JAKHAR TRAVELS vs BHANWAR LAL CHOUDHARY
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JD:43547]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11160/2025
CNR: RJHC010509542025 | URN: CW / 19807U / 2025
Jakhar Travels, Through Partner Prashant S/o Shri Mohan Ram,
Aged 38 About Years, Registered Office Shop No. 22, S-34,
Samrat Ashok Udyan, Pal Road, Jodhpur.
----Petitioner
Versus
Bhanwar Lal Choudhary S/o Shri Magni Ram Choudhary, R/o
House No. D-26, Opposite Baba Ramdev Temple, Shastri Nagar,
District Jodhpur.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Firoz Khan
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Himanshu Choudhary
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
Reporatble-
Date of Conclusion of Arguments : 20/07/2026
Date on which Order is Reserved : 20/07/2026
Full Order or Operative Part : Full Order
Date of Pronouncement : 15/09/2026
BY THE COURT:-
1. The instant Writ Petition has been filed under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India against the impugned judgment dated
16.05.2025 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal,
Jodhpur in Appeal No.26/2025, whereby the appeal preferred by
Bhawarlal Choudhary under Section 19(6) of the Rajasthan Rent
Control Act, 2001 came to be allowed and the judgment and
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decree dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned Rent Tribunal,
Jodhpur Metropolitan in Rent Case No.26/2025 was set aside.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner-
Jakhar Travels instituted proceedings under Section 18 of the
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 before the learned Rent
Tribunal, Jodhpur Metropolitan, seeking protection against
interference with its use and occupation of the disputed premises
and apprehended dispossession otherwise than in accordance with
law. The petitioner's claim was founded upon the assertion that it
was in possession of the premises pursuant to a registered rent
deed and was, therefore, entitled to protection against forcible
dispossession.
2.1. During the pendency of the proceedings, Pappu Ram, stated
to have been authorised by the respondent, moved an application
under Order I Rule 10 CPC read with Section 21 of the Rajasthan
Rent Control Act, seeking his impleadment. The application was
opposed by the petitioner; however, the learned Rent Tribunal
rejected the same vide order dated 04.02.2025 and thereafter
proceeded with adjudication of the main petition.
2.2. By judgment dated 25.02.2025, the learned Rent Tribunal
allowed the petition and granted permanent injunction in favour of
the petitioner, proceeding on the premise that the relationship of
landlord and tenant stood established and that the petitioner was
in possession of the premises by virtue of the registered rent
deed. Consequently, the respondent was restrained from
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interfering with the petitioner's use and occupation of the
premises or evicting it before expiry of the stipulated period of the
rent agreement except in accordance with due process of law.
2.3. The aforesaid judgment and decree came to be assailed
before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal by Bhawarlal
Choudhary. Admittedly, he was not arrayed as a party to the
original proceedings. He, therefore, sought leave to maintain the
appeal on the premise that the judgment under challenge directly
affected his rights and interests in the disputed premises.
2.4. Before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bhawarlal
Choudhary asserted that he had purchased the disputed premises
from the erstwhile owner, Subhash Sharma, by a registered sale
deed dated 07.02.2025, a copy whereof was placed on record. It
was contended that, in view of the said purchase, the judgment
and decree passed by the learned Rent Tribunal had a direct and
prejudicial bearing upon his asserted rights in the very property
forming the subject matter of the proceedings.
2.5. The appellant also relied upon material concerning actual
possession of the premises and contended that, notwithstanding
the alleged execution of the rent agreement, possession had never
in fact been delivered to the original petitioner by the erstwhile
owner and that the erstwhile owner had neither handed over
possession nor received rent in the manner asserted by the
petitioner. In support thereof, reliance was placed upon a bank
statement evidencing return of the amount, photographs of the
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premises and the office of M.R. Travels, a notice issued to the
original petitioners and an FIR lodged by Pappu Ram. A pen drive
was also produced, which, upon being viewed by the learned
Appellate Tribunal, was found to depict an incident of alleged
vandalism at the disputed premises and intervention by the police.
