Oguljeren Derchiyeva vs Union Of India

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 09.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 05.08.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 05.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010198372023
+ W.P.(C) 6948/2023
OGULJEREN DERCHIYEVA ......Petitioner
Through: Dr. Ashutosh, Mr. S.S. Arora,
Mr. Abhijeet Sagar, Ms.
Fatima, Advs

versus

UNION OF INDIA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Devvrat Yadav, SPC with
Mr. Kartik Sharma, GP for
UOI.
Ms. Anushree Narain, Mr.
Maman Chola, Mr. Apurv
Yadav, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1. Through the present Writ Petition, the Petitioner seeks issuance
of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated
27.07.2022 [„Impugned Order‟] passed by the Additional Secretary to
the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of
Revenue, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 129DD of
the Customs Act, 1962. By the said order, while partly allowing the
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revision applications, the Revisional Authority set aside the direction
contained in the Order-in-Original dated 29.09.2021, as affirmed by
the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), permitting re-export of the
confiscated gold on payment of redemption fine. Consequently, the
Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent to
permit re-export of the seized gold upon such terms as this Court may
deem appropriate.
2. The principal issue which arises for consideration in the present
Petition is whether the Revisional Authority, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962
[„Customs Act‟], was justified in setting aside the order of the
Adjudicating Authority permitting redemption of confiscated gold by
way of re-export under Section 125 of the Customs Act, on the ground
that re-export of goods forming part of a passenger's baggage is
specifically governed by Section 80 of the Customs Act and not by
Section 125 thereof.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present
Petition, the relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.
4. The Petitioner, a national of Turkmenistan, arrived at the Indira
Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, on 01.05.2019 from
Turkmenistan. According to the Respondent, after crossing the Green
Channel and while proceeding towards the exit gate of the
International Arrival Hall, the Petitioner was intercepted by the
Customs authorities. Upon being questioned, she is stated to have
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denied carrying any dutiable, restricted or prohibited goods.
Thereafter, a search of her hand baggage resulted in the recovery of 06
gold bars of 999 purity weighing 600 grams and various gold
ornaments comprising 18 gold chains, 01 gold ring, 06 gold bracelets
and 01 gold pendant of 585 purity weighing 1,825 grams, aggregating
to 2,425 grams of gold, valued at Rs. 48,52,474/- at the relevant time.
The aforesaid gold was seized by the Customs authorities on the
allegation that the Petitioner had failed to declare the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Customs Act.
5. Pursuant thereto, a show cause notice came to be issued to the
Petitioner alleging, inter alia , that the recovered gold was liable to
confiscation under the provisions of the Customs Act. The Petitioner
contested the proceedings, asserting that she had been falsely
implicated and that the statement purportedly recorded under Section
108 of the Customs Act had neither been voluntarily made nor
correctly recorded. It was also her case that she intended to utilise the
gold for financing her medical treatment in India and had purchased
the same in Turkmenistan.
6. The Joint Commissioner of Customs, by Order-in-Original
dated 31.12.2020, concluded that the recovered gold was liable to
confiscation under Sections 111(d), 111(i), 111(j), 111(l) and 111(m)
of the Customs Act. Besides imposing penalties under Sections 112
and 114AA of the Customs Act and confirming the demand of
customs duty together with consequential penalty in respect of the
Petitioner's alleged previous imports, the Adjudicating Authority, in
exercise of powers under Section 125 of the Customs Act, granted the
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Petitioner an option to redeem the confiscated gold by directing that
the same be permitted to be re-exported upon payment of redemption
fine of Rs. 8,00,000/-.
7. Aggrieved by the quantum of redemption fine and penalty
imposed under the Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2020, the Petitioner
preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals).
Simultaneously, the Respondent-department also preferred an appeal
contending that, having regard to the quantity and nature of the
recovered gold, the Adjudicating Authority ought to have ordered
absolute confiscation instead of permitting re-export upon payment of
redemption fine. By Order-in-Appeal dated 29.09.2021, the
Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) dismissed both the appeals and
affirmed the Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2020 in its entirety.
