LAL SINGH through Lrs. Ram Piari vs MULAKH RAJ deceased through Lrs. Purshotam Lal

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 132 of 2006
Reserved on: 19.9.2026
Date of Decision: 01.10.2026
Lal Singh (deceased) through LRs & ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Mulakh Raj (deceased) through LRs & ors. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Appellants : Ms Radhika Gautam, Advocate
(through video-conferencing)
and Mr Jai Ram Sharma,
Advocate (present in person in
the Court).
For Respondents No.1(a)
to 1(e).
: Mr Mohinder Verma, Advocate.
Respondents No.2(a) to 2(f) and 3 to 6 proceeded ex parte.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
and decree dated 15.12.2005, passed by learned Additional
District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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First Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree dated
3.5.2001, passed by learned Sub-Judge-II, Nurpur, District
Kangra (learned Trial Court), were set aside. (The parties shall
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned
Trial Court for seeking possession of the suit land mentioned in
the head note and para-1 of the plaint. It was asserted that the
suit land is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs and was
entered in their ownership and possession before the settlement.
The defendant encroached upon part of the suit land in the last
week of July 1985 and constructed a structure/abadi on the suit
land. The plaintiffs asked him to remove the encroachment. The
defendant assured that he would vacate the suit land if any
encroachment was detected during the settlement; however, he
failed to adhere to his promise and got his name recorded in the
revenue record as kabij. Hence, the suit was filed for seeking the
relief mentioned above.
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3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement
taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability
and cause of action, the plaintiffs being estopped by their act and
conduct from filing the suit, the suit being bad for non-joinder of
necessary parties, and the plaintiffs having acquiesced by their
act and conduct to the acts of the defendant. The contents of the
plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that the defendant
came to India after partition in 1947. He was poor and had no
money to purchase the land. He resided with Sarnu for some
time. Sarnu made an oral gift/donation of the suit land to the
defendant somewhere in the year 1949. The defendant started
cultivating the suit land and raised construction upon part of it.
Rooms were added to the original construction from time to time.
Purshotam and Kuldeep Chand, sons of the defendant, also raised
construction on the suit land. The construction was also
electrified. No protest was raised by any person. The defendant
also raised an orchard of different fruit-bearing trees. The
possession of the defendant is open, continuous, and peaceful, to
the knowledge of the plaintiffs and their predecessors, and he
has become the owner by way of adverse possession. The suit has
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been filed without any basis; hence, it was prayed that the suit be
dismissed.
4. No replication was filed.
5. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues
on 22.12.1998: -
(1) Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the suit land?
OPP.
(2) If Issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiffs are
entitled for possession of the suit land? OPP.
(3) Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD.
(4) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and
conduct from filing the present suit? OPD.
(5) Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file
the present suit? OPD.
(6) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary
parties? OPD.
(7) Whether the plaintiffs have acquised on account of
the defendant, as alleged? OPD.
(8) Whether the defendant has become owner of the
suit land by way of adverse possession, as alleged?
OPD.
(9) Relief.
6. The parties were called upon to produce their
evidence. The plaintiffs examined plaintiff No. 1 Lal Singh (PW-1)
and Jagdish Raj (PW-2). The defendant examined himself (DW-
1), Khazan Singh (DW-2), Prakash Chand (DW-3), Hukmi Ram
(DW-4), and Raj Kumar (DW-5).
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7. The learned Trial Court held that the defendant had
installed an electricity meter in his residential house in the year
1975. The plaintiffs’ witness also admitted that he had seen the
defendant in possession for more than 22 years. The house tax
was being paid by the defendant from the year 1973–74. All these
circumstances made the plaintiffs’ version regarding their being
in possession before the settlement and the defendant taking
possession in 1985 highly doubtful. The plaintiffs had permitted
the defendant and his sons to raise construction by spending
huge amounts of money and had not protested; therefore, they
were estopped from claiming possession of the constructed
portion. The plea taken by the defendant that he had become
owner by way of adverse possession was not proved. Hence, the
learned Trial Court answered Issue Nos. 1, 4, and 7 in affirmative,
Issue No. 2 partly in affirmative, Issue Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 8 in
negative, and partly decreed the suit. The plaintiffs were held
entitled to the vacant portion of the suit land, but not entitled to
the portion under the construction of the defendant. The
defendant was directed to deposit the average market value of the
portion over which he had raised construction.
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8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed
by the learned Trial Court, the defendant filed an appeal, which
was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track
Court, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned First Appellate Court).
The learned Appellate Court held that the defendant had got his
house electrified, and he was paying the house tax to the Gram
Panchayat. The defendant had not examined the legal heirs of
Sarnu or produced any document to establish the gift deed. The
defendant had openly asserted himself to be the owner and had
acted in his capacity as the owner. No objection was raised by the
plaintiffs to the acts of the defendant. The plea taken by the
defendant that he had become the owner of the suit land by
adverse possession was duly proved. Learned Trial Court erred in
delivering possession to the plaintiffs. Hence, the appeal filed by
the defendant was allowed, and the judgment and decree passed
by the learned Trial Court were set aside.