2.6. Upon consideration of the aforesaid material, the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal found that the learned Rent Tribunal had
not adequately considered the defence material bearing upon the
question of delivery and actual possession and had recorded its
finding regarding possession without properly adverting to the
material produced in rebuttal. Consequently, the finding regarding
possession was held to be unsustainable and, by judgment dated
16.05.2025, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal allowed the
appeal preferred by Bhawarlal Choudhary under Section 19(6) of
the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 and set aside the judgment
and decree dated 25.02.2025. Hence the instant writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned
judgment primarily on the ground that the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal committed a serious error in entertaining the appeal at
the instance of Bhawarlal Choudhary, who admittedly was not a
party to the original proceedings. It is contended that the
proceedings under Section 18 of the Act were confined to the
dispute between the petitioner and the respondent and that a
person who had never been impleaded before the original forum
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could not, merely by asserting an independent claim over the
property, acquire a right to assail the judgment rendered therein.
It is further contended that the learned Rent Tribunal had duly
considered the registered rent deed and the material available on
record and had recorded a categorical finding regarding the
petitioner's possession. According to learned counsel, the learned
Appellate Tribunal ought not to have disturbed such finding,
particularly when the relief sought by the petitioner was confined
to protection against forcible dispossession and interference with
its existing possession.
3.1. Learned counsel also submits that the registered sale deed
dated 07.02.2025, by itself, could not confer upon Bhawarlal
Choudhary an unfettered right to challenge an adjudication
rendered in proceedings to which he was not a party. Any
controversy concerning the validity, legal effect or enforceability of
the said sale deed, according to learned counsel, would
necessarily require adjudication in appropriate independent
proceedings and could not legitimately form the basis for
unsettling the judgment and decree passed by the learned Rent
Tribunal. Learned counsel lastly contends that the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal has travelled beyond the limited
controversy arising under Section 18 of the Act and has entered
into questions concerning title and actual possession which,
according to him, were neither necessary nor germane for
deciding the original proceedings. It is, therefore, urged that the
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impugned judgment dated 16.05.2025 be set aside and the
judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned
Rent Tribunal be restored.
4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for Bhawarlal
Choudhary submits that the writ petition proceeds on an
erroneous premise that a person who was not a party to the
original proceedings can never be regarded as an aggrieved
person. According to learned counsel, what is material is not the
mere presence or absence of a person before the original forum,
but whether the judgment under challenge has a direct and
adverse bearing upon a legally cognizable right or interest claimed
by such person. It is contended that Bhawarlal Choudhary
produced the registered sale deed dated 07.02.2025 in support of
his claim over the disputed premises and specifically asserted that
the decree passed by the Rent Tribunal was directly affecting his
rights and interest therein. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal,
therefore, rightly found his grievance to be real and substantial
and, consequently, granted him leave to maintain the appeal.
4.1. It is further submitted that the learned Rent Tribunal
proceeded on the assumption that execution of the rent
agreement, by itself, established the petitioner's possession,
without properly examining the categorical defence of the
erstwhile owner that possession had never been delivered
pursuant to the said agreement. According to learned counsel, this
was not a peripheral issue but went to the very foundation of the
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relief claimed under Section 18 of the Act. The documentary and
other material produced before the Appellate Tribunal, including
the bank statement, photographs, notice, FIR and pen drive, was
duly considered by it, and upon such consideration the Appellate
Tribunal found the finding regarding possession recorded by the
Rent Tribunal to be unsustainable. It is urged that such an
appellate determination, based upon appreciation of the material
available on record, does not warrant interference in the limited
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution.
4.2. It is lastly contended that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal
neither adjudicated finally upon the title claimed by Bhawarlal
Choudhary nor travelled beyond the jurisdiction vested in it. It
merely examined whether the judgment of the Rent Tribunal
directly affected the appellant and whether the finding of
possession recorded by the original Tribunal could withstand
scrutiny in the light of the material available on record. The
impugned appellate judgment, therefore, according to learned
counsel, suffers from neither jurisdictional error nor perversity and
calls for no interference under Article 227.
5. I have considered the rival submissions and carefully
examined the impugned judgment as well as the material placed
on record.
