M/S Shahi Export House (Now Known As Shahi Export Pvt. Ltd.) vs Presiding Officer, Lobour Court And Another

AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 26630 of 2026
…..Petitioner(s)
M/S Shahi Export House (Now Known
As Shahi Export Pvt. Ltd.)
Versus
Presiding Officer, Lobour Court And
Another
…..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Karshit Nigam, Sr. Advocate
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Baqer Mehdi, C.S.C.
Court No. - 36
HON’BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.
1. Heard Sri Shakti Swarup Nigam, learned Senior Advocate assisted
by Sri Karshit Nigam, learned counsel for petitioner and Ms. Bushra
Mariyam, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Baqer Mehadi,
Advocate for Respondent-2.
2. Since the issue involve in this case is purely legal, therefore, with
the consent of parties, the Court proceed to decide it without exchange of
pleadings.
3. Petitioner before this Court is M/s Shahi Export House (now
known as Shahi Export Pvt. Ltd.). A domestic inquiry was initiated
against Respondent-2, a Workman, under petitioner concerned and on
basis of inquiry report said Workman was terminated. The date of

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Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
inquiry report is 28.09.2001 and order of terminated is dated 17.10.2001.
The Workman raised an industrial dispute before Labour Court, Noida.
4. An issue which was to be framed as a preliminary issue, i.e.,
whether domestic inquiry conducted by petitioner against Workman was
fair or not, was framed as an additional issue.
5. Before making adjudication to said additional issue, the evidence
from side of Employer was also taken on record and by impugned order
not only additional issue was decided but on basis of evidence so
recorded, a finding was returned that charges levelled against Workman
were not found proved. It was held that domestic inquiry was unfair as
sufficient opportunity was not granted to Workman and on consideration
of oral as well as documentary evidence, so led, it was further held that
no proper opportunity was granted to Workman, therefore, the order
dated 17.10.2001, whereby Workman was terminated from services, was
held to be illegal and directed that it’s legal consequence shall be
followed.
6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioner has placed
reliance on a judgment passed by this Court in M/s Dwarikesh Sugar
Industries Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rampur and others,
2023:AHC:44828 wherein this Court has considered the judgments
passed by Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. vs.
Ludh Budh Singh, 1972(1) SCC 595; Cooper Engineering Ltd. vs. P.P.
Mundhe, 1975(2) SCC 661; Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber
Co. of India (P) Ltd. vs. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company, 1976(1)
SCC 819; Shambu Nath Goyal vs. Bank of Baroda, 1983(4) SCC 491;
Rajendra Jha vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1984 (Supp.) SCC
520; Neeta Kaplish vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and another,
1999(1) SCC 517; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs.
Lakshmidevamma, 2001(5) SCC 433; Management of Madhurantakam
Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. S. Viswanathan, 2005(3) SCC 193;
Union of India and others vs. Dinesh Prasad, 2012(12) SCC 63; M.L.
Singla vs. Punjab National Bank and others, 2018(18) SCC 21; and, U.P.

3
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
State Road Transport Corporation vs. Gajadhar Nath, 2021(10) SCC
697. He further submits that there is no ambiguity in position of law that
if an industrial dispute is raised against the order passed on basis of
domestic inquiry, the Labour Court at first instance will decide an issue,
whether domestic inquiry was fair or not. In case answer is in
affirmative, the dispute will not further proceed for adjudication.
However, in case answer remain in negative, the Employer shall be
granted an opportunity to present evidence to prove the charge and
Labour Court on basis of evidence so led before it, will decide matter on
merit, whether charge was proved or not. For reference, relevant part of
the judgment passed by this Court in M/s Dwarikesh Sugar Industries
Ltd. (supra) is reproduced hereinafter:
“( )
ङ विश्लेषण
.
१३ विधिकबिन्दुपरनिर्णयदेनेकेलिएवादीकेविद्वानवरिष्ठअधिवक्ताद्वारा

उल्लेखितविधि दृष्टांगोपरध्यानदेनाआवश्यकहै।
. ( )
१४ नीताकपलिश पूर्वमेउल्लेखित मेंउच्चतमन्यायालयनेपूर्वमेंनिर्णीत देल्ही
. , ( ) . . .
क्लोथऐंडजनरलमिल्सको प्रति लुधबुधसिंह १९७२ १एस सी सी ५९५ के
,
प्रकरणकेनिर्णयकेकुछअंशकाउल्लेखकिया कि जबप्रबंधनउसकेद्वाराकीगईजाँच

परनिर्भरताजताताहैऔरसाथहीसाथअधिकरणकेसमक्षअपनेउक्ततर्कमेंपूर्वाग्रह
, ,
केबिनाकीगईजाँचउचितथी साक्ष्यभीप्रस्तुतकरताहै तबभीअधिकरणकाविधिक
,
दायित्वहै कि वोप्राथमिकस्तरपरहीयहविचारकरेकि क्याप्रबंधनद्वाराकीगईजाँच

