Goutam Chakraborty And Ors vs The Defence Secretary And Ors

$~11 to 13
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 28.04.2026
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CONT.CAS(C) 80/2025
GOUTAM CHAKRABORTY AND ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. M.C. Dhingra, Sr. Adv., Mr.
Tashriq Ahmad, Ms. Farzeen Iqbal,
Mr. Gaurav Dhingra and Mr.
Shashank Singh, Advs.
versus
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. C.A. Brijesh, Mr. Ritwik Sharma
and Mr. Ishith Arora, Advs. for
Sharad Mehra.
Ms. Manisha Agarwal Narain, CGSC,
Mr. Siddhant Soni, Mr. Nipun Jain,
Ms. Dimpi Vaid, Mr. Rishabh Dev,
Advs.
12
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CONT.CAS(C) 177/2025 and CM APPLs.7046/2025, 7047/2025
ORDNANCE FACTORIES OFFICE SUPERINTENDENTS
WELFARE ASSOCIATION (OFOSWA) THROUGH ITS
GENERAL SECRETARY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mriganga Dutta, Sr. Adv., Mr. P.
S. Sudheer and Ms. Anne Mathew,
Advs.
versus
MR RAJESH KUMAR SINGH & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. C.A. Brijesh, Mr. Ritwik Sharma
and Mr. Ishith Arora, Advs. for
Sharad Mehra.
Ms. Manisha Agarwal Narain, CGSC,
Mr. Siddhant Soni, Mr. Nipun Jain,
Ms. Dimpi Vaid, Mr. Rishabh Dev,
Advs.
CONT.CAS(C) 80/2025 and connected matters Page 1 of 12


Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
20:23:18

13
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CONT.CAS(C) 813/2025
SHRI DEBASISH NARAYAN BOSE AND ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. M.C. Dhingra, Sr. Adv., Mr.
Tashriq Ahmad, Ms. Farzeen Iqbal,
Mr. Gaurav Dhingra and Mr.
Shashank Singh, Advs.
versus
SH RAJESH KUMAR SINGH, THE DEFENCE SECRETARY
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. C.A. Brijesh, Mr. Ritwik Sharma
and Mr. Ishith Arora, Advs. for
Sharad Mehra.
Ms. Manisha Agarwal Narain, CGSC,
Mr. Siddhant Soni, Mr. Nipun Jain,
Ms. Dimpi Vaid, Mr. Rishabh Dev,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL)

1. The present petitions have been filed by the petitioners alleging wilful
disobedience/non-compliance by the respondents with the directions
contained in the judgment dated 14.10.2014 passed in W.P.(C) 4606/2013.
The operative directions therein are as under:
“26. The petitioners were treated historically as equals to CSS/CSSS
employees and enjoyed equal pay and all benefits flowing from equal
pay. This was based on the previous four instances of determinations by
successive Pay Commissions that they performed equal work. No other
evidence of "complete identity" of work was necessary in the
circumstances of the case. The materials on the record do show that the
Sixth CPC stated in more than one place specifically that historical
parity in pay scales ought not to be disturbed. Such being the case, this
Court is of the opinion that the CAT fell into error in holding that
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Signature Not Verified
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By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
20:23:18

differentiation was facially justified, and could not be gone into given the
nature of restricted judicial review. Consequently, a direction is issued to
the respondents to fix the members of the Petitioner Association and
other similarly placed Assistants working in Ordnance Factories and in
OFB in the same pay scale as was given to Assistants similarly placed in
CSS/CSSS, Army Headquarters, UPSC, CAT, MEA, Ministry of
Parliamentary Affairs, etc. with effect from the same date as was first
given to them. Consequential pay fixation and fitment orders shall be
issued within eight weeks from today. The writ petition is allowed in the
above terms without any order as to costs.”