6. The first question which arises for consideration is whether
the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal was justified in entertaining
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the appeal preferred by Bhawarlal Choudhary, notwithstanding the
fact that he was not a party to the original proceedings. Mere non-
impleadment before the original forum cannot, in every case,
foreclose the right of a person to assail an adjudication which
directly and adversely affects his legally cognizable rights. The real
test is whether the judgment sought to be challenged operates to
the direct prejudice of the person seeking to invoke the appellate
jurisdiction. At the same time, a stranger having no real
connection with the subject matter cannot be permitted to enter
concluded litigation merely on the basis of a remote, fanciful or
speculative interest.
6.1. In the present case, Bhawarlal Choudhary did not rest his
claim upon any vague or remote interest. He asserted that he had
purchased the disputed property from the erstwhile owner through
a registered sale deed dated 07.02.2025 and placed a copy
thereof before the Appellate Tribunal. His specific grievance was
that the decree passed by the Rent Tribunal had a direct bearing
upon the very premises in which he claimed an independent
interest and possession. In these circumstances, the Appellate
Tribunal cannot be said to have acted illegally or without
jurisdiction in examining his grievance and granting him leave to
maintain the appeal.
6.2. The requirement of obtaining leave itself constitutes an
important safeguard against indiscriminate intervention by
persons who are complete strangers to the lis. The appellate
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forum is required to satisfy itself that the proposed appellant has a
genuine and substantial grievance arising from the judgment
under challenge. In the present matter, the registered sale deed
coupled with the specific assertion of direct prejudice furnished
sufficient basis for the Appellate Tribunal to exercise its discretion
in favour of Bhawarlal Choudhary. His grievance was also not
confined to a question of title; he asserted that the decree had
practical consequences upon his possession and that attempts
were being made to rely upon the decree against him. The
Appellate Tribunal, therefore, committed no jurisdictional error in
entertaining the appeal.
6.3. The next and more substantial question is whether the
Appellate Tribunal was justified in interfering with the finding of
the Rent Tribunal regarding possession of the disputed premises.
The learned Rent Tribunal proceeded on the footing that the
petitioner was in possession of the premises pursuant to the
registered rent agreement and, on that basis, granted protection
against dispossession otherwise than by due process of law. The
existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and the execution of
the rent agreement were treated as sufficient to sustain the relief.
However, the defence of the erstwhile owner was that, despite
execution of the alleged rent agreement, possession had never
actually been delivered to the petitioner.
6.4. This aspect assumes considerable significance because
possession was not an incidental matter in the proceedings; it
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constituted the very foundation of the relief claimed under Section
18 of the Rent Control Act. A rent agreement may establish a
contractual arrangement between the parties, but the execution of
such an agreement and actual delivery of possession are two
distinct factual aspects. Where the entitlement to protection
against dispossession rests upon an assertion of actual
possession, the adjudicating forum is required to examine the
evidence relating to such possession with due care and
circumspection.
6.5. In the facts of the present case, the question of actual
delivery of possession assumes still greater significance. The
material available on record indicates that the alleged rent
agreement did not culminate in the actual transfer of physical
possession of the disputed premises to the petitioner. The case set
up by the contesting side was not merely that the petitioner
subsequently lost possession; rather, the categorical assertion was
that possession was never handed over to the petitioner at all.
Thus, the foundational fact necessary for maintaining a claim
based upon protection from dispossession was itself seriously in
dispute. The alleged rent agreement, in these circumstances,
could not, merely by its execution, be treated as conclusive proof
that the petitioner had entered into and retained physical
possession of the premises.
6.6. It is also significant that the amount stated to have been
tendered towards the alleged tenancy was returned. The bank
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statement relied upon before the Appellate Tribunal lends support
to the defence that the alleged contractual arrangement did not
translate into an actual landlord-tenant relationship accompanied
by delivery of possession. The distinction between a document
evidencing an intended or purported tenancy and the actual
creation and enjoyment of a tenancy pursuant to delivery of
possession cannot be disregarded when the very relief sought is
founded upon an assertion of existing possession.
