SRI. K. OMPRAKASH vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.12745 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SRI K.OMPRAKASH
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
S/O A.S.KUDURAPPA
SENIOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF HORTICULTURE
BDA, CENTRAL OFFICE, BENGALURU
RESIDING AT NO.153, NTI HOUSING
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LAYOUT
RAJIV GANDHI NAGAR
ND
2 PHASE, KODIGEHALLI,
YELAHANKA
BENGALURU – 560 092.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SHIVAPRASAD SHANTANAGOUDAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY LOKAYUKTA POLICE, BENGALURU
REPRESENTED BY
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
PRINCIPAL BENCH
BENGALURU – 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
Digitally signed by
PADMAVATHI B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
2
(BY SRI VENKATESH S.ARBATTI, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
B.N.S.S., PRAYING TO QUASH THE SOURCE INFORMATION REPORT
DATED 11.07.2025 VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND FIR BEARING
CR.NO.43/2025 DATED 28.07.2025 REGISTERED BY THE
RESPONDENT LOKAYUKTA POLICE, FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S
13(1)(b) R/W 13(2) OF THE P.C ACT, 1988 (AMENDMENT ACT,
rd
2018) AGAINST THE PETITIONER, PENDING ON THE FILE OF 23
ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BENGALURU, VIDE
ANNEXURE-B AND ORDER DATED 28.07.2025 BEARING
NO.LOK/INV(G)/CITY-1/43/2025 PASSED BY THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BENGALURU CITY -1 UNDER SECTION 17(c) OF THE PREVENTION
OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 (AMENDMENT ACT, 2018) VIDE
ANNEXURE C.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before the Court calling in question
registration of a crime in Crime No.43 of 2025 registered for
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short).
3
2. Heard Sri Shivaprasad Shantanagoudar , learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti,
learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
The petitioner, at the relevant point in time, was working as
Senior Assistant Director of Horticulture attached to the Central
Office of the Bangalore Development Authority. A source report is
drawn on 11-07-2025 and based upon the said source report, the
Superintendent of Police of the respondent/Karnataka Lokayukta
registers a crime in Crime No.43 of 2025 for offences punishable as
quoted supra . On the same day, i.e., on 28-07-2025 it appears
authorization under Section 17(c) of the Act is rendered appointing
one Sri Shivamurthy B.I., Deputy Superintendent of Police-6,
Karnataka Lokayukta as the Investigating Officer. During the course
of investigation, the respondent/Lokayukta obtains search and
seizure warrant and conducts search and seizure on the house and
office of the petitioner and takes custody of several documents,
after which disproportionate asset is drawn, which is shown to be at
119.30% to the petitioner’s known source of income. Investigation
4
ensues. The petitioner is now before the Court calling in question
the very registration of crime.
4. The learned counsel Sri Shivaprasad Shantanagoudar
appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the
disproportionate asset so drawn is clearly faulty by ignoring several
factors and the circular issued by the Lokayukta itself on
11-05-2023 as to how disproportionate asset must be calculated.
He would seek to clarify everything and further seek to place
reliance upon the judgments of the coordinate Benches of this Court
in CHANNAKESHAVA H.D. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[W.P.No.28052 of 2023 decided on 25-04-2024]; G.M.
SHIVAKUMAR v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA [ W.P.No.17248 of
2022 decided on 07-03-2024] and SATHISH S v. THE
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE INSPECTOR [W.P.No.22483
of 2023 and connected matters decided on 02-07-2024]. The
learned counsel takes this Court through the said judgments and
further seeks to place reliance upon the judgment of the coordinate
5
Bench in the case of N. SATISH BABU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
1
LOKAYUKTA PS which is affirmed by the Apex Court.
5. The learned counsel Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti , appearing
for the Lokayukta would contend that the proceedings are at the
nascent stage. The source report is drawn on 11-07-2025 for the
check period 05-02-1999 to 11-07-2025. Based upon the source
report, authorization under Section 17(c) of the Act is granted. All
the contentions that are now sought to be urged can be urged at
the stage of trial before the concerned Court as they are in the
realm of seriously disputed questions of fact. He would submit that
investigation into the cases of corruption should be at best left to
be tried before the concerned Court and not interfered under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel would submit that
all the calculations can always be submitted by the petitioner to the
concerned Investigating Officer during the course of investigation.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
1
Writ Petition No.3107 of 2024 decided on 23-04-2026
6
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The legality or
correctness in initiation of proceedings, registration of crime,
conduct of search and seizure or authorization granted under
Section 17(c) of the Act, the contentions of the learned counsel for
the petitioner or its refuting at the hands of the learned counsel
appearing for the Lokayukta have all been considered by the
coordinate Benches of this Court in CHANNAKESHAVA H.D. and in
the case of N.SATISH BABU . Therefore, it is not necessary for this
Court to delve into the matter except noticing the law as declared
by the coordinate Bench. The coordinate Bench in N.SATISH
supra
BABU has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
10. Based on the rival contentions of the petitioner and
respondents, the following points arise for consideration in the
present petition;
(i) Whether the judgment of the Apex Court dated
06.05.2025 passed in case of Karnataka Lokayuktha Police
vs. K.L.Gangadharaiah – Crl.A.No.2444/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023) along with connected matters
including the present Crl.A.No.2460/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024), would come in the way or have
the effect of precluding the petitioner from contending that
conducting of preliminary enquiry prior to registration of the
impugned FIR was desirable / warranted / required / necessary
in the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case?
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(ii) Whether the source report dated 18.11.2023
nd
submitted by the 2 respondent requires or warrants or makes
it desirable for conducting of preliminary enquiry by the
respondents before proceeding further in the matter?
(iii) Whether the impugned FIR is valid and sustainable in
law?
(iv) Whether the order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the
Superintendent of Police – Lokayuktha under the second proviso
to Section 17 of the P.C.Act is valid and sustainable in law?
Re-Point No.1:-
11. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondents –
Lokayuktha contended that having regard to the fact that the
earlier order dated 01.03.2024 passed by this Court in the
present petition was set aside by the Apex Court in
Crl.A.No.2460/2025 (SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024) dated
06.05.2025, wherein it was held that it was not necessary /
essential for the respondents to have conducted any preliminary
enquiry prior to registration of the impugned FIR, the petitioner
is precluded from re-agitating the very same issue / question
once again; per contra, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner
would submit that in its aforesaid order dated 06.05.2025, the
Apex Court has come to the conclusion that conducting of
preliminary enquiry was not mandatory and the question / issue
as to whether preliminary enquiry ought to be conducted or not
would be dependent on the facts and circumstances of a
particular / given case and as such, it was open for the
petitioner to assail the FIR on the ground that preliminary
enquiry was warranted / required / desirable in the instant case
having regard to the incomplete, inadequate, defective and
nd
sketchy source report submitted by the 2 respondent. In order
to appreciate the rival contentions, it would be apposite to
extract the earlier order passed by this Court in the present
petition dated 01.03.2024 , which is as hereunder:-
“This petition is filed by the petitioner/accused under
Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, read with 482
of Cr.P.C for quashing the FIR in Crime No.3/2024
registered by the Karnataka Lokayuktha police, Bengaluru,
for the offences punishable under Section 13(1) (b), read
8
with 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(Amendment Act 2018) (hereinafter referred to as 'PC Act').
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned special counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2.
3. The case of the prosecution is that on the suo-
motu complaint registered by the Lokayuktha police,
Bengaluru, against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner
was appointed as Industrial Extension Officer, Shikaripura
Industries and Commerce Department on 24.10.1994.
Then he was appointed as Junior Engineer in 2002 and
worked in various departments of Public Works Department
(for short 'PWD'). Now he is Executive Engineer in PWD. As
per the source report collected by the police on 18.11.2023,
FIR has been registered, alleging that during his tenure as
public servant he has amassed wealth to the tune of
Rs.3,62,50,000/- about 110% disproportionate to his known
source of income in his name, from check period
24.10.1994 till date. Accordingly, the investigation has
taken up which is under challenge. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has vehemently challenged the
proceedings/investigation mainly on the ground, that the
DySP of Lokayuktha filed a source report against the
petitioner without conducting preliminary enquiry as
mandated under the law by the Lalita Kumari vs.
Government of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in
(2014) 2 SCC 1, passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Further contended that the superintendent of police without
conducting preliminary enquiry/verification and without
satisfying himself of the genuineness of the source report
and without application of mind, in contravention of the
proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act, had permitted the
respondent No.1 to register the FIR and conduct the
investigation which is bad in law.
4. Learned counsel further contended, while
according the permission, the Superintendent of Police (SP),
had not at all considered that there is no preliminary
enquiry or registering the FIR and he should verify the
preliminary enquiry and FIR, then only accord the
permission under Section 17 of the PC Act. But the alleged
permission reveals he has not verified any FIR and no FIR
was registered based upon the source report, the
permission has been granted. Therefore, conducting
investigation is bad in law and hence prayed for quashing
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investigation. In support of his case, learned counsel for
the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as under:-
1. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in case
of State of Haryana & Ors. V. Bhajan Lal &
Ors.
2. WP No. 16028/2023 in case of
Shri. Pramod Kumar NG V. State of
Karnataka dated 14.12.2023.
3. (2021) 5 SCC 469, in case of
Charansingh V. State of Maharashtra &
Ors.
4. W.P. No. 43817/2018 (GM-RES) in case
of Navaneeth Mohan N Vs. SHO, ACB,
Bengaluru dated 21.04.2021.
5. W.P. No. 15886/2022 (GM-RES) in case
of Balakrishna H.N. V. State of Karnataka
by ACB, Mysuru, dated: 03.01.2023.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent
Lokayuktha filed statement of objection contending that the
petitioner amassed wealth disproportionate to the known
source of income to the tune of Rs.3,62,50,000/- i.e.,
110%. The accused has purchased various properties and
is leading lavish life and purchased benami property in
name of his wife, mother-in-law and daughters. The matter
is under investigation. The SP after verifying the source
report and then passed the order as per proviso to Section
17 of the PC Act. He further contended section 17 (a) of the
PC Act, was amended on 26.7.2017. Therefore, it is not
applicable to the case. The petitioner cannot seek relief
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, prayed for
dismissing the petition. In support of his contention learned
counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in case of ' CBI Vs Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi alias Vijayalakshmi reported in AIR
(2021) 18 SCC 135 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 923 court
5041 and contended that this court cannot verify and sit as
a chartered accountant. The petitioner is having right to file
his documents and explanation. Therefore, prayed for
dismissing the petition.
6. Having heard the arguments, perused the
records. The main contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the Section 17, proviso 2 of the PC Act,
was not followed, which is mandatory in nature. Prior to
10
according permission, the SP is required to verify the source
report and should make preliminary enquiry and to register
FIR. Thereafter, shall pass the order under Section 17 of PC
Act, for investigating the matter. But here in this case, no
FIR was registered and based upon the source report, he
has accorded the permission under Section 17 proviso 2 of
the PC Act. In support of his case, learned counsel relied
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan
lal's case stated supra . Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
at paragraph 128 as under;
"128. The conspectus of the above
decisions clearly shows that the granting of
permission under Section 5-A authorising an officer
of lower rank to conduct the investigation is not to
be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of
routine, but it is an exercise of his judicial
discretion having regard to the policy underlying
and the order giving the permission should, on the
face of it, disclose the reasons for granting such
permission. It is, therefore, clear in the light of the
above principle of law that the Superintendent of
Police or any police officer of above rank while
granting permission to a non-designated police
officer in exercise of his power under the second
proviso to Section 5-A(1), should satisfy himself
that there are good and sufficient reasons to
entrust the investigation with such police officer of
a lower rank and record his reasons for doing so;
because the very object of the legislature in
enacting Section 5-A is to see that the
investigation of offences punishable under Section
161, 165 or 165-A of Indian Penal Code as well as
those under Section 5 of the Act should be done
ordinarily by the officers designated in clauses (a)
to (d) of Section 5-A(1). The exception should be
for adequate reasons which should be disclosed on
the face of the order. In this connection, it is
worthy to note that the strict compliance with
Section 5-A(1) becomes absolutely necessary,
because Section 5- A(1) expressly prohibits police
officers, below certain ranks, from investigating
into offences under Sections 161, 165 and 165-A,
IPC and under Section 5 of the Act without orders
of Magistrates specified there- in or without
authorisation of the State Government in this
behalf and from effecting arrests for those offences
without a warrant. See also A.C. Sharma v. Delhi
Administration".
11
7. Learned counsel also relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra & Ors, Hon'ble
Supreme Court held in paragraph Nos. 15 and 15.1 are
as under;
"15. While expressing the need for a
preliminary enquiry before proceeding against
public servants who are charged with the allegation
of corruption, it is observed in P. Sirajuddin³ that:
(SCC p. 601, para 17),
"before a public servant, whatever be
his status, is publicly charged with acts of
dishonesty which amount to serious
misdemeanour or misconduct of indulging into
corrupt practice and a first information is
lodged against him, there must be some
suitable preliminary enquiry into the
allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging
of such a report against a person who is
occupying the top position in a department,
even if baseless, would do incalculable harm
not only to the officer in particular but to the
department he belonged to in general. If the
Government had set up a Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption Department as was done in the
State of Madras and the said department was
entrusted with enquiries of this kind, no
exception can be taken to an enquiry by
officers of this Department.
It is further observed that: (P.
Sirajuddin case³, SCC p. 601, para 17)
"when such an enquiry is to be held for
the purpose of finding out whether criminal
proceedings are to be initiated and the scope
thereof must be limited to the examination of
persons who have knowledge of the affairs of
the person against whom the allegations are
made and documents bearing on the same to
find out whether there is a prima facie
evidence of guilt of the officer, thereafter, the
ordinary law of the land must take its course
and further enquiry be proceeded with in terms
of the Code of Criminal Procedure by lodging a
first information report."
15.1. Thus, an enquiry at pre-FIR stage
is held to be permissible and not only
12
permissible but desirable, more particularly in
cases where the allegations are of misconduct
of corrupt practice acquiring the
assets/properties disproportionate to his known
sources of income. After the enquiry/enquiry at
pre-registration of FIR stage/preliminary
enquiry, if, on the basis of the material
collected during such enquiry, it is found that
the complaint is vexatious and/ or there is no
substance at all in the complaint, the FIR shall
not be lodged. However, if the material
discloses prima facie a commission of the
offence alleged, the FIR will be lodged and the
criminal proceedings will be put in motion and
the further investigation will be carried out in
terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry would be
permissible only to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not and only
thereafter FIR would be registered. Therefore,
such a preliminary enquiry would be in the
interest of the alleged accused also against
whom the complaint is made.