2. It can be seen that the sweep of the aforesaid terms covers not only
the members of the petitioner association therein but also similarly placed
persons, inter alia , Assistants working in Ordnance Factories and in OFB.
3. It transpires that the benefit of the aforesaid directions was not
afforded to the petitioners, inter alia , Assistants working in Ordnance
Factories and in OFB (headquarters), hence, the present petitions have been
filed.
4. At the outset, it is noticed that vide order dated 30.03.2026 in certain
identical matters (CONT. CAS(C) 1091/2024 and CONT. CAS(C) 31/2025),
this Court has held as under:
“5. There is merit in the contention advanced by the petitioner that, in
terms of the directions contained in paragraph – 26 of the judgment
dated 14.10.2014, the pay scale of the Assistants/Personal Assistants
working in Ordnance Factories and the OFB is required to be fixed at
par with that of similarly placed Assistants in CSS/CSSS, AFHQ (Army
Headquarters), the Railway Board, etc., alongwith all consequential
benefits of pay fixation and fitment. Consequently, once such parity in
pay scale was directed to be granted together with all the attendant
benefits, the same is required to be maintained and continued throughout
the course of service.”

5. The position that the benefit in terms of the aforesaid directions has to
be extended to all similarly situated persons is evident from the overarching
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Signing Date:20.05.2026
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terms in which the relief has been framed by the Court. The same also
follows from various judgments of the Supreme Court.
6. In Girish Mittal vs. Parvati V. Sundaram and Another , (2019) 20
SCC 747, the Supreme Court, inter alia , observed as under:
“15. We do not agree with Mr Gupta that a contempt petition is
maintainable only at the behest of a party to the judgment. The directions
issued by this Court are general in nature and any violation of such
directions would enable an aggrieved party to file a contempt petition.
[Priya Gupta v. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, (2013) 11 SCC
404 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 534]”

7. In Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation

Limited and Others vs. Ram Gopal , (2021) 13 SCC 225, the Supreme Court
has, inter alia , made the following observation:

“13. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply
to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its
instrumentalities are expected in such category of cases to themselves,
extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed
employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of
courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to
judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State
of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava [State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 191] , laying down
that : (SCC pp. 363-64, para 22)

“22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees
is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons
need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so
would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied
in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence
evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly
situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal
rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons
did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated
differently……

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Signing Date:20.05.2026
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14. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari
Lal in service, does not possess any ingredient of a judgment in rem. The
abovecited exception, therefore, does not come to the respondent's
rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor
is it apparent from the material on record that the respondent was unable
to approach the court of law in time on account of any social or financial
disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal
aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner.
Instead, he seems to be under the assumption that the termination order
is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and that he
can agitate the same at his own sweet will. Neither of these three
assumptions are true, as elaborated by us earlier.”

8. In Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel vs. Union of India and Others , (2024)
SCC OnLine SC 3664, the Supreme Court, inter alia , observed as under:
“14. It is a well settled principle of law that where a citizen aggrieved by
an action of the government department has approached the court and
obtained a declaration of law in his/her favour, others similarly situated
ought to be extended the benefit without the need for them to go to court.
[See Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi, (1975) 4
SCC 714]

15. In K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431, this Court
while reinforcing the above principle held as under:—

“19. The writ petitions and the appeals must succeed. We set aside
the impugned judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench of
the Kerala High Court and direct that each of the three transferee
banks should take over the excluded employees on the same terms
and conditions of employment under the respective banking
companies prior to amalgamation. The employees would be
entitled to the benefit of continuity of service for all purposes
including salary and perks throughout the period. We leave it open
to the transferee banks to take such action as they consider proper
against these employees in accordance with law. Some of the
excluded employees have not come to court. There is no
justification to penalise them for not having litigated. They too
shall be entitled to the same benefits as the petitioners. ….”

(Emphasis Supplied)

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Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
20:23:18

16. No doubt, in exceptional cases where the court has expressly
prohibited the extension of the benefit to those who have not approached
the court till then or in cases where a grievance in personam is
redressed, the matter may acquire a different dimension, and the
department may be justified in denying the relief to an individual who
claims the extension of the benefit of the said judgment.

17. That is not the situation here. In the submissions too, the respondents
have not been able to point out any valid justification as to how the
applicants who obtained the benefit from the AFT, Principal Bench in
OA No. 111 of 2013 and batch are not identically situated with the
appellant. Like the applicants who succeeded, the appellant was also ripe
for the third chance before the amended para 4(a) of AI No. 37 of 1978
was introduced on 20.03.2013. The Principal Bench of the AFT in OA
No. 111 of 2013 after clearly holding that the applicants therein were
denied the third chance directed consideration of their cases for
permanent absorption by granting one-time age relaxation by
considering them under the unamended policy.