9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed
by the learned First Appellate Court, the plaintiffs have filed the
present appeal, which was admitted on 27.3.2006 on the
following substantial question of law:
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(i) Whether the First Appellate Court erred in holding
the respondent to be in adverse possession of the
suit land when the entire case of the respondent was
that he was in possession of the suit land under a
gift from one Sarnu?
10. I have heard Ms Radhika Gautam, learned counsel
appearing through video conferencing, and Mr Jai Ram Sharma,
learned counsel appearing in the Court for the
appellant/plaintiffs, and Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel
for respondents No. 1(a) to 1(e).
11. Ms Radhika Gautam, learned counsel for the
appellants/plaintiffs, submitted that the necessary ingredients of
adverse possession were not satisfied. The defendant never
acknowledged the title of the plaintiffs, which is a necessary
condition to claim adverse possession. The possession, however
long, cannot amount to adverse possession, and the learned
Appellate Court conflated long possession and adverse
possession. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be
allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Appellate Court be set aside. She relied upon the judgment of this
Court in Pritu alias Pritam Singh v. Balwant Singh,
2023:HHC:20655 , in support of her submissions.
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12. Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for respondents
No. 1(a) to 1(e), submitted that the suit was barred by limitation.
It has been held by both the learned Courts below that the plea
taken by the plaintiffs that the defendant had encroached upon
the suit land during the settlement in the year 1985 was not
proved on record. The possession was taken before 1985, and the
suit was filed on 24.4.1996; hence, it was hopelessly barred by
limitation. He prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He
relied upon the judgments in Ramiah Vs. N. Narayana Reddy
(dead) by LRs 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 835 and R. Nagaraj (dead)
through LRs and anr. Vs. Rajmani & ors. 2025 INSC 478 in support
of his submissions.
13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
Substantial Question of Law:
14. The defendant Mulakh Raj (DW-1) stated that he
resided with Sarnu for one and a half years. Sarnu did not have
any sons. Sarnu gifted the suit land to the defendant for
constructing a house. The defendant constructed a house and
planted fruit-bearing trees over the suit land. The house was
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electrified in the year 1975. Two other houses were constructed
by his sons, Purshotam Lal and Kuldeep. Sarnu, or the plaintiffs,
never objected to the construction of the house. The defendant
had become the owner by way of adverse possession.
15. The plaintiff Lal Singh admitted in his cross-
examination that the defendant does not have any other house
except the house located on the suit land, the village was
electrified in the year 1975, and the defendant had obtained the
electricity connection. Thus, the defendant’s version that the
house was electrified in the year 1975 is duly proved by the
admission of the plaintiffs.
16. Hukmi Ram, Clerk (DW-4), proved the application
filed by the defendant for electricity connection on 4.12.1973. The
meter was installed on 18.9.1975. His statement corroborates the
defendant’s statement and the admission made by the plaintiff
that the defendant’s house was electrified in the year 1975.
17. The plaintiff, Lal Singh, admitted in his cross-
examination that the defendant was paying chulla tax to the
Gram Panchayat. Raj Kumar (DW-5) stated that as per the house
tax register for the year 1973–74, the name of the defendant was
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recorded at serial number 141. The defendant used to pay the
house tax. He proved the receipts on record. His statement,
coupled with the admission made by the plaintiff in the cross-
examination that the defendant was paying chulla tax to the
Gram Panchayat, shows that the defendant has been in
possession since the year 1973–74.
18. Jagdish Chand (PW-2) stated that the suit land was
earlier in possession of the plaintiffs and now it is in possession
of the defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had
forcibly encroached upon the suit land, but he could not say
anything about it. He had seen the defendant to be in possession
for 22 years when he had attained the age of discretion. He made
the statement in the year 2000, which means that according to
him, the defendant has been in possession since the year 1978.
His statement is also as per the record wherein the defendant has
been shown to be paying house tax since 1973, applying for
electrification of the house in the year 1973, and getting the
electricity connection in the year 1975.
19. The statement of Jagdish Chand is binding upon the
plaintiffs because he was put forward as a witness of truth by the
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plaintiffs. The testimony of Jagdish Chand and the record falsify
the plea taken by the plaintiffs in para-2 of the plaint that they
remained in possession till Rabi 1985 and the defendant had
taken possession in the year 1985.
20. The plea taken by the defendant that he was put in
possession by Sarnu and he had immediately constructed a house
thereafter is not supported by any material on record. Learned
Courts below had rightly held that the defendant had not
examined any legal heir of Sarnu to prove that Sarnu had gifted
the land to the defendant. Khazan Singh (DW-2) stated that he
had been seeing the defendant to be in possession since 1969. His
testimony does not establish that the defendant has been in
possession since the year 1949.
21. Prakash Chand (DW-3) stated that he knew the
parties, Mulkh Raj and Sarnu. He had performed the ceremonies
of the gift in the year 1957–58, and the land was gifted to the
defendant Mulkh Raj. The testimony of this witness is contrary to
the defendant’s version asserted in para-3 of the written
statement that the oral gift/donation was made in the year 1949.
