State Of Punjab And Ors. vs Gurjeet Singh
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
1
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
IN T
THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJ
JAB AND HARYANA
ARH
AT CHANDIGA
RSA No.4
STATE OF PUN
Vs
GURJEET SIN
1 The date
2 The date
3 The date
website
4 Whether
pronounc
pronounc
5 The delay
judgment
4599 of 2009 (O&M)
…Appe llants
NJAB AND ORS.
GH
…Respondent
when the judgment was reserv
when the judgment is pronoun
when the judgment is uploaded
ved 08.07.2026
nced 14.09.2026
d on the 14.09.2026
only operative part of the judg
ced or whether the full judgme
ced
y, if any, of the pronouncement
gment is
Full
nt is
t of full Not applicable
t, and reasons thereof.
CORAM: HON
N'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKES
SH MANUJA
Present: Mr
for
Mr
for
. Arun Jindal, Addl. A.G., Punja
ab
the appellants.
. Puneet Sharma, Advocate
the respondent (through video-c
conferencing).
HARKESH MA
1. By
ANUJA, J.
way of present appeal, challeng
e has been laid to the judgment a
and
decree dated 09
9.06.2009 passed by Addl. Di
istrict Judge, Patiala (hereinaf
fter
referred to as
“First Appellate Court”), whe
erein appeal filed on behalf of
the
plaintiff-respond
dent against the judgment and d
decree dated 01.03.2006 passed
d by
the Court of Civ
vil Judge (Jr. Division) (hereinaf
fter referred to as “trial Court
t”) ,
was allowed, the
ereby decreeing the suit of the pl
laintiff-respondent.
2. Bri
iefly stated, the plaintiff’s case is
s that he was appointed as a Spec
cial
Police Officer
(SPO) on 30.08.1994 and wa
as posted at GRP, Bathinda.
On
13.07.1998, he w
was selected for appointment as
s a Constable in 5th Battalion, IR
RB,
Amritsar, and w
was called for medical examinatio
on on 13.03.2000. He was involv
ved
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2
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
in a criminal cas
se on 13.01.1997 which was pen
nding at the relevant time. Howev
ver,
the character ve
erification report submitted by t
the CID did not disclose anyth
hing
adverse against
him. His service file, received
from GRP, however, indicated
the
registration of th
he said criminal case. Consequen
ntly, the plaintiff was not permit
tted
to join as a Con
nstable and continued to discharg
ge his duties as an SPO. Thereaf
fter,
vide order No. 3
32037-38/SPO Cell dated 06.10
.2000, his services were ordered
d to
be terminated an
nd the said order was allegedly
y passed without affording him a
any
opportunity of h
hearing or issuing any show-ca
ause notice. It was further plead
ded
that his service
es could not have been term
minated merely on the ground
of
registration of
a criminal case and that, aft
ter completion of six months
of
satisfactory serv
vice, he became eligible and enti
itled to appointment as a Constab
ble.
After serving n
otice under Section 80 CPC, th
he plaintiff instituted the civil s
suit
challenging the
termination order and seeking th
he consequential reliefs.
3. Upo
on notice, the defendants ap
ppeared and filed their writ
tten
statement. The s
suit was contested, inter alia , o
on the grounds of want of cause
e of
action and impr
roper valuation for the purpose
es of court fee. On merits, it w
was
pleaded that the
e plaintiff was enlisted as an SP
PO under Section 17 of the Pol
lice
Act, 1861, whi
ch empowered the police auth
orities to appoint residents of
the
neighbourhood i
in situations where a threat to th
he locality was apprehended and
the
regular police fo
orce was considered insufficient
t. According to the defendants,
the
plaintiff was en
ngaged as a daily wager and,
in terms of the conditions of
his
engagement, his
s services could be terminated a
at any time without prior notice
e. It
was, therefore,
contended that he had no righ
ht to hold the post. It was furt
ther
denied that, cha
aracter verification report cont
ained nothing adverse against
the
plaintiff while
specifically pleading that FIR
R No. 16 dated 13.01.1997 un
nder
Sections 307, 3
323, 324, 148 and 149 IPC wa
as registered against him at Pol
lice
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3
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
Station Kotwal
i, Bathinda, and that the said
d fact was duly reported by
the
DSP/CID, Bathi
inda, vide letter dated 24.04.20
000. It was accordingly maintain
ned
that the plaintiff
ff was discharged from service v
vide order No. 32037-38/SPO C
Cell
dated 06.10.200
00 by the competent authority
in accordance with the conditi
ons
governing his en
ngagement. On these premises, d
dismissal of the suit was sought.