8. Learned counsel also relied upon the coordinate
bench in stated supra at
Navaneeth Mohan's case
paragraph Nos.15 and 16 as under;
"15. The source report which is part of
Annexure-A submitted before Superintendent of
Police, ACB, Bengaluru, the note of Superintendent
of Police, ACB do not indicate that along with the
said report any material was placed before him to
grant permission to register the FIR and
investigate the matter. In the order of
Superintendent Police absolutely, there is no
reference to submission of any documents along
with the source report. In one stroke the
Superintendent of Police says that he is convinced
that it is a fit case to register the FIR and
investigate the case. He does not even say that
any preliminary enquiry was conducted prior to
placing source report before him. Therefore, there
is clear violation of the direction issued by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalitha Kumari's case in
registering the FIR.
16. In the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Charansingh Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others in Crl.A.No.363/2021
dated 24.03.2021 relied upon by the learned Spl.
13
Public Prosecutor himself, in para 12 it was held
that before registering the FIR a preliminary
enquiry shall be conducted either confidential or
open enquiry."
9. Another coordinate bench in Balakrishna's
case stated supra also taken similar view and has held
at paragraph 12 as under;
"12. If the reasons rendered by Apex
Court are noticed, two factors would emerge one,
that the prosecution is required to draw up source
report after conducting some sort of a preliminary
enquiry to know the assets of the Government
servant and two, after the source information
report is placed before the Superior Officer -
Superintendent of Police, he has to verify as to
whether a crime should be registered or otherwise.
If these principles that would emerge from the
judgment of the Apex Court are considered qua the
facts obtaining in the case at hand, the registration
of the crime would fall foul of the principles laid
down by the Apex Court and that of this Court in
the afore-quoted judgment. Therefore, on this
short ground that the source information report
disclosed blatant non-application of mind and non-
conduct of preliminary inquiry as is necessary in
law only in cases concerning disproportionate
assets.
10. In view of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble
Supreme Court as well as coordinate benches of this
court and looking to the fact of the case, where the
superintendent of police have granted permission on
8.1.2024 and directed the Dy.SP to investigate the
matter. The said order has been passed just based
upon the source report submitted by one Ramakrishna
Dy.SP -06. On perusal of the order it does not reveal
the application of mind by the SP directing to register
and investigate the matter. Just that he has passed the
order as per the source report of the Dy.SP-06 and he
has authorised to register and investigate the case. But
learned SP has not at all applied his mind as to how the
said figure was required to be investigated and
registered the FIR. The coordinate bench has held in
the Balakrishna's case stated supra, the source report,
if makes out a cognizable offence, the police officer can
register the FIR by making a preliminary enquiry then
forward the FIR as well as preliminary enquiry report,
14
along with the source report to the SP for according
permission to investigate the matter. However, herein
this case, it is a clear violation of the mandatory
provision of Section 17 (proviso 2) of PC Act. In the
Charan Singh's case stated supra, has considered the
same. Here in this case, even if there is no preliminary
enquiry to be conducted by the police in order to know
the veracity of the source report and if the cognizable
offence is made out, they have registered FIR and then
forwarded the same to SP for according the permission
to investigate the matter. In this case, after according
permission by the SP, the FIR has been registered.
Absolutely there is no preliminary enquiry conducted by
police. FIR was also not registered prior to order of
SP. The coordinate bench of this court while considering
the Lalita Kumari's case in Balakrishna's case stated
supra had quashed the criminal proceeding and another
coordinate bench in WP.No.43817/2018 in Navaneeth
Mohan's case also had quashed the criminal
proceedings based upon the non-compliance of the
guidance issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
Lalita Kumari's case and Charan Singh's case stated
supra.
Therefore, considering the facts an d
circumstances of the case, there is clear violation
of guidelines issued in Lalita Kumari's case and
Charan Singh's case and in view of the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's
case, the prosecution launched by the respondent
is abuse of process of law. It is not a fit case for
investigating the matter and FIR is liable to be
quashed.
Accordingly, this petition is allowed .
Consequently, the FIR filed against the
petitioner/accused in Crime No.3/2024 registered
by the Karnataka Lokayuktha police, Bengaluru, is
hereby quashed.”
11.1 As stated supra, various Benches of this Court quashed
FIRs and proceedings arising out of alleged offences punishable under
Section 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the P.C.Act as against various accused
persons, aggrieved by which, the respondents – Lokayuktha
15
approached the Apex Court which tagged / linked all the matters
together with the lead case being the case of Karnataka Lokayuktha
Police vs. K.L.Gangadharaiah – Crl.A.No.2444/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023) and the present proceedings in
Crl.A.No.2460/2025 (SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024), was tagged /
linked along with the said matters and culminated in a final order
dated 06.05.2025 as hereunder:-
O R D E R
1.
Heard.
2.
Delay condoned.
3.
Leave granted.
4. These appeals by special leave involve
common questions of facts and law and hence, the
same are being decided analogously by this order.
5. The appellants have challenged the orders passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (For
short, “High Court”) in writ petitions preferred by the
respondents herein, [the original writ-petitioners
( Hereinafter, being referred to as “respondents”.) ],
assailing the FIRs registered against them by the
Karnataka Lokayuktha Police under the provisions of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (For short, “PC
Act”.)
5.
In the writ petitions, filed before the High Court,
the primary grounds laying challenge to the
registration of the FIRs were twofold: -
i.
That no preliminary enquiry
whatsoever was conducted in accordance
with Section 9 of the Karnataka Lokayukta
Act, 1984 and hence, the direction given by
the Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayuktha to register the FIRs
against the respondents for the offence/s
punishable under the PC Act, were illegal
and without jurisdiction.
ii.
That the direction given by the
Superintendent of Police to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, for investigating
the cases pursuant to registration of the
16
FIRs, was contrary to the mandate of
Section 17 of the PC Act.
6.
The High Court allowed the said writ
petitions and accepted the challenge laid by the
respondents against registration of the FIRs and
further investigation on both grounds referred to
supra and quashed the said FIRs having been
registered without jurisdiction. One such similar
order was assailed by the State of Karnataka
and the Karnataka Lokayuktha Police by way of
Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 titled as State
of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy - 2025
SCC OnLine SC 382, wherein this Court
reversed the judgment of the High Court
and affirmed the action of the Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha, in directing the
registration of the FIR and investigation thereof
by the Deputy Superintendent of Police without
conducting any preliminary inquiry.
7.
During the course of hearing of the
present appeals, learned counsel representing
the respondents, candidly conceded that so far
as the two pivotal issues pertaining to the
registration of the FIRs without a preliminary
inquiry being conducted and the power of the
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka
Lokayuktha to authorize investigation by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police are concerned,
the same are no longer res integra and stand
concluded against the respondents by the
judgment of this Court in T.N. Sudhakar
Reddy (supra) wherein, it was held as below:-
“51. In view of the above discussion,
we conclude that: -
a.
The High Court erred in coming to
th
the conclusion that the order dated 4
December, 2023, passed by the
Superintendent of Police, was directly
passed under Section 17 of the PC Act,
thereby violating the mandatory provisions
of the PC Act.
b.
The preliminary inquiry is not
mandatory in every case under the PC
17
Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a
source information report which is both
detailed and well-reasoned and such that
any reasonable person would be of
the view that it prima facie discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence,
the preliminary inquiry may be avoided .
c.
Section 17 of the PC Act relates
specifically to the investigation process, and
not the initial act of registering the FIR, for
which it relies on the provisions of the CrPC.
Hence, it places limitations on only the
investigation; it does not impede the
fundamental duty of the law enforcement
agency to record and register an FIR for
cognizable offences.
d.
On a harmonious reading of the
provisions of the PC Act and the CrPC, it
is manifest that the Superintendent of
Police is competent to direct the
registration of an FIR if he has
information about the commission of a
cognizable offence, punishable under the
PC Act. The former is also competent to
simultaneously direct the Deputy
Superintendent of Police to register an
FIR for the offences under the PC Act,
with the understanding that the
subsequent investigation will be subject
to the restrictions outlined in Section
17 of the PC Act . A composite order to
register the FIR and conduct investigation
aligns with the statutory framework of the
CrPC and the PC Act.”
( Emphasis Supplied )
8.
Without prejudice to the above, the
respondents’ counsel have asserted before us that in
addition to the above two grounds, relating to
jurisdiction, numerous other grounds touching upon
the merits were raised by the writ petitioners in their
respective writ petitions which were not adverted to
by the High Court because the said writ petitions
were allowed on the above two preliminary grounds
only, finding the action of the Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha to be in teeth of the
provisions contained under the Karnataka Lokayukta
18
Act, 1984 and Section 17 of the PC Act.
9.
They fervently urged that there was no
foundational material available with the
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha so
as to justify direct registration of the FIRs, particularly
those pertaining to the allegations of amassing
disproportionate assets punishable under Sections
13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the PC Act.
10.
The writ petitions came to be allowed on the
preliminary issues of jurisdiction and hence, various
other grounds raised by the respondents in their writ
petitions which touched upon the merits of the
matter were not dealt with by the High Court, thereby,
causing grave prejudice to the respondents. Hence,
they prayed that the matters should be remitted to
the High Court for fresh consideration of the writ
petitions on the issues and grounds not adverted to by
the High Court while deciding the writ petitions.
11.
To this submission, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant has no objection.
12.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at bar and have gone
through the material placed on record.
13.
Learned counsel representing the respondents
have fairly conceded to the position that the High
Court erred in quashing the FIRs on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Police to
direct registration of the FIR without a preliminary
inquiry and in authorizing the Deputy
Superintendent of Police to conduct investigation.
Undeniably, these issues stand concluded, and the
reasoning assigned by the High Court has been
reversed by this Court in the case of T.N.
Sudhakar Reddy (supra) and which has been
followed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
State of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D.-
2025 SCC OnLine SC 753.
14.
However, this Court is conscious of the fact
that the grounds taken by the respondents touching
upon the merits were not adverted to by the High
Court because the writ petitions were decided on the
19
preliminary issues of jurisdiction only. Hence, the
respondents, [original writ petitioners], were deprived
of adjudication of other grounds raised in the writ
petitions which has left them remediless in view of the
judgment in T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra).
15.
In view of the discussion made above, we
hereby quash the orders passed by the High Court
and remit the matters back to the High Court for
fresh adjudication of the writ petitions on merits. This
consideration upon remand shall be restricted to the
grounds though taken but not adjudicated by the High
Court while deciding the writ petitions.
16.
Learned counsel for the respondents have
brought to the notice of this Court that owing to
the orders passed by this Court, permitting the
Investigating Agency to continue the investigation,
chargesheets have been filed against the
respondents in some matters. They, thus, urged
that the respondents may be permitted to assail the
chargesheets in the writ petitions received post-
remand.
17.
We, therefore, provide that in whichever
cases where the chargesheets have been submitted
during pendency of these appeals, the respondent/s
(writ petitioners before the High Court) concerned
shall be at liberty to assail the chargesheets in their
respective writ petitions, which shall stand revived
pursuant to this order. However, this liberty is
limited to the extent of assailing the chargesheets, if
any, filed during pendency of these appeals and
shall not be taken as expanding the scope of the
writ petitions any further. Needless to state that the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 do provide ample remedies
to an accused to challenge the orders passed by the
trial Court whether interim, interlocutory or final
and thus, the aggrieved persons would not be
rendered remediless in any situation.
18. As the respondents were enjoying interim
protection, while the writ petitions were pending
before the High Court, we hereby direct that no
coercive steps shall be taken against the
respondents for a period of six weeks from today.
20
19. Accordingly, it is directed that the writ
petitions filed by the respondents before the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru shall stand
restored to their original numbers. We request the
High Court to take up and decide the writ petitions
post remand expeditiously.
20.
The impugned orders are set aside, and the
appeals are allowed in the above terms.
21.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
11.2 In pursuance of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex
Court, the present petition has been remitted back to this Court
for reconsideration afresh in accordance with law. A perusal of
the aforesaid judgment passed by the Apex Court will indicate
that two primary grounds laying challenge to the registration of
FIR viz., non-conducting of preliminary enquiry in accordance
with Section 9 of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984 and the
direction given to the Dy.S.P. by the S.P. for investigating the
cases pursuant to registration of the FIRs was contrary to the
mandate of Section 17 of the P.C.Act were taken note of by the
Apex Court which placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in
T.N.Sudhakar Reddy’s case and Channakeshava’s case
supra, in order to come to the conclusion that it was not
mandatory to conduct a preliminary enquiry before registration
of the FIR and authorizing the Dy.S.P. to conduct investigation;
in fact, at paragraph-14 of its judgment, the Apex Court took
note of the concession made by the learned counsel for the
accused that as held in Sudhakar Reddy’s case and
Channakeshava’s case supra, conducting of preliminary
enquiry was not mandatory and accordingly, Ground No.1
extracted in paragraph-6 of its judgment was answered in
favour of the Lokayuktha; however, in the entire judgment, the
Apex Court did not address or deal with or record any finding as
regards the desirability or requirement of conducting preliminary
enquiry and merely held that conducting of preliminary enquiry
was not mandatory in every case and the question / issue as to
whether a source information report is both detailed and well
reasoned and such that any reasonable person would be of the
view that it prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, preliminary enquiry may be avoided, would necessarily
21
have to be decided on the basis of facts and circumstances
which are case – specific and dependent on the factual matrix
obtaining in a particular case; in other words, rather than laying
down any proposition / rule of absolute / universal application
that a preliminary enquiry was not required to be conducted in
relation to the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) r/w
13(2) of the P.C.Act, the Apex Court categorically held that
preliminary enquiry was not mandatory and the requirement /
desirability of conducting such a preliminary enquiry would be
completely and totally dependent on the facts of each case.
11.3 Further, the Apex Court has specifically directed
that the matters be remitted back to this Court for fresh
adjudication on merits and the consideration upon remand shall
be restricted to grounds taken but not adjudicated upon by this
Court while deciding the present petition in its order dated
01.03.2024; in this context, as stated supra, while allowing the
present petition and quashing the impugned FIR and
proceedings, this Court came to the conclusion that conducting
of preliminary enquiry was mandatory and non-
conducting of the same would vitiate the impugned FIR
and proceedings; however, this Court did not record any
finding that conducting of preliminary enquiry was
desirable / not desirable or warranted / not warranted or
required / not required and the said issue was not
considered by the Apex Court in its remand order and
was accordingly, remitted back to this Court for
reconsideration afresh on all grounds including the said
issue / question as regards desirability / requirement of
conducting a preliminary enquiry. It follows therefrom
that in the absence of any finding recorded by the Apex
Court while remitting the matter back to this Court to the
effect that conducting of preliminary enquiry was not
desirable / warranted / required, it cannot be said that
the petitioner is precluded from raising the said question
/ issue in the present petition after remand and
consequently, the said contention urged by the learned
counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted; to put it
differently, in the light of the unequivocal / unambiguous
directions issued by the Apex Court permitting the
petitioner to raise all grounds on merits without putting /
imposing any restriction as to the question / issue
regarding desirability / requirement of preliminary
22
enquiry, I am of the considered opinion that the
petitioner is not precluded from contending that
conducting of preliminary enquiry was required /
warranted / desirable in the facts and circumstances of
the instant case.