6.7. The expression "dispossession", in its ordinary legal sense,
necessarily postulates a pre-existing possession capable of being
disturbed or taken away. A person cannot ordinarily complain of
being dispossessed from premises which were never delivered into
his physical possession in the first place. Thus, where the
foundation of the claim under Section 18 is that the petitioner is in
occupation and apprehends dispossession, the existence of actual
physical possession at the relevant point of time assumes
foundational importance. The requirement becomes particularly
material where the alleged landlord-tenant relationship itself is
founded upon a rent agreement whose execution is said to have
been followed by delivery of the premises. If physical possession
was never delivered, the mere existence of a rent deed cannot, by
itself, convert an intended or purported arrangement into an
existing state of landlord-tenant possession for the purpose of
seeking protection against dispossession.
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6.8. In the present case, therefore, the question was not merely
whether a registered rent agreement existed on paper. The more
fundamental question was whether the transaction embodied in
that document had, in fact, fructified into the relationship asserted
by the petitioner and whether the petitioner had actually entered
into physical possession of the rented premises. The material
relied upon before the Appellate Tribunal, including the return of
the amount tendered through the bank, the photographs depicting
the premises and the office of M.R. Travels, the notice, the FIR
and the pen drive depicting the incident at the premises,
constituted relevant material bearing directly upon this
foundational issue. The Appellate Tribunal was consequently
justified in examining the entire factual matrix rather than treating
the rent deed, in isolation, as determinative of possession.
6.9. The Appellate Tribunal noticed that the Rent Tribunal had not
adequately considered the defence evidence on this crucial aspect.
The assertion of the erstwhile owner regarding non-delivery of
possession was supported by other material, including the
material concerning return of the amount, photographs showing
M.R. Travels operating from the premises and the notice issued to
the original petitioners. The Appellate Tribunal also took into
consideration the FIR and the material produced during the
appellate proceedings concerning the incident at the premises.
6.10.In these circumstances, the finding that the actual physical
possession of the disputed premises had never been delivered to
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the petitioner assumes decisive relevance. If the petitioner never
obtained physical possession, the very factual foundation of its
plea of existing occupation and apprehended dispossession
becomes unsustainable. Correspondingly, the asserted landlord-
tenant relationship, insofar as it is relied upon as an existing
relationship giving rise to the right of protection under Section 18,
cannot be presumed merely from the execution of the rent deed,
particularly when the surrounding material indicates that the
arrangement remained unconsummated by actual delivery of
possession and the amount tendered was returned.
6.11.This Court is conscious that the mere execution of a rent
agreement cannot invariably be equated with the delivery of
possession, nor can every dispute regarding possession be
decided solely on the basis of the nomenclature of the document.
The real substance of the transaction and the conduct of the
parties have to be examined. In the present case, the Appellate
Tribunal undertook precisely such an exercise and found, upon
consideration of the material before it, that the finding of actual
possession recorded by the Rent Tribunal could not be sustained.
Such an approach is consistent with the nature of the controversy
because, where the relief is predicated upon an existing state of
possession, the Court or Tribunal cannot dispense with proof of
that foundational fact merely because a document purporting to
create a tenancy is available on record.
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6.12.In these circumstances, the conclusion reached by the
Appellate Tribunal that the finding of possession recorded by the
Rent Tribunal had been arrived at without proper consideration of
material evidence cannot be characterised as perverse. The
Appellate Tribunal was exercising its statutory appellate
jurisdiction and was fully competent to examine whether the
finding recorded by the original Tribunal was supported by a
proper and balanced consideration of the evidence. The mere fact
that the appellate forum reached a conclusion different from that
of the original Tribunal does not, by itself, furnish a ground for
interference under Article 227. What is required to be seen is
whether the conclusion reached by the appellate forum is a legally
permissible and rational one arising from the material on record.
In the present case, it undoubtedly is.
