the root of the investigation. Another <br /> significant aspect is the discrepancy regarding the time of incident <br /> In Ex.P3 and Ex.P5 (Section 164 statement), the time of incident <br /> is stated as 5.30 p.m. However, certain witnesses and police <br /> records indicate the time as between 10.00 p.m. to 11.00 p.m. <br /> Such material contradiction regarding the time of occurrence <br /> affects the credibility of the prosecution case. As the Ex.P5 is the <br /> statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 21.06.2021 <br /> before the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) & JMFC, <br /> Ramanagara, it is significant to notice that the alleged incident has <br /> happened on 16.06.2021 at about 5.30 p.m., by the accused <br /> Nos.1 and 2 , however the 164 statement was recorded on <br /> 21.06.2021,there is a delay in recording the statement of victim <br /> which is not explained by the prosecution. <br /> 50. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF <br /> KARNATAKA BY NONAVINAKERE v. SHIVANNA @ TARKARI <br /><br /> 30<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> SHIVANNA reported in AIR ONLINE 2014 SC 233 , has issued <br /> guidelines, which are as follows: <br /> “ 9. On considering the same, we have accepted the <br /> suggestion offered by the learned counsel who appeared <br /> before us and hence exercising powers under Article <br /> 142 of the Constitution, we are pleased to issue interim <br /> directions in the form of mandamus to all the police <br /> station in charge in the entire country to follow the <br /> direction of this Court which are as follows: <br /> (i) Upon receipt of information relating to the <br /> commission of offence of rape, the Investigating <br /> Officer shall make immediate steps to take the <br /> victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial <br /> Magistrate for the purpose of recording her <br /> statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. A copy of <br /> the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. should <br /> be handed over to the Investigating Officer <br /> immediately with a specific direction that the <br /> contents of such statement under Section 164 <br /> Cr.P.C. should not be disclosed to any person till <br /> charge sheet/report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is <br /> filed. <br /> (ii) The Investigating Officer shall, as far as possible, <br /> take the victim to the nearest Lady <br /> Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate. <br /> (iii) The Investigating Officer shall record specifically <br /> the date and the time at which he learnt about <br /> the commission of the offence of rape and the <br /> date and time at which he took the victim to the <br /> Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate <br /> as aforesaid. <br /><br /> 31<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> (iv) If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking <br /> the victim to the Magistrate, the Investigating <br /> Officer should record the reasons for the same in <br /> the case diary and hand over a copy of the same <br /> to the Magistrate. <br /> (v) Medical Examination of the victim: Section 164 A <br /> Cr.P.C. (inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in Cr.PC. <br /> imposes an obligation on the part of Investigating <br /> Officer to get the victim of the rape immediately <br /> medically examined.) A copy of the report of <br /> such medical examination should be immediately <br /> handed over to the Magistrate who records the <br /> statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. <br /> 10. A copy of this order thus be circulated to all the <br /> Director Generals of Police of all the States/Commissioner <br /> of Police in Metropolitan cities / Commissioner of Police of <br /> Union Territories who are then directed to send a copy of <br /> this order to all the police stations in charge in their <br /> States/Union Territories for its compliance in cases which <br /> are registered on or after the receipt of a copy of these <br /> directions. Necessary instructions by the DGPs/ <br /> Commissioners of Police be also issued to all the police <br /> station incharge by the DGPs/Commissioner of Police <br /> incorporating the directions issued by us and recorded <br /> hereinbefore. <br /> 11. The matter be posted again after four weeks to <br /> ensure compliance of this order by the DGS & <br /> Commissioners of Police in the country before the <br /> appropriate Bench and also for such other further order or <br /> orders which may be considered necessary. <br /><br /> 32<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> The IO has not followed the mandatory guidelines and has <br /> handled the case in a very negligent manner by not explaining the <br /> delay in producing the victim before the Magistrate to record the <br /> statement under Section 164(5) of Cr.PC. <br /> 51. The demeanor of the victim, as recorded by the Trial Court, <br /> also assumes relevance. It is noted that victim was murmuring to <br /> herself, was earning livelihood by begging, used to scream and <br /> was not properly dressed. Though demeanor alone cannot <br /> discredit testimony, when read along with the inconsistencies and <br /> admissions, it raises doubt regarding reliability. It is further <br /> observed that during cross-examination, the learned Trial Judge <br /> recorded certain observations, which are as under: <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>“</th><th>28. ಘಟೆ ಾಾಗ ನ ೆ ತು ಎಂದು ಖರಾ ೇಳಲ</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ಬರುವ ಲ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ . ನನ! "ೖ"ೕ$ೆ ಒಂದು &ೆ ೆಯಷು) ಕೂಡ &ಾಯ</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ಆಲ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ . ಾವ.