कीकार्यवाहीउचितवमान्यहै।अगरअधिकरणसंतुष्टहैकि जाँचकीकार्यवाहीउचित
,
रूपसेकीगईहैएवंमान्यहै तबप्रस्तुतसाक्ष्यपरगुणदोषपरविचारकरनेकाकोई

प्रश्नहीनहींरहजाताहैवअधिकरणकेवलदंडकीसमीक्षाकरसकताहै।
.
१५ जबअधिकरणयहनिर्धारितकरताहैकि जाँचकीकार्यवाहीउचितरूपसेनही
,
कीगईथी तभीवोउसक्षेत्राधिकारकोप्राप्तकरताहैजहांविवादकोगुणदोषके

आधारपरनिर्धारितकरसकताहैऔरउसदशामेंवोप्रबंधनद्वाराप्रस्तुतसाक्ष्यपर

विचारकरताहैऔरविवादकोसाक्ष्यकेआधारपरगुणदोषपरनिस्तारितकरताहै।
. ( )
१६ नीताकपलिश पूर्वमेउल्लि खित मेयहभीकहागयाहैकि उपरोक्तसिद्धान्त
. ,
उच्चतमन्यायलयद्वारा वर्कमैनप्रति फायरस्टोनटायरवरबड़को ऑफइंडिया
( ) . . .
१९७३ १एस सी सी ८१३ मेंभीअनुसरितकियागयाहै।
. . . ( )
१७ उच्चतमन्यायालयने एम एल सिंगला पूर्वमेउल्लेखित मेंयहप्रतिपादित
, ,
किया क्योंकि पदच्युक्ति काआदेशघरेलूजाँचपरआधारितथा अतःश्रमन्यायालयका

यहदायित्वथाकि वोसर्वप्रथमप्रारम्भि कबिन्दूकेरूपमेइसप्रश्नपरविचारकरनिर्णित

करेकि क्याघरेलूजाँचवैधानिकवउचितथीऔरउसकेउत्तरकेआधारपरहीआगेकी

कार्यवाहीसुनिश्चितकरे।क्योकि उक्तनिर्णयकेतथ्यवपरिस्थि तियोंमेंश्रमन्यायालयने
,
उपरोक्तप्रक्रियानहीअपनायीथी तोउच्चतमन्यायालयनेयहनिर्धारितकियाकि श्रम

न्यायालयनेक्षेत्राधिकारकीत्रुटिकरीथी।

4
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
.
१८ जहांतकविपक्षीद्वाराइसन्यायालयकीपूर्णपीठकेएकनिर्णय मेसर्सस्वरूप
. ( ) ,
वेजीटेबलप्रोडक्टसइंडस्ट्रीजलि पूर्वमेउल्लेखित परबलदेनेकाविषयहै जहां

पूर्णपीठनेयहनिर्धारितकियाकि श्रमन्यायालयकायहदायित्वनहीहैकि क्याघरेलू
,
जाँचवैधानिकवउचितहै कोप्रारम्भि कबिन्दुबनाकरहीनिर्णयदियाजायेवसमस्त

बिन्दुओंकोएकसाथनिर्धारितभीकरसकताहै।परन्तुजैसापूर्वमेउल्लेखकियाहैकि
. . ( )
पूर्णपीठकेनिर्णयकेउपरान्त एम एल सिंगला पूर्वमेउल्लेखित मेयहस्पष्टरूपसे

निर्धारितकियागयाकि श्रमन्यायालयकेप्रारम्भि कबिन्दुकि घरेलूजाँचकोउचितव

वैधानिकबनानाहीहोगावउसकेनिर्धारणकेउपरान्तहीआगेकीकार्यवाहीकरसकता
, ,
है इसकारणसेयहन्यायालय पूर्णपीठकेनिर्णयकाअनुपालनकरनेकेलिएबाध्य

नहीहै।
.
१९ प्रतिवादीकेद्वाराअन्यनिर्णयोंकेआधारपरयहकथनकियागयाहैकि अगर
, /
प्रारम्भि कबिन्दूनबनाकरकोईत्रुटिकीभीहो तबभीवादी प्रबंन्धककोसमस्तसाक्ष्य
,
श्रमन्यायालयकेसमक्षरखनेकीपूर्णस्वतंत्रताथी जिसकाउसनेलाभभीउठायाऔर
,
प्रबंधननेवर्तमानयाचिकामेंऐसाकोईभीकारणकाकथननहींकियाहै कि साक्ष्यन

