Ashutosh Mittal vs Punita Mittal

151

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

TA No.24 of 2026
Date of decision: 12.11.2026

Ashutosh Mittal
…Applicant

Versus

Punita Mittal
…Respondent

CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU

Present :- Mr. Karan Kaushal, Advocate and
Mr. Nitesh Dalal, Advocate
for the applicant.

Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Tamanna Banwala, Advocate
for the respondent.

*
MANDEEP PANNU, J . (Oral)
1. The present transfer application has been filed by the
applicant-petitioner under Section 24 read with Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984,
seeking transfer of Domestic Violence Case No. 139 of 2025, titled ‘ Punita
Mittal versus Ashutosh Mittal and others’ , pending before the Court of Shri
Abhishek Chaudhary, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurugram, to
the Court of Ms. Poonam Kanwar, learned Additional Principal Judge,
Family Court, Gurugram, where a petition under Section 125 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding Section 144 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), between the same parties is stated to be
pending adjudication.
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -2-

2. The case set up by the applicant is that the parties to the
present application are involved in matrimonial litigation and, apart from
the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the DV Act'), a petition seeking
maintenance between them is also pending before the Family Court,
Gurugram. It is contended that the allegations and the factual background
involved in both the proceedings are substantially overlapping and that the
evidence required to be led in the two matters would also be similar.
According to the applicant, continuation of the two proceedings before
different courts would result in multiplicity of litigation, unnecessary
expenditure and inconvenience to the parties and may also give rise to
conflicting findings on the same set of facts. It is, therefore, submitted that
the interest of justice would be better served if both the matters are heard
by the same court.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant has further contended that
the Family Court is competent to grant reliefs contemplated under Sections
18 to 22 of the DV Act in view of the provisions of Section 26 thereof. It is
argued that since the Family Court is already seized of the matrimonial
dispute and the maintenance proceedings between the parties, there is no
legal impediment in transferring the proceedings under the DV Act to the
said court. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Rohan Shah
versus Nishigandha Shah , Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 477 of
2022 , decided on 20.12.2023. It is submitted that in the said judgment, the
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -3-

Bombay High Court, after considering the provisions of the DV Act and the
Family Courts Act, held that an application instituted under Section 12 of
the DV Act before a Magistrate could be transferred to the Family Court.
The Court also took into consideration the fact that the Family Court could
grant the reliefs contemplated under Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act and
that transfer of the proceedings would avoid multiplicity of litigation and
save the time and expense of the parties. It is, accordingly, contended that
the present application deserves to be allowed on similar considerations.
4. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent has opposed
the application and submitted that an independent application under
Section 12 of the DV Act is maintainable before the Court of the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, which is the forum specifically designated under the
statute. It is contended that the mere fact that certain reliefs under the DV
Act can also be sought before a Family Court in proceedings already
pending there does not confer upon the Family Court the original
jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate an independent application under
Section 12 of the DV Act. Learned counsel has submitted that Section 26 of
the DV Act has a limited scope and cannot be construed as conferring
concurrent jurisdiction upon the Family Court to entertain an application
under Section 12 of the Act. It is further argued that transfer of the
proceedings would deprive the aggrieved person of the statutory procedure
and appellate remedy provided under the DV Act. In support of these
submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the
Delhi High Court in Aseem Khanna versus Akanksha Dua, TR.P. (Crl.)
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -4-

No. 23 of 2024, decided on 18.09.2024, as well as the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi versus Vidhi Rawal,
2025 INSC 734 . It is, thus, contended that the Family Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain an independent proceeding instituted under Section
12 of the DV Act and the prayer for transfer is liable to be declined.
5. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties.
6. The controversy which arises for consideration is whether an
independent proceeding instituted under Section 12 of the DV Act and
pending before the Court of a Judicial Magistrate First Class can be
transferred to a Family Court merely because another proceeding between
the same parties is pending before the Family Court, particularly when the
proposed transferee court is sought to be vested with the adjudication of the
entire proceeding under the DV Act.
7. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to notice
the relevant statutory provisions. Section 12 of the DV Act provides for
presentation of an application by an aggrieved person or on her behalf
before the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Act. Section 27
identifies the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class or the
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within whose local limits the
aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business
or is employed, or where the respondent resides or carries on business or is
employed, or where the cause of action has arisen, as the competent court
to entertain the application under the Act. Section 28 provides that, save as
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -5-

