G.M.N College Trust And Management Society vs Union Of India And Others

CWP No.15583 of 2021 (O&M) - 1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

CWP No.15583 of 2021 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 02.11.2026

G.M.N COLLEGE TRUST AND MANAGEMENT SOCIETY
...Petitioner

Versus

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
...Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH

Present: Mr. Ashok Kumar Chandhok, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Sandeep Goyal, Advocate
for respondents No.2 and 3.

Mr. Kapil Bansal, DAG, Haryana.



KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)

1. The proceedings before this Court have been instituted under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the recovery
order dated 30.11.2017 (Annexure P-1), passed by respondent No.3 under
Section 8-F of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the Act’), whereby an amount of
Rs.44,37,082/- was sought to be recovered from its bank account, and a
consequential direction for refund of the amount recovered thereunder. In
the alternative, a direction is sought to respondent No.6 to entertain and
decide the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the assessment
order dated 25.04.1994, by condoning the delay in filing the same, which
was dismissed vide order dated 17.03.2020 (Annexure P-2).
2. Briefly stated, the petitioner is a Government-aided educational
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institution affiliated with Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra. An
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assessment order dated 25.04.1994 (Annexure P-8) was passed against it
under Section 7-A of the Act, determining provident fund dues amounting to
Rs.44,36,532/- for the period from August 1982 to October 1991. The
petitioner challenged the said assessment order by filing CWP No.8536 of
1994, which was disposed of on 05.03.2009 along with CWP No.13075 of
1993 (Annexure P-11). While disposing of the petitions, this Court, inter
alia, granted liberty to the petitioners in cases where assessment orders under
Section 7-A of the Act had already been passed, to avail of the statutory
remedy of appeal under Section 7-I of the Act within two months from the
date of receipt of the certified copy of the order. It was further directed that
no recovery shall be effected till the claim was decided by the Assessing
Authority or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that the certified copy of the order
dated 05.03.2009 was received by it only on 01.01.2018 and, thereafter, it
preferred a statutory appeal under Section 7-I of the Act on 12.01.2018
before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II,
Chandigarh (for short, ‘the Tribunal’), along with an application seeking
condonation of delay. The petitioner also relies upon its representation dated
16.12.2017 submitted to respondent No.3, requesting that the matter be
examined in consultation with the Director, Higher Education, Haryana,
particularly in view of the provident fund contributions stated to have
already been deposited in respect of the employees concerned.
4. The Tribunal, vide order dated 17.03.2020 (Annexure P-2),
dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay and consequently the
appeal as barred by limitation. It noticed that the order dated 05.03.2009 had
been passed in proceedings instituted by the petitioner itself and that the
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petitioner had not furnished any explanation for obtaining the certified copy
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thereof after a lapse of nearly nine years. The Tribunal further held that Rule
7(2) of the Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1997 (for short, ‘the Rules’) prescribes a period of 60 days for filing
an appeal, which can be extended by a further period of 60 days on sufficient
cause being shown. It was, accordingly, held that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the maximum permissible period of
120 days and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be
invoked to extend the said period.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the recovery
proceedings, primarily on the ground that the assessment made under
Section 7-A of the Act was erroneous and included employees whose
provident fund contributions had already been deposited with the Director,
Higher Education, Haryana. It is further the petitioner's case that the
recovery was effected without considering its representation dated
16.12.2017 and without examining the directions issued by this Court on
05.03.2009. The principal relief, however, hinges upon the petitioner's
challenge to the order dated 17.03.2020 passed by the Tribunal and its
prayer for a direction to entertain the statutory appeal by condoning the
delay.
Per contra,
6. learned counsel for the respondents have supported
the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, and maintained that the appeal
thereagainst was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant material on record.
8. The question which arises for consideration is whether the
Tribunal was vested with the jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an
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appeal under Section 7-I of the Act beyond the maximum period prescribed
under Rule 7(2) of the Rules.
9. The aforesaid question regarding the jurisdiction of the
Appellate Tribunal to condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed
under Rule 7(2) of the Rules has recently been considered by a Division
Bench of this Court in LPA-2392-2026 titled Indira Gandhi National
College, Ladwa v. Union of India and other s, decided on 30.10.2026. In the
said case, the assessment order under Section 7-A of the Act had been
passed on 25.04.1994. The writ petition challenging the same was disposed
of by this Court on 31.08.2013, granting liberty to the appellant therein to
avail the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 7-I of the Act within two