8. Both the Petitioner as well as the Respondent thereafter invoked
the revisional jurisdiction of the Central Government under Section
129DD of the Customs Act against the order dated 29.09.2021. The
Petitioner sought reduction of the redemption fine and penalties,
whereas the Respondent questioned the legality of the direction
permitting re-export of the confiscated gold.
9. By the Impugned Order, the Revisional Authority partly
allowed both revision applications. While accepting the Petitioner's
contention that the demand of customs duty and consequential penalty
under Section 114A of the Customs Act relating to the Petitioner's
alleged previous imports could not be sustained, it further held that, in
matters relating to passenger baggage, re-export is specifically
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governed by Section 80 of the Customs Act and, in the absence of
compliance with the statutory requirements contained in Sections 77
and 80 thereof, the Adjudicating Authority could not have permitted
re-export of the confiscated gold by invoking Section 125 of the
Customs Act. Consequently, the direction permitting re-export of the
confiscated gold was set aside.
10. It is this part of the Impugned Order, whereby the benefit of re-
export granted by the Adjudicating Authority and affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) came to be withdrawn, which
has been assailed by the Petitioner in the present proceedings.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
11. Contentions on behalf of the Petitioner:
11.1. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Impugned
Order proceeds on an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the
Customs Act. It was contended that both the Adjudicating Authority
as well as the Commissioner (Appeals), after considering the entire
material on record, had exercised the discretion vested under Section
125 of the Customs Act to permit redemption of the confiscated gold
by allowing its re-export upon payment of redemption fine. According
to the learned counsel, the Revisional Authority exceeded the limited
scope of its jurisdiction under Section 129DD of the Customs Act in
upsetting concurrent findings which neither suffered from perversity
nor disclosed any error of law.
11.2. It was submitted that the Petitioner had travelled to India solely
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for obtaining medical treatment. In support thereof, reliance was
placed upon the medical invitation letter dated 11.01.2019 issued by
Jaypee Hospital, Noida, recording that the Petitioner had been advised
to undergo treatment under Dr. Sandeep Chaddha, Senior Consultant,
Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, and requesting issuance
of a Medical (M) Visa. It was argued that the aforesaid document,
which formed part of the record, clearly demonstrated the bona fides
of the Petitioner‟s visit to India and corroborated her consistent case
that she intended to raise funds for her medical treatment.
11.3. It was then contended that the Order-in-Appeal dated
29.09.2021 specifically noted that the Petitioner had consistently
maintained that the recovered gold belonged to her, that it had been
purchased by her in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, and that she intended to
sell the same to generate funds for her medical treatment in India. It
was submitted that even according to the findings recorded by the
Appellate Authority, the Petitioner‟s case regarding ownership of the
seized gold and the purpose for which it had been brought to India had
remained consistent throughout the proceedings.
11.4. It was further submitted that the Order-in-Appeal dated
29.09.2021 specifically records that the Petitioner had claimed
ownership of the seized gold from the very inception, including in her
statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, that the
Adjudicating Authority had found no material to disbelieve such
claim, and that no third person had ever asserted ownership over the
seized gold. It was further noticed therein that even the departmental
appeal failed to place any material contradicting the Petitioner‟s
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ownership. On the strength of these findings, learned counsel
submitted that the Revisional Authority was not justified in interfering
with the discretion exercised by the Adjudicating Authority permitting
redemption by way of re-export.
11.5. It was further contended that the reliance placed by the
Respondent upon Section 80 of the Customs Act is wholly
misconceived. It was argued that Section 80 merely enables a
passenger, who has made a declaration under Section 77 of the
Customs Act, to seek detention of goods for subsequent re-export and
operates in an entirely different field. According to the learned
counsel, once the goods had already been confiscated and the
Adjudicating Authority had exercised its statutory discretion under
Section 125 of the Customs Act by permitting redemption upon
payment of fine, the provisions of Section 80 operated in an altogether
different field and did not govern the exercise of discretion under
Section 125 of the Customs Act.
11.6. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed
upon the decision dated 21.08.2023 of this Court in Nidhi Kapoor v.