रखपानेकेकारणउसकेसाथकोईपक्षपातहुआहो।इसकेअतिरिक्तप्रतिवादीने
( )
पुरजोरबलउच्चतमन्यायालयकीसंवैधानिकपीठकेनिर्णय लक्ष्मीदेवम्मा श्रीमती
( ) , ,
पूर्वमेउल्लेखित परदियाहैकि श्रमन्यायालय प्रारम्भमेही घरेलूजांचउचितहैया
, ,
नहीं केबिन्दुपरविचारणकरनेकेलिएबाध्यनहींहै औरयहबिन्दुबादमेभीनिर्धारित
,
कियाजासकता है इसके लिएप्रतिवादी के वरिष्ठअधिवक्ता नेसमकक्षपीठ
. . . . . . ( )
द्वारा रिजिनलमैनेजरयू पी एस आर टी सी पूर्वमेउल्लेखित केमामलेमेदियेगये

निर्णयपरभीबलदिया।
.
२० उपरोक्ततर्कपरनिर्णयलेनेसेपूर्वमैनेसंविधानपीठद्वारादियेगयेनिर्णयका

परिशीलनध्यानपूर्वककिया।संविधानपीठके समक्षयहविवादथाकि उच्चतम
, ( )
न्यायालयकीदोपीठोंद्वारादियेगये शम्भूनाथगोयलप्रति बैकऑफबडौदा १९८३
. . . , ,
४एस सी सी ४९१ व राजेन्द्रझांप्रति पीठासीनअधिकारी लेबरकोर्ट १९८४
( ) . . . , ,
सप्पली एस सी सी ५२० केनिर्णयोंमेअगरकोईविरोधाभासहै तोकौनसानिर्णय
,
उचितहै कि प्रबंधनद्वारासाक्ष्यप्रस्तुतकरनेकीप्रार्थनाकिसस्तरपरकरसकताहै।
, ,
क्याउसकोप्रारम्भि कबिन्दु कि क्याघरेलूजांचअवैधानिकवमान्यहै केनिस्तारणका

इन्तजारकरनाचाहियेयाप्रारम्भमेहीप्रति उत्तरकेसाथहीसाक्ष्यप्रस्तुतकरनेकी

प्रार्थनाकरदेनीचाहिये।इसनातेसंविधानपीठनेबहुमतसेयहनिर्धारितकियाकि

उपरोक्तदोनोनिर्णयोंमेकोईविरोधाभासनहींहैकि नियोक्ताकोजवाबकेसाथहीयह
,
प्रार्थनापत्रभीदाखिलकरनाचाहियेकि वोसाक्ष्यभीप्रस्तुतकरनाचाहताहै जिससे
,
वादनिस्तारणमेदेरीनहोवयहप्रार्थनाक्योकि वैकल्पि कहै तोनियोक्तापरकोईभी
. . . . , ( )
प्रतिकूलप्रभावनहीहोगा।संविधानपीठने कूपरइंजी लि प्रति पी पी मुंधे १९७५ २
SCC
६६१ कोअनुमोदितकरतेहुएप्रस्तर१४मेयहनिर्णितकियाकि घरेलूजाँचकी

निष्पक्षतापरयदि प्रश्नउठेतोउसेप्रारम्भि कबिन्दुकेरूपमेंहीनिर्णितकियाजायेव

उसकेबादहीसाक्ष्यकेआधारपरवादनिर्णितकियाजाये।विवादकेवलसाक्ष्यदेनेके
,
प्रार्थनापत्रकेसमयपरथा जिसपरसंविधानपीठनेनिर्धारितकियाकि वोप्रथमस्तर

परहीविकल्पकेसाथकियाजानाचाहिये।परन्तुपीठकेदोसदस्योनेसहमति दिखाते
( . )
हुए न्यायमूर्ति शिवराजवी पाटिलकेद्वारालिखागयानिर्णय यहस्पष्टकियाकि श्रम

न्यायालयप्रकरणकीपरिस्थि तियोंमेसाक्ष्यदेनेकाआदेशवादकीकार्यवाहीकेदौरानव
,
निर्णयलेनेसेपहलेकभीभीनिर्धारितकरसकताहै क्योकि इसअधिकारकाआधार
,
प्रक्रियात्मकहै नकि किसीविधि केप्रावधानकेतहत।
. ( )
२१ मैने रिजिनलमैनेजर पूर्वमेउल्लेखित केनिर्णयकापरिशीलनभीसतर्कता
,
केसाथकियापरन्तु समकक्षएकलपीठद्वारायहनिर्धारितकरनाकि लक्ष्मीदेवम्मा