4. Rep
plication to the written statem
ment was filed by the plain
ntiff
re-iterating the
facts contained in the plaint wh
hile denying those contained in
the
written statemen
nt of the defendant.
5. Fro
om the pleadings of the parties, fo
following issues were framed:-
“i)
Whether the plaintiff is entitl
led to declaration Prayed for? O
OPP
ii)
suit
Whether the plaintiff has no
t? OPD
cause of action to file the pres
sent
iii)
of c
Whether the suit has not bee
court fee, if so its effect? OPD
en properly valued for the purp
pose
iv)
Relief.”
6. On
appraisal of evidence led by t
the parties, the learned trial Co
urt,
vide its judgmen
nt and decree dated 01.03.2006, d
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff
ff.
7. Agg
grieved against the judgment an
nd decree dated 01.03.2006 pas
ssed
by the learned tr
rial Court, the plaintiff preferred
an appeal, which was allowed v
vide
judgment and d
decree dated 09.06.2009 by th
he learned First Appellate Co
urt,
thereby decreein
ng the suit of the plaintiff. He
ence, the present Regular Seco
ond
Appeal was filed
d by the appellant-defendant-Sta
ate.
CONTENTION
NS
ON BEHALF O
OF THE APPELLANT-STATE
E
8. Imp
pugning the judgment and decre
ee dated 09.06.2009 passed by
the
learned First Ap
ppellate Court, learned counsel
l for the appellant-State submit
tted
MOHMED ATIK
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4
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
that the respond
dent was appointed as an SPO o
on daily-wage basis, subject to
the
condition that h
his services could be terminated
d without issuance of a show-ca
ause
notice. During h
his engagement, FIR No.16 date
ed 13.01.1997 under Sections 3
307,
323, 324, 148 a
and 149 IPC was registered again
nst him. Consequently, pursuan
t to
the directions o
of the Director General of Poli
ice, Punjab dated 21.09.2000,
the
competent autho
ority discharged him vide order
r dated 06.10.2000 in terms of
the
conditions of h
his engagement. It was cont
tended that, the discharge be
eing
simpliciter and w
without any stigma, no show-cau
use notice or opportunity of hear
ring
was required. In
n support, reliance was placed u
upon the judgment of the Divis
sion
Bench of this C
Court in Parveen Kumar v. St
tate of Punjab, 2001(3) RSJ 2
206,
wherein, it was h
held as under:
“In view of the complaints rec
the petitioners the former did n
satisfactory. It was, thus, ope
service without affording an op
petitioners were temporary em
When the competent authority
it had two options before it - it
terms of the Standing Orders u
take disciplinary/punitive acti
misconduct. In the present case
first option and discharged t
question of affording any oppo
therefore, arise and the comp
towards them as it was not ta
action against them though it
competent authority had chos
event an opportunity of hearin
petitioners and even a regular
our opinion, no fault can b
competent authority in choosing
ceived by respondent No. 3 agai
not consider their work and cond
inst
duct
en to him to discharge them fr
rom
pportunity of hearing to them. T
mployees working on daily wag
The
ges.
received complaints against th
t could discharge the petitioners
under which they were appointed
em,
s in
d or
ion against them for the alleg
e, the competent authority chose
ged
the
The
not,
ient
nary
the petitioners from service. T
ortunity of hearing to them did n
petent authority was rather leni
aking any punitive or disciplin
t was open to it to do so. If
the
that
en the second option then in t
ng would have been afforded to
the
d. In
r inquiry would have been held
e found with the action of
g the first option.”
the
9. Lea
arned counsel further relied up
pon the judgment of this Court
t in
Sher Singh v. S
State of Haryana, 1994(2) SLR
R 100 , to contend that a consta
able
could be discha
arged under Rule 12.21 of the
Punjab Police Rules within th
hree
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5
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
years of his en
nrolment, even where the circu
umstances involved allegations
of
misconduct .