6.13.There is yet another aspect which cannot be lost sight of. If,
as found by the Appellate Tribunal, possession had not actually
been delivered pursuant to the alleged rent agreement, the
appropriate remedy of the original petitioners was to seek such
relief as may be available to them in accordance with law. A claim
based upon an agreement cannot, by itself, authorise a person to
obtain possession by force. The right to seek possession and the
right to take possession are fundamentally different. The former
may be pursued before the competent forum; the latter cannot be
asserted through extra-legal means. The principle of due process
operates equally upon all persons claiming an interest in the
property. The jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 227
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of the Constitution stands on an altogether different footing. It is a
supervisory jurisdiction and not a continuation of the appellate
process. The power of superintendence is intended to keep
subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their lawful
authority and to correct cases of patent jurisdictional error,
manifest perversity, flagrant disregard of law or procedure, or
failure of justice of such exceptional magnitude as may warrant
supervisory intervention. It is not meant to enable this Court to
re-appreciate the entire evidence merely because another view
may also be possible.
7.1. Tested on these well-settled parameters, the impugned
judgment withstands scrutiny. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal
was competent to entertain the appeal under Section 19(6) of the
Act. It examined the locus of Bhawarlal Choudhary, considered the
material placed in support of his claimed interest in the property,
examined the rival material relating to possession and thereafter
recorded reasons for setting aside the judgment of the Rent
Tribunal. There is neither any indication of exercise of jurisdiction
not vested in it nor any failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by
law. Its reasoning cannot be said to be wholly extraneous,
irrational or perverse.
7.2. The submission that the Appellate Tribunal ought to have
affirmed the finding of the Rent Tribunal would, in substance,
require this Court to undertake a fresh appraisal of the evidence
and substitute its own conclusion for that reached by the
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competent appellate forum. Such an exercise would transgress the
legitimate confines of Article 227 jurisdiction. The supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court cannot be transformed into a second
appellate jurisdiction merely because the order under challenge
has reversed the conclusion reached by the original Tribunal.
7.3. It is equally necessary to make it clear that an order
protecting a person from dispossession otherwise than by due
process cannot be construed as conferring upon that person any
independent right to interfere with or dispossess another claimant
in respect of the same premises. An injunction protects only such
right or possession as has been the subject matter of
adjudication; it cannot be enlarged so as to operate against an
independent claim which was never before the original forum.
7.4. This Court is, however, conscious that the proceedings under
Article 227 do not call for a final pronouncement upon the
competing claims of title. The registered sale deed dated
07.02.2025 has been relied upon by Bhawarlal Choudhary in
support of his grievance, but the ultimate validity, legal effect or
consequences of that instrument are not matters which require
determination in the present proceedings. Likewise, this Court
does not consider it appropriate to pronounce upon the ultimate
validity or enforceability of the alleged tenancy, the rights claimed
by M.R. Travels, the precise relationship between the erstwhile
landlord and tenant, or any other independent claim relating to
title or possession. All such questions, to the extent they remain
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open in law, shall be determined by the competent forum in
appropriate proceedings.
7.5. Upon an overall consideration of the record and keeping in
view the narrow parameters governing the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction, this Court finds no compelling reason to differ from
the conclusion reached by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal. The
impugned judgment is a reasoned appellate determination
founded upon consideration of the material available before it. It
does not disclose any patent illegality, jurisdictional transgression
or manifest perversity warranting interference under Article 227 of
the Constitution.
7.6. Consequently, the challenge to the judgment dated
16.05.2025 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal,
Jodhpur in Appeal No.26/2025 fails. The said judgment, whereby
the appeal preferred by Bhawarlal Choudhary under Section 19(6)
of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 was allowed and the
judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned
Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur Metropolitan in Rent Case No.26/2025 was
set aside, is affirmed.
8. Accordingly, the present writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is dismissed.
8.1 It is clarified that nothing contained in this order shall be
construed as a final adjudication upon the title claimed by
Bhawarlal Choudhary, the validity or legal effect of the registered
sale deed dated 07.02.2025, the existence or enforceability of the
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alleged tenancy, or the competing claims of the parties regarding
possession. Any such issue, if otherwise open to adjudication,
shall remain available to be considered by the competent forum in
accordance with law and uninfluenced by the observations made
herein.
9. The stay petition is also dismissed.
(FARJAND ALI),J
375/Mamta Tak
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