5
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
( ) ,
पूर्वमेउल्लेखित मेंयहभीनिर्धारितकियाकि घरेलूजाँचनिष्पक्षनहीहै काबिन्दु
,
प्रारम्भि करूपसेबनानाआवश्यकनहीहै परन्तुनतोसंविधानपीठकेसमक्षयहबिन्दु

विचाराधीनहीथाऔरनहीऐसासंविधानपीठनेनिर्णयमेकहीभीनिर्धारितकियाहै।
( )
ऐसाप्रतीतहोताहैकि रिजिनलमैनेजर पूर्वमेउल्लेखित केप्रस्तर२३केआखिरमे
,
संविधानपीठकेनिर्णयमेउक्तकहागयाहै अभिलेखकेविपरीतहै।
.
२२ उपरोक्तविश्लेषणकापरिणामहैकि श्रमन्यायालयकादायित्वहैकि प्रारम्भि क
" "
रूपसे क्याघरेलूजाँचनिष्पक्षहै काबिन्दुनिर्धारितकरेऔरउसकेनिर्णयकेउपरान्त
,
हीआगेकीकार्यवाहीकरे।नियोक्ता श्रमन्यायालयमेंउत्तरदाखिलकरतेसमय

प्रारम्भि कबिन्दुपरभीअपनास्पष्टीकरणवसाथहीसाथसाक्ष्यदेनेकीप्रार्थनाभीकर

सकताहै।वर्तमानप्रकरणमेनियोक्ताद्वाराप्रारम्भमेंहीयहप्रार्थनाकीगईथीकि
" " ,
प्रारम्भि कबिन्दुकि घरेलूजाँचनिषपक्षहै बनायाजाये परन्तुश्रमन्यायालयनेप्रार्थना

निरस्तकरतेहुएसाक्ष्यआमंत्रितकियातथाजोसाक्ष्यश्रमन्यायालयकेसमक्षप्रस्तुत

कियेगयेउसकेअतिरिक्तघरेलूजाँचमेंप्रस्तुतसाक्ष्यपरभीविचारकरतेहुएयह

निर्धारितकियाकि नकेवलघरेलूजाँचदूषितथीवरन्पदच्युतिभीअवैधानिकथी।
. ,
२३ श्रमन्यायालयअगरयहनिर्धारितकरताहैकि घरेलूजाँचनिष्पक्षनहीहै तो

केवलउससाक्ष्यपरजोउसकेसमक्षलेखबद्धकियेगयेवपत्रजातकोपत्रावलीपरलाये
, , ,
गयेहै केआधारपरहीयहनिर्धारितकरेगाकि क्याआरोपसाबितहोताहै यानही
(
परन्तुवर्तमानप्रकरणमेश्रमन्यायालयनेदोनोसाक्ष्य जोघरेलूजाँचमेकार्यवाहीके
) ,
दौरानवश्रमन्यायालयकेसमक्षआये परविचारकिया जोपूर्णरूपसेअवैधानिकहै।
( ( ) )
देखें नीताकपलिश पूर्वमेउल्लि खित केप्रस्तरसंख्या२७व२८ कर्मकारोंकेवरिष्ठ

अधिवक्ताद्वाराप्रस्तुतअन्यविधिकदृष्टांगोंकाकोईलाभकर्मकारोंकोनहींमिलसकता

है।अतःइसस्तरपरआक्षेपितआदेशकेनिम्नअंशमहत्वपूर्णहैकि श्रमन्यायालयने
-
उपरोक्तवैधानिकत्रुटिकरीः
"
इसबैकडेटिंगकेसम्बन्धमेंसर्वोतमसाक्ष्यकेवलसम्बन्धि तकिसानों
, 24.11.2016
काहीहोसकताथा जिनकेगन्नेकीतौलदिनांक कोहोना
,
दर्शायीगयीहै लेकिनकिसीभीकिसानसेनतोपूछतांछकीगयीऔरनही

उनकोघरेलूजांचमेऔरनहीन्यायालयमेंप्रस्तुतकियागया।अतःमात्र

सेवायोजककेइसकथनमेंविश्वासनहींकियाजासकताकि श्रमिकअर्जेन्द्र
24 24.11.2016
कुमारनेउपरोक्त पर्चियोंमेंबैकडेटिंगकरकेदिनांक दर्शायी
"
हो।
" 24.11.2016
जहांतकदिनांक कोश्रमिकद्वाराअन्यतौललिपिकोंके