ೇ ಅ0ಾ12ಾರ 3ಾ4ಲ ಮತು6 ಸುಳ7</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ೇಳ796.ೆ:ೕೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ ಯಲ . ಾನು ಈಗ 3ಾತಾ4ರುವದನು! ಇನು! 5</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>=ಷದ> ಮ ೆಯು0ೆ6ೕೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ ಯಲ . (?ಾ@.ಾರಳ7 ತಮAಷ)Bೆ</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>0ಾೇ ಏೇೋ &ೊಣBೊಳ780ಾ6 ಇರು0ಾ6 ೆ ಎನು!ವದನು! ಈ</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ಾ1ಾಲಯ ಗಮF.ೆ.)</td><td></td><td>”</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /><br /> 33<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 55. Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 confers very <br /> wide powers upon a trial Judge to put questions to any witness, in <br /> any form, at any stage of the proceedings, in order to discover or <br /> obtain proper proof of relevant facts. The provision expressly <br /> authorises the Judge to ask questions “in any form,” which <br /> includes leading questions. Therefore, as a matter of law, a Judge <br /> can put leading questions even to a rape-victim during trial. This <br /> power operates notwithstanding the restrictions contained in <br /> Sections 141 to 143 of the Evidence Act relating to leading <br /> questions. However, though the power is extensive, it is not <br /> arbitrary or unregulated; it must be exercised judiciously, <br /> cautiously, and in furtherance of justice. In trials for offences <br /> under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, the recording of the <br /> victim’s evidence carries additional sensitivity. Statutory <br /> safeguards such as the proviso to Section 146 of the Evidence Act, <br /> Section 53A of the Evidence Act, and Section 327(2) of the Code <br /> of Criminal Procedure mandate protection of the dignity and <br /> privacy of the prosecutrix. The Court is required to ensure that <br /> victim is not subjected to humiliating or irrelevant questioning and <br /> that the atmosphere of the courtroom does not become <br /><br /> 34<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> intimidating. In this context, the Judge is not expected to remain <br /> a silent spectator; rather, the Judge may intervene to clarify <br /> ambiguities, to ensure that the testimony is properly understood, <br /> or to prevent confusion created during cross-examination. <br /> 3. <br /> ಅವ ಬGರೂ ೇI 3ಾಡಲು ಬಂದರು. ಮುಖ1 K2ಾರLೆ .ಾಖಲು 3ಾಡು96ರುವ ಸಮಯದ> <br /> , <br /> ಆ ೋMತರ ವNೕಲರು ಪ.ೇ ಪ.ೇ ಮಧ1 ಪQೇRಸು96ದು: ಆದ : ಂದ ಾೇ ಸSತಃ ?ಾ@.ಾರ &ೆ <br /> ಆ ೋMತರು ಮA "ೕ$ೆ ೇI 3ಾ4.ಾ:ಾ ಎಂದು BೇU.ಾಗ ಆBೆ ಸVಷ)ಾ ೇI 3ಾ4.ಾ:ೆ <br /> <br /> ಎಂದು ೇUರು0ಾ6ೆ.)<br /> 4. <br /> ಪ ನಃ ಆೋMತರ ವNೕಲರ Bೋ Bೆಯ "ೕೆ&ೆ ಪನಃ ಪQR!F.ಾಗ ೇI 3ಾಡಲು ಪQಯತ! ಪಟ)ರು <br /> <br /> ಎನು!0ಾ6ೆ.”<br /> In the case on hand the trial court has interfered in the recording <br /> of evidence. The role of the judge while recording the evidence is <br /> to facilitate all the stake holders of the case, that too in the <br /> matters of offences against women. The adversial system of <br /> criminal jurisprudence expects the same. <br /> 52. The Supreme Court in STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. ANI, <br /> (1997)6 SCC 162, cautioned that judicial intervention must not <br /> appear to fill up lacunae in the prosecution case. These principles <br /> apply with equal force in rape trials. Thus, although a Judge may <br /> legally ask leading questions to a rape victim under Section 165, <br /><br /> 35<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> such power must be exercised only for clarification and to obtain <br /> proper proof of relevant facts. The Judge cannot suggest answers, <br /> introduce material facts not already spoken to by the witness, or <br /> supply essential ingredients of the offence—such as penetration—<br /> if the witness herself has not deposed to them. Nor can the Judge <br /> neutralize contradictions brought out in cross-examination or <br /> repair weaknesses in the prosecution case. Any such intervention <br /> may give rise to an apprehension of bias and may affect the <br /> fairness of the trial, which is an integral component of Article 21 of <br /> the Constitution. <br /> 53. In essence, the role of the trial Judge in recording the <br /> evidence of a rape victim is to strike a careful balance between <br /> sensitivity and neutrality. The Court must protect the dignity of <br /> the victim and ensure that her testimony is clearly and properly <br /> recorded, but it must not abandon its impartial position or assume <br /> the mantle of the prosecuting agency. The power under Section <br /> 165 of Indian Evidence Act is meant to advance the cause of <br /> justice and discovery of truth, not to tilt the balance in favour of <br /> either party. In the present case the Trial court has put leading <br /><br /> 36<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> question as to the directly commission of alleged offences by the <br /> accused persons which has prompted the victim to say <br /> affirmatively, however when the same question was putforth the <br /> victim has answered that the accused have attempted to commit <br /> rape, which is against to the jurisprudence of role of