Punjab State Warehousing Corporation Chandigarh And Ors vs Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda And Anr

CWP-6239-2020 (O&M) -1-
241
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP-6239-2020 (O&M)
Date of decision: November 04, 2026
PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION CHANDIGARH
AND ORS
...Petitioners
Versus
PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BATHINDA AND
ANR
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Sarthak Gupta, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Rajesh Hooda, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel)
for respondent No.2-workman.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner-Corporation has invoked the jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the
award dated 18.09.2019 (Annexure P-1), passed by respondent No.1 in
Reference No.46 of 2013, whereby the reference was decided in favour of
respondent No.2-workman and the petitioner-Corporation was directed to
reinstate him with continuity of service and 25% back wages.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-management
contends that the impugned award proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of
the nature of the workman's appointment and the documentary material
available on record. It is submitted that the workman was appointed as a
helper vide office order dated 07.01.2000 (Annexure P-5) (Ex. M-37 before
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the learned Tribunal) on a contractual basis for a period of three months at a

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consolidated salary of Rs.2,620/- per month. His appointment was governed
by the terms contained in the office order, which expressly stipulated that his
services were liable to be terminated at any time without notice or assigning
any cause. The workman, therefore, could not claim continuation in service
as a matter of right beyond the period for which he had been engaged.
3. It is further contended that the workman's engagement was not
uninterrupted in the manner asserted by him. He was engaged on contractual
terms, with the duration of engagement being governed by the relevant
office orders. The mere fact that he had rendered service for a period
exceeding 240 days could not, by itself, conclude the controversy. It is
submitted that where employment comes to an end in circumstances falling
within the exception contemplated under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), such cessation
would not constitute retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of
the Act and the requirements of Section 25-F would consequently not be
attracted.
4. Learned counsel further submits that the industrial dispute was
raised after an unexplained delay of nearly 12 years. The workman's services
came to an end in November 2000, whereas the demand notice was issued
only on 25.10.2012. The learned Tribunal, it is contended, failed to
appreciate the legal consequences of such inordinate delay.
5. Reliance has also been placed upon Prabhakar v. Joint
Director, Sericulture Department and Another, SLP (C) No.27080 of 2015,
decided on 07.09.2015, and Narain Dutt v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, Ambala and others, LPA-1475-2018 (O&M), decided on 11.12.2018.
It is submitted that although no specific period of limitation is prescribed
under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1), the appropriate
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Government is required to consider whether the dispute continues to be alive
and whether it is expedient to make a reference. The impugned award,
therefore, cannot be sustained in the absence of a proper consideration of the
contractual terms governing the engagement and the unexplained delay in
raising the industrial dispute.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2-
workman supports the impugned award. It is submitted that the workman
was appointed as a helper on 18.09.1997 and continued to discharge his
duties with the petitioner-Corporation until November 2000. Although his
appointment was described as contractual, he was repeatedly continued in
service over a period of time. It is, therefore, contended that the actual nature
and continuity of employment, rather than the description given to it in the
appointment documents, must govern the determination.
7. Learned counsel further submits that the workman had
completed more than 240 days of service during the twelve months
preceding cessation of his employment. Despite this, his services were
brought to an end without compliance with Section 25-F of the Act. No
notice or wages in lieu thereof were given, nor was retrenchment
compensation paid. It is argued that the management cannot avoid these
mandatory requirements merely by describing the engagement as
contractual. The workman had also specifically pleaded that persons junior
to him were retained and fresh appointments were made thereafter, thereby
attracting Section 25-G of the Act. It is accordingly submitted that the
finding of the learned Tribunal regarding non-compliance with Section 25-F
of the Act is justified and that the award granting reinstatement with
continuity of service and 25% back wages does not call for interference.
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8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant material on record.
9. The principal questions which arise for consideration are
whether the learned Tribunal correctly applied the provisions of Sections
2(oo)(bb) and 25-F of the Act while holding the cessation of the workman's
services to be illegal and whether the industrial dispute, raised after an
unexplained lapse of nearly 12 years, could still be treated as a live dispute
warranting the grant of relief.
10. The impugned award proceeds on the premise that since the
workman had completed more than 240 days of service, his services could
not have been brought to an end without compliance with Section 25-F of
the Act. The learned Tribunal also placed considerable reliance upon the
admission of the management witness regarding the period of service and
the absence of notice, charge-sheet or enquiry. However, the question
whether cessation of the workman's services constituted retrenchment within
the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act necessarily required consideration of
the exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb).