साथहड़तालपरजानेकाप्रश्नहैतोइसमेंघरेलूजांचकेदौरानगवाहराजकुमार
( -13), ( -14),
द्वारालिखितकथन ई विजेन्द्रसिंहकालिखितकथन ई औंकार
( -15), ( -16),
सिंहकालिखितकथन ई नीरजकुमारकालिखितकथन ई योगेन्द्र
( -17),
कुमारकालिखितकथन ई रमेशपरसुरामपुरियाकालिखितकथन
( -18), ( -19),
ई अशोककुमारशर्माकालिखितकथन ई जितेन्द्रकुमारका
( -20)
लिखितकथन ई प्रस्तुतकियेगयेहैं। इनतथ्योकोस्वयंसेवायोजक
-2
साक्षी जांचअधिकारीश्रीसलिलस्वरूपआर्यनेभीस्वीकारकियाहैकि

उसनेश्रमिककेसमक्षघरेलूजांचकेदौरानइनगवाहोंकेबयानअंकितनहीं
,
कियेथे।उपरोक्तसभीबयानगवाहानटाईपशुदाबाहरसेलेकरआये जिन्हें

घरेलूजांचमेंप्रस्तुतकरदिया।मेरीरायमेंघरेलूजांचप्रक्रियापूरीतरहसे

दूषितहै।घरेलूजांचकेदौरानगवाहानकेकथनसम्बन्धि तश्रमिककेसमक्ष
,
हीअंकितकियेजानेचाहिएभलेहीवहहाथसेलिखेहुएहोंयाटंकणद्वारा

लेकिनउपरोक्तसभीबयानगवाहअन्यत्रसेटाईपशुदालायेथेऔरउन्होने

6
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026

घरेलूजांचमेंदाखिलकरदिये।अतःमात्रइसकेआधारपरयहनिष्कर्षनहीं

निकालाजासकताकि श्रमिकअर्जेन्द्रकुमारकिसीहड़तालमेंशामिलहुआ
24.11.2016
हो।वैसेभीइसबातकीपुष्टिहोचुकीहैकि दिनांक कोश्रमिक
24
द्वाराअपनेक्रयकेन्द्रपर किसानोंकेगन्नेकीतुलाईकीथीऔरउन्हे

भुगतानभीसेवायोजकद्वाराकियागया। अतःनतोइसबातकीपुष्टीहोतीहै
24.11.2016
कि दिनांक कोश्रमिककिसीहड़तालमेंशामिलरहाहोऔरनही
24.11.2016 "
इसतथ्यकीकि दिनांक कोगन्नेकीतुलाईनकीगयीहो।
( )
च निष्कर्ष
.
२४ उपरोक्तविचारविमर्शकेपरिणामस्वरूपविचारार्थकविधिकबिन्दुकानिस्तारण
, "
कियाजाताहैकि श्रमन्यायालयकोप्रारम्भि करूपमेही क्याघरेलूजाँचनिष्पक्षव
"
मान्यहै केविधिकबिन्दुबनाकरउसकानिस्तारणकरनाचाहियेऔरपरिणामके

फलस्वरूपहीआगेकीकार्यवाहीविधिकरूपसेकरनीचाहियेकि अगरघरेलूजाँच
, ,
निष्पक्षपाईजातीहै तोश्रमन्यायालयमात्रसजाकेसमानुपातकीजाँचकरसकताहै
,
परन्तुयदिश्रमन्यायालययहपाताहैकि घरेलूजाँचदूषितहै तोनियोक्ताकोश्रमिकके

विरूद्धआरोपसाबितकरनेकेलिएसाक्ष्यदेनेकीअनुमति प्रदानकरनीचाहियेऔरयदि

साक्ष्यपूर्वमेंहीनियोक्ताद्वारादियाजाचुकाहैतोउक्तसाक्ष्यकेआधारपरयह
,
निर्धारितकरेगाकि आरोपसाबितहोताहैयानहीं इसस्तरपरश्रमन्यायालयघरेलूजाँच

मेदियेगयेसाक्ष्यकोअपनेनिर्णयकाआधारनहीबनासकता।
. .
२५ उच्चतमन्यायालयनेएकनवीननिर्णय उत्तरप्रदेशस्टेटरोडट्रांसपोर्टकोर्प
, ( ) . . . (
प्रति गजाधरनाथ २०२२ ३एस सी सी १९० में वर्कमेनप्रति फायरस्टोनटायर पूर्व
) ,
मेउल्लेखित केनिर्णयमेसिद्धान्तोकापुनःउल्लेखकियाकि यदिनियोक्ताद्वाराकी
,
गयीघरेलूजाँचदूषितपायीजातीहै तोअधिकरणकोनियोक्ताकोसाक्ष्यप्रस्तुतकरने
,
काअवसरदेनाहीहोगा कि उसकेद्वाराकर्मकारकेविरूद्धकीगयीकार्यवाहीउचितहै।
( )
इसीप्रकरणमेंसंविधानपीठके लक्ष्मीदेवम्मा पूर्वमेउल्लेखित केनिर्णयकाभी