10. Lea
arned counsel also contended
that the respondent’s antecede
ents
were relevant fo
or determining his suitability for
r appointment as a Constable in
the
police force. In
support, reliance was placed u
upon the judgment of the Hon’
’ble
Supreme Court
in Delhi Administration v. Su
ushil Kumar, 1996(11) SCC 6
605 ,
wherein it was h
held:
“Th
gro
acq
Cod
und
of a
the
ver
crit
und
wri
of
des
disc
bac
Trib
rec
the
Wh
to b
act
car
the
righ
to t
he Tribunal in the impugned or
ound that since the responde
rder allowed the application on
ent had been discharged and
the
d/or
enal
quitted of the offence punishabl
le under Section 304 Indian Pe
de, under Section 324 read with
der Section 324 Indian Penal Co
Section 34 Indian Penal Code a
ode, he cannot be denied the ri
the State. The question is: whet
is correct in law? It is seen t
antecedents is one of the import
and
ight
ther
appointment to the post under t
view taken by the Tribunal i
rification of the character and a
that
tant
post
teria to test whether the selecte
der the State. Though he was
ed candidate is suitable to a p
s physically found fit, passed
s provisionally selected, on acco
appointing authority found it
the
ount
itten test and interview and was
his antecedent record, the ap
sirable to appoint a person of s
not
such record as a Constable to
the
the
The
ciplined force. The view taken
ckground of the case cannot
by the appointing authority in
be said to be unwarranted. T
njustified in giving the direction
bunal, therefore, was wholly unj
consideration of his case. Though
for
d of
ion.
date
h he was discharged or acquitted
as nothing to do with the questi
nduct or character of the candid
criminal offences, the same ha
hat would be relevant is the con
be appointed to a service and n
not the actual result thereof. If
a particular way, the law will t
the
take
ual result happened to be in a
re of the consequences. The cons
sideration relevant to the case is
Appointing Authority, therefore,
s of
antecedents of the candidate. A
htly focused this aspect and foun
the service.”
has
him
nd him not desirable to appoint h
10.1. No
other argument was raised on be
ehalf of the appellants.
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6
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
ON BEHALF O
OF RESPONDENTS
11. On t
the other hand, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of responde
ent-
plaintiff submit
tted that the judgment and dec
cree passed by the First Appell
late
Court been base
ed on proper appreciation of ma
aterial facts and the relevant ru
ules,
called for no int
erference and as such, present ap
ppeal was liable to be dismissed.
.
DISCUSSION A
AND REASONING
12. I ha
ave heard learned counsels for
the parties and perused the pap
per-
book. I am una
able to find substance in the co
ontentions raised on behalf of
the
appellant/defend
dant-State.
13. The
e question which arises for consi
ideration is whether the order da
ated
06.10.2000 was
a simpliciter discharge of the pl
laintiff in terms of the conditions
s of
his engagement
as an SPO or whether the said p
power was exercised on the basis
s of
the allegations le
evelled against him.
14. The
ere is no dispute that the plaintif
ff was engaged as an SPO and t
that
the conditions o
of his engagement permitted hi
is discharge without issuance o
of a
show-cause noti
ice. However, the said condition
n cannot be considered in isolati
ion.
The nature of t
the order has to be examined f
from the material which led to
its
passing. In the p
present case, the order of dischar
rge dated 06.10.2000 (Ex.P-30) w
was
issued pursuant
to the communication of the DG
GP, Punjab dated 21.09.2000 (Ex
x.P-
29). The said c
ommunication specifically refer
rs to the criminal case against
the
plaintiff, his cus
stody from 14.02.1997 to 28.02
2.1997 and the allegation regard
ding
production of a
false medical certificate. The sa
aid communication directed that
the
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7
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
plaintiff be disc
charged in view of the above f
facts. Thus, the order of discha
arge
cannot be viewe
ed independently of the material
which formed its basis.