11.4 Learned counsel for the respondents also
alternatively contended that in the light of the judgments of the
Apex Court in Vijayalakshmi’s case supra, Sudhakar
Reddy’s case supra and Channakeshava’s case supra,
conducting of preliminary enquiry was neither desirable nor
warranted or required to be done by the respondent –
Lokayuktha; in order to appreciate this contention, it would be
necessary to refer to the aforesaid judgments of the Apex
Court; in Vijayalakshmi’s case supra , the Apex Court held as
under:-
“14. The rival submissions now fall for our
consideration. Based on the submissions, this Court is
called upon to decide two questions:
14.1. (i) Whether CBI is mandatorily required to
conduct a preliminary enquiry before the registration of
an FIR in every case involving claims of alleged
corruption against public servants; and
14.2. (ii) Independent of the first question, whether the
judgment of the High Court to quash the FIR can be
sustained in the present case.
D. Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory
before registering an FIR
D.1. Precedents of this Court
15. Before proceeding with our analysis of the issue, it
is important to understand what previous judgments of
this Court have stated on the issue of whether CBI is
required to conduct a preliminary enquiry before the
registration of an FIR, especially in cases of alleged
corruption against public servants.
16. The first of these is a judgment of a two-Judge
Bench in P. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras,
(1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] , in which it
was observed that before a public servant is charged
23
with acts of dishonesty amounting to serious
misdemeanour, some suitable preliminary enquiry must
be conducted in order to obviate incalculable harm to
the reputation of that person. G.K. Mitter, J. held that :
(SCC p. 601, para 17)
“17. … Before a public servant, whatever
be his status, is publicly charged with acts of
dishonesty which amount to serious
misdemeanour or misconduct of the type
alleged in this case and a first information is
lodged against him, there must be some
suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations
by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a
report against a person, specially one who like
the appellant occupied the top position in a
department, even if baseless, would do
incalculable harm not only to the officer in
particular but to the department he belonged to,
in general.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The above decision was followed by another
two-Judge Bench in Nirmal Singh Kahlon [Nirmal Singh
Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 523] , wherein it was observed that in
accordance with the CBI Manual, CBI may only be held
to have established a prima facie case upon the
completion of a preliminary enquiry. S.B. Sinha, J. held
thus : (SCC p. 456, para 30)
“30. Lodging of a first information report by CBI is
governed by a manual. It may hold a preliminary inquiry; it
has been given the said power in Chapter VI of the CBI
Manual. A prima facie case may be held to have been
established only on completion of a preliminary enquiry.”
18. The most authoritative pronouncement of law
emerges from the decision of a Constitution Bench in
Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] . The issue before the
Court was whether
“a police officer is bound to register a first
information report (“FIR”) upon receiving any
24
information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence under Section 154 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 … or the
police officer has the power to conduct a
“preliminary inquiry” in order to test the
veracity of such information before registering
the same” (SCC p. 17, para 1).
Answering this question on behalf of the Bench, P.
Sathasivam, C.J. held that under Section 154 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), a police officer need not
conduct a preliminary enquiry and must register an FIR when
the information received discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence.
19. Specifically with reference to the provisions of the
CBI Manual, the decision noted : (Lalita Kumari case [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-39,
83-86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-112, 114-119
and 120 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , SCC pp. 50-51, para 89)
“89. Besides, the learned Senior Counsel relied on
the special procedures prescribed under the CBI Manual to
be read into Section 154. It is true that the concept of
“preliminary inquiry” is contained in Chapter IX of the
Crime Manual of CBI. However, this Crime Manual is not a
statute and has not been enacted by the legislature. It is a
set of administrative orders issued for internal guidance of
CBI officers. It cannot supersede the Code. Moreover, in
the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Code
itself, the provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be
relied upon to import the concept of holding of preliminary
inquiry in the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
At this juncture, it is also pertinent to submit that CBI is
constituted under a special Act, namely, the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946 and it derives its power to
investigate from this Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. However, the Court was also cognizant of the
possible misuse of the powers under criminal law resulting
in the registration of frivolous FIRs. Hence, it formulated
“exceptions” to the general rule that an FIR must be
registered immediately upon the receipt of information
disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. The
Constitution Bench held : (Lalita Kumari case [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-
39, 83-86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-112,
25
114-119 and 120 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , SCC pp. 59-
60, paras 115, 117 & 119)
“115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold
that Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory
registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences,
yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry
may be required owing to the change in genesis and
novelty of crimes with the passage of time. …
*
117. In the context of offences relating to
corruption, this Court inP. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v.
State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri)
240] expressed the need for a preliminary inquiry before
proceeding against public servants.
*
119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims
regarding registration or non-registration, what is
necessary is only that the information given to the police
must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In
such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory.
However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the
information given, then the FIR need not be registered
immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of
preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose
of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has
been committed. But, if the information given clearly
mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there
is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other
considerations are not relevant at the stage of
registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is
falsely given, whether the information is genuine,
whether the information is credible, etc. These are the
issues that have to be verified during the investigation of
the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be
seen is merely whether the information given ex facie
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If,
after investigation, the information given is found to be
false, there is always an option to prosecute the
complainant for filing a false FIR.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. The judgment provides the following conclusions :
(Lalita Kumari case [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-39, 83-86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105,
106-107, 111-112, 114-119 and 120 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
, SCC p. 61, para 120)
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
26
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity
for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only
to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
*
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to
verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received
but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The category of
cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as
under:
*
(d) Corruption cases
*
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary
inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. The Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari case [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-39, 83-
86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-112, 114-119 and 120 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] thus held that a preliminary enquiry is not
mandatory when the information received discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence. Even when it is conducted, the scope of a
preliminary enquiry is not to ascertain the veracity of the
information, but only whether it reveals the commission of a
cognizable offence. The need for a preliminary enquiry will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. As an illustration,
“corruption cases” fall in that category of cases where a
preliminary enquiry “may be made”. The use of the expression
“may be made” goes to emphasise that holding a preliminary
enquiry is not mandatory. Dwelling on the CBI Manual, the
Constitution Bench held that : (i) it is not a statute enacted by the
legislature; and (ii) it is a compendium of administrative orders for
the internal guidance of CBI.
23. The judgment in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] was analysed by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Yashwant Sinha [Yashwant
27
Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338] where the Court refused to grant
the relief of registration of an FIR based on information submitted
by the appellant-informant. In his concurring opinion, K.M. Joseph,
J. described that a barrier to granting the relief of registration of an
FIR against a public figure would be the observations of this Court
in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] noting that a preliminary enquiry may be
desirable before doing so. Joseph, J. observed : (Yashwant Sinha
case [Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338, paras 114-115
and 117] , SCC pp. 385 & 387-89, paras 108, 110, 112 & 114)
“108. Para 120.6 [of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] ]
deals with the type of cases in which preliminary inquiry
may be made. Corruption cases are one of the categories of
cases where a preliminary inquiry may be conducted. …
*
110. In para 117 of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State
of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , this
Court referred to the decision in P. Sirajuddin v. State of
Madras [P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595
: 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] and took the view that in the context
of offences related to corruption in the said decision, the
Court has expressed a need for a preliminary inquiry before
proceeding against public servants.
*
112. In Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , one of the
contentions which was pressed before the Court was that in
certain situations, preliminary inquiry is necessary. In this
regard, attention of the Court was drawn to CBI Crime
Manual. …
*
114. The Constitution Bench inLalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] , had before it, the CBI Crime Manual. It also
considered the decision of this Court inP. Sirajuddin [P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970
SCC (Cri) 240] which declared the necessity for preliminary
inquiry in offences relating to corruption. Therefore, the
petitioners may not be justified in approaching this Court
seeking the relief of registration of an FIR and investigation
on the same as such. This is for the reason that one of the
exceptions where immediate registration of FIR may not be
resorted to, would be a case pointing fingers at a public
figure and raising the allegation of corruption. This Court
also has permitted preliminary inquiry when there is delay,
28
laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over
three months. A preliminary inquiry, it is to be noticed in
para 120.7 of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , is to be
completed within seven days.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. The decision of a two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State
of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri)
702] thereafter has noted that while the decision in Lalita Kumari
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] held that a preliminary enquiry was desirable in cases of
alleged corruption, that does not vest a right in the accused to
demand a preliminary enquiry. Whether a preliminary enquiry is
required or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case, and it cannot be said to be mandatory requirement without
which a case cannot be registered against the accused in
corruption cases. Hemant Gupta, J. held thus : (Managipet case
[State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87, paras 33-34
: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] , SCC pp. 103-105, paras 28-30 & 32-
34)
“28. In Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] the Court
has laid down the cases in which a preliminary inquiry is
warranted, more so, to avoid an abuse of the process of
law rather than vesting any right in favour of an accused.
Herein, the argument made was that if a police officer is
doubtful about the veracity of an accusation, he has to
conduct a preliminary inquiry and that in certain
appropriate cases, it would be proper for such officer, on
the receipt of a complaint of a cognizable offence, to
satisfy himself that prima facie, the allegations levelled
against the accused in the complaint are credible. …
29. The Court concluded that the registration of an
FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the
information discloses commission of a cognizable offence
and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a
situation. …
30. It must be pointed out that this Court has not
held that a preliminary inquiry is a must in all cases. A
preliminary enquiry may be conducted pertaining to
matrimonial disputes/family disputes, commercial offences,
medical negligence cases, corruption cases, etc. The
judgment of this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
29
does not state that proceedings cannot be initiated against
an accused without conducting a preliminary inquiry.
*
32. … The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry
being necessary before lodging an FIR would depend upon
the facts of each case. There is no set format or manner in
which a preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. The
objective of the same is only to ensure that a criminal
investigation process is not initiated on a frivolous and
untenable complaint. That is the test laid down inLalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524].
33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that
the information collected is in respect of disproportionate
assets of the accused officer. The purpose of a preliminary
inquiry is to screen wholly frivolous and motivated
complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly and objectively.
Herein, relevant information was available with the
informant in respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a
cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer recording
the FIR is satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed
against the accused even without conducting any inquiry
or by any other manner on the basis of the credible
information received by him. It cannot be said that the FIR
is liable to be quashed for the reason that the preliminary
inquiry was not conducted. The same can only be done if
upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment
of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426] wherein, this Court held inter alia that
where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused and also where a
criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with
an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry
warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not required
to be mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases. It has
been reiterated by this Court in multiple instances that the
type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no
fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be
conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal collection of
30
information disclosing a cognizable offence to the
satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In Charansingh [Charansingh v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 469 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 617 :
(2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 52] , the two-Judge Bench was confronted
with a challenge to a decision to hold a preliminary enquiry.
The Court adverted to the ACB Manual in Maharashtra and held
that a statement provided by an individual in an “open inquiry”
in the nature of a preliminary enquiry would not be confessional
in nature and hence, the individual cannot refuse to appear in
such an inquiry on that basis. M.R. Shah, J. writing for the two-
Judge Bench consisting also of one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
held : (SCC pp. 479-82, paras 11, 14 & 15)
“11. However, whether in a case of a complaint
against a public servant regarding accumulating the assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income, which
can be said to be an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, an enquiry at pre-FIR
stage is permissible or not and/or it is desirable or not, if
any decision is required, the same is governed by the
decision of this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524].
11.1. While considering the larger question,
whether police is duty-bound to register an FIR and/or it is
mandatory for registration of FIR on receipt of information
disclosing a cognizable offence and whether it is
mandatory or the police officer has option, discretion or
latitude of conducting preliminary enquiry before
registering FIR, this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari
v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
has observed that it is mandatory to register an FIR on
receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence and it
is the general rule. However, while holding so, this Court
has also considered the situations/cases in which
preliminary enquiry is permissible/desirable. While holding
that the registration of FIR is mandatory under Section
154, if the information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary enquiry is
permissible in such a situation and the same is the general
rule and must be strictly complied with, this Court has
carved out certain situations/cases in which the
preliminary enquiry is held to be permissible/desirable
before registering/lodging of an FIR. It is further observed
that if the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
31
inquiry, a preliminary enquiry may be conducted to
ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. It
is observed that as to what type and in which cases the
preliminary enquiry is to be conducted will depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.
*
14. In the context of offences relating to
corruption, in para 117 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] ,
this Court also took note of the decision of this Court in P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras [P. Sirajuddin v. State of
Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] in which
case this Court expressed the need for a preliminary
enquiry before proceeding against public servants.
*
15.1. Thus, an enquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to
be permissible and not only permissible but desirable,
more particularly in cases where the allegations are of
misconduct of corrupt practice acquiring the
assets/properties disproportionate to his known sources of
income. After the enquiry/enquiry at pre-registration of
FIR stage/preliminary enquiry, if, on the basis of the
material collected during such enquiry, it is found that the
complaint is vexatious and/or there is no substance at all
in the complaint, the FIR shall not be lodged. However, if
the material discloses prima facie a commission of the
offence alleged, the FIR will be lodged and the criminal
proceedings will be put in motion and the further
investigation will be carried out in terms of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry
would be permissible only to ascertain whether cognizable
offence is disclosed or not and only thereafter FIR would
be registered. Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry would
be in the interest of the alleged accused also against whom
the complaint is made.
15.2. Even as held by this Court in CBI v. Tapan
Kumar Singh [CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC
175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] , a GD entry recording the
information by the informant disclosing the commission of
a cognizable offence can be treated as FIR in a given case
and the police has the power and jurisdiction to investigate
the same. However, in an appropriate case, such as
allegations of misconduct of corrupt practice by a public
servant, before lodging the first information report and
further conducting the investigation, if the preliminary
enquiry is conducted to ascertain whether a cognizable
offence is disclosed or not, no fault can be found. Even at
the stage of registering the FIR, what is required to be
considered is whether the information given discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence and the information so
lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to
32
suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this
stage, it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the
information given suspects the commission of a cognizable
offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied
that a cognizable offence has been committed. Despite the
proposition of law laid down by this Court in a catena of
decisions that at the stage of lodging the first information
report, the police officer need not be satisfied or convinced
that a cognizable offence has been committed, considering
the observations made by this Court in P. Sirajuddin [P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970
SCC (Cri) 240] and considering the observations by this
Court inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] before lodging
the FIR, an enquiry is held and/or conducted after
following the procedure as per Maharashtra State Anti-
Corruption & Prohibition Intelligence Bureau Manual, it
cannot be said that the same is illegal and/or the police
officer, Anti-Corruption Bureau has no jurisdiction and/or
authority and/or power at all to conduct such an enquiry at
pre-registration of FIR stage.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Hence, all these decisions do not mandate that a
preliminary enquiry must be conducted before the registration of
an FIR in corruption cases. An FIR will not stand vitiated because a
preliminary enquiry has not been conducted. The decision in
Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] dealt specifically with a case of
disproportionate assets. In that context, the judgment holds that
where relevant information regarding prima facie allegations
disclosing a cognizable offence is available, the officer recording
the FIR can proceed against the accused on the basis of the
information without conducting a preliminary enquiry.