judges during <br /> trial of sexual assault cases. <br /> 54. No doubt, it is a settled principle of law that conviction for <br /> the offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the <br /> prosecutrix, provided her evidence inspires confidence and is <br /> found to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. It is equally settled <br /> that no rule of law requires corroboration in every case. However, <br /> this principle applies only when the testimony of the prosecutrix is <br /> clear, consistent and free from material contradictions. In the <br /> present case, on careful scrutiny of the evidence, it is seen that <br /> the testimony of the prosecutrix suffers from several material <br /> inconsistencies and omissions, as already discussed above. These <br /> infirmities are not minor discrepancies but go to the root of the <br /> prosecution case. Therefore, victim’s evidence cannot be said to <br /> be of such sterling quality so as to form the sole basis for <br /><br /> 37<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> conviction without corroboration. A comparison of victim’s <br /> statement under Section 164 CrPC, the contents of the FIR and <br /> victim’s deposition before the Court reveals substantial variations <br /> on material particulars. These contradictions relate to important <br /> aspects of the alleged incident and affect the credibility of victim’s <br /> version. In such circumstances, it would not be safe to rely solely <br /> upon victim’s testimony. As a matter of prudence, independent <br /> corroboration on material particulars was necessary before <br /> recording a finding of guilt against the appellant. <br /> <br /> 55. In the present case, in view of the serious doubt regarding <br /> identification and the absence of convincing corroboration from <br /> medical and independent evidence, this Court is of the considered <br /> opinion that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing the <br /> guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence <br /> punishable under Section 376-D IPC. Criminal jurisprudence <br /> mandates that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of <br /> proof. Where two views are possible on the evidence on record, <br /> the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. The benefit <br /> of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused. <br /><br /> 38<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 56. Upon a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire <br /> evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed <br /> to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence does <br /> not disclose clear and consistent identification of the accused by <br /> PW-4; the medical evidence does not cogently prove forcible <br /> sexual intercourse; the seizure, custody and proof of material <br /> objects suffer from serious infirmities; the arrest and production of <br /> the accused are clouded by discrepancies; and the independent <br /> witnesses have not furnished unimpeachable corroboration. The <br /> cumulative effect of the non-identification by the victim, <br /> contradictions regarding the time of incident, absence of injuries, <br /> defective proof of medical evidence, inconsistencies in the arrest <br /> procedure, improper marking of material objects, and lack of <br /> reliable corroboration, creates a substantial and reasonable doubt <br /> as to the guilt of the appellants under Section 376-D IPC. It is a <br /> cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden lies <br /> entirely on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable <br /> doubt, and suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of <br /> proof. In the present case, the benefit of such doubt must <br /> necessarily enure to the appellants. <br /><br /> 39<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> 57. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the <br /> prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond <br /> all reasonable doubt. The appellants are therefore entitled to <br /> acquittal by extending the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, I answer <br /> Point No.1 in the affirmative, holding that the appellants have <br /> made out a case for interference with the impugned judgment of <br /> conviction and order on sentence. <br /> Regarding point No.2: <br /> For the reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass the following: <br /> O R D E R <br /> (i) The appeal is allowed; <br /> (ii) The judgment of conviction and order on <br /> th st<br /> sentence dated 28 /31 March, 2023 passed <br /> in SC No.26 of 2022 by the III Additional <br /> District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara, <br /> convicting the appellants for the offence <br /> punishable under Section 376-D IPC, is hereby <br /> set aside; <br /><br /> 40<br /> Crl.A. No.824 of 2023 <br /> (iii) The appellants are acquitted of the offence <br /> punishable under Section 376-D IPC; <br /> (iv) The Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate this <br /> order forthwith to the concerned jail authority <br /> through e-mail and the appellants shall be set <br /> at liberty, if they are not required in any other <br /> case; <br /> Registry to send the copy of the judgment along with trial <br /> Court records to the concerned Court. <br /> Sd/- <br /> (G. BASAVARAJA) <br /> JUDGE <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> lnn </div>