14.1 The
e position becomes clearer from
m the findings recorded by both
the
learned Courts
below, wherein it has been no
oticed that DW-2 admitted that
no
show-cause not
tice was issued to the plaintiff
f and that his service record w
was
satisfactory. If t
the plaintiff was otherwise perfo
orming his duties satisfactorily,
the
reference to th
he aforesaid allegations in th
he communication preceding
the
discharge order
cannot be treated as an irreleva
ant circumstance. The record sho
ows
that the allegatio
ons against the plaintiff were act
ted upon while passing the order
r of
discharge.
15. Fur
rther, the distinction between
a termination simpliciter and
d a
termination foun
nded on misconduct has been e
explained by the Hon'ble Supre
eme
Court in Mathew
w P. Thomas v. Kerala State C
Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. and O
Ors.,
(2003) 3 SCC 26
63 . It was held that where the or
rder is simpliciter in form, the Co
ourt
can examine the
e background and attending circ
cumstances to ascertain whether
the
termination was
s in fact founded on misconduc
t. The relevant observations are
e as
under:
“Fr
term
hav
tim
an
diff
sim
as f
mo
form
a p
stig
bac
rom long line of decisions it ap
mination is simplicitor or puni
ving due regard to the facts and
me the distinction between the fo
appears to us whether an order
r of
itive has ultimately to be decid
ded
ay a
circumstances of each case. Ma
oundation and motive in relation
n to
order of termination either is
ficult either to categorize or cla
mplicitor falling in one or the oth
s thin or overlapping. It may
assify strictly orders of terminat
be
tion
duct
r on
her category, based on miscond
er of termination simplicitor or
bility to continue in service. If
d order of termination simiplictor
foundation for passing the orde
tive on the ground of unsuitab
m and language of the so called
probationer clearly indicate that
the
r of
it is
t it is punitive in nature or/and i
eed to be go into the details of
gmatic there may not be any ne
the
the
ckground and surrounding circ
cumstances in testing whether
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8
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
ord
serv
sim
is p
be
mis
a p
may
of a
nec
out
emp
also
out
rea
der of termination is simplicito
or or punitive. In cases where
minated by an order of terminat
the
tion
er it
may
vices of a probationer are term
mplicitor and the language and f
form of it do not show that eithe
punitive or stigmatic on the face
e of it but in some cases there m
ng circumstances to show t
a background and attendin
sconduct was the real basis and
probationer. In other words, th
that
design to terminate the services
he facade of the termination or
s of
rder
y be simplicitor but the real fac
a probationer on the basis of mi
cessary to travel beyond the orde
ce behind it is to get rid of servi
ices
mes
find
isconduct. In such cases it becom
er of termination simplicitor to f
round and what weighed with
t what in reality is the backgr
the
ss it
ployer to terminate the services
o becomes necessary to find out
t the suitability of the person t
ality removed from service on the
of a probationer. In that proces
t whether efforts were made to f
to continue in service or he is
e foundation of his misconduct”
find
s in
16. Fur
rther, this Court in Surinder P
Pal Kaur v. State of Punjab a
and
others , reported
d as 2005 (1) SCT 106 , consider
red the scope of the Standing Or
rder
permitting disch
harge of an SPO without notice.