otherwise provided in the Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Thus, the statutory
scheme makes a specific provision regarding the forum before which an
independent application under Section 12 is to be instituted and the
procedure governing such proceedings.
8. At this stage, it is also necessary to examine Section 26 of the
DV Act, upon which considerable reliance has been placed by learned
counsel for the applicant-petitioner. The said provision enables an
aggrieved person to seek reliefs available under Sections 18 to 22 of the
Act in any legal proceeding before a Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal
Court affecting her and the respondent, whether such proceeding was
instituted before or after the commencement of the DV Act. The provision,
therefore, enables the aggrieved person to seek the specified reliefs under
the DV Act in proceedings which are otherwise pending before the courts
mentioned therein. However, the question whether such provision also
confers jurisdiction upon a Family Court to entertain an independent
application under Section 12 of the DV Act is entirely different. The power
to grant certain reliefs under the Act in an already pending proceeding
cannot automatically be equated with the jurisdiction to entertain and
adjudicate an independent application instituted under Section 12 thereof.
9. This distinction has also been explained by the Kerala High
Court in Vineet Ganesh versus Priyanka Vasan, Transfer Appeal (Civil)
No.1 of 2023 , decided on 09.08.2023. The Division Bench, after examining
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -6-

the scheme of the DV Act, held that although the reliefs contemplated
under Sections 18 to 22 may be sought before a Family Court in a
proceeding pending before it, an independent application under Section 12
of the Act can be entertained only by the Magistrate. The Court further held
that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Family Court under Section 26 is
not concurrent with the original jurisdiction specifically vested in the
Magistrate under Section 27. It was accordingly held that a proceeding
instituted under the DV Act before a Judicial Magistrate First Class cannot
be transferred to a Family Court.
10. The aforesaid legal position was subsequently considered by
the Delhi High Court in Aseem Khanna versus Akanksha Dua (supra) . In
the said case also, the husband had sought transfer of proceedings instituted
by his wife under Section 12 of the DV Act from the Court of the
Metropolitan Magistrate to the Family Court where divorce proceedings
between the parties were pending. The principal ground for seeking transfer
was that the allegations in the two proceedings were substantially similar
and that their adjudication by the same court would avoid conflicting
decisions. The Delhi High Court considered the judgment of the Bombay
High Court in Rohan Shah versus Nishigandha Shah (supra) as well as
the contrary view taken by the Kerala High Court in Vineet Ganesh versus
Priyanka Vasan (supra) . After examining the provisions of Sections 26 and
27 of the DV Act and the scheme of the Family Courts Act, the Delhi High
Court declined to follow the view taken by the Bombay High Court and
held that the original jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -7-

12 of the DV Act vests exclusively in the jurisdictional Magistrate. It was
further observed that the Family Court can grant reliefs under Sections 18
to 22 in proceedings pending before it, but such power does not confer
upon it the jurisdiction to entertain an independent application under
Section 12 of the Act. The Court also took note of the fact that the
procedure governing adjudication, enforcement of orders and the appellate
remedy under the two statutory mechanisms are different. Consequently,
the prayer for transfer of the DV proceedings to the Family Court was
declined.
11. Coming to the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the
applicant in Rohan Shah versus Nishigandha Shah (supra) , there is no
doubt that the Bombay High Court took a contrary view and permitted
transfer of an application instituted under Section 12 of the DV Act from
the Court of the Magistrate to the Family Court. The Court, inter-alia ,
observed that there was no specific bar against the Family Court dealing
with proceedings under the DV Act, particularly in view of Section 26
thereof. It also took into consideration the overlapping nature of the
disputes and the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.
However, the said judgment represents a view different from the one
subsequently adopted by the Delhi High Court in Aseem Khanna (supra) .
The latter judgment specifically noticed and considered Rohan Shah
(supra) and the contrary view of the Kerala High Court before arriving at
its conclusion.
12. The aforesaid distinction assumes further significance in view
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -8-