months from the receipt of a copy of the order. However, the statutory
appeal was preferred only on 05.03.2018, i.e. after a lapse of approximately
four and a half years. The explanation furnished for the delay was found
unsatisfactory.
10. After examining Rule 7(2) of the Rules, the Division Bench
held that the prescribed period of 60 days could be extended by a further
period of 60 days only, subject to sufficient cause being shown.
Consequently, the maximum permissible period for filing an appeal was held
to be 120 days, beyond which the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to
condone the delay. The Division Bench placed reliance upon the judgments
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU,
Kakinada and others v. M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care
Limited, 2020 AIR (SC) 2819 , and Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others, (2010) 5 SCC 23 ,
to reiterate that the statutory period of limitation, including the restricted
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power of condonation, cannot be circumvented by invoking the general
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provisions of the Limitation Act. The said view reiterates the settled legal
position that the Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal beyond the
maximum period of 120 days prescribed under the applicable statutory
provisions.
11. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is true that the
petitioner claims to have received the certified copy of the order dated
05.03.2009 on 01.01.2018 and to have preferred the statutory appeal on
12.01.2018. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal after the claimed receipt of
the certified copy was not substantial. However, the matter cannot be
examined merely by reference to the interval between the alleged receipt of
the certified copy and the filing of the appeal. The material question is why
the petitioner, having itself instituted CWP No.8536 of 1994 and being fully
aware of the proceedings initiated by it, remained inactive for nearly nine
years after the disposal of the writ petition before even seeking a certified
copy of the order.
12. The Tribunal specifically noticed that the petitioner had failed
to furnish any explanation for applying for the certified copy of the order
dated 05.03.2009 only on 01.01.2018. Even during the proceedings before
the Tribunal, no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming for such
prolonged inaction. The petitioner cannot be permitted to indefinitely
postpone the commencement of proceedings for availing a statutory remedy
by remaining inactive in obtaining a copy of an order passed in proceedings
instituted by it, particularly when the liberty to avail the appellate remedy
had been specifically granted by this Court.
13. The decision of the Division Bench in Indira Gandhi National
College, Ladwa (supra), though arising from a different factual situation,
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reinforces the principle that the statutory remedy must be pursued within the
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period prescribed and that the restricted power of condonation cannot be
enlarged by invoking general equitable considerations. Once the petitioner
failed to explain its prolonged inaction in pursuing the remedy specifically
granted by this Court, the Tribunal was justified in declining to exercise its
power of condonation. In any event, the Tribunal could not have extended
the statutory period beyond the maximum permissible period of 120 days by
invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
14. Accordingly, no jurisdictional error or patent illegality can be
attributed to the order dated 17.03.2020 passed by the Tribunal warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India.
15. The challenge to the consequential recovery proceedings also
does not warrant interference. The order dated 05.03.2009 passed by this
Court did provide that no recovery shall be effected till the claim of the
petitioner was decided by the Assessing Authority or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be. However, the said protection was linked to
the pursuit and determination of the petitioner's claim before the competent
statutory forum and could not be construed as an indefinite restraint on
recovery irrespective of the petitioner's conduct in pursuing the remedy.
16. In the present case, the petitioner did avail the statutory remedy
of appeal, but the same came to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
The petitioner cannot, therefore, rely upon the interim protection
contemplated in the order dated 05.03.2009 to indefinitely resist recovery,
particularly when its failure to pursue the remedy within the permissible
period has not been satisfactorily explained.
17. The petitioner's further contention that the assessment included
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employees whose provident fund contributions had allegedly been deposited
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with the Director, Higher Education, Haryana, pertains to the correctness of
the original assessment order dated 25.04.1994. The said assessment order
has neither been set aside nor modified by any competent forum. The
petitioner cannot seek adjudication of the merits of the original assessment
in the present proceedings so as to circumvent the statutory remedy which it
failed to pursue within the permissible period. Its representation dated
16.12.2017, by itself, could neither extend the period of limitation nor render
the subsisting assessment order unenforceable.
18. In these circumstances, no ground is made out for quashing the
recovery order dated 30.11.2017 or directing refund of the amount recovered
thereunder.
19. The instant writ petition accordingly stands dismissed.

02.11.2026 (KIRTI SINGH)
SwarnjitS JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
SWARNJIT SINGH
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