Principal Commissioner and Additional Secretary to the
1
Government of India & Ors. , to contend that the power of
redemption under Section 125 of the Customs Act is an independent
statutory discretion and that, even in respect of goods held to be
prohibited, redemption is not altogether excluded but remains a matter
for the adjudicating authority to decide on the facts of each case. It
was submitted that the Revisional Authority could not interfere merely

1
2023 SCC OnLine Del 5099
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because it preferred a different view regarding the exercise of such
discretion.
11.7. It was lastly submitted that the Revisional Authority failed to
appreciate the Petitioner‟s contention that the statement recorded
under Section 108 of the Customs Act ought not to have been relied
upon, as it was not recorded in a language understood by the
Petitioner and was allegedly obtained with the assistance of an
interpreter who was not officially notified. It was contended that the
Petitioner, being a national of Turkmenistan, understood only the
Turkmen language and, therefore, no adverse inference could have
been drawn solely on the basis of such statement.
12. Contentions of the Respondent:
12.1. Per contra , learned counsel for the Respondent supported the
Impugned Order and contended that the Revisional Authority acted
strictly within the ambit of the powers conferred under Section
129DD of the Customs Act, which expressly authorises the Central
Government to annul or modify an order passed by the Commissioner
of Customs (Appeals). According to the learned counsel, the
Impugned Order neither re-appreciates the evidence nor substitutes
one plausible view for another, but rectifies an order which was
contrary to the statutory scheme governing import and re-export of
goods forming part of passenger baggage.
12.2. It was further submitted that the Petitioner cannot be regarded
as a first-time offender. Drawing attention to the findings recorded by
the Commissioner (Appeals), it was contended that the Petitioner‟s
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own statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act disclose that
she had, on an earlier occasion as well, brought gold into India, sold
the same in the domestic market and utilised the proceeds for her
medical treatment. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had
failed to produce any documentary evidence, including purchase
invoices, to establish lawful acquisition or ownership of such a large
quantity of gold. According to the learned counsel, the Petitioner‟s
own disclosed financial condition also rendered her explanation
inherently improbable and constituted an additional circumstance
which the Adjudicating Authority failed to adequately appreciate
while extending the discretionary benefit of redemption coupled with
re-export.
12.3. It was submitted that both the Adjudicating Authority as well as
the Commissioner (Appeals) had concurrently held the seized gold to
be “prohibited goods”. Once the seized gold had been held to
constitute prohibited goods, redemption under Section 125 was not a
matter of right and the discretion vested in the Adjudicating Authority
was required to be exercised judiciously and on the basis of relevant
and legally sustainable considerations. It was further submitted that
considerations such as the Petitioner‟s medical treatment or
humanitarian circumstances could not furnish a legal basis for
exercising discretion under Section 125 of the Customs Act.
12.4. It was next contended that the Petitioner‟s challenge proceeds
on an erroneous understanding of the scope of the revisional
jurisdiction under Section 129DD of the Customs Act. Inviting the
attention of the Court to the language employed in Section 129DD, it
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was submitted that the Central Government is expressly empowered to
“annul or modify” an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
According to the learned counsel, where the discretion exercised by
the subordinate authority is shown to be arbitrary, unsupported by
relevant considerations or contrary to the statutory framework,
nothing in Section 129DD precludes the Revisional Authority from
interfering with such exercise of discretion. It was, therefore,
submitted that the interference by the Revisional Authority falls
squarely within the powers conferred by the statute.
12.5. It was further submitted that the seized gold did not constitute
bona fide baggage permissible under the applicable Baggage Rules
and, therefore, could not claim the benefit available to passengers
importing personal baggage. Consequently, it was contended that the
gold constituted „prohibited goods‟ within the meaning of Section
2(33) of the Customs Act. Reliance was placed upon the decision of
this Court in Nidhi Kapoor (supra), wherein it was held that gold
imported in contravention of the applicable statutory restrictions
constitutes prohibited goods and that, in such cases, redemption under
Section 125 is not a matter of right but remains within the discretion
of the competent authority, to be exercised in accordance with the
statutory scheme.