27. This conclusion is also supported by the judgment of
another Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami v.
Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] . The
judgment was in context of Section 5(1)(e) of the old Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, which is similar to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC
Act. It was argued that : (i) a public servant must be afforded an
opportunity to explain the alleged disproportionate assets before
an investigating officer; (ii) this must then be included and
explained by the investigating officer while filing the charge-sheet;
and (iii) the failure to do so would render the charge-sheet invalid.
Rejecting this submission, the Constitution Bench held that doing
so would elevate the investigating officer to the role of an enquiry
officer or a Judge and that their role was limited only to collect
33
material in order to ascertain whether the alleged offence has been
committed by the public servant.
28. In his opinion for himself and Venkatachaliah, J., K.
Jagannatha Shetty, J. held thus : (K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami
v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655, para 75 : 1991 SCC (Cri)
734] , SCC p. 715, para 75)
“75. … since the legality of the charge-sheet has
been impeached, we will deal with that contention also.
The counsel laid great emphasis on the expression “for
which he cannot satisfactorily account” used in clause (e)
of Section 5(1) of the Act. He argued that that term means
that the public servant is entitled to an opportunity before
the investigating officer to explain the alleged
disproportionality between assets and the known sources
of income. The investigating officer is required to consider
his explanation and the charge-sheet filed by him must
contain such averment. The failure to mention that
requirement would vitiate the charge-sheet and renders it
invalid. This submission, if we may say so, completely
overlooks the powers of the investigating officer. The
investigating officer is only required to collect material to
find out whether the offence alleged appears to have been
committed. In the course of the investigation, he may
examine the accused. He may seek his clarification and if
necessary he may cross check with him about his known
sources of income and assets possessed by him. Indeed,
fair investigation requires as rightly stated by Mr A.D. Giri,
learned Solicitor General, that the accused should not be
kept in darkness. He should be taken into confidence if he
is willing to cooperate. But to state that after collection of
all material the investigating officer must give an
opportunity to the accused and call upon him to account
for the excess of the assets over the known sources of
income and then decide whether the accounting is
satisfactory or not, would be elevating the investigating
officer to the position of an enquiry officer or a Judge. The
investigating officer is not holding an enquiry against the
conduct of the public servant or determining the disputed
issues regarding the disproportionality between the assets
and the income of the accused. He just collects material
from all sides and prepares a report which he files in the
court as charge-sheet.”
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, since an accused public servant does not
29.
have a right to be afforded a chance to explain the alleged
disproportionate assets to the investigating officer before the
filing of a charge-sheet, a similar right cannot be granted to the
34
accused before the filing of an FIR by making a preliminary
enquiry mandatory.
30. Having revisited the precedents of this Court, it is
now necessary to consider the provisions of the CBI Manual.
D.2. CBI Manual
31. In the judgment in Vineet Narain [Vineet Narain v.
Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] , as
three-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the provisions of the
CBI Manual must be followed by the officers of CBI strictly, and
disciplinary action should be taken against those who deviate
from them. J.S. Verma, C.J. noted : (SCC pp. 269-70, para 58)
“58. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we
hereby direct as under:
I. Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) and
Central Vigilance Commission (“CVC”)
*
12. The CBI Manual based on statutory provisions
of CrPC provides essential guidelines for CBI's functioning.
It is imperative that CBI adheres scrupulously to the
provisions in the Manual in relation to its investigative
functions, like raids, seizure and arrests. Any deviation
from the established procedure should be viewed seriously
and severe disciplinary action taken against the officials
concerned.”
32. In the later judgment of a two-Judge Bench in
Shashikant [Shashikant v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 630 : (2007)
1 SCC (Cri) 406] , it was held that CBI cannot be faulted
for conducting a preliminary enquiry in accordance with
the CBI Manual. S.B. Sinha, J. held : (SCC pp. 635-37 &
639, paras 9, 11, 19 & 25)
“9. … It is also not disputed that the CBI Manual
was made by the Central Government providing for
detailed procedure as regards the mode and manner in
which complaints against public servants are to be dealt
with.
*
11. The CBI Manual provides for a preliminary
inquiry. By reason thereof a distinction has been made
between a preliminary inquiry and a regular case. A
preliminary inquiry in terms of Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual
may be converted into a regular case as soon as sufficient
material becomes available to show that prima facie there
has been commission of a cognizable offence.
*
35
19. When an anonymous complaint is received, no
investigating officer would initiate investigative process
immediately thereupon. It may for good reasons carry out
a preliminary enquiry to find out the truth or otherwise of
the allegations contained therein.
*
25. … The procedure laid down in the CBI Manual
and in particular when it was required to inquire into the
allegation of the corruption on the part of some public
servants, recourse to the provisions of the Manual cannot
be said to be unfair.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [CBI v. Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 344 :
(2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 475] , a two-Judge Bench observed
that the provisions of the CBI Manual require strict
compliance. B.S. Chauhan, J. held : (SCC p. 309, para 24)
“24. … the CBI Manual, being based on statutory
provisions of CrPC, provides for guidelines which require
strict compliance. More so, in view of the fact that the ratio
of the judgment of this Court in M.M. Rajendran [State of
T.N. v. M.M. Rajendran, (1998) 9 SCC 268 : 1998 SCC
(Cri) 1000] has been incorporated in the CBI Manual, the
CBI Manual itself is the best authority to determine the
issue at hand. The court has to read the relevant
provisions of the CBI Manual alone and no judgment of this
Court can be a better guiding factor under such a
scenario.”
34. Hence, it is necessary to scrutinise the
provisions of the CBI Manual. Chapter 8 of the CBI Manual
is titled “Complaints and Source Information”. Para 8.1
notes that CBI must register every complaint it receives,
whatever be its source, before it starts verifying it. Para
8.6(ii) provides that verification can be undertaken for
“[c]omplaints containing specific and definite allegations
involving corruption or serious misconduct against public
servants, etc. falling within the ambit of CBI, which can be
verified”. Paras 8.8-8.9 describe the process of verification
where the officers are to examine records informally and
discreetly without making written requisitions, and that
this process ordinarily should not take more than three
months but can take up to four months for complicated
cases. Para 8.24 indicates that the officer entrusted with
verification must submit a detailed report at the end of the
process with specific recommendations, including whether
a preliminary enquiry is required or if a regular case should
be registered directly.
36
35. The FIR in the present case has been
registered on the basis of “Source Information”. Both
during the course of the hearing and in the affidavit filed
by CBI, it has been explained that CBI found information
and documents while investigating another case. Para 8.26
of the CBI Manual notes that every officer of CBI can
develop source information “regarding graft, misuse of
official position, possession of disproportionate assets,
fraud, embezzlement, serious economic offences, illegal
trading in narcotics and psychotropic substances,
counterfeiting of currency, smuggling of antiques, acts
endangering wildlife and environment, cybercrimes,
serious frauds of banking/financial institutions, smuggling
of arms and ammunition, forgery of passports, etc. and
other matters falling within the purview of CBI and verify
the same to ascertain whether any prima facie material is
available to undertake an open probe”. However, while
doing so, they are to keep their superior officer “well
informed”.
36. Further, Para 8.27 describes the process once
such “source information” is developed and submitted to
the superior officer. It reads as follows:
“8.27. The source information once developed
must be submitted in writing giving all available details
with specific acts of omissions and commissions and copies
of documents collected discreetly. The internal vigilance
enquiries or departmental enquiry reports should normally
not be used as basis for submitting the source information.
The SP concerned after satisfying himself that there is
prima facie material meriting action by CBI and further
verification is likely to result in registration of a regular
case, would order verification if it falls within his
competence. In the cases which are within the competence
of higher officers, he will forward his detailed comments to
the DIG and obtain orders from superior officer competent
to order registration. The verification of SIRs must begin
only after the competent authority has approved its
registration. At this stage a regular SIR number will be
assigned to the SIR which will also be entered in the
source information sub-module of Crimes Module with all
other details.”
The superior officer thus has to verify whether the
developed “source information” prima facie would result in
the registration of a case by CBI; if yes, they then have to
direct the verification of such information. Verification is
governed by Para 8.29, which speaks of a process similar
to Para 8.9. Para 8.32 provides that verification of “source
information” shall be completed within three months and
approval of the competent authority is required to carry
37
out verification beyond that period. Similar to Para 8.24,
under Para 8.33, the officer entrusted with verification has
to submit a report with specific recommendations on
whether a preliminary enquiry is required or if a regular
case should be registered directly.
37. If a preliminary enquiry is necessary, it is covered
by Chapter 9 of the CBI Manual. Para 9.1 notes:
“ 9.1. When, a complaint is received or
information is available which may, after verification as
enjoined in this Manual, indicate serious misconduct on the
part of a public servant but is not adequate to justify
registration of a regular case under the provisions of
Section 154CrPC, a preliminary enquiry may be registered
after obtaining approval of the competent authority…When
the verification of a complaint and source information
reveals commission of a prima facie cognizable offence, a
regular case is to be registered as is enjoined by law. A PE
may be converted into RC as soon as sufficient material
becomes available to show that prima facie there has been
commission of a cognizable offence. When information
available is adequate to indicate commission of cognizable
offence or its discreet verification leads to similar
conclusion, a regular case must be registered instead of a
preliminary enquiry. It is, therefore, necessary that the SP
must carefully analyse material available at the time of
evaluating the verification report submitted by Verifying
Officer so that registration of PE is not resorted to where a
regular case can be registered…”
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, two distinct principles emerge from the
above : (i) a preliminary enquiry is registered when
information (received from a complaint or “source
information”) after verification indicates serious
misconduct on part of a public servant but is not enough to
justify the registration of a regular case; and (ii) when the
information available or after its secret verification reveals
the commission of a cognizable offence, a regular case has
to be registered instead of a preliminary enquiry being
resorted to necessarily.
38. Paras 9.7-9.8 note that once it is decided that a
preliminary enquiry is required, a “PE Registration Report” is
required to be prepared. Para 9.10 specifies that in cases of
corruption, the preliminary enquiry should be limited to a
scrutiny of records and talking to the bare minimum persons.
Para 9.11 notes that the records should be collected under a
proper receipt memo (unlike the process of verification) and
that the statements herein should be collected in the same
38
manner as they would be at the investigation stage. However,
it is clarified that notices under Sections 91 and 160CrPC shall
not be resorted to during a preliminary enquiry. Paras 9.12-
9.14 then discuss the procedure for converting a preliminary
enquiry into a regular case, which has to happen the moment
sufficient material is available which discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence which could result in prosecution.
Finally, Para 9.16 provides that a preliminary enquiry must be
completed within three months.
D.3. Analysis
39. The precedents of this Court and the provisions of the
CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a preliminary enquiry is
not mandatory in all cases which involve allegations of corruption.
The decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
holds that if the information received discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary enquiry would be
required. It also clarified that the scope of a preliminary enquiry is
not to check the veracity of the information received, but only to
scrutinise whether it discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence. Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a
preliminary enquiry is required only if the information (whether
verified or unverified) does not disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence. Even when a preliminary enquiry is initiated, it
has to stop as soon as the officer ascertains that enough material
has been collected which discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence. A similar conclusion has been reached by a two-Judge
Bench in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19
SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition
that a preliminary enquiry is mandatory is plainly contrary to law,
for it is not only contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench
in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] but would also tear apart the framework
created by the CBI Manual.
40. This view is also supported by the decision of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. State of Maharashtra
[Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 :
(2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] , which reversed the decision of a two-
Judge Bench in Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. Stateof Maharashtra
[Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6
SCC 454 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 124] which had, inter alia, held that
“a preliminary enquiry may be conducted by the DSP concerned to
find out whether the allegations make out a case under the
[Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
39
Act, 1989 (“the Atrocities Act”)] and that the allegations are not
frivolous or motivated”. However, in the three-Judge Bench
decision, it was held that such a direction was impermissible since
neither CrPC nor the Atrocities Act mandate a preliminary inquiry.
Arun Mishra, J. held : (Union of India case [Union of India v. State
of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] , SCC
p. 801, para 68)
“68. The direction has also been issued that the DSP
should conduct a preliminary inquiry to find out whether the
allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act, and
that the allegations are not frivolous or motivated. In case a
cognizable offence is made out, the FIR has to be outrightly
registered, and no preliminary inquiry has to be made as
held inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014)
2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] by a Constitution Bench.
There is no such provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure
for preliminary inquiry or under the SC/ST Act, as such
direction is impermissible. Moreover, it is ordered to be
conducted by the person of the rank of DSP. The number of
DSP as per stand of the Union of India required for such an
exercise of preliminary inquiry is not available. The direction
would mean that even if a complaint made out a cognizable
offence, an FIR would not be registered until the preliminary
inquiry is held. In case a preliminary inquiry concludes that
allegations are false or motivated, FIR is not to be
registered, in such a case how a final report has to be filed
in the Court. Direction 79.4 cannot survive for the other
reasons as it puts the members of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in a disadvantageous position in the
matter of procedure vis-à-vis to the complaints lodged by
members of upper caste, for latter no such preliminary
investigation is necessary. In that view of the matter it
should not be necessary to hold preliminary inquiry for
registering an offence under the Atrocities Act, 1989.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. In a recent decision of a two-Judge Bench in Vinod Dua
v. Union of India [Vinod Dua v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC 286
: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414] , a direction of the Court was sought
for requiring “that henceforth FIRs against persons belonging to
the media with at least 10 years standing be not registered unless
cleared by a committee…”. In refusing such a prayer, the Court
observed that doing so would be akin to instituting a preliminary
inquiry which was not mandated by the statutory framework. U.U.
Lalit, J. speaking for the Bench held : (Vinod Dua case [Vinod Dua
40
v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC 286 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414] ,
SCC para 86)
“86. … the directions issued in Subhash Kashinath Mahajan
[Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6
SCC 454 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 124] regarding holding of a
preliminary inquiry were not found consistent with the statutory
framework. The second prayer made in the writ petition is asking
for the constitution of the Committee completely outside the scope
of the statutory framework. Similar such exercise of directing
constitution of a Committee was found inconsistent with the
statutory framework in the decisions discussed above. … Any relief
granted in terms of second prayer would certainly, in our view,
amount to encroachment upon the field reserved for the
legislature. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the
prayer and dismissing the writ petition to that extent .”