It was held that such power co
ould
be exercised in
case of unsatisfactory work and
d conduct, but where the discha
arge
was founded up
pon a specific allegation of misc
conduct, an inquiry and opportun
nity
of hearing were
necessary. The relevant observa
ations are reproduced hereunder:
“18.
servi
disch
and
conf
impu
hers
requ
agai
conc
and
para
being
stigm
expla
being
The contention of counsel for t
ices, being governed by the s
harge from service at any time, w
the respondents that the petitione
er's
tanding order, which permits
whatsoever for unsatisfactory w
ccepted, had the impugned or
conduct of the petitioner. As
hat the petitioner miscond
fficer, the punishing authority w
the
work
conduct, would have been ac
fined itself to the work and c
rder
the
duct
ugned order concludes th
elf/misbehaved with another Off
uired to hold an inquiry and on
was
the basis of evidence, led for a
reafter arrive at an independ
and
dent
inst the allegations and, ther
clusion. In the absence of any su
ch procedure having been adopt
ted,
ding
in view of the settled law,
agraphs, I have no hesitation in
as referred to in the preced
n holding that the impugned or
rder
g founded on an alleged miscon
matic. As no show-cause no
nduct is not only punitive but a
otice was ever issued, nor a
also
any
der,
anation sought or any inquiry
y conducted, the impugned ord
g violative of the principles of n
natural justice, has to be set asi
ide.
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9
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
Mere
wage
misc
inqu
ely because the petitioner wa
es, would be no reason to dispe
conduct, without issuance of a s
uiry.”
as an S.P.O., appointed on da
aily
s of
f an
ense her services on allegations
show-cause notice or holding of
17. Lik
kewise, in State of Punjab and
others v. Dharam Pal , reported
d as
2015 (3) SCT
633 , this Court, reiterated that
t the power to discharge an S
SPO
without notice is
s available in a case of discharge
e simpliciter, but cannot be invok
ked
where the ord
er is stigmatic and founded
upon misconduct. The relev
vant
observations are
e as under:
“10
of T
200
app
Ord
Off
sati
the
stig
rem
bee
ther
to
opp
ord
0. Reference can be made to a
Tarsem Lal v. State of Punjab
01) decided on 17.12.2003 where
pellant was allowed by observin
judgment of this Court in the c
b and another (RSA No. 3997
case
7 of
eby the appeal filed by the plaint
ng that Clause (9) of the Stand
ents to discharge the Special Pol
duct has been found to be
otice to him. However, a perusa
tiff-
ding
der gives power to the responde
ficers, whose work and cond
lice
not
l of
it is
The
ving
isfactory without issuing any no
order dispensing with the servic
gmatic in nature. It is not an
moval of the services of the app
ces of the appellant shows that i
order of removal simpliciter. T
pellant is on account of his hav
en found absent from duty. An or
rder passed with a stigma attach
affording an opportunity of hear
hed
ring
reto could be passed only after a
the official under Article 311 o
portunity of hearing was denied
der of removal from service was h
of the Constitution of India. T
d to the appellant in that case. T
The
The
held not sustainable in law.
11.
aris
sam
In view of all that has been d
ses for consideration in this r
me is dismissed.”
discussed above, no question of l
regular second appeal. Hence
law
the
18. App
plying the aforesaid legal princip
ples to the facts of the present ca
ase,
the condition of
f engagement permitting dischar
rge without issuance of show-ca
ause
notice would u
undoubtedly apply where the d
discharge is simpliciter. Howev
ver,
where the discha
arge is founded upon allegations
s of misconduct, the position wo
ould
be different. In
the present case, the commun
nication dated 21.09.2000(Ex.P-
29)
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10
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
specifically refe
ers to the criminal case registere
ed against the plaintiff, his custo
ody
from 14.02.1997
7 to 28.02.1997 and the allegati
ion regarding production of a fa
alse
medical certifica
ate, and thereafter directs his dis
scharge under the conditions of
his
engagement. Th
he order dated 06.10.2000 w
was passed pursuant to the s
said
communication.