11. In this regard, the management had specifically relied upon the
office orders governing the workman's engagement, particularly the order
dated 07.01.2000 (Ex. M-37), stipulating a contractual engagement for three
months and containing a condition regarding cessation of services. The
learned Tribunal was, therefore, required to determine the legal effect of the
contractual stipulations in the context of the workman's successive
engagements and the circumstances in which his services actually came to
an end. The completion of 240 days, though relevant, could not by itself
conclude the question of retrenchment without examining whether the
cessation fell within the statutory exception.
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12. It is equally true that the mere description of an appointment as
contractual would not automatically attract Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. The
genuineness of the fixed-term engagement and the circumstances
surrounding cessation have to be considered. In Haryana State Electronics
Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni, (2006) 9 SCC 434, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court considered the applicability of the aforesaid provision in the
context of contractual employment. The legal position requires examination
of the nature of the engagement and the circumstances in which the services
came to an end, rather than treating the contractual stipulation or the
completion of 240 days as conclusive in isolation.
13. Similarly, in Satish Kumar v. Haryana State and another,
LPA-2927-2025 (O&M), decided on 21.09.2026, the Division Bench
considered the cessation of a contractual engagement in the context of
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. The decision reiterates the relevance of the
contractual terms governing a fixed-term engagement and the circumstances
in which such engagement comes to an end. The applicability of the said
principle, however, has to be determined with reference to the material on
record in each case.
14. In the present case, the difficulty with the impugned award is
that the finding of illegal retrenchment has been returned without an
adequate determination of the applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act,
despite the contractual documents being part of the record. The admission
regarding completion of 240 days and absence of notice or compensation
could not, by themselves, dispense with the necessity of determining
whether the cessation amounted to retrenchment in the first place. The
statutory consequences under Section 25-F could follow only after such
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determination. The approach adopted by the learned Tribunal, therefore,
suffers from a material error in the application of the statutory provisions.
15. The other aspect which requires consideration is the inordinate
delay in raising the industrial dispute. The workman initially pleaded that his
services had been terminated on 16.08.2000, though he admitted in his
cross-examination that he continued to work till 10.11.2000. The demand
notice was issued only on 25.10.2012, after a lapse of nearly 12 years. The
reference was thereafter received by the learned Tribunal on 22.03.2013.
16. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others,
(2000) 2 SCC 455, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the absence of a
prescribed period of limitation under the Act does not confer an unrestricted
power to revive disputes which have become stale. The question whether a
dispute continues to remain alive has to be examined in the facts and
circumstances of each case.
17. The aforesaid principle was considered in detail in Prabhakar v.
Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another (supra), wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that merely because no specific period of
limitation is prescribed under the Act, an industrial dispute cannot be raised
at any point of time irrespective of the circumstances. The explanation for
the delay, the conduct of the parties and the existence of circumstances
demonstrating that the dispute continued to remain alive are relevant
considerations.
18. In the present case, the learned Tribunal rejected the objection
regarding delay substantially on the ground that no specific period of
limitation had been prescribed under the Act. However, the workman
admitted in his cross-examination that after cessation of his services, he had
not submitted any application or representation to the senior officers of the
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management seeking reinstatement. No satisfactory explanation for the
prolonged interval of nearly 12 years is borne out from the material
considered in the award. In these circumstances, the absence of a prescribed
period of limitation could not, by itself, furnish a sufficient ground to
entertain the dispute without examining whether it had continued to remain
alive.
19. The mere fact that the appropriate Government subsequently
made a reference under Section 10 of the Act would not, by itself, conclude
the question of delay or revive a dispute which had become stale. The
learned Tribunal was required to examine the objection in the light of the
principles laid down in Nedungadi Bank and Prabhakar (supra). Its
approach, treating the absence of a prescribed limitation period as sufficient
to overcome the unexplained delay, is contrary to the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
20. This Court is conscious that the jurisdiction exercised under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature and
that interference with an award of the Industrial Tribunal is not warranted
merely because another view of the evidence is possible. However, where
the award proceeds on an erroneous application of the statutory provisions or
adopts a legally impermissible approach to a material issue governing the
rights of the parties, interference in supervisory jurisdiction is justified.
21. In the present case, the impugned award suffers from material
errors of law on both counts. The finding of illegal retrenchment has been
returned without adequately determining the applicability of the exception
under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, while the objection regarding delay has
been rejected without examining whether the dispute continued to remain
alive despite the unexplained lapse of nearly 12 years. These are not merely
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matters of an alternative appreciation of evidence but go to the legal basis on
which the reference has been answered in favour of the workman. The
award, therefore, cannot be sustained in the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
22. For the foregoing reasons, the present writ petition is allowed.
23. The award dated 18.09.2019 passed by the Industrial Tribunal,
Bathinda, is set aside.
24. All pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
November 04, 2026 JUDGE
Ithlesh
Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
ITHLESH KUMAR
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order/judgment