उल्लेखकियाकि उपरोक्तस्थि ति मेंनियोक्ताकासाक्ष्यदेनेकाअधिकारप्रक्रियात्मकहै
,
नकि वैधानिक जोवादकेत्वरितनिस्तारणकेलियेहै।
.
२६ वर्तमानप्रकरणमेश्रमन्यायालयनेदोवैधानिकत्रुटिकरीहै।पहलीउसनेघरेलू

जाँचनिष्पक्षहैकोनतोप्राथमिकबिन्दुबनायाऔरनहीउसकानिस्तारणप्रारम्भमे

कियातथादूसरीउसनेअऩ्ति मनिर्णयमेंजहांएकओरयहनिर्धारितकियाकि घरेलूजाँच
, -
दूषितहै वहींदूसरीओरवोसाक्ष्यजोउसकेसामनेलेखबद्धहुएकेसाथ साथघरेलूजाँच

केदौरानदियेगयेसाक्ष्यपरभीविचारकिया।इनदोवैधानिकत्रुटियोंकेकारणआक्षेपित

आदेशअवैधानिकहोजाताहै।
( )
छ आदेश
. . .
२७ आक्षेपितचारोंआदेशदिनांकित०३ ११ २०२०निरस्तकियेजातेहैंतथाचारोंवाद

श्रमन्यायालयकोप्रतिप्रेषितकरआदेशितकियाजाताहैकि श्रमन्यायालयसर्वप्रथम
' ’
प्रारम्भि कबिन्दु क्याघरेलूजाँचदूषितहैकोनिर्धारितकरेगावउसकेनिर्णयकेआधार

परहीआगेकीकार्यवाहीवैधानिकरूपसेकरेगा।क्योकि नियोक्ताअपनासाक्ष्यदेचुका
, ,
है तोअगरघरेलूजांचदूषितपाईजातीहै तोश्रमन्यायालयउक्तसाक्ष्यकेआधारपर

हीअपनानिर्णयदेगा।उक्तकार्यवाहीआजसेछःमहीनेकेअन्दरसमाप्तकरेगा।
.
२८ उपरोक्तनिर्देशकेसाथचारोंयाचिकाएंआंशिकरुपसेस्वीकारवअंतिमरुपसे
”
निस्तारितकीजातीहैं।

7
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
7. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent-Workman has
placed reliance on a judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Shashi Export Private Limited vs. State of U.P. and others,
2018:AHC:22600, wherein a similar issue was involved between parties
to this Court and Labour Court concerned has adopted similar procedure
and Coordinate Bench has dismissed writ petition filed by petitioner.
8. During argument it is informed that aforesaid judgment in Shashi
Export Private Limited (supra) was challenged at the behest of petitioner
before Supreme Court, being Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11076 of
2018 (Shahi Exports Ptv. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and another), which was
dismissed on 07.05.2018. For reference paras 9, 10 and 11 of aforesaid
judgment in Shashi Export Private Limited (supra) is reproduced
hereinafter:
“9. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner
and examined the record. In view of plea raised by the petitioner in
paragraph-19 of written statement, Labour Court framed an additional
issue on 28.03.2007 "Whether domestic inquiry was fair and proper
and has been done in consonance of principles of natural justice?".
Labour Court also directed that this issue would be decided along with
main issue referred to it. The petitioner has not only examined V.K.
Solanki (Inquiry Officer) as EW-1, on 13.09.2007 but also filed entire
papers relating to domestic inquiry from the stage of suspension on
16.08.2001 to dismissal on 27.10.2001, to prove that inquiry was fair
and proper. The petitioner also examined Rajendra Ahuja (Manager
Karmik & Administration) as EW-2, on 22.07.2010, Neeraj Harjani
(Assistant General Manager) as EW-3, on 21.09.2016 and Promod
Kumar Gupta (senior supervisor) as EW-4, on 23.03.2017, to prove the
charges as leveled against respondent-3, in domestic inquiry. After
close of the evidence, the petitioner filed written arguments on
03.05.2017 and never demanded any further opportunity for additional
evidence. Arguments that the petitioner was not given opportunity to
prove charges against respondent-3 is misconceived.
10. A copy of the charge sheet of domestic inquiry has been filed as
Annexure-2 to the writ petition. In the charges, incidents dated
09.07.2001, 10.07.2001, 12.07.2001, 27.07.2001, 08.08.2001,
11.08.2001 and 14.08.2001 were mentioned. In none of these incident,
name of Smt. Ranjana Jha (respondent-3) has been mentioned. Only
allegation against respondent-3 was that on 14.08.2001 after 2.00 p.m.,
the workers (including respondent-3) had assembled at factory gate and
began to shout that whoever would inquire about production, he would