18. The respondent authorities on their own should have extended the
benefit of the judgment of AFT, Principal Bench in OA No. 111 of 2013
and batch to the appellant. To illustrate, take the case of the valiant
Indian soldiers bravely guarding the frontiers at Siachen or in other
difficult terrain. Thoughts on conditions of service and job perquisites
will be last in their mind. Will it be fair to tell them that they will not be
given relief even if they are similarly situated, since the judgment they
seek to rely on, was passed in the case of certain applicants alone who
moved the court? We think that would be a very unfair scenario.
Accepting the stand of the respondents in this case would result in this
Court putting its imprimatur on an unreasonable stand adopted by the
authorities.

19. The stand of the Department relying on the judgment of this Court in
State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni, (1981) 4 SCC 130
to contend that mere reduction in chance of consideration did not result
in deprivation of any right does not appeal to us. The appellant's case is
founded on the principle of discrimination. What is sauce for the goose
ought to be sauce for the gander. If the applicants in O.A. No. 111 of
2013 whom we find are identically situated to the appellant were found
to be eligible to be given a third chance for promotion, because they
acquired eligibility before the amendment to AI No. 37 of 1978 on
20.03.2013, we find no reason why the appellant should not be treated
alike.
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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
20:23:18

20. The order dated 13.03.2014 in the application for clarification of the
AFT, Principal Bench, order of 22.01.2014 and the order dated
19.05.2014 in the review relied upon in the counter affidavit do not in
any manner dilute the case of the appellant herein. In fact, the order
dated 13.03.2014 fully supports the appellant since it extended the
benefit to those persons who acquired the eligibility in 2013. As far as
the order in review dated 19.05.2014 directing that there would be no
dilution in the laid down criterion and the further direction that the order
in review shall not form a precedent does not imply that the main order
of 22.01.2014 of the Principal Bench, AFT, should not be extended to
similarly situated individuals like the appellant, who has been knocking
the doors for relief since September, 2014.”

9. A reading of the judgment dated 14.10.2014 also reveals that the
rationale given therein is squarely applicable to the present set of petitioners.
In particular, it is apposite to refer to the following observations in the said

judgment:

“19. The Central Government’s first explanation for denial is that this is
in terms authorized by Para 3.1.14 of the Sixth CPC recommendations.
That is plainly incorrect, because that portion of the Sixth CPC merely
indicated the replacement scales from the existing Rs.5000-8000/- to be
Rs.6500-10,500/-.By the time this recommendation was accepted,
Assistants in the CSS/CSSS were already enjoying the higher scale of
Rs.6500-10,500/-. Even the CCS (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008 support this
inference. Under Rule 3(1) of the said Rules, “existing basic pay” means
“pay drawn in the prescribed existing scale of pay, including stagnation
increment(s)”, but does not include any other type of pay like ‘special
pay’, etc. Rule 3(2) on the other hand, prescribed “existing scale” in
relation to a Government servant as “the present scale applicable to the
st
post held by the Government servant... as on the 1 day of
January..2026”. Rule 3(7) defined “revised pay structure” as one in
relation to any post specified in column 2 of the First Schedule and
meaning “the pay band and grade pay specified against that post or the
pay scale specified in column 5 & 6” thereof, unless a different revised
pay band and grade pay or pay scale is notified separately for that post”.
Rule 11 prescribed the mode of fixation in pay after 01.01.2006. Part B
of Section II of the First Schedule to the Rules specifically stated as
follows:
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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
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Signature Not Verified
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By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
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The interest part of the above table is that but for the explanation it
affords, the substantive part of the Rules are based on the
replacement scales being in accordance with the ones indicated in
Part A of the First Schedule – read with definition of “revised
pay”. The scales indicated, under the First schedule are in the form
of merger of four pay scales – Rs.4500-7000/-; Rs.5000-8000/-;
5500-9000/-; and Rs.6500-10,500/-. All are merged into one play
scale, i.e. Rs.9300-34800/-. The Rules, as well as the Sixth CPC
recommendations specifically talk of continuation of pay benefits
on the basis of “historical parity”.
As observed earlier, this
historical parity is not denied; however, the explanation for denial
of the benefit of upgradation – and the consequent placement is
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Signing Date:20.05.2026
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higher pay scales, to employees in Ordnance Factories is that OFB
employees are not specifically mentioned, as opposed to mention of
other non-secretariat employees: “like AFHQSS/AFHQSSS/RBSS
and Ministerial/Secretarial posts in Ministries/Departments
organisations like MEA, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, CVC,
UPSC, etc.”. This argument is both upersuasive and specious,
because mention of specific department was meant only by way of
illustration; else a contrary intention would have been clearer.
That the mention of some, not all non-secretariat employees is
illustrative and not exhaustive is clear from the qualifying terms –
“like” and “etc.”.
The allusion to historical parity with reference
to only a few illustration was to encompass all those organizations
where employees had identical pay scales and not merely those in
enumerated departments or organizations. Any other interpretation
would negate the whole intention of maintaining historical parity
altogether.”