42. In view of the above discussion, we hold that since
the institution of a preliminary enquiry in cases of corruption is
not made mandatory before the registration of an FIR under
CrPC, the PC Act or even the CBI Manual, for this Court to issue
a direction to that effect will be tantamount to stepping into the
legislative domain. Hence, we hold that in case the information
received by CBI, through a complaint or a “source information”
under Chapter 8, discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, it can directly register a regular case instead of
conducting a preliminary enquiry, where the officer is satisfied
that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence.
43. The above formulation does not take away from the
value of conducting a preliminary enquiry in an appropriate
case. This has been acknowledged by the decisions of this
Court in P. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970)
1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] , Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari
v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] and
Charansingh [Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5
SCC 469 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 617 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 52] .
Even in Vinod Dua [Vinod Dua v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC
286 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414] , this Court noted that “[a]s a
matter of fact, the accepted norm — be it in the form of the CBI
Manual or like instruments is to insist on a preliminary inquiry”.
The registration of a regular case can have disastrous
consequences for the career of an officer, if the allegations
ultimately turn out to be false. In a preliminary enquiry, CBI is
allowed access to documentary records and speak to persons
just as they would in an investigation, which entails that
information gathered can be used at the investigation stage as
41
well. Hence, conducting a preliminary enquiry would not take
away from the ultimate goal of prosecuting accused persons in
a timely manner. However, we once again clarify that if CBI
chooses not to hold a preliminary enquiry, the accused cannot
demand it as a matter of right. As clarified by this Court in
Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87
: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] , the purpose of Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri)
524] noting that a preliminary enquiry is valuable in corruption
cases was not to vest a right in the accused but to ensure that
there is no abuse of the process of law in order to target public
servants.
11.5 In Sudhakar Reddy’s case supra, the Apex Court
held as under:-
13. The core questions which arise for our consideration
in the present case are as follows:—
A. Whether a preliminary inquiry was mandatory before
directing registration of an FIR under the PC Act in the facts of
the case at hand or whether the source information report could
be treated to be a substitute for the preliminary inquiry?
th
B. Whether the Order dated 4 November, 2023,
passed by the Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the
PC Act, is sustainable in the eyes of law?
Issue A : Whether a preliminary inquiry was
mandatory before directing registration of an FIR under
the PC Act in the facts of the case at hand or whether the
source information report could be treated to be a
substitute for the preliminary inquiry?
14. It is the case of the appellant-State that preliminary
inquiry is not mandatory before registration of an FIR. Without
prejudice to the above, it is contended that the source
information report submitted by the Police Inspector, Karnataka
Lokayukta Police Station to the Superintendent of Police,
detailing acquisition of assets by the respondent
disproportionate to his known sources of income, itself serves
as a preliminary inquiry report as it was elaborate enough to
disclose a prima facie case for the offences punishable under
Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act.
15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondent would urge that the Superintendent of Police acted
42
in gross violation of law while issuing an order to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police to register an FIR as preliminary
inquiry in ‘corruption cases’ is a condition precedent for
registration of the FIR. Further, preliminary inquiry can only be
conducted by a police officer, who is competent to investigate
the offence, and thus, a source information report, however
detailed, cannot be taken to be a substitute for a preliminary
inquiry.
16. In addressing this issue, we must first consider the
legal framework established by this Court in a catena of
decisions, particularly in P. Sirajuddin (supra), Lalita
Kumari (supra), Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra),
and Managipet (supra). This Court in P. Sirajuddin (supra) has
held that before any public servant is charged with any acts of
dishonesty, a preliminary inquiry ‘must’ be conducted in order
to obviate incalculable harm to the reputation of that person.
The relevant para from P. Sirajuddin is extracted herein
below:—
“17. Before a public servant, whatever be his
status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty
which amount to serious misdemeanour or
misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first
information is lodged against him, there ‘must’ be
some suitable preliminary inquiry into the allegations
by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report
against a person, specially one who like the appellant
occupied the top position in a department, even if
baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the
officer in particular but to the department he
belonged to, in general…”
(emphasis supplied)
17. However, the authoritative pronouncement of
law in respect of registration of the FIR emerges from the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra)
wherein, the issue before the Court was whether a police
officer is obligated to register an FIR upon receiving
information regarding the commission of a cognizable
offence under Section 154 of the CrPC (corresponding
Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023) or whether it is essential to conduct a preliminary
inquiry to verify the information before registration of the
FIR. This Court held that under Section 154 of the CrPC, a
police officer is required to register an FIR when the
information received by him discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, without undertaking a preliminary
43
inquiry. However, the Court was also cognizant of the
possible misuse of the criminal law resulting in the
registration of frivolous FIRs. To address this concern, it
outlined specific ‘exceptions’ to the general rule, which
mandates the immediate registration of FIR upon
receiving information about a cognizable offence. The
Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra) held:
“119. Therefore, in view of various
counterclaims regarding registration or non-
registration, what is necessary is only that the
information given to the police must disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. In such a
situation, registration of an FIR is
mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made
out in the information given, then the FIR need not be
registered immediately and perhaps the police can
conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for
the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a
cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the
information given clearly mentions the commission of a
cognizable offence, there is no other option but to
register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not
relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as,
whether the information is falsely given, whether the
information is genuine, whether the information is
credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be
verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the
stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is
merely whether the information given ex facie
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If,
after investigation, the information given is found to be
false, there is always an option to prosecute the
complainant for filing a false FIR.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The following guidelines were laid down by the
Constitution Bench governing the issues:—
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory
under Section 154 of the Code, if the information
discloses commission of a cognizable offence and
no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a
situation.
120.2. If the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may
44
be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable
offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must
be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry
ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry
of such closure must be supplied to the first
informant forthwith and not later than one week. It
must disclose reasons in brief for closing the
complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his
duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is
disclosed. Action must be taken against erring
officers who do not register the FIR if information
received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is
not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the
information received but only to ascertain whether
the information reveals any cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may
be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal
delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for
example, over 3 months’ delay in reporting the
matter without satisfactorily explaining the
reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. It was held that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory
if the information received by the police officer/Investigating
45
Agency discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. However,
if the preliminary inquiry is conducted, its scope is limited to
determine whether the information prima facie reveals commission
of a cognizable offence and does not extend to verifying its
truthfulness. The necessity of a preliminary inquiry depends on the
specific facts and circumstances of each case. For instance,
corruption cases fall into a category where a preliminary inquiry
‘may be made’.
20. The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted in Lalita
Kumari (supra) underscores that conducting such an inquiry is
discretionary in nature and not a mandatory obligation.
21. Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari (supra), this
Court in Managipet (supra) held that while the decision in Lalita
Kumari (supra) noted that a preliminary inquiry was desirable in
cases of alleged corruption, this does not vest a right in the
accused to demand a preliminary inquiry. Whether the preliminary
inquiry is required to be conducted or not will depend on the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, and it cannot be
said to be a mandatory requirement, in the absence of which, an
FIR cannot be registered against the accused in corruption-related
matters.
22. The relevant paragraphs from Managipet (supra) are
extracted herein below:—
“33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the
information collected is in respect of disproportionate assets of
the accused officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to
screen wholly frivolous and motivated complaints, in
furtherance of acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant
information was available with the informant in respect of
prima facie allegations disclosing a cognizable
offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR is
satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed against the
accused even without conducting any inquiry or by any other
manner on the basis of the credible information received by
him. It cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for
the reason that the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The
same can only be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an
FIR, no offence is disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made
to a judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein, this Court held inter alia
that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused and also where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
46
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry
warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not required
to be mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases. It has
been reiterated by this Court in multiple instances that the
type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. There are no fixed
parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be conducted.
Therefore, any formal and informal collection of information
disclosing a cognizable offence to the satisfaction of the person
recording the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. A three-judge bench of this Court in Thommandru
Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra) extensively discussed the judicial
precedents and legal principles governing the requirement of
conducting a preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR.
The Court affirmed the view taken by the two-judge Bench
in Managipet (supra), holding that a preliminary inquiry may
not be necessary if the officer recording the FIR possesses
relevant information which discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. The relevant extracts from Thommandru
Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra) are reproduced herein below:—
“32. [..]… we hold that since the institution of a
Preliminary inquiry in cases of corruption is not made
mandatory before the registration of an FIR under the CrPC,
PC Act or even the CBI Manual, for this Court to issue a
direction to that affect will be tantamount to stepping into the
legislative domain.
39. The precedents of this Court and the provisions of
the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a preliminary
inquiry is not mandatory in all cases which involve allegations
of corruption. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC
1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds that if the information
received discloses the commission of a cognizable offence at
the outset, no preliminary inquiry would be required. It also
clarified that the scope of a preliminary inquiry is not to check
the veracity of the information received, but only to scrutinise
whether it discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a preliminary
inquiry is required only if the information (whether verified or
unverified) does not disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. Even when a preliminary inquiry is initiated, it has to
stop as soon as the officer ascertains that enough material has
been collected which discloses the commission of a cognizable
47
offence. A similar conclusion has been reached by a two-Judge
Bench in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019)
19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the
proposition that a preliminary inquiry is mandatory is plainly
contrary to law, for it is not only contrary to the decision of
the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State
of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] but would
also tear apart the framework created by the CBI Manual.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is
perspicuous that conducting a preliminary inquiry is not sine qua
non for registering a case against a public servant who is accused
of corruption. While preliminary inquiry is desirable in certain
categories of cases including those under the PC Act, it is neither
a vested right of the accused, nor a mandatory pre-requisite for
registration of a criminal case. The purpose of a preliminary
inquiry is not to verify the veracity of the information received,
but merely to ascertain whether the said information reveals the
commission of a cognizable offence. The scope of such inquiry is
naturally narrow and limited to prevent unnecessary harassment
while simultaneously ensuring that genuine allegations of a
cognizable offence are not stifled arbitrarily. Thus, the
determination, whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or not
will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case.
25. In the present case, the Police Inspector of the
Karnataka Lokayukta submitted a comprehensive source
th
information report dated 10 November, 2023 to the
Superintendent of Police, which included meticulous
documentation and evaluation of the assets acquired by the
respondent, which were grossly disproportionate to his known
sources of income. The respondent, during his tenure of service
in various departmental units, had acquired assets worth Rs.
3,81,40,246/-, which were disproportionate and almost 90.72%
more than his known sources of income. Thereupon, the
Superintendent of Police took cognizance of the source
information report and concluded that the allegations made
against the respondent did constitute prima facie offences
punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with
Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
26. It is clearly discernible that the source information
th
report dated 10 November, 2023, was in the nature of a
preliminary inquiry in itself and nothing else. The comprehensive
nature of the said report took it beyond a simple complaint, as it
provided a meticulous breakdown of the respondent's monetary
acquisitions. Further, the report makes cross-referencing of
48
official income records with actual property acquisitions, bank
deposits, and other financial assets. In substance, the source
information report prime facie reflects a systematic pattern of
financial irregularities, wherein the discrepancy in acquisition of
assets was found to be 90.72% more than the known sources of
income of the respondent.
27. Thus, in our view the source information report dated
th
10 November, 2023, served as a critical piece of information
which not only documented the financial discrepancies but also
presented a clear, prima facie picture of disproportionate assets
accumulated by the respondent but also demanded immediate
and thorough investigative action. As we have noted above, the
scope of preliminary inquiries is not to verify the absolute
truthfulness of information, and it is only to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is disclosed or not therefrom. The source
information report in the case at hand clearly satisfies this
criterion by comprehensively documenting the financial
irregularities committed by the respondent and disclosed a prima
facie case of commission of a cognizable offence involving
acquisition of disproportionate assets, punishable under the PC
Act. Thus, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in
concluding that the FIR was liable to be quashed on account of
omission to conduct a preliminary inquiry.
11.6 In Channakeshava’s case supra, the Apex Court
held as under:-
11. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, senior advocate appearing
for the appellant would rely upon the judgment of this Court
in State of Karnataka v. T.N Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 382 to contend that an enquiry before
registration of FIR under PC Act is not mandatory. After
considering the law as laid down in Lalita Kumari (Supra),
this Court in T.N Sudhakar Reddy (Supra) observed as
follows:
“19. … The necessity of a preliminary inquiry
depends on the specific facts and circumstances of
each case. For instance, corruption cases fall into a
category where a preliminary inquiry ‘may be
made’.
20. The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted in
Lalita Kumari (supra) underscores that conducting
such an inquiry is discretionary in nature and not a
mandatory obligation.
49
21. Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari
(supra), this Court in Managipet (supra) held that
while the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) noted
that a preliminary inquiry was desirable in cases of
alleged corruption, this does not vest a right in the
accused to demand a preliminary inquiry. Whether
the preliminary inquiry is required to be conducted
or not will depend on the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case, and it cannot be said
to be a mandatory requirement, in the absence of
which, an FIR cannot be registered against the
accused in corruption-related matters.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, in the said case, this Court held that:
“51. In view of the above discussion, we conclude
that:
a…..
b. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in
every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is
in seisin of a source information report which is
both detailed and well-reasoned and such that any
reasonable person would be of the view that it
prima facie discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may be
avoided.
(Emphasis Supplied)
12. To sum up, this Court has held that in matters of
corruption a preliminary enquiry although desirable, but
is not mandatory. In a case where a superior officer,
based on a detailed source report disclosing the
commission of a cognizable offence, passes an order for
registration of FIR, the requirement of preliminary
enquiry can be relaxed.
13. All the same, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned
senior advocate for respondent no. 1, would argue that
respondent no. 1 was never given a chance to explain
his position before the registration of FIR. He would,
further, argue that FIR has been used as an instrument
to harass the public servant and this is a case where no
prior notice or hearing was given to the officer
(respondent no. 1), which could have taken place if a
preliminary enquiry had been held.
14. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, senior counsel, has
relied upon a recent Three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi,
(2021) 18 SCC 135 where it was specifically stated that
50
an accused public servant does not have any right to
explain the alleged disproportionate assets before filing
of an FIR. We are also of the opinion that this is the
correct legal position as there is no inherent right of a
public servant to be heard at this stage.
15. In view of the above, it is clear that
preliminary enquiry was not mandated in the present
case, considering that detailed information was already
there before the SP in the form of the source report
referred above. We have also gone through the order
passed by the SP, directing registration of FIR against
respondent no. 1, which reflects that the SP had passed
that order on the basis of material placed before him in
the form of the source report.
16. Considering all the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court ought not to have quashed
the FIR in the present case. Accordingly, we allow this
appeal and impugned order dated 25.04.2024 is hereby
set aside.
17. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
18. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s)
disposed of.”
11.7 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgments,
the Apex Court has categorically reiterated that whilst
conducting / holding of a preliminary enquiry cannot be
said to be a mandatory requirement without which a
case cannot be registered against the accused, whether a
preliminary enquiry is required or not will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case; the Apex Court has
not laid down any absolute principle of universal
application to the effect that preliminary enquiry is not
desirable / required in corruption cases and the aforesaid
judgments of the Apex Court cannot be construed /
treated / understood as having laid down any such
absolute / universal proposition as sought to be
contended by the learned counsel for the respondents
and consequently, the said contention urged by the
learned counsel for the respondents – Lokayuktha cannot
be accepted.
51
11.8 In the instant case, petitioner has specifically
contended that there was no foundational material
available with the respondent to justify the direct
registration of the impugned FIR without conducting
preliminary enquiry, particularly in view of the instant
case involving allegations of disproportionate assets and
the contentions of the petitioner in this regard goes to
the root of the matter and forms part of the merits to the
challenge to the FIR; in this regard, it is pertinent to note
that the Apex Court has categorically remitted the matter
for de novo adjudication touching upon the merits in
relation to grounds which were earlier not considered by
this Court and in the absence of any finding recorded by
this Court as regards desirability of a preliminary enquiry,
the said question / issue as to whether a preliminary
enquiry was required or desirable clearly remained open
and live for adjudication upon remand forming part of the
grounds on merits that were raised but not decided by
this Court in its earlier order dated 01.03.2024.
11.9 Further, the factual issue as to whether the
source information report in the present case was
sufficiently detailed, credible and capable of disclosing
the commission of a cognizable offence remains a matter
for judicial scrutiny and consequently, the petitioner is
clearly not precluded and on the other hand, he is entitled
to contend before this Court that the material relied upon
by the respondents was inadequate and insufficient so as
to justify registration of the impugned FIR without a
preliminary enquiry and such an examination by this
Court clearly falls squarely within the scope of
adjudication permitted by the remand order. It is
therefore clear that the issue / question relating to
necessity and justification for dispensing with
preliminary enquiry, particularly in the absence of
credible foundational material remains open for
consideration and adjudication by this Court in the
present petition and as such, it cannot be said that the
petitioner is precluded from contending that preliminary
enquiry was desirable / required / warranted in the facts
and circumstances of the instant case and the various
contentions urged by the learned counsel for the
respondents – Lokayuktha cannot be accepted.
52
11.10 Under these circumstances, I am of the considered
opinion that the judgment of the Apex Court dated 06.05.2025
passed in case of Karnataka Lokayuktha Police vs.
K.L.Gangadharaiah – Crl.A.No.2444/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023) along with connected matters
including the present / instant Crl.A.No.2460/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024), would not come in the way or
have the effect of precluding the petitioner from contending that
conducting of preliminary enquiry prior to registration of the
impugned FIR was desirable / warranted / required / necessary
in the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Point No.1 is accordingly answered in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondents by holding that
the petitioner is not precluded from contending that
conducting of preliminary enquiry was required /
desirable / warranted prior to the respondents
registering the impugned FIR against the petitioner in the
instant case.
Re-Point No.2:-
12. While dealing with Point No.1 supra , I have
come to the conclusion that though it is not mandatory to
conduct a preliminary enquiry, the question / issue as to
whether preliminary enquiry is desirable / required /
warranted depends on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case; in this context, it is pertinent to reiterate
that while the petitioner contends that the source report
nd
submitted by the 2 respondent in the instant case is
inadequate, incomplete, inaccurate and sketchy without
containing sufficient details and material particulars
thereby warranting / requiring conducting of preliminary
enquiry, respondents contend that the source report is
self-sufficient and would obviate / dispense with the
necessity / requirement of conducting a preliminary
enquiry, which was not required or warranted in the
instant case.
12.1 Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would
be necessary to refer to the Circular dated 11.05.2023 issued
by the Karnataka Lokyuktha prescribing guidelines to be
53
followed by Investigating Officers while investigating
disproportionate assets (DA) cases – regarding as hereunder:-
“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
LOK/DGP/CIRCULAR-01/2023 Office of the
Director General of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta,
M.S.Building, Bengaluru-560001.
Date: 11/05/2023.
CIRCULAR
Sub: Guidelines to be followed by the Investigating
officers while Investigating Disproportionate
Asset (DA) cases-reg.
With a view to standardise investigation of Disproportionate
Asset (DA) cases the following directions are issued for immediate
compliance by all the Investigation Officers (I.O) henceforth. These
directions will also apply to DA cases under Investigation currently.
i. All DA cases shall be registered only after
a. Submission of detailed Source Information Report
(SIR) by the generating officer to the Unit
Superintendent of Police (SP), followed by
b. Thorough verification of the SIR by the Unit SP
and submission of the same to DGP/ADGP KLA,
and
c. Obtaining orders of the DGP/ADGP
ii. All SIRs submitted for orders of DGP/ADGP, shall contain
A, B, C and D statements and calculation of DA as per
Annexure-1 and comments of the Unit SP on being
satisfied with the SIR.
iii. Upon receipt of orders from DGP/ADGP KI.A, the Unit SP
shall get the FIR registered and issue orders under Sec.
17 PC Act 1988 assigning the Investigation Officer (10).
The 1.0 shall not be the same as SIR generating officer.
54
iv. The FIR shall be submitted to the concerned court in
scaled cover, with request to be opened on completion of
the search proceedings.
v. Wherever required, searches shall be planned without any
delay after thorough verification of addresses to be
searched.
vi. In all Class-1 cases, the detailed proposal for searches *
shall be submitted to the Headquarters through the Unit
Ssl (confidentially through E-mail, fax or any other
means) and searches conducted after approval from
DGP/ADGP, KLA. In all other cases the Unit SP shall be
competent to approve the search proposal.
vii. All searches shall be conducted only under warrants
issued by the Court under sec 93 (1) (c) of Cr.P.C. Only
in exceptional circumstances, searches may be conducted
under sec 165 Cr.P.C, at new locations discovered during
the course of searches.
viii. Extreme confidentiality shall be maintained during
briefing and conduct of the search operations. The Unit
officer shall make all logistic arrangements such as
travel, halt, meals, equipment and stationery etc.,
seeking assistance of witnesses, well in advance. Search
parties should compulsorily comprise of at least some
woman staff. The Unit Officer shall ensure searches are
conducted as per law following the Standard Operating
Procedure. Provisions of Sections 96, 165, 166. 101, 102
and 103 of Cr.P.C. must be fully complied with.
ix. On completion of searches, the IO shall consider freezing
of accounts and assets that are suspect in nature,
without affecting day to day livelihood of the accused and
connected individuals.
x. In appropriate cases, I.O may initiate process for
attachment of properties under the Criminal Law
Amendment Ordinance, 1944 after getting authorization
from the State Government.
xi. The I.O shall prepare a detailed Plan of Action and gut
approved by the unit SP. I.O. shall take up investigation
on a day to day basis without any delay and ensure
completion within the time frame set in the plan.
xii. The process of obtaining Schedule 1-23 statements from
the accused is discontinued and henceforth, I.Os to
55
collect Statements I-VI as in Annexure -2. The request
shall be made through the controlling officer of the AGO,
fixing a time frame of two months for its submission,
extendable up to three months with justifiable reasons
failing which the investigation shall be concluded
recording the fact that the accused failed to submit the
statements.
xiii. With respect to day-to-day living expenditure of the
AGO, the I.O to consider 33% of the Net Salary Income
as per Hon'ble Supreme Court guidelines in State of
Punjab Vs. Sajjan Singh - AIR 1964, SC 465
xίν. On completion of investigation, the I.O shall issue notice
to the AGO to finally explain the DA made out in the
investigation and record defence of the accused.
xv. The IO shall conduct investigation into the defence of the
accused and record his/her reasoned rebuttal if any.
xvi. In appropriate cases the I.O to consider invoking
sections of The Prohibition of Benami Property
Transactions Act, 1988.
xvii. The final calculation of DA shall be made as per
Annexure-3
xviii. During the course of Investigation, the IO shall submit
detailed Progress reports to the Unit SP and DGP/ADGP
as per SoP
xix. On conclusion of Investigation, the Final Report (FR) of
the I.O along with SP Comments shall reach Office of
DGP/ADGP without any further delay, for Final Orders.
xx. It shall be the responsibility of the Unit SP to ensure
strict compliance of the I.O, to this circular and ensure
timely completion of investigations in D.A cases.
Class-I cases: *
a) All cases involving officers of and above the Rank of
Class-1 Gazetted or Officers of equivalent Ranks.
b) All cases involving Elected representatives of MLA/MP or
above Rank.
56
c) All cases referred by the Hon'ble High Court or the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
d) Cases of Criminal Misconduct involving a wrongful loss to
the Government of and above 5 Crores.
Sd/-
Director General of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta
Bengaluru”
12.2 As can be seen from the aforesaid guidelines
issued by the respondents themselves prescribing strict
guidelines / directions to be followed for immediate
compliance by all Investigating officers including cases
under investigation with a view to standardize
investigation of DA cases, it is incumbent upon the I.O. to
submit a detailed source information report to the Unit
Superintendent of Police; the said guidelines, directions
also prescribe a thorough verification of the source
information report by the Unit S.P. and submission of the
same to DGP / ADGP, KLA and thereafter, to obtain
orders of the DGP / ADGP; as per the aforesaid Circular, it
is only after submission of a detailed source information
report by the I.O., verification of the same by the Unit
S.P. and submission to the DGP / ADGP and passing of
orders by him along with a satisfaction note of the Unit
S.P. on being satisfied with the source information report
that the I.O. shall register the FIR and issue orders under
Section 17 of the P.C.Act.
12.3 The aforesaid guidelines issued by the
respondents themselves clearly indicates that submission
of a detailed source information report is necessary /
essential / required before proceeding further in the
matter and all necessary and material particulars are to
be incorporated in the source report including conducting
of preliminary enquiry, if required / desirable for the
purpose of submission of a detailed source information
report; in other words, having regard to the mandatory
requirement of a submission of a detailed source
information report by the I.O., in the event, the source
report is found to be sketchy, incomplete, inaccurate and
57
inadequate in a given case, preliminary enquiry would be
desirable, warranted and required depending on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case, as can be
discerned from the Circular issued by the Lokayuktha
itself.
12.4 There is no gainsaying the fact that in the
case of Lalitha Kumari vs. Government of U.P. – (2014)
12 SCC 1 , the Apex Court held that if no cognizable
offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR
need not be registered immediately and perhaps, the
police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or
enquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to
whether a cognizable offence has been committed by the
accused. In the said judgment, the Apex Court illustrated
the types of cases which may require conducting of
preliminary enquiry and one such category as held by the
Apex Court included cases relating to corruption, apart
from offences under the Indian Penal Code(IPC). The
principles laid down in Lalitha Kumari’s case supra , have
been statutorily recognised and incorporated in sub-
section(3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, 2023 and
explained by the Apex Court in the case of Imran
Pratapgadi vs. State of Gujarat – 2026 (1) SCC 721 , and
the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Ashish Dave vs. State of Rajasthan – 2026 INSC 244 ,
wherein it was held as under:-
22. In the given facts, the least that was
expected from the police officials was to either
require the complainant-company to furnish
supporting material and details to prima facie make
out the allegations made in the FIR, or else to hold a
preliminary inquiry before registering the formal
FIR. This conclusion finds support from the following
observations made by this Court in Lalita Kumari
v. Govt. of U.P. - (2014) 2 SCC 1.: -
“119. Therefore, in view of various
counterclaims regarding registration or non-
registration, what is necessary is only that the
information given to the police must disclose
the commission of a cognizable offence. In
such a situation, registration of an FIR is
58
mandatory. However, if no cognizable
offence is made out in the information
given, then the FIR need not be
registered immediately and perhaps the
police can conduct a sort of preliminary
verification or inquiry for the limited
purpose of ascertaining as to whether a
cognizable offence has been
committed….”
[Emphasis supplied]
23. The new regime under the BNSS specifically
deals with such situations and provides an additional
safeguard where the complaint is for offences carrying
punishment between three to seven years. Sub-section (3) of
Section 173 BNSS empowers the officer in charge of a police
station, with prior permission of a superior officer, to conduct
a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a
prima facie case for proceeding in the matter where the
alleged offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term
between three and seven years. For ease of reference, Section
173 BNSS is reproduced hereinunder:
“173. Information in cognizable cases.—
(1) Every information relating to the commission
of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area
where the offence is committed, may be given
orally or by electronic communication to an
officer in charge of a police station, and if
given—
(i) orally, it shall be reduced to
writing by him or under his
direction, and be read over to the
informant; and every such
information, whether given in writing
or reduced to writing as aforesaid,
shall be signed by the person giving
it;
(ii) by electronic communication,
it shall be taken on record by him
on being signed within three days
by the person giving it, and the
substance thereof shall be entered
in a book to be kept by such officer
in such form as the State
59
Government may by rules
prescribe in this behalf:
Provided that if the information is given by
the woman against whom an offence under
Section 64, Section 65, Section 67, Section
70, Section 75, Section 78, Section 68,
Section 71,Section 76, Section 79 or Section
66, Section 69, Section 74, Section 77, Section
124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is
alleged to have been committed or attempted,
then such information shall be recorded, by a
woman police officer or any woman officer:
Provided further that—
(a) in the event that the person
against whom an offence under
Section 64,Section 65, Section 66,
Section 68, Section 71, Section 76,
Section 69, Section 74, Section 77,
Section 67, Section 70, Section 75,
Section 78, Section 79 or Section
124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 is alleged to have
been committed or attempted, is
temporarily or permanently mentally
or physically disabled, then such
information shall be recorded by a
police officer, at the residence of the
person seeking to report such
offence or at a convenient place of
such person's choice, in the presence
of an interpreter or a special
educator, as the case may be;
(b) the recording of such information
shall be videographed;
(c) the police officer shall get the
statement of the person recorded by
a Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-
section (6) of Section 183 as soon as
possible.
60
(2) A copy of the information as recorded
under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith,
free of cost, to the informant or the victim.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in Section 175, on receipt of
information relating to the commission of
any cognizable offence, which is made
punishable for three years or more but less
than seven years, the officer in charge of
the police station may with the prior
permission from an officer not below the
rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police,
considering the nature and gravity of the
offence, —
(i) proceed to conduct
preliminary enquiry to ascertain
whether there exists a prima
facie case for proceeding in the
matter within a period of
fourteen days; or
( i i ) proceed with investigation
when there exists a prima facie
case.