8
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
not be able to stand on his leg. It is admitted that the petitioner was not
engaged in production work rather she was checker of finished material
and posted in Finishing Department. Rajendra Ahuja (Manager Karmik
& Administration) EW-2, in his cross examination has admitted that
there is no evidence to prove that respondent-3 had participated in go
slow move. Neeraj Harjani (Assistant General Manager) EW-3, in his
cross examination has admitted that respondent-3 has not assaulted any
person. Promod Kumar Gupta (senior supervisor) EW-4, in his cross
examination admitted that Ranjana Jha was working in finishing
department and had not assaulted any workman or the officer of
management. Thus charges of domestic inquiry was not proved before
Labour Court. Finding in this respect does not suffer from any
illegality.
11. V.K. Solanki (Inquiry Officer) EW-1, in his cross examination
admitted that envelope, in which notices were sent to respondent-3 did
not contain her correct address. Smt. Ranjana Jha in her statement has
stated that Inquiry Officer conducted inquiry inside factory premises
and she or other employees were not permitted to enter factory
premises. This statement has been believed by Labour Court. Finding
that domestic inquiry was not fair and proper does not suffer from any
illegality. ”
9. I have considered above submissions and perused the record.
10. So far as position of law is concerned, even a Coordinate Bench
has passed a different order, this Bench can still follow the judgment
passed in M/s Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. (supra) wherein several
judgments passed by Supreme Court on the issue was considered,
however, the same were not considered or placed on record for
consideration before Coordinate Bench in Shashi Export Private Limited
(supra).
11. Coordinate Bench in Shashi Export Private Limited (supra) has
placed reliance on Lakshmidevamma (supra), however, the same was
only with regard to legal consequence of an ex parte inquiry and the
aspect of procedure to be undertaken was not considered. Whereas, this
Bench in M/s Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. (supra) has taken note of
judgments passed by Supreme Court which has prescribed specifically
the process to be adopted by Labour Court in such circumstances.

9
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
12. Learned Senior Advocate for petitioner has placed reliance on a
judgment passed by Supreme Court in State of Uttarakhand and others
vs. Sureshwati, 2021(3) SCC 108 that position of law as referred above
was reiterated and for reference relevant part of said judgment is
reproduced hereinafter:
“18. This Court has in a catena of decisions held that where an
employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissal or discharge
of a workman, it is open for him to justify the action before the Labour
Court by leading evidence before it. The entire matter would be open
before the tribunal, which would have the jurisdiction to satisfy itself
on the evidence adduced by the parties whether the dismissal or
discharge was justified.
19. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Workmen v. Motipur Sugar
Factory (P) Ltd. AIR 1965 SC 1803 held that :
“11. It is now well settled by a number of decisions of this Court
that where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before
dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him to justify
the action before the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence
before it. In such a case the employer would not have the benefit
which he had in cases where domestic enquiries have been held.
The entire matter would be open before the tribunal which will
have jurisdiction not only to go into the limited questions open
to a tribunal where domestic enquiry has been properly held (see
Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [Indian Iron & Steel
Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130] ) but also to satisfy
itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the
dismissal or discharge was justified. We may in this connection
refer to Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan [Sasa
Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, AIR 1959 SC
923] , Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen [Phulbari Tea Estate v.
Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111] , and Punjab National Bank Ltd.
v. Workmen [Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960
SC 160] . These three cases were further considered by this
Court in Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh [Bharat Sugar
Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 684] , and reference was
also made to the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in
Ram Swarath Sinha v. Belsund Sugar Co. [Ram Swarath Sinha
v. Belsund Sugar Co., 1954 LAC 697] It was pointed out that
‘the important effect of omission to hold an enquiry was merely
this : that the tribunal would not have to consider only whether
there was a prima facie case but would decide for itself on the
evidence adduced whether the charges have really been made
out’. It is true that three of these cases, except Phulbari Tea

10
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
Estate case [Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC
1111], were on applications under Section 33 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. But in principle we see no difference
whether the matter comes before the tribunal for approval under
Section 33 or on a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. In either case if the enquiry is defective or if
no enquiry has been held as required by Standing Orders, the
entire case would be open before the tribunal and the employer
would have to justify on facts as well that its order of dismissal
or discharge was proper. Phulbari Tea Estate case [Phulbari Tea
Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111] was on a reference
under Section 10, and the same principle was applied there also,
the only difference being that in that case there was an inquiry
though it was defective. A defective enquiry in our opinion
stands on the same footing as no enquiry and in either case the
tribunal would have jurisdiction to go into the facts and the
employer would have to satisfy the tribunal that on facts the
order of dismissal or discharge was proper.”
20. Subsequently in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh
Singh [Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, (1972) 1
SCC 595] this Court held that : (SCC pp. 615-16, para 61)
“60. ... (1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the
management, or if the management makes it clear that it does
not rely upon any domestic enquiry that may have been held by
it, it is entitled to straightway adduce evidence before the
Tribunal justifying its action. The Tribunal is bound to consider
that evidence so adduced before it, on merits, and give a
decision thereon. In such a case, it is not necessary for the
Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as the
employer himself does not rely on it.
*
(3) When the management relies on the enquiry conducted by it,
and also simultaneously adduces evidence before the Tribunal,
without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry proceedings are
proper, it is the duty of the Tribunal, in the first instance, to
consider whether the enquiry proceedings conducted by the
management, are valid and proper. If the Tribunal is satisfied
that the enquiry proceedings have been held properly and are
valid, the question of considering the evidence adduced before it
on merits, no longer survives. It is only when the Tribunal holds
that the enquiry proceedings have not been properly held, that it
derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute and in
such a case it has to consider the evidence adduced before it by

