SHAKEEL AHMAD MAGLO vs GOVERNMENT OF J AND K AND ANR. (HOME)

1
P a g e |

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR



HCP No. 221/2025

Reserved on: 07.05.2026

Pronounced on: 13.05.2026
Uploaded on: 14.05.2026

Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced - Full


Shakeel Ahmad Maglo
S/O Abdul Gani Maglo,
R/O Batamurran Wanpora,
Keller, District Shopian.


…Petitioner(s)

Through: Adv. Zahid Hussain Dar.


Vs.


1. Union Territory of J&K through
Principal Secretary to Govt.,
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.

2. District Magistrate, Shopian.


…Respondent(s)

Through: Dy.AG Bikramdeep Singh.



CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A.CHOWDHARY, JUDGE

JUDGMENT


By way of the present Habeas Corpus Petition, the petitioner seeks
1.
quashment of Detention Order No. 07/DMS/PSA of 2025 dated
01.05.2025 passed by respondent No. 2-District Magistrate Shopian,
under the provisions of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act,
1978, whereby the detenue has been placed under preventive

2
P a g e |

detention to deter him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
‘security of UT of J&K’.

2. On perusal of the grounds of detention, it transpires that the detenue
was involved in antinational activities, which are highly prejudicial
to the sovereignty of the State and peace of the district; that the
detenue is in contact with active terrorists and is working as an
OGW for them which succinctly described his abnormal behaviour
and prejudicial nature towards peace and stability in the district; that
the detenue was previously involved in case registered as FIR
No.62/2020 under sections 307 IPC, 7/27 IA Act, 16, 18, 19, 20
UL(P)A of Police Station Shopian; that the deneue was released on
bail in the said FIR by the competent court of law; that thereafter the
petitioner was kept under surveillance and the secret information
received from intelligence agencies revealed that the petitioner was
continuously working as OGW of the terrorists; that the activities of
the petitioner were found highly prejudicial to the security of UT of
J&K, as such, in order to prevent him from indulging in similar
activities it has become imperative to detain him under the
provisions of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978.

1. The main grounds urged by learned counsel for the petitioner are
that the allegations forming basis of detention are general, vague and
bereft of material particulars; that the detenue had already been
granted bail by the competent criminal court and the said bail order
was never challenged by the respondents before any superior forum;
that the detaining authority has failed to record any compelling
reason showing that the ordinary law of the land was insufficient to

3
P a g e |

deal with the detenue; that the grounds of detention are nothing but a
verbatim reproduction of the police dossier, demonstrating complete
non-application of mind by the detaining authority.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that preventive detention
being an exception to a cherished right to personal liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the procedural
safeguards provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the
Public Safety Act are required to be strictly complied with. It is
argued that the detention order cannot sustain, once the record
demonstrates mechanical exercise of power and absence of genuine
subjective satisfaction.

3. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has
supported the detention order and submitted that the activities of the
detenue were prejudicial to the maintenance of security of UT of
J&K and, therefore, the detaining authority was justified in passing
the impugned order.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the detention record
produced by the respondents and considered the same.

5. A perusal of grounds of detention reveals that the allegations leveled
against the detenue except his involvement in case FIR No.62/2020
registered at Police Station Shopian, are couched in general and
vague expressions without specifying precise particulars regarding
dates, places and overt acts attributable to the detenue. Preventive
detention, which directly impinges upon personal liberty, cannot be
sustained on the basis of indefinite and ambiguous allegations.

6. Significant aspect which goes to the root of the matter is that the
detenue had already been enlarged on bail by the competent criminal

4
P a g e |

court in the substantive criminal case registered against him. The
record does not indicate that the said bail order was ever challenged
by the respondents before the appellate or revisional forum. Once a
competent court had granted bail to the detenue, it was incumbent
upon the detaining authority to demonstrate compelling reasons
necessitating preventive detention despite availability of ordinary
Rekha v.
criminal law remedies. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported as (2011) 5 SCC 244
categorically held that where ordinary law of the land is sufficient to
deal with the situation, recourse to preventive detention laws is
unwarranted. The Court observed that preventive detention cannot
be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law. Likewise, in
Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah reported as (1985) 4
SCC 232 , the Supreme Court held that detention cannot be justified
merely because the accused has been enlarged on bail. In Sama
Aruna v. State of Telangana & Ors. reported as (2018)12 SCC
150 , the Supreme Court reiterated that preventive detention laws
cannot be invoked when ordinary penal law is sufficient to take care
of the situation. In Para-16 the Apex Court came up with the
following reference:-
“16. Obviously, therefore, the power to detain,
under the Act of 1986, can be exercised only
for preventing a person from engaging in,
or pursuing or taking some action which
adversely affects or is likely to affect
adversely the maintenance of public order;
or for preventing him from making
preparations for engaging in such activities.
There is little doubt that the conduct or
activities of the detenu in the past must be
taken into account for coming to the
conclusion that he is going to engage in or

5
P a g e |

make preparations for engaging in such
activities, for many such persons follow a
pattern of criminal activities. But the
question is how far back? There is no doubt
that only activities so far back can be
considered as furnish a cause for preventive
detention in the present. That is, only those
activities so far back in the past which lead
to the conclusion that he is likely to engage
in or prepare to engage in such activities in
the immediate future can be taken into
account. In Golam Hussain alias Gama v.
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Ors.
(1974)4 SCC 530, this Court observed as
follows:
“5. No authority, acting rationally, can be
satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of
future mischief merely because long
ago the detenu had done something
evil To Rule otherwise is to sanction a
simulacrum of a statutory
requirement. But no mechanical test
by counting the months of the interval
is sound. It all depends on the nature
of the acts relied on, grave and
determined or less serious and
corrigible, on the length of the gap,
short or long, on the reason for the
delay in taking preventive action, like
information of participation being
available only in the course of an
investigation. We have to investigate
whether the causal connection has
been broken in the circumstances of
each case.

Suffice it to say that in any case, incidents
which are said to have taken place nine to
fourteen years earlier, cannot form the basis
for being satisfied in the present that the
detenu is going to engage in, or make
preparation for engaging in such
activities…”


7. In the present case, the detention order nowhere records as to why
the ordinary law was inadequate or why the respondents could not
seek cancellation of bail if the detenue had allegedly indulged in
unlawful activities after grant of bail. Absence of such satisfaction
renders the detention order legally unsustainable. Preventive

6
P a g e |

detention cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal
process.

8. The detenue is entitled to make an effective representation against
his detention and such right becomes illusory where the allegations
are vague and lacking in material particulars. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.
reported as (1975) 2 SCC 81 held that vague grounds strike at the
very root of constitutional safeguards guaranteed to a detenue.
Similarly, in Smt. Shalini Soni Etc v. Union of India & Ors.
reported as (1980) 4 SCC 544 , it was held that the grounds of
detention must be clear, specific and definite so as to enable the
detenue to make an effective representation.

9. Reliance can also be placed on the judgment of Apex Court in case
titled Chaju Ram v. State of J&K reported as AIR 1971 SC 263 ,
wherein vague and uncertain allegations were held sufficient to
vitiate the detention order. The Court has observed and enunciated
that:-
Even as to the grounds, we have something to say.
“
The grounds charge him with having conspired
with some leaders of Democratic Conference and
having incited landless people of R.S Pura Tehsil to
forcibly occupy the land comprised in Nandpur
Mechanised Farm and to have persuaded them to
resist violently any attempt to evict them. No details
of the leaders of the Conference or of the persons
incited or the dates on which he conspired or incited
the squatters or the time when such conference took
place, are mentioned. It would be impossible for
anybody to make a representation against such
grounds. These grounds, on the authorities of this
Court, too numerous to be cited here, must be held
to be vague. Therefore on both the twin grounds,
namely, that he was deprived of his right to make a
representation and also because the grounds in
themselves were very vague, we must hold that there

7
P a g e |

was no compliance with the law as laid down in
the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention
Act. The result, therefore, is that the detention must
be declared to be unlawful and Chaju must be
declared to be entitled to his liberty. He is ordered to
be released. The detenue was questioned by us and
he expressed a desire that he may not be released in
Delhi, because he has no means of going back. He
asked to be released in Jammu. We direct therefore
that he shall be taken back to the place where he
was in detention in Jammu and released within the
shortest possible time.”

10. The detention record further reveals that the grounds of detention
are substantially a reproduction of the police dossier supplied by the
sponsoring agency. A comparative reading of the dossier and
grounds of detention leaves no manner of doubt that the detaining
authority has merely copied the contents of the dossier verbatim
without independent application of mind. Such mechanical exercise
defeats the very purpose of subjective satisfaction contemplated
under the Public Safety Act. The Apex Court in Jai Singh & Ors. v.
State of J&K reported as AIR 1985 SC 764 deprecated the practice
of reproducing the police dossier word-for-word while passing
detention orders and held the same to be indicative of non-
application of mind. Para-13 of the judgment being relevant is
reproduced as under:-
"13. Applying the settled legal position to the facts
of the present case, I find that the order impugned
cannot stand as it is based on grounds of detention,
which is only verbatim copy of police dossier. The
order of detention, for the reasons, exhibit total
non- application of mind on the part of detaining
authority and therefore, the petition is allowed and
the detention order No. PSA/104 dated 16.10.2020
passed by the District Magistrate, Kathua-
respondent No. 2 directing the detention of Balbir
Chand S/O Rana R/O Chack Drab Khan, Tehsil
and District Kathua is quashed. Respondents are
directed to release the detenue forthwith, provided

8
P a g e |

he is not required in connection with any other
case".
Similarly, in Anant Sakharam Raut & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. reported as (1987) 1 SCC 340 , the Supreme
Court held that mechanical exercise of detention power vitiates the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

11. Preventive detention laws confer extraordinary powers upon the
executive to detain a person without trial and, therefore, the
constitutional and statutory safeguards must receive strict
interpretation. Liberty of a citizen cannot be sacrificed at the altar of
mere suspicion or mechanical satisfaction. The subjective
satisfaction contemplated under the statute must be real, genuine and
based upon independent application of mind.

12. Viewed thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
allegations against the detenue are vague and non-specific. The
detenue had already been granted bail and the respondents failed to
demonstrate why ordinary law was insufficient, also the detaining
authority failed to record compelling reasons necessitating
preventive detention. Consequently, the impugned detention order
cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

13. Having regard to the afore-stated reasons and discussion made
hereinabove, the present Habeas Corpus Petition is, allowed, and
Detention Order No. 07/DMS/PSA of 2025 dated 01.05.2025 passed
by respondent No. 2- District Magistrate, Shopian, is quashed. The
respondents are directed to release the detenue namely Shakeel
Ahmad Maglo S/O Abdul Gani Maglo R/O Batamurrain Wanpora,

9
P a g e |

District Shopian, forthwith from preventive custody, provided he is
not required in connection with any other case(s).

14. Scanned detention record be returned to learned counsel for the
respondents.

( M. A. CHOWDHARY )
JUDGE
Srinagar
13.05.2026
Muzammil. Q

Whether the order is reportable: Yes / No