(4) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the
part of an officer in charge of a police station to
record the information referred to in sub-
section (1), may send the substance of such
information, in writing and by post, to the
Superintendent of Police concerned who, if
satisfied that such information discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence, shall either
investigate the case himself or direct an
investigation to be made by any police officer
subordinate to him, in the manner provided by
this Sanhita, and such officer shall have all the
powers of an officer in charge of the police
station in relation to that offence failing which
such aggrieved person may make an
application to the Magistrate.”
[Emphasis supplied]
24. This provision was considered by this Court in
- (2026) 1 SCC
Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat
61
721 , wherein the scope of Section 173 BNSS has been
explained as follows: -
“23. Section 154 of the CrPC does not provide for
making any preliminary inquiry. However, as held
in the case of Lalita Kumari, a preliminary inquiry
is permissible if the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence and indicates the
necessity for an inquiry. A preliminary inquiry
must be conducted only to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is disclosed. However, sub-
Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS
makes a significant departure from Section
154 of the CrPC. It provides that when
information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence which is made
punishable for 3 years or more but less
than 7 years is received by an officer-in-
charge of a police station, with the prior
permission of a superior officer as
mentioned therein, the police officer is
empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry
to ascertain whether there exists a prima
facie case for proceeding in the matter.
However, under Section 154 of the CrPC,
as held in the case of Lalita Kumari, only a
limited preliminary inquiry is permissible to
ascertain whether the information received
discloses a cognizable offence. Moreover, a
preliminary inquiry can be made under the
CrPC only if the information does not
disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of
the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section
(1) of Section 173.In the category of cases
covered by sub-Section (3), a police officer
is empowered to make a preliminary inquiry
to ascertain whether a prima facie case is
made out for proceeding in the matter even
if the information received discloses
commission of any cognizable offence. That
is very apparent as sub-Section (3) of
Section 173 refers explicitly to receiving
information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence. Therefore, in a case
where sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is
62
applicable, even if the information
pertaining to the commission of any
cognizable offence is received, an inquiry
can be conducted to ascertain whether a
prima facie case exists for proceeding in
the matter. The intention appears to be to
prevent the registration of FIRs in frivolous
cases where punishment is up to 7 years,
even if the information discloses the
commission of the cognizable offence.
However, under Section 154 of the CrPC,
the inquiry permitted by paragraph 1
20.2
of the decision in the case of Lalita Kumari
is limited only to ascertain whether the
cognizable offence is disclosed.
24. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of
the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if
the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima
facie case exists to proceed, he should
immediately register an FIR and proceed to
investigate. But, if he is of the view that a
prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he
should immediately inform the first
informant/complainant so that he can avail a
remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.
25. Before we go into the applicability of
sub- Section (3) of Section 173 of the
BNSS to the facts of the case, we must
deal with sub-Section (1) of Section 173.
Take a case where a person a pproaches
an officer-in-charge of a police station
either personally or by electronic
communication and alleges that he has
seen ‘A’ assaulting ‘X’ with a stick. If the
injury caused is simple, it will be an
offence punishable under Section 115 (2)
of the BNS. As per the first Schedule of the
BNSS, it is a non-cognizable offence.
Therefore, based on such information, FIR
cannot be registered. If grievous hurt is
caused, it will be an offence punishable
under Section 117 (2) of the BNS, which is
a cognizable offence. Therefore, the
allegations made in the information
furnished to an officer-in-charge of a police
63
station must be examined by the officer
only with a view to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is made out. Taking the
information as correct, the officer has to
determine whether it makes out a case of
the commission of a cognizable offence. If
the allegation makes out a case of a
cognizable offence, unless the offence falls
in sub-Section (3) of Section 173, it is
mandatory to register FIR.
[….]
28. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the
BNSS confers a discretion on the officer
receiving information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence to
conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain
whether a prima facie case exists to
proceed. This option is available when the
offence alleged is made punishable for 3
years or more but less than 7 years. In
the facts of the case, all the offences except
the offence under Section 57 of the BNS are
punishable by imprisonment for less than
7 years. Section 57, on the face of it, is not
applicable. Therefore, this option was also
available to the police officer in the present
case. The officer did not exercise the said
option.”
[Emphasis supplied]
The crux of the above observations, therefore, is
that under the regime of Section 154 of the CrPC, as
explained in Lalita Kumari (supra), a preliminary
inquiry is permissible only for the limited purpose of
ascertaining whether the information discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. However, the
scheme of Section 173(3) of the BNSS travels a step
further and exposits situations where preliminary
inquiry may be made even where the complaint is
filed for cognizable offences. The said provision
empowers the police officer, even in a case where the
information may ostensibly disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence punishable between three and
seven years, to conduct a preliminary inquiry so as
to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case
64
for proceeding in the matter. Thus, the legislative
intent behind incorporating sub-section (3) of Section
173 appears to be to provide a safeguard against
mechanical registration of FIRs in cases where the
allegations, though couched in the language of a
cognizable offence, may in substance be vague,
speculative or inherently doubtful.
25.None of the offences alleged in the
impugned FIR carries imprisonment which may
extend to more than seven years, thereby
bringing the case within the category where the
option of conducting a preliminary enquiry under
Section 173(3) of the BNSS was clearly available
to the police authorities. However, the police
officials did not choose to exercise this option,
and the FIR came to be registered straightaway
in a mechanical manner without even a semblance
of verification of the fictional and conjectural
allegations made in the complaint. In the given
facts, where the complaint contained vague
allegations and was completely bereft of
particulars, the situation clearly warranted a
preliminary enquiry so as to arrive at the necessary
“prima facie” satisfaction as to the commission of a
cognizable offence. Though there is no hard and
fast criterion for determining when such prima facie
satisfaction may arise, the very object of permitting
a preliminary enquiry is to prevent initiation of
criminal proceedings on the basis of frivolous or
speculative allegations. The allegations contained
in the complaint being so indeterminate and lacking
in basic particulars, we are of the opinion that the
police authorities ought to have exercised the
option available under Section 173(3) of the
BNSS.
26. Thus, ex facie, we are satisfied that the
complainant-company has misused the process of
law to settle the scores and to escape possible
liabilities which it may have apprehended on account
of some sharp reporting.”
12.5 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgment, the
desirability, relevance, importance, requirement etc., of conducting a
preliminary enquiry under Section 173(3) of BNSS, 2023 has been
explained by the Apex Court, thereby indicating that there cannot be
65
an absolute / straitjacket / universal rule / formula as regards
conducting / non-conducting of a preliminary enquiry and the same
would be dependent on the facts and circumstances obtaining in a
particular case.
12.6 In Nirankar Nath Pandey’s case supra , the Apex
Court held as under:-
1.
Leave granted.
2.
The Appeal before us is against the order
of the High Court of Allahabad dated 11.01.2024
whereby the High Court has refused to quash the FIR
lodged against the Appellant.
3.
The factual background of the present
case is that FIR No.0002 of 2023 dated 17.10.2023 was
registered as Case Crime No.0002 of 2023 against the
Appellant under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section
13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988(Hereinafter,
PC Act). The Appellant filed Criminal Miscellaneous Writ
Petition No.18777 of 2023 before the High Court for
quashing of the said FIR. The High Court vide order
dated 11.01.2024 dismissed the Appellant’s Writ
Petition. Aggrieved by this, the Appellant is before us.
4.
Prior to the present FIR, another FIR was
lodged in the year 2018, bearing Case Crime No.476 of
2018 for offences under Section 420, 467, 468, 471,
120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section
13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act in Police Station
Kotwali, District Fatehpur, U.P against some officials of
the Excise Department, U.P., wherein the present
Appellant was implicated and he was subsequently
enlarged on bail. This Case Crime No.476 of 2018 is
pending before the Trial Court.
5.
Due to the earlier FIR, a notice dated
25.08.2020 was issued to the Appellant by the
Department of Vigilance Establishment, U.P. whereby
the Appellant was directed to submit the Statement of
Declaration of Assets and other income details. Pursuant
to this notice, the Appellant submitted all such details
before the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Department.
66
6.
The Appellant was working as Assistant
Excise Commissioner when the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance
Establishment initiated an inquiry against him. This open
inquiry disclosed the Appellant’s income from known and
legitimate sources during the period of checking as
Rs.94,28,605/- (Rupees Ninety Four Lakh Twenty Eight
Thousand Six Hundred Five only). For the same period,
the Appellant was found to have amassed assets
including living expenses worth Rs.1,16,02,669/-
(Rupees One Crore Sixteen Lakh Two Thousand Six
Hundred Sixty Nine only). The Appellant is said to have
amassed assets including expenses of around
Rs.21,74,064/- (Twenty One Lakh Seventy Four
Thousand Sixty Four only) more than his known income.
This is said to be the disproportionate assets in
question. The Inquiry Report was forwarded to the
Government on 20.03.2023 by the Joint Director, Uttar
Pradesh Vigilance Establishment and directions were
issued vide Demi-Government Letter dated 20.04.2023
issued by the Vigilance Department, Government of U.P.
for institution of criminal proceedings against the
Appellant. Consequent to this, the present FIR was
registered against the Appellant based on the complaint
of Inspector, Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment
Sector, Ayodhya.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the relevant material.
8.
The Appellant has declared his and his
wife’s assets consequent to notice dated 25.08.2020. It
is stated that the wife of the Appellant is also earning
from teaching yoga, agriculture, and from receiving
house rent. It is submitted that the Appellant’s total
income since 1996 to 2020 is Rs.75,73,676/- (Seventy-
Five Lakh Seventy-Three Thousand Six Hundred Seventy
Six only) and the income of his wife during the aforesaid
period is about Rs.41,67,592/- (Rupees Forty One Lakh
Sixty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Two only).
These declarations are supported by the relevant income
tax returns. The ornaments of the Appellant’s wife have
been sold for an amount of Rs.2,16,000/- (Rupees Two
Lakh Sixteen Thousand only) and the Appellant received
Rs.1,00,000/(Rupees One Lakh only)from a Life
Insurance Policy plus there is an amount of Rs.49,000/-
(Rupees Forty Nine Thousand only)that was given to the
Appellant by his father. Therefore, the total income and
67
assets of the Appellant and his wife has been submitted
to be Rs.1,21,06,268/- (Rupees One Crore Twenty One
Lakh Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight only) during
the period of 1996 to June 2020. Further, the Appellant
has explained and submitted documents regarding the
properties owned by him and his wife and a loan given
by the Bank. This has not been considered by the Uttar
Pradesh Vigilance Department. The present FIR is lodged
on the basis of the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance
Establishment prima facie finding the Appellant guilty.
However, if we consider the declared assets of the
Appellant and his wife for the aforesaid period it comes
up to Rs.1,21,06,268/(Rupees One Crore Twenty One
Lakh Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight only). The
present FIR states the disproportionate assets to be
Rs.1,16,02,669/(Rupees One Crore Sixteen Lakh Two
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine only) for the same
period.
9. We are of the view that the Appellant’s
wife’s income must be considered as well while
calculating the total income and assets. Both the
Appellant and his wife have filed the relevant income tax
returns in order to show their respective incomes
andassets. The Respondents in their Counter-Affidavit
have not denied these income tax returns or alleged
them to be forged or fabricated. Therefore, when a
public servant is submitting his income tax returns, they
should be presumed to be true and correct. If you duly
consider the income tax returns of the Appellant and his
wife for the check period of the year 1996-2020, the
total income is coming up to be Rs.1,21,06,268/-
(Rupees One Crore Twenty One Lakh Six Thousand Two
Hundred Sixty Eight only) which is in fact more than the
assets amounting to Rs.1,16,02,669/- (Rupees One
Crore Sixteen Lakh Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty
Nine only) which is said to be the disproportionate
assets in question under the present FIR.
10.
Further, we have considered that the
check period is from the year 1996 to 2020, which is
almost twenty five years. It must be taken into account
that over such a long period of time, there is inflation
and a natural progression in the changing economy that
affects the value of assets such as property. This can
understandably lead to discrepancies in declaring the
value of assets over the years. Therefore, there should
68
be a more dynamic approach while considering an
individual’s income and assets over the span of two
decades, such as in the present case. The notion that
the declared value of an asset such as property or gold
will remain static is flawed. This has to be considered
while examining an individual’s assets and income while
making a determination regarding disproportionate
assets. Such an examination needs to reflect such
adjustments and changes as is natural with the
progression of time.
11.
We find it pertinent to note that in
cases such as these where disproportionate assets
are being dealt with, the amounts under scrutiny
cannot be looked at in the same manner as one
would do a Bank statement or daily ledger of
income and expenditure. The scrutiny process
cannot be as mechanical as that when you are
examining declared assets and the income of an
individual over such a long period of time. There
has to be a certain margin that is given while
making such an assessment as there are invariably
economical fluctuations that would have taken
place, especially over the course of nearly twenty-
five years. It is crucial to have a nuanced
appreciation of how time and economic conditions
affect asset value in such cases.
12.
This Court has held in State of Haryana
vs. Bhajan Lal , 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 that when
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused, powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India could be exercised to prevent
abuse of the process of any court. We find that the
present FIR in question and the case against the
Appellant is covered under these findings in Bhajan Lal
(supra) .
13.
In view of the above discussion, we find it
appropriate to quash FIR No, 0002 of 2023 dated
17.10.2023 pending against the Appellant.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed.
Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.”
69
12.7 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgment, the
Apex Court has held that for evaluating cases relating to
disproportionate assets involving public servants, the
authorities must consider economic fluctuations and presume
income tax returns to be accurate unless specifically proven to
be false and the importance and relevance of the income tax
returns have been taken into account and highlighted by the
Apex Court.
12.8 In the instant case, it would be necessary to refer to the
source report (Translated copy) dated 18.11.2023 submitted by the
nd
2 respondent – Dy.S.P., which is as hereunder;
Date: 18.11.2023
To,
The Superintendent of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta
Bangalore City Division-1
Bangalore
Sir,
Sub: Submissions of Source Report in respect of Sri N.
Satish Babu S/o. Late T. Narasimhaiah, aged 52 years,
Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Buildings
Division, K.R.Circle, Bangalore regarding possession of illegal
properties:
With reference to the above cited subject I submit that the
suspected Government Servant Sri N. Satish Babu,
Superintending Engineer, has been working in the office of the
Buildings division, Public Works Department. As per the basic
information gathered about it, he has acquired properties highly
disproportionate to his known source of income and the details
are as mentioned below:
1. Name of the S.G.O.: Sri N.Satish Babu
2. Present post held: Superintending Engineer, Public
Works Department
3. Place of working: Office of the Superintending
Engineer, Public Works
Department, Buildings
division, Bangalore.
th
No. 23/A, 6 cross,
3rd main, Jayamahal
Extension, Bangalore
70
4. Native place: Kolar District, Chintamani
BACKGROUND:
The suspected officer Sri N.Satish Babu, son of late T.