11
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
the management and decide the matter on the basis of such
evidence.”
21. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in Workmen
v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. [Workmen v.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813 :
1973 SCC (L&S) 341] wherein the broad principle regarding holding
of the enquiry were spelt out as : (SCC pp. 827-29 & 831-32, paras 32
& 40-41)
“32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly
emerge:
‘(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the
quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if
a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if
action of the employer is justified.
(2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to
conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of
the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural
justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality.
(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and
the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from
the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no
jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer
as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the
employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in
the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of
victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide.
(4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the
enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in
order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order,
had to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to
adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce
evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to
the employee to adduce evidence contra.
(5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the
Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a
prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of
the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before
the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it,
has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is
proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial
functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands
on the same footing as no enquiry.

12
Writ C No. 26630 of 2026
(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence
placed before it for the first time in justification of the action
taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry
conducted by an employer is found to be defective.
(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should
straightaway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a
dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no
domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to
be defective.
(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity
of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to
justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If
such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to
refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce
evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of
both the management and the employee and to enable the
Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct.
(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry
conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a
Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be
interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the
punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation.
(10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of
dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid
compensation is, as held by this Court in Panitole Tea Estate v.
Workmen [Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen, (1971) 1 SCC 742]
within the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal.’
*
40. Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where
a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the
Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it
for the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11-A, about the
guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the
Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a
conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry
has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct
arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a
proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved.
41. We are not inclined to accept the contentions advanced on
behalf of the employers that the stage for interference under
Section 11-A by the Tribunal is reached only when it has to
consider the punishment after having accepted the finding of
guilt recorded by an employer. It has to be remembered that a

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Tribunal may hold that the punishment is not justified because
the misconduct alleged and found proved is such that it does not
warrant dismissal or discharge. The Tribunal may also hold that
the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified because the
alleged misconduct itself is not established by the evidence. To
come to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to
reappraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately it may hold that the
misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved
does not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. That
is why, according to us, Section 11-A now gives full power to
the Tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both
these points. Now the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reappraise
the evidence and come to its conclusion enures to it when it has
to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it in which an
employer relies on the findings recorded by him in a domestic
enquiry. Such a power to appreciate the evidence and come to its
own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was always
recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the
basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both
categories are now put on a par by Section 11-A.”
13. In aforesaid circumstances, when law on issue is very clear and
reiterated by Supreme Court time and again, the procedure undertaken
by Labour Court concerned, being contrary and in the teeth of judgments
passed by Supreme Court, cannot be sustainable. For sake of repetition
the principle enunciated by Supreme Court in Workmen of M/s Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. (supra) is again taken into
consideration that even a Workman is dismissed or any adverse action is
taken against a Workman even without conducting an inquiry, in such
case the Labour Court after making a declaration that no inquiry was
conducted, an opportunity should be granted to Employer to prove,
whether charge can be proved or not and that further proceeding will be
initiated only after the Labour Court has taken a decision, whether
domestic inquiry was fair or not.
14. In the present case, Labour Court has undertaken both proceedings
simultaneously instead of taking one after another and, therefore, an
illegality was erupted. Accordingly, impugned award dated 07.01.2026
passed in Adjudication Case No. 279 of 2009, is set aside only to the
extent whereby petitioner was not granted opportunity to prove that

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charge was make out or not. The Court is not interfering decision of
Labour Court that domestic inquiry was unfair. The matter is remitted
back with direction that Labour Court concerned will provide an
opportunity to produce evidence including fresh evidence also from the
side of Employer with further opportunity to Workman to cross-examine
the same, if so advised. The entire proceedings shall be concluded within
a period of three months from today. It is also directed that no party will
take any unnecessary adjournments.
15. With aforesaid directions/ observations, the writ petition is
disposed of.
July 15, 2026
AK
(Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
AWADESH KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad