AMRUTBHAI DAYALJIBHAI PATEL vs NARAYANDAS CHELASHRI HEMARAMJI RAMSNEHI

C/SCA/12348/2026 (GJHC240625192026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12348 of 2026

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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AMRUTBHAI DAYALJIBHAI PATEL & ORS.
Versus
NARAYANDAS CHELASHRI HEMARAMJI RAMSNEHI & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR NV GANDHI(1693) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 01/09/2026
JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr.N.V.Gandhi, learned advocate for the
petitioners.
2. This petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, seeking the following reliefs :
“A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue
appropriate writ, order or direction and be pleased to
quash and set aside the impugned order dtd.
14.07.2026 passed by the Ld. 5th Addl. Session judge,
Surat at Bardoli passed in Civil Misc. Application No.
01 of 2026 (Annex.A) in the interest of justice; AND
B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay the
implementation and operation of the impugned order
dtd. 14.07.2026 passed by the Ld. 5th Addl. Session
judge, Surat at Bardoli passed in Civil Misc.
Application No. 01 of 2026, during the pendency and
final disposal of this Petition; AND
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C) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to grant ad-
interim relief in terms of Para-B; AND”
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS :
3. At the outset, Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate, would
submit that despite the reply filed by the petitioner objecting
to the delay of 171 days in filing the regular appeal by
respondent No.1, while adjudicating the delay application, the
Appellate Court has not taken into account the same, rather
condoned the delay in filing the appeal though no sufficient
cause is made out by the respondent.
3.1 Mr. Gandhi, learned advocate, would submit that
respondent No.1 challenged the judgment and decree passed
by the Trial Court by way of a regular appeal wherein there is
a delay of 171 days in filing such appeal and only main
grounds were set out in the delay application, namely: (i)
respondent No.1 was hospitalized at Unicare Hospital as an
indoor patient, (ii) respondent No.1 is a Saint, so he needs to
visit different ashrams and (iii) respondent No. 1, being a
Saint, could not appoint a power of attorney.
3.2 Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate, would further submit that
no supporting documents so far as the illness of the
respondent No.1 were submitted before the Appellate Court.
It is submitted that during the pendency of the suit before the
Trial Court, respondent No.1 was in fact represented by his
power of attorney and while submitting the reply objecting to
the delay application, the petitioners had submitted the
documents showing that respondent Mo.1 was represented
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through a power of attorney, thereby shown to the Appellate
Court that a false statement made by the respondent No.1 in
his delay application.
3.3 Mr. Gandhi, learned advocate, would further submit that
there was no case made out by respondent No.1, inasmuch as
no sufficient cause was made out in the delay application and
the Appellate Court should not have entertained such a delay
application while exercising its discretion, which was
exercised in an arbitrary manner, then this Court should
interfere with the impugned order.
3.4 Mr. Gandhi, learned advocate, would also point out to
this Court that so far as the observation made in para 7 of the
impugned order is concerned, the rectification order was
passed by the Appellate Court on 18/07/2026, whereby it
corrected its observation made in para-7 of the impugned
order, i.e., "no objection of respondent" to "objection of
respondent".
3.5 At last, Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate, would submit that
since no sufficient cause was made out by respondent No.1
while instituting the regular civil appeal, this Court should
entertain this petition by exercising its power under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
4. No other and further submissions have been made by
the learned advocate for the petitioners.
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C/SCA/12348/2026 (GJHC240625192026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
ANALYSIS & REASONS :
5. Having heard Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate for the
petitioner and upon perusal of the impugned delay application
as well as the impugned order passed thereon by the
Appellate Court, coupled with the other documents including
the reply filed by the petitioners herein, prima facie, it
appears that there was a delay of 171 days in filing the
regular civil appeal by respondent No.1 before the Appellate
Court, which was condoned by the Appellate Court vide its
impugned order dated 14/07/2026. While condoning the delay,
the Appellate Court appears to have taken note of the fact
that the applicant - respondent No.1 herein was admitted to
Unicare Hospital as an indoor patient and his treatment was
going on and also taken into account the fact that there was
no inordinate, long, or gross delay in filing the appeal.
Further, it has been observed that there was no negligent act
on the part of respondent No.1, and no prejudice would cause
to the other side, inasmuch as the appeal will be decided on
merit. Thus, considering the aforesaid aspects, the Appellate
Court has exercised its discretion in favour of respondent
No.1, whereby it has condoned the delay.
6. Mr. Gandhi, learned advocate, at the outset of his
submission made a grievance that despite the reply filed by
the petitioners objecting the delay application, the same was
not at all considered by the Appellate Court. It is true that
except for taking note of the reply in the impugned order, no
submission of the learned advocate for the petitioners was
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C/SCA/12348/2026 (GJHC240625192026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
recorded by the Appellate Court, albeit the impugned order
was passed after taking into consideration the reply filed by
the petitioners. In such a situation, if really the oral
submission being made before the Appellate Court by learned
advocate for the petitioners and same was not recorded, the
recourse available to the petitioners was to approach the very
court that passed the order. [ See-Shankar K Mandal vs.