. Further, as noticed by the lear
rned Courts below,DW-2 admit
tted
that the work an
nd conduct of the plaintiff were
e satisfactory. Thus, the allegati
ons
referred to in E
Ex.P-29 were not merely inciden
ntal circumstances, but constitu
uted
the basis for pas
ssing the order of discharge. Onc
ce the discharge was founded up
pon
allegations of m
misconduct, the same could n
ot have been effected by mer
rely
invoking the co
ondition permitting discharge wi
ithout notice. The allegations w
were
required to be e
stablished in accordance with la
aw and the plaintiff was required
d to
be served with
a show-cause notice and afford
ded an opportunity of hearing. T
The
mere form of th
he order as one of discharge sim
mpliciter would not change its t
true
nature. In the ab
bsence of such opportunity and
proof of the allegations, the or
rder
dated 06.10.200
00 cannot be sustained. The First
t Appellate Court, therefore, righ
htly
held the same to
o be punitive in nature.
19. The
e reliance placed by learned Sta
ate counsel upon Parveen Kuma
ar’s
case (supra) , do
oes not alter the position. The sai
id decision recognises the power
r of
the competent a
authority to discharge a tempora
ary/daily-wage employee where
the
authority merely
y exercises the power available
under the applicable conditions
s of
engagement ins
stead of initiating disciplinary p
proceedings. That principle wo
ould
undoubtedly app
ply where the order is genuine
ely one of discharge simpliciter
r. It
cannot, howeve
er, be invoked where the alle
eged misconduct is not merely
y a
circumstance inf
fluencing the employer's discreti
ion but constitutes the very basis
s of
MOHMED ATIK
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11
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
the decision to t
terminate. The present case, on t
the evidence noticed above, falls
s in
the latter catego
ry.
20. Fur
rthermore, the reliance upon Sh
her Singh’s case (supra) is equa
ally
misplaced. In th
his case, the Hon’ble Bench was
s concerned with the scope of R
Rule
12.21 of the Pun
njab Police Rules in relation to t
the discharge of a constable dur
ring
the prescribed p
period of enrolment, on an asses
ssment of whether he was likely
y to
prove an efficien
nt police officer. However, the p
plaintiff herein was appointed as
s an
SPO and, despit
te having been selected for appo
ointment as a Constable, was ne
ever
permitted to join
n that post. His discharge was f
from his existing engagement as
s an
SPO, thus the sa
aid case does not advance the cas
se of the appellant.
21. The
e contention raised on behalf of
f the appellants that the antecede
ents
of the plaintiff w
were relevant for determining h
his suitability for appointment a
as a
Constable, relyi
ing upon Sushil Kumar’s case
(supra) also does not find me
erit.
Though in the
present case also, the plaintif
ff was ultimately acquitted in
the
criminal proceed
dings vide order dated 05.01.200
01(Ex. P-31), however, no evide
nce
whatsoever has
been brought on record to show
w any adverse material regarding
the
antecedents of t
the plaintiff. Even the character
r verification report (Ex. D-2) d
does
not record any a
adverse antecedent except the re
egistration of the aforesaid crimi
inal
case. Further, th
he order of discharge was pass
ed pursuant to the communicat
tion
referring to the
registration of the criminal case
e against the plaintiff. Neverthele
ess,
the fact remain
ns that once the discharge w
was founded upon allegations
of
misconduct, the
e same could not have been effe
ected without issuing a show-ca
ause
notice and afford
ding an opportunity of hearing to
o the plaintiff.
22. In
view of the foregoing discuss
sion, this Court is of the hum
mble
opinion, that the
e learned First Appellate Court af
fter considering the communicat
tion
MOHMED ATIK
2026.09.14 18:16
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
12
09 (O&M)
RSA No.4599 of 200
dated 21.09.200
00, the discharge order dated 06.
.10.2000 and the statement of D
DW-
2, rightly record
ded that the discharge was punitiv
ve in nature and the same could
not
have been effect
ted without issuing show cause n
notice and affording opportunity
y of
hearing. Thus, f
finding no illegality or perversi
ity in the decision rendered by
the
First Appellate C
Court, the judgment and decree
dated 09.06.2009 is upheld and
the
present appeal is
s hereby dismissed.
23. Pen
nding misc. application(s), if any
y, also stands disposed of.
(HARKESH MANUJA)
JUDGE
2026
September 14, 2
Atik
ether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
ether reportable Yes/No
Whe
Whe
MOHMED ATIK
2026.09.14 18:16
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document