of the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh
Kumar Tripathi versus Vidhi Rawal (supra) . In the said case, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court examined the nature of proceedings initiated under Section
12 of the DV Act and the jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise its
inherent powers for quashing such proceedings. While holding that
proceedings under the DV Act are predominantly civil in nature, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court also examined the scheme of Sections 12, 26, 27
and 28 of the Act. The Court clarified that an application under Section 12
is to be entertained by the Magistrate having jurisdiction under Section 27
and that Section 26 does not confer upon a Civil Court or Family Court the
jurisdiction to entertain an independent application under Section 12. The
Court also explained that the availability of reliefs under Sections 18 to 22
before other courts in proceedings pending before them does not mean that
such courts acquire concurrent original jurisdiction to entertain an
application under Section 12 of the Act.
13. Though the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment
was primarily concerned with the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to quash
proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act and was not directly
examining the question of transfer of such proceedings to a Family Court,
the statutory interpretation placed by it upon Sections 26 and 27 of the Act
is of considerable relevance to the controversy involved in the present case.
The fact that the proceedings under the DV Act are predominantly civil in
nature does not, by itself, alter the forum specifically designated by the
legislature for entertaining an independent application under Section 12.
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -9-

The nature of the reliefs sought and the nature of the forum having
jurisdiction to entertain the original application are separate considerations.
Consequently, the civil nature of the reliefs cannot be treated as sufficient
to confer upon the Family Court jurisdiction to adjudicate an independent
application under Section 12 of the Act.
14. It is also necessary to deal with the reliance placed upon
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Section 7(2)(a) of the said Act
confers upon the Family Court the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate
of the First Class under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which relates to orders for maintenance of wives, children and parents. The
fact that the Family Court is competent to adjudicate a maintenance
petition between the parties does not mean that it thereby acquires
jurisdiction to entertain every other proceeding between them, particularly
one for which a separate forum has been prescribed under a special
enactment. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act cannot be interpreted so as
to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Family Court beyond that contemplated by
the statute.
15. In the present case, the principal ground urged by the
applicant-petitioner for seeking transfer is that a maintenance petition
between the same parties is already pending before the Family Court and
that both proceedings arise out of the matrimonial relationship between
them. However, the mere fact that the parties are common or that certain
allegations may overlap cannot be a ground to transfer a proceeding to a
court which is not vested with the requisite original jurisdiction to entertain
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -10-

it. The possibility of some common evidence being led in the two
proceedings or the apprehension of conflicting findings cannot override the
statutory scheme governing the jurisdiction of the respective courts.
Moreover, the legislature itself, by enacting Section 26 of the DV Act, has
provided a mechanism whereby an aggrieved person can seek reliefs under
Sections 18 to 22 in proceedings pending before a Family Court. Thus, the
purpose of avoiding multiplicity of litigation can be achieved to the extent
permitted by the statute without transferring the independent proceeding
under Section 12 to a forum not designated for its original adjudication.
16. The apprehension that the parties may have to incur additional
expenditure or face inconvenience on account of the proceedings being
pending before two different courts is also not sufficient to justify the
transfer sought. Convenience of the parties, though a relevant consideration
in deciding a transfer application, cannot be the sole consideration where
the proposed transfer would result in the proceeding being placed before a
court lacking jurisdiction to entertain the same. The jurisdiction of a court
is conferred by statute and cannot be assumed merely on the basis of
convenience or consent of the parties.
17. It is, therefore, held that the mere pendency of a maintenance
petition between the parties before the Family Court does not confer upon
that Court the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate an independent
proceeding instituted under Section 12 of the DV Act. The proposed
transfer, if allowed, would amount to placing the said proceeding before a
forum which has not been vested with the requisite original jurisdiction
NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD

TA No.24 of 2026 -11-

under the statutory scheme. The applicant has, therefore, failed to make out
a case for transfer of the proceedings in question.
18. Consequently, finding no merit in the present transfer
application, the same is hereby dismissed .
19. Needless to observe that nothing stated hereinabove shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the pending
proceedings under the DV Act or the maintenance petition, which shall be
adjudicated by the respective courts in accordance with law.
20. The parties are directed to appear before learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Gurugram, on the date already fixed.
21. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.

(MANDEEP PANNU)

12.11.2026 JUDGE
neetu
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether Reportable: Yes/No

NEETU RANI
2026.11.13 09:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this ORDER/JUDGMENT
PHHC, CHD