State of Bihar – (2003) 9 SCC 519 ]. In fact, such recourse
was adopted by the petitioners qua rectification of para-7 of
the impugned order, as the petitioners had filed the
appropriate application to get the factual correction recorded
in para-7. Even, the Appellate Court appears to have rectified
the incorrect fact recorded in para-7 of the impugned order
vide its order dated 18/07/2026 passed in the said application,
whereby it corrected its observation made in para-7, i.e., "no
objection of respondent" to "objection of respondent". Mr.
Gandhi, learned advocate, would not be in a position to show
that while adopting such recourse, the petitioners made any
grievance about non-recording of the submission of their
learned advocate in the impugned order. Thus, in such
scenario, this Court would unable to accept the submission of
Mr. Gandhi, learned advocate, that the Appellate Court has
not taken note of the objections of the petitioners.
7. Be that as it may, this Court has independently examined
and considered the objections of the petitioners ventilated
before this Court. It may be true that respondent No.1 was
represented by a power of attorney before the Trial Court, but
at the same time, the petitioners cannot dispute the fact that
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respondent No.1 is aged about 75 years and considering the
fact that he is a Saint, who renounced the world, he was
required to take appropriate help to institute the appeal,
resulted into delay in filing the appeal. Since the respondent
No.1 is an elderly man who fell sick and was admitted to the
hospital for treatment, such fact should not be doubted by the
Court unless any positive evidence brought on record by the
petitioners to show that the respondent No.1 was hale and
hearty. No such evidence was brought on the record. Thus,
considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there was
no substance in the resistance offered by the petitioners who
opposed the application for condonation of delay.
8. According to my considered view, once the Appellate
Court found that there was sufficient cause made out and
exercised its discretion in a positive manner by condoning the
delay, merely because another view is possible, this Court
should not disturb the impugned order by exercising its power
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Rather, for the
reasons supra, I am in complete agreement with the reasons
assigned by the Appellate Court while condoning the delay.
9. There is an additional reason not to interfere with the
impugned order. As per the following decisions of the
Honourable Apex Court, wherein it has been held that once
the discretion is exercised by the courts below in a positive
manner, the Appellate Court should not interfere with such
discretionary order, especially when the delay has been
condoned by the Court having found sufficient cause.
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C/SCA/12348/2026 (GJHC240625192026) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
9.1 In the case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through
LRS & ORS v. Union of India reported in (2023) 10 SCC
531 , it has been held thus:
“30. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are
not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in
appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether
to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of
grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is
fairly well-settled that "a court of appeal should not ordinarily
interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below". If any
authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in
Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, 2003 10 SCC 390. which in
turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, 1980 2 SCC 593. where it has been
held that "an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed
is not right but only when it is clearly wrong".
31. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21st
December 2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the
decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani
(supra), K.V. Ayisumma (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) were
holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the
field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision.
Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal 14 is one such decision apart from University of
Delhi (supra)] which have not accepted governmental lethargy,
tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as
sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of
discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the
liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid
decisions which have been referred to above. We find that the High
Court in the present case assigned the following reasons in support
of its order:
a. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that
some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient
to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of
justice.
b. The expression sufficient cause is elastic enough for courts to do
substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against one another, the former would
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prevail.
c. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown
for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while
exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly
explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered
when deciding such applications for condonation of delay.
d. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate
unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case,
the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account
of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the
government counsel on record before the Reference Court.
e. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to
suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt
inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did
not border on callousness.
32. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have
been exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order
under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for
interference, which it is not.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1.
9.2 Likewise, in a case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M.
Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 , the Hon’ble
Apex Court of India held as follows:
“9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion
of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such
discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit.
Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the
only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be
uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in
certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the
explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the
explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of
discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such
finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of
discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse.
But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone
the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider
the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior
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Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the
conclusion of the lower Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Thus, taking into account the ratio of the aforesaid
decisions and applying them to the facts of the present case, I
am of the considered view that there is no gross illegality or
irregularity committed by the Appellate Court while
condoning the delay; rather, it is found that the Appellate
Court has exercised its discretion in positive manner, thereby
condoned the delay of 171 days in filing regular civil appeal.
Once the Appellate Court found that there was sufficient
cause which prevented the respondent No.1 from filing the
regular civil appeal after a period of 171 days, this Court is
unable to agree with any of the submissions canvassed by Mr.
Gandhi, learned advocate.
11. Lastly, it would be apt to observe that this Court has no
wider jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India unlike the Appellate jurisdiction. It is a settled position
of law that unless the impugned order is perverse, grossly
erroneous and/or contrary to the settled principles of law, this
Court should not interfere with the impugned order. [ See:
M/s. Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel – (2022) 4
SCC 181 and Sameer Suresh Gupta Thro P.A. holder vs.
Rahul Kumar Agarwal - (2013) 9 SCC 374 ]. The impugned
order is neither perverse nor grossly erroneous much less
passed contrary to settled principles of law.
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12. In view of the aforesaid observations, discussion and
reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, it
is dismissed in limine . There shall be no order as to costs.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
GAURAV J THAKER
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