Narasimhaiah, aged 52 years, Superintending Engineer, Public
Works Department, Buildings Division, K.R. Circle, Bangalore
basically is from Chintamani, Kolar district. After completing his
B.E., he was appointed on 24-10-1994 in the Industries and
Commerce Department and thereafter joined the Public Works
Department in the year 2002 as Assistant Engineer. Thereafter
he was promoted phase-wise, at present he is serving as
Superintending Engineer, Buildings Division, K.R. Circle,
Bangalore. He married N. Sudha, daughter of Sri Hanumantha
Reddy of Chitradurga, in the year 1996 and she is presently
working as C.D.P.O. in the Women and Children Welfare
Department. She is residing at D.No. 228, JRC Layout, 6th cross,
Chitradurga along with her family, and the suspected officer is
residing at Government quarters at 23/A, 6th cross, 3rd main,
Jayamahal Extension, Bangalore. They have two daughters; the
first daughter Smt. Manjusha is married and the second daughter
Kum. Sireesha is pursuing her education in BBA.
SOURCE OF CORRUPTION:
The suspected Government Officer Sri N.Satish Babu was
appointed in the Government service and he has discharged
duties in different districts of the state of Karnataka. During his
tenure he used to extract illegal gratification from the general
public, contractors, commission agents, leading a luxurious life
and it is understood that he has purchased properties in his name
and in the names of his family members.
It is learnt that the above officer has acquired properties
in the names of his wife, children and mother-in-law, and if a raid
is conducted, there is possibility of tracing more currency,
documents relating to his properties acquired and also gold
jewels.
It is prima facie found that the suspected officer Sri
N.Satish Babu has acquired more properties disproportionate to
his known source of income. The period from his joining
Government service i.e., from 24.10.1994 till today is considered
as check period.
DETAILS OF THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE
SUSPECTED GOVERNMENT OFFICER FROM THE DATE OF HIS
JOINING SERVICE AND THEIR APPROXIMATE VALUE:
71
(A)
Sl Description of the properties Approximate
No. Value
The suspected Government Officer Sri N.
Satish Babu has not submitted his details
of his assets and liabilities available with
him prior to his joining service.
-
(B)
Sl No. Description of the properties Approximate
Value
1 A residential house in the name of the
suspected Government Officer Sri N. Satish
Babu bearing no. 757,
Chikkabommanasandra, Yelahanka, Ward
No.04, Bangalore (Allala Sandra, Jakkur
Plantation, Judicial Layout)
2,30,00,000.00
2 Site No. 228, JRC Layout, 6th cross,
Chitradurga in the name of Smt. N. Sudha,
wife of the suspected Government Officer
(The said site is gifted by her mother to her
daughter and the suspected officer has
constructed a house on the said land. Only
the said construction is taken into account)
25,00,000.00
3 Agricultural land in the name of Kumari
Sireesha, the second daughter of the
suspected Government officer bearing
survey no. 30, at Guddadavvanahalli,
Kasaba Hobli, Chitradurga District and Taluk
measuring 11.09 acres.
80,00,000.00
4 Two floor house constructed in the
Agricultural land bearing survey no. 30,
measuring 11-09 acres at
Guddadavvanahalli, Kasaba Hobli,
Chitradurga district and taluk
20,00,000-00
4 LIC polices which may be in the name of
the suspected Government Officer and in
the names of his family members
20,00,000-00
11 Bank Fixed Deposits which may be in the
name of the suspected Government Officer
and in the names of his family members
10,00,000-00
12 Maruti Swift Car bearing registration No. KA
-04-ML- 6330 in the name of the suspected
Government Officer
8,00,000-00
13 Two wheeler bearing registration no. KA- 70,000-00
72
16-6828- in the name of the suspected
Government Officer
14 Two wheeler of Honda Activa make bearing
registration no. KA16ET-7388 in the name
of the suspected Government officer
80,000-00
15 Tata Punch Car bearing registration No. 22-
BH-3599C in the name of Ashuthosh Bram
C/o. Smt. N. Sudha
8,00,000.00
- Total value (Approximate) 4,02,50,000.00
(C) APPROXIMATE EXPENDITURE OF THE SUSPECTED
GOVERNMENT SERVANT:
Sl
No.
Details of the expenditure Approximate
Value
1 Approximate value of Government registration
and stamp duty and property tax paid by the
suspected Government servant at the time of
buying of the properties in his name and in the
names of his family members
25,00,000.00
2 Approximate family expenditure 30,00,000.00
3 Approximate educational expenses towards his
daughters (the first daughter has studied in a
foreign country)
30,00,000.00
4 Home Appliances, Gold, Silver jewels value 60,00,000.00
5 Repayment of loans (Approximate) 60,00,000.00
6 Approximate expenditure for marriage of the first 20,00,000.00
daughter
7 Maintenance expenses of the vehicles maintained 5,00,000.00
by the officer
8 Expenses for the development of the land in
survey no. 30, measuring 11-09 acres in
Guddadavvanahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Chitradurga
district and taluk and also towards fencing,
borewell, shed for poultry and fish farming etc.
60,00,000.00
- Total approximate expenditure 2,90,00,000.00
(D) APPROXIMATE INCOME OF THE SUSPECTED GOVERNMENT
OFFICER:
Sl
No.
Description of Income Approximate
Value
1 Approximate net income from Salary of the 80,00,000.00
suspected government servant
2 Approximate net income from Salary of the wife 40,00,000.00
73
of the suspected government officer
3 Income derived from the sale of the immovable
properties belonging to Smt. N. Sudha, wife of
the suspected Government officer
1,00,00,000.00
4 Approximate loan amount which may be obtained
by the Government Officer from different banks
by Government Officer
1,00,00,000.00
5 Approximate rent that might have been received
by the suspected Government Officer and his wife
10,00,000.00
- TOTAL INCOME APPROXIMATE 3,30,00,000.00
1 Total value of the properties 4,02,50,000.00
2 Total expenditure 2,90,00,000.00
3 Total properties and expenditure (1+2) 6,92,50,000.00
4 Total income 3,30,00,000.00
5 Properties illegally earned (3-4=5) 3,62,50,000.00
6 Percentagewise (5 / 4 \times 100 = 6) 110.00%
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- KG. RAMAKRISHNA
Submitted:
Received the Source Report, Investigation Report and Authority
letter bearing No. LOK/INV(G)/City/03/2024 DATED 03-01-24 ON
8-01-2024 at 2.30 pm from the office of the Superintendent of
Police, and case is registered vide Police Station case No. 3/2024
under section 13(1)(b) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption act 1988 (as amended in 2019).
Sd/-
Dy.SP-2”
12. 9 If the source report is examined, bearing in
mind the Lokayuktha Circular and in the light of the
aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, it becomes
evident that the respondents did not verify or ascertain
or take any steps to scrutinize the income tax returns
submitted by the petitioner and his wife, both of whom
are undisputedly public servants as well as their daughter
and had submitted their income tax returns regularly,
which were relevant and essential for the purpose of
preparing and submitting the source report; it is needless
to state that the income tax returns of the petitioner, his
wife and daughter would necessarily have to be verified
74
and scrutinized by the respondents for the purpose of
preparing and submitting the source report; in the instant
case, in the absence of verification / scrutiny of the
income tax returns of the petitioner, his wife and
daughter and in the light of the principles laid down by
the Apex Court in Nirankar Nath Pandey’s case supra , I
am of the view that the source report submitted by the
nd
2 respondent is incomplete, inadequate, sketchy,
defective and lacking in material particulars and details,
thereby making it desirable and warranting / requiring
conducting of preliminary enquiry before proceeding
further in accordance with law.
12.10 A perusal of the source report will also
indicate that in Column B pertaining to Assets alleged to
be acquired by the petitioner, the value of which was
disproportionate to the known sources of income of the
petitioner and his wife, Sl.No.2 refers to property No.228,
th
JRC Layout, 6 cross, Chitradurga, which is said to be
valued at Rs.25 lakhs; the details of acquisition of the
nd
said property, even according to the 2 respondent is
traced to a gift deed dated 09.09.2004 said to be
executed by the petitioner’s mother-in-law in favour of
the petitioner’s wife; it is needless to state that the said
property which is said to be acquired under a gift deed
(obviously without any consideration) is sought to be
incorporated / included in the assets / properties of the
petitioner for the purpose of preparing the source report
without verifying or ascertaining further details in this
regard by ignoring the fact that prima facie, a property
acquired by way of a gift deed cannot be said to be a
property acquired by the petitioner by intentionally
enriching himself illicitly as contemplated under Section
13(1)(b) of the P.C.Act; it follows therefrom that having
included the said property as one of the properties for the
purpose of a source report for alleged offences under
Section 13(1)(b) of the P.C.Act, it was both desirable and
necessary / required for conducting of a preliminary
enquiry in the instant case for the purpose of preparing a
source report which is clearly sketchy, defective,
inadequate and incomplete on this ground also .
75
12.11 A perusal of the aforesaid source report will also
indicate that in addition to the properties / assets standing in
the name of the petitioner and his wife who were both
undisputedly public servants, the properties standing in the
name of their daughter and petitioner’s mother-in-law (wife’s
mother) have also been included for the purpose of coming to
the conclusion that the petitioner possessed assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income; however, a
perusal of the source report will clearly indicate that the same
contains numerous / several inherent discrepancies,
contradictions and lack of material particulars and details which
would necessitate conducting of a preliminary enquiry by the
respondents before proceeding further in the matter. Under
these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the
source report dated 18.11.2023 is clearly sketchy, defective,
incomplete, inadequate, insufficient and lacking in material
particulars and details, thereby making it desirable and
requiring / warranting conducting of preliminary enquiry by the
respondents in accordance with law in the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Point No.2 is also accordingly answered in favour of
the petitioner and against the respondents by holding
that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it
would be necessary, appropriate and desirable for the
respondents to conduct a preliminary enquiry before
proceeding further in the matter.
Re-Point Nos.3 and 4:-
13. A perusal of the material on record will indicate
that pursuant to the aforesaid source report dated
18.11.2023, the respondents not only registered the
impugned FIR dated 08.01.2024 but also passed an order
dated 08.01.2024 granting permission / approval under
Section 17 of the P.C.Act to conduct investigation against
the petitioner in relation to the alleged offences; while
dealing with Point Nos. 1 and 2 supra, I have already
come to the conclusion that conducting of preliminary
enquiry prior to registration of the FIR and obtaining
permission / approval for investigation under Section 17
of the P.C.Act was not only desirable but also required /
warranted in the facts and circumstances of the instant
76
case; undisputedly, no such preliminary enquiry was
conducted by the respondents before registration of the
impugned FIR or granting permission / approval for
investigation under Section 17 of the P.C.Act and in the
light of the findings recorded by me hereinbefore, the
impugned FIR deserves to be quashed and the matter
remitted back to the concerned respondents with a
direction to conduct a preliminary enquiry in accordance
with law and thereafter to proceed further in the matter;
insofar as the order dated 08.01.2024 passed under
Section 17 of the P.C.Act is concerned, as a consequence
of quashing the impugned FIR and remitting the matter
back to the concerned respondents with a direction to
conduct a preliminary enquiry and thereafter, proceed
further in accordance with law, it is not necessary to
advert to or express any opinion on the various
contentions / grounds urged by both sides as regards the
said order dated 08.01.2024 passed under Section 17 of
the P.C.Act except stating that since the FIR is hereby
quashed, the said order would consequently also have to
be quashed and the matter remitted back as stated supra.
Accordingly, Point Nos.3 and 4 are also answered in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
14. In the result, I pass the following:-
ORDER
(i) Petition is hereby partly allowed.
(ii) The impugned FIR in Crime No.3/2024 at Annexure-A
dated 08.01.2024 registered by the respondents – Lokayuktha
against the petitioner for alleged offences punishable under
Sections 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, (Amendment Act, 2018), is hereby quashed / set aside
and consequently, the order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the
respondents under Section 17 of the P.C.Act is also hereby set
aside.
(iii) The matter is remitted back to the concerned
respondents to conduct a preliminary enquiry pursuant to the
77
source report dated 18.11.2023 and to thereafter proceed
further in accordance with law.”
The coordinate Bench was following the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of NIRANKAR NATH PANDEY v. STATE OF UTTAR
2
PRADESH , wherein it is held as follows:
“…. …. ….
10. Further, we have considered that the check period
is from the year 1996 to 2020, which is almost
twenty five years. It must be taken into account
that over such a long period of time, there is
inflation and a natural progression in the changing
economy that affects the value of assets such as
property. This can understandably lead to
discrepancies in declaring the value of assets over
the years. Therefore, there should be a more
dynamic approach while considering an individual’s
income and assets over the span of two decades,
such as in the present case. The notion that the
declared value of an asset such as property or gold
will remain static is flawed. This has to be
considered while examining an individual’s assets
and income while making a determination
regarding disproportionate assets. Such an
examination needs to reflect such adjustments and
changes as is natural with the progression of time.
11. We find it pertinent to note that in cases such as
these where disproportionate assets are being dealt
with, the amounts under scrutiny cannot be looked
at in the same manner as one would do a Bank
statement or daily ledger of income and
expenditure. The scrutiny process cannot be as
mechanical as that when you are examining
2
Criminal Appeal No.5009 of 2024 decided on 04.12.2024
78
declared assets and the income of an individual
over such a long period of time. There has to be a
certain margin that is given while making such an
assessment as there are invariably economical
fluctuations that would have taken place, especially
over the course of nearly twenty-five years. It is
crucial to have a nuanced appreciation of how time
and economic conditions affect asset value in such
cases.
12. This Court has held in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal ,
1992 SCC (Cri) 426
that when allegations made in the
first information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
We find that the present FIR in question and the case
against the Appellant is covered under these findings in
Bhajan Lal (supra) .
13. In view of the above discussion, we find it appropriate to
quash FIR No, 0002 of 2023 dated 17.10.2023 pending
against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal is
allowed.
14. Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The judgment of the coordinate Bench in the case of N. SATISH
BABU was called in question by the Karnataka Lokayukta before
the Apex Court. The Apex Court by the following order rejected the
S.L.P. The order reads as follows:
79
“O R D E R
We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order
of the High Court. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition is
dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
In the light of the judgment of coordinate Bench, on similar lines
the subject petition also deserves to succeed with the same
directions that the coordinate Bench has rendered its judgment in
N.SATISH BABU supra.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed in part .
(ii) Crime registered in Crime No.43 of 2025 by the
respondent/Lokayukta Police stands quashed.
(iii) The matter is remitted back to the hands of the
Karnataka Lokayukta to pass necessary orders right
from the stage at which the coordinate Bench has
pointed out the defect, bearing in mind the observations
made in the course of the order.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
CT:MJ
Bkp/