10. Learned counsel for the respondents seeks to oppose the present

petitions, relying upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in
State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015) 1 SCC 347:
“22.2 However, this principle is subject to well-recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful
action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up
after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts
who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their
efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the
judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be
extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches
and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to
dismiss their claim.”

11. In the present case, the aforesaid exception would not apply inasmuch
as in light of the factual conspectus, and the nature of the directions
contained in the judgment dated 14.10.2014 give rise to a continuing cause
of action. Also, the petitioners have been diligently pursing with the
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Signing Date:20.05.2026
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respondents for the grant of similar dispensation as has been afforded to
similarly situated persons.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents also seeks to resist the present
petitions on the ground that with regard to the present petitioners, there was
no historical pay parity in any of the previous Pay Commissions.
13. The said contention of the learned counsel for the respondents
regarding the absence of any pay parity is negated by the reasoning and
rationale given in the judgment dated 14.10.2014, particularly, the
aforementioned observations in paragraph 19 thereof.
14. It is incumbent upon the respondents to uniformly apply their policy
and extend identical treatment to all similarly situated persons. Any
differential treatment cannot be countenanced, in view of the scope and
import of the aforesaid judgment dated 14.10.2014.
15. In such a situation, it is incumbent on this Court to pass consequential
orders. In Anil Kumar Shahi v. Prof. Ram Sevak Yadav , (2008) 14 SCC
115, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“50. It is by now well settled under the Act and under Article 129 of
the Constitution of India that if it is alleged before this Court that a
person has wilfully violated its order it can invoke its jurisdiction
under the Act to enquire whether the allegation is true or not and if
found to be true it can punish the offenders for having committed
“civil contempt” and if need be, can pass consequential orders for
enforcement of execution of the order, as the case may be, for
violation of which, the proceeding for contempt was initiated. In other
words, while exercising its power under the Act, it is not open to the
Court to pass an order, which will materially add to or alter the order
for alleged disobedience of which contempt jurisdiction was invoked.
When the Court directs the authority to consider a matter in
accordance with law, it means that the matter should be considered to
the best of understanding by the authority and, therefore, a mere error
of judgment with regard to the legal position cannot constitute
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Signing Date:20.05.2026
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contempt of Court. There is no wilful disobedience if best efforts are
made to comply with the order.”

16. In the circumstances, the respondents are directed to afford the same
dispensation to the petitioners as has been afforded to Assistants in
Ordnance Factories and in the Ordnance Factory Board Headquarters and to
refrain from according differential treatment to similarly situated persons.
17. Let the necessary compliance be done by the respondents within a
period of 12 weeks from today. Let a compliance affidavit be filed within a
period of 8 weeks thereafter.
18. The present petitions stand disposed of in the above terms. Pending
applications also stand disposed of.
19. It is made clear that in the event of non-compliance on the part of the
respondents, the same shall be construed as egregious breach/wilful
disobedience of the orders passed by this Court, entailing action under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In such eventuality, the petitioners shall be at
liberty to revive these petitions.

SACHIN DATTA, J
at/sv
APRIL 28, 2026/

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
Signing Date:20.05.2026
20:23:18