12.6. Insofar as the Petitioner‟s challenge to the statement recorded
under Section 108 of the Act is concerned, it was submitted that the
said statement was recorded in the presence of independent witnesses
and with the assistance of an independent interpreter. It was argued
that the statement had never been retracted during the adjudication
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proceedings and that the allegations regarding coercion and improper
interpretation were raised for the first time in the writ proceedings.
12.7. It was lastly submitted that the quantity of gold involved in the
present case is substantial, namely 2425 grams, valued at more than
Rs.48 lakhs at the relevant time. It was argued that extending the
benefit of redemption coupled with re-export in such circumstances
would dilute the statutory scheme intended to regulate import of
valuable goods through passenger baggage and would undermine the
statutory framework regulating the import of gold through passenger
baggage.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:
13. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced
on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.
14. At the outset, it deserves notice that the scope of the present
Petition is considerably narrow. The Petitioner has not assailed the
findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority, as affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), holding the recovered gold
liable to confiscation under the provisions of the Customs Act.
Equally, the Revisional Authority has already granted partial relief to
the Petitioner by setting aside the demand of customs duty and the
consequential penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act in
relation to the Petitioner‟s alleged previous imports. Consequently, the
only question which survives for consideration is whether the
Revisional Authority was justified in interfering with that part of the
Order-in-Original whereby the Adjudicating Authority permitted
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redemption of the confiscated gold by directing its re-export upon
payment of redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act.
15. The controversy essentially turns upon the proper interpretation
of Sections 77, 80 and 125 of the Customs Act and the relationship
between these provisions. For convenience, the said provisions read as
under:
“77. Declaration by owner of baggage.—The owner of any baggage
shall, for the purpose of clearing it, make a declaration of its contents
to the proper officer.”
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
“80. Temporary detention of baggage.—Where the baggage of a
passenger contains any article which is dutiable or the import of
which is prohibited and in respect of which a true declaration has
been made under section 77, the proper officer may, at the request of
the passenger, detain such article for the purpose of being returned to
him on his leaving India 1 [and if for any reason, the passenger is not
able to collect the article at the time of his leaving India, the article
may be returned to him through any other passenger authorised by
him and leaving India or as cargo consigned in his name].”
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
“125. Option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation.—(1) Whenever
confiscation of any goods is authorised by this Act, the officer
adjudging it may, in the case of any goods, the importation or
exportation whereof is prohibited under this Act or under any other
law for the time being in force, and shall, in the case of any other
goods, give to the owner of the goods [or, where such owner is not
known, the person from whose possession or custody such goods have
been seized,] an option to pay in lieu of confiscation such fine as the
said officer thinks fit:
[Provided that where the proceedings are deemed to be
concluded under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 28 or
under clause (i) of sub-section (6) of that section in respect of the
goods which are not prohibited or restricted, the provisions of this
section shall not apply:
Provided further that], without prejudice to the provisions of
the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 115, such fine shall not
exceed the market price of the goods confiscated, less in the case of
imported goods the duty chargeable thereon.
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[(2) Where any fine in lieu of confiscation of goods is
imposed under sub-section (1), the owner of such goods or the
person referred to in sub-section (1), shall, in addition, be liable to
any duty and charges payable in respect of such goods.]
[(3) Where the fine imposed under sub-section (1) is not paid
within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the date of
option given thereunder, such option shall become void, unless an
appeal against such order is pending.
Explanation.—For removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that in
cases where an order under sub-section (1) has been passed before
the date on which the Finance Bill, 2018 receives the assent of the
President and no appeal is pending against such order as on that
date, the option under said sub-section may be exercised within a
period of one hundred and twenty days from the date on which such
assent is received.]”
16. A perusal of the above provisions reveals that Section 77 casts a
mandatory obligation upon every passenger arriving in India to
truthfully declare the contents of his or her baggage before clearance
by the Customs authorities. Section 80, which specifically deals with
passenger baggage, creates a limited statutory exception. It enables the
proper officer, upon the request of the passenger, to detain dutiable or
prohibited articles for the purpose of their subsequent return or re-
export. However, this statutory benefit is not available universally.
The Legislature has consciously made its availability conditional upon
the passenger having made a true declaration under Section 77.
Section 125, on the other hand, operates in an altogether different
field. It empowers the adjudicating authority to grant an option to
redeem confiscated goods upon payment of redemption fine. The
provision neither specifically deals with passenger baggage nor
expressly authorises re-export of confiscated baggage irrespective of
compliance with Section 80.
17. The legislative scheme, therefore, indicates that while Section
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125 confers a general discretionary power regarding confiscated
goods, Section 80 constitutes a special statutory code governing return
or re-export of goods forming part of passenger baggage, provided a
true declaration has been made under Section 77 of the Customs Act.
18. At this stage, it also becomes necessary to notice the language
employed in Section 125. The provision draws a clear distinction
between two categories of goods. In respect of goods whose import or
export is prohibited under the Customs Act or under any other law for
the time being in force, the adjudicating authority “may” grant an
option to redeem the confiscated goods. However, in respect of “any
other goods”, the adjudicating authority “shall” grant such an option.
19. The expression “any other goods” cannot be read in isolation. It
merely refers to goods which do not fall within the preceding category
of prohibited goods. The Legislature has, therefore, consciously
adopted two different standards. While redemption of non-prohibited
goods is ordinarily mandatory, redemption of prohibited goods has
been left entirely to the judicial discretion of the adjudicating
authority. Such discretion, however, is neither absolute nor
unstructured. Like every statutory discretion, it must be exercised in
conformity with the object, purpose and overall scheme of the
enactment. The Legislature has consciously conferred discretion in
one category and imposed an obligation in the other. Such legislative
differentiation cannot be ignored by treating both categories alike. To
do so would amount to rewriting Section 125 rather than interpreting
it.
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20. The legislative distinction is, therefore, deliberate. Parliament
has consciously denied an automatic right of redemption in respect of
prohibited goods. If the expression “any other goods” occurring in
Section 125 were interpreted so broadly as to include prohibited goods
as well, the distinction drawn by the Legislature between the
expressions “may” and “shall” would stand obliterated. Such an
interpretation would render the opening part of Section 125 wholly
redundant. Courts must presume that every word employed by
Parliament has been used for a purpose and no part of the statute can
be treated as superfluous.
21. Equally significant is what Section 125 does not provide.
Although the provision authorises redemption of confiscated goods
upon payment of fine, it nowhere provides that such redemption
necessarily carries with it an entitlement to re-export the goods. Nor
does it contain any non obstante clause overriding the special
provisions governing passenger baggage. Had the Legislature
intended Section 125 to independently authorise re-export of baggage
irrespective of compliance with Section 80, it could easily have
employed appropriate language to that effect. The conspicuous
absence of such language assumes considerable significance.
22. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that a statute
must be read as a whole and that every provision should be interpreted
harmoniously so as to give effect to the legislative intent. Equally well
settled is the principle that where a statute contains both a general
provision and a special provision dealing with a particular subject, the
latter ordinarily prevails over the former.
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23. Applying these principles, this Court is unable to accept the
Petitioner‟s submission that Section 125 can be invoked to direct re-
export of passenger baggage notwithstanding non-compliance with
Section 80. Such an interpretation would virtually render the
conditions incorporated in Section 80 redundant. If every passenger
who failed to make a declaration under Section 77 could nevertheless
seek re-export by invoking Section 125 after confiscation, the
statutory safeguards consciously incorporated by Parliament in
Section 80 would become wholly otiose. Courts must avoid an
interpretation which renders any statutory provision nugatory or
ineffective. Acceptance of the Petitioner‟s submission would, in
effect, permit a passenger who has admittedly violated Section 77 to
ultimately secure substantially the same benefit which Parliament has
expressly reserved only for a passenger who has complied with
Section 77. Such an interpretation would reward non-compliance and
defeat the legislative object underlying Section 80.
24. The legislative object behind Section 80 also deserves
emphasis. The benefit of detention for subsequent re-export is
available only to a passenger who voluntarily approaches the Customs
authorities and truthfully declares the goods carried by him or her. The
statutory incentive contained in Section 80 is intended to encourage
truthful disclosure at the point of entry into India. It is not designed to
confer the same benefit upon a passenger who suppresses the
existence of dutiable or prohibited goods, crosses the Green Channel
and is thereafter intercepted upon detection by the Customs
authorities. If the very same benefit could thereafter be claimed
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merely by invoking Section 125 after confiscation, every passenger
carrying undeclared goods would have little incentive to comply with
the mandatory declaration requirement under Section 77 in the first
place. Such an interpretation would seriously undermine the efficacy
of the statutory declaration mechanism and place an honest passenger,
who complies with the law, on the same footing as one who
consciously conceals goods until detection. Such a consequence could
never have been intended by Parliament.
25. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the Petitioner
neither declared the recovered gold under Section 77 nor requested
detention of the same under Section 80. Rather, according to the
record, she crossed the Green Channel and was intercepted only
thereafter. The very jurisdictional facts necessary for invocation of
Section 80 were, therefore, admittedly absent. Once the statutory
conditions prescribed by the special provision were not fulfilled, the
Adjudicating Authority could not have achieved the same result
indirectly by invoking the general power contained in Section 125.
26. This Court is, therefore, in complete agreement with the
reasoning adopted by the Revisional Authority that the order directing
re-export was contrary to the statutory framework governing
passenger baggage. The Revisional Authority merely restored the
legislative balance contemplated by the Customs Act and cannot be
said to have committed any jurisdictional error in doing so.
27. Learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to justify the order of
re-export by emphasising that the Petitioner had brought the gold
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solely for financing her medical treatment in India. This submission
also does not merit acceptance.
28. The only contemporaneous document placed on record in
support of the Petitioner‟s visit to India is the medical invitation letter
dated 11.01.2019 issued by Jaypee Hospital, Noida. The said
communication merely records that the Petitioner had been advised
treatment under a Senior Consultant in the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynaecology and requests issuance of a Medical Visa.
29. Beyond the aforesaid document, no medical record whatsoever
has been produced demonstrating the nature of the ailment, the
necessity of treatment, the estimated expenditure involved, the
proposed surgery or the financial requirement sought to be met by
carrying such a substantial quantity of gold into India. Significantly,
while it has been urged before this Court that the Petitioner required
treatment for a serious neurological condition, including a brain
surgery, no medical material supporting such assertion forms part of
the record. On the contrary, the only medical document relied upon
pertains to consultation with the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology. The evidentiary record, therefore, does not support the
factual foundation on which the plea of compelling necessity has been
sought to be built.
30. Even otherwise, the submission does not withstand legal
scrutiny. The Customs Act regulates import of goods through a
comprehensive statutory framework. The legislative object is to
ensure transparency, declaration and compliance with customs laws.
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The statutory obligation to declare imported goods arises independent
of the purpose for which such goods are intended to be utilised.
Financial necessity or personal hardship, howsoever genuine, cannot
authorise an individual to disregard the mandatory requirements
governing import of valuable goods into the country.
31. Equally, the explanation offered by the Petitioner does not
accord with ordinary human conduct and commercial prudence. If the
object was merely to meet the expenses of medical treatment in India,
there existed several lawful modes of arranging funds, including
carrying permissible foreign currency through authorised channels or
transferring funds through recognised banking mechanisms. The
explanation offered by the Petitioner, by itself, cannot furnish a legal
justification for disregarding the mandatory requirements of the
Customs Act.
32. The interpretation canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner would
also produce consequences which Parliament could never have
intended. Every passenger found carrying undeclared high-value
goods could, after interception, seek redemption coupled with re-
export by asserting that the goods were intended for meeting personal
expenses, medical treatment or some other compelling necessity. Such
an interpretation would substantially erode the statutory obligation of
declaration under Section 77 and reduce the safeguards incorporated
in Section 80 to a matter of mere formality. Courts must avoid an
interpretation which encourages circumvention of statutory
obligations or renders the legislative safeguards ineffective.
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33. It also deserves notice that the quantity of gold involved in the
present case is itself a relevant circumstance. The recovered gold
weighs approximately 2.425 kilograms and was valued at more than
Rs.48 lakhs at the relevant time. The quantity and value of the
recovered gold reinforce the necessity for strict adherence to the
statutory declaration mechanism prescribed under the Customs Act.
The law does not contemplate that goods of such magnitude may be
brought into India without declaration and thereafter permitted to be
re-exported merely because the importer subsequently furnishes an
explanation regarding their intended utilisation. The larger the
quantity and value of the goods sought to be imported, the greater is
the necessity for strict adherence to the declaration requirements
contemplated by the Customs Act.
34. The submission that the Adjudicating Authority and the
Commissioner (Appeals) had concurrently exercised discretion in
favour of the Petitioner equally does not persuade this Court. A
statutory discretion exercised upon an erroneous understanding of the
governing provisions remains amenable to correction in revisional
jurisdiction. Section 129DD of the Customs Act expressly authorises
the Central Government to examine the legality and propriety of the
order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and to modify or annul
the same. Once the Revisional Authority found that the direction
permitting re-export was inconsistent with the statutory framework
governing passenger baggage, interference became not only
permissible but necessary.
35. Equally devoid of merit is the contention that the Revisional
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Authority exceeded the permissible limits of its jurisdiction. The
Revisional Authority has not reassessed disputed facts or substituted
one plausible factual inference for another. The interference is
founded entirely upon interpretation of the statutory provisions
governing passenger baggage and redemption of confiscated goods.
Correction of an order contrary to the statutory scheme squarely falls
within the ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Section 129DD of the
Customs Act.
36. The reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Nidhi
Kapoor (supra) also does not advance the Petitioner‟s case. The said
decision reiterates that redemption under Section 125 is discretionary
and not automatic. However, the issue arising in the present case is
qualitatively different. The question here is whether the discretionary
power under Section 125 can be exercised so as to confer a benefit
which the Legislature has specifically regulated under Section 80.
That question neither arose for consideration nor was decided in Nidhi
Kapoor (supra). The judgment was principally concerned with the
classification of undeclared imported gold as “prohibited goods” and
the nature of the discretion exercisable under Section 125. It did not
examine the interplay between Sections 80 and 125 of the Customs
Act. The judgment is, therefore, clearly distinguishable.
37. The remaining submissions relating to the voluntariness of the
statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, the alleged
deficiencies in interpretation, the Petitioner‟s ownership of the gold
and the surrounding factual circumstances no longer materially
survive for consideration. The legality of confiscation is not under
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challenge before this Court. The controversy is confined solely to the
legality of permitting re-export under Section 125. Those factual
submissions, therefore, do not have any bearing upon the legal issue
requiring determination.
38. Lastly, this Court is conscious that the Petitioner‟s plea is
sought to be projected as one deserving equitable consideration on
account of her medical condition. However, sympathy cannot
substitute statutory compliance. Judicial discretion must operate
within the four corners of the legislative framework. Once Parliament
has consciously prescribed the conditions subject to which the benefit
of re-export may be claimed, Courts cannot create an additional
equitable exception merely because the individual case appears
deserving of compassion. The Customs Act represents a carefully
balanced legislative framework regulating the import and export of
goods, and its provisions cannot be diluted by invoking humanitarian
considerations unsupported by the statutory scheme. Hard cases
cannot be permitted to make bad law. The rule of law demands that
statutory mandates be applied uniformly to all persons alike.
CONCLUSION:
39. Accordingly, for all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Revisional Authority committed no error
in holding that the direction permitting re-export of the confiscated
gold under Section 125 of the Customs Act was contrary to the
statutory scheme governing passenger baggage.
40. The Impugned Order, insofar as it sets aside the direction
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permitting re-export, suffers from no jurisdictional error, perversity or
patent illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
41. Consequently, the present Writ Petition, being devoid of merit,
is dismissed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

SHAIL JAIN, J.
AUGUST 05, 2026
jai/pal

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