Hence, no reliance can be placed upon his testimony.
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22. The revenue record also does not support the
defendant's version. The copy of Jamabandi for the year 1942–43
(Ex. D-1) shows Sarnu to be the co-owner in possession of
Khasra No. 695. He is recorded to be the owner of Khasra Nos.
697 and 698, but Gulab Deen is shown to be in possession of
these Khasra numbers. The copy of Misal Haquiat 1970–71 (Ex.
D-2) shows that Khasra Nos. 695, 696, 697, and 698 were
converted into Khasra No. 585, and the plaintiffs are recorded to
be the owners in possession of the suit land. Sarnu was not in
possession of Khasra Nos. 697 and 698 as per the copy of Misal
Haquiat for the year 1942–43 and could not have gifted it to the
defendant. Further, the name of the defendant was not recorded
in any of the Jamabandis before 1985–86, and the revenue record
does not support the defendant’s claim that he remained in
possession of the suit land. The entries in the copy of Jamabandi
carry with them a presumption of correctness, and the burden is
upon the defendant to rebut the presumption. The oral evidence
of the defendant does not prove that he has remained in
possession of the suit land since 1949.
23. The copy of Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadeed (Ex. P-1)
mentions that the name of the defendant was recorded as per the
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nd
order passed by the learned AC 2 Grade in File No. 12 of 1986,
decided on 6.1.1986. Therefore, the entry of the name of the
defendant as in possession was pursuant to the order passed by
nd
the learned AC 2 Grade. The defendant has not produced a copy
nd
of the application filed before the learned AC 2 Grade to
establish that he had asserted a claim to the suit land as a donee
since 1949. This was significant because this was the first time
that he had asserted his claim on the suit land, and it is essential
to know what exactly was said by the defendant before the
revenue authorities.
24. The learned Appellate Court held that the possession
of the defendant is long and it could be inferred that he was in
possession since 1949. The plaintiffs had not objected to the
possession, and the defendant’s claim that he was in adverse
possession has to be accepted as correct. It was rightly submitted
on behalf of the plaintiffs that the learned Appellate Court had
conflated long possession and adverse possession. It was laid
down by this Court in Tilak Raj vs. Bhagat Ram & another, 1997 (1)
Sim.LC 281 that adverse possession means a possession expressly
or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner, and long
possession does not mean adverse possession. It was observed: -
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“11. It is well settled that adverse possession means a
hostile assertion, that is, a possession which is expressly
or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner.
12. It is also well settled that a person who bases his title
on adverse possession must plead and prove by clear and
unequivocal evidence that the possession was hostile to
the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the
property claimed. In deciding whether the acts of the
defendant constitute adverse possession, regard has to be
had to the animus of such defendant which has to be
ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case.
13. It is equally well settled that mere possession for
howsoever long a period is not enough to claim title
inasmuch as the possession has to be adverse.”
25. Similarly, it was held in Shishi Ram v. Megh Chand,
2012 SCC OnLine HP 5133= AIR 2013 HP 65 , that long possession is
not adverse possession and adverse possession means hostile
possession expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true
owner. It was observed:
“12. It is settled law that mere possession, however long, does
not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse
possession really means hostile possession which is expressly or
impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner, and in order to
constitute adverse possession, the possession/ roved must be
adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent so as to show that
it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of
acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such
possession in denial of the true owner's must be peaceful, open
and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile
enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in
the property, though it is not necessary that there should be
evidence of the adverse possession actually informing the real
owner of the former's hostile action.”
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26. This position was reiterated in Mast Ram v. Tejinder
Singh, 2018 SCC OnLine HP 2573 = 2018 (2) Latest HLJ 1364 (H.P)
and it was held that mere long possession is not an adverse
possession. It was observed: -
25. It would be noticed that no exact date of possession has
been set out in the pleadings. As per settled law, mere
possession is not enough to prove the plea of adverse
possession, and it does not result in the conversion of
peaceful possession into adverse possession.
26. This issue has been considered in detail by the learned
Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 306 of 2016, titled
Satpal v. State of H.P., decided on 08.08.2016 , wherein it was
observed as under: -
"22. Moreover, the plea of adverse possession as
raised by the petitioner is absolutely vague as the
petitioner has not cared to mention the date from
which his possession in fact became adverse. This
question assumes importance as the petitioner
initially had set up a lawful title in himself.
23. In Kamla and others v. Baldev Singh and others
2008(1) Shim. LC 215 , this court has held as under:
"......Moreover, in case the defendant or his
father were in possession of the suit land as
owner and the possession was never taken by
the plaintiffs in pursuance of the decree, they
can be said to be in possession as owner, but
they cannot be treated to be in adverse
possession of the suit land in any manner. The
learned trial Court has not given its findings
that the defendant or his father continued to
be the owner of the suit land even after
passing of the decree since the decree was
never executed, but has given the findings in
the alternative that the defendant has become
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owner by way of adverse possession. This plea
was taken by the defendant in the alternative,
but he never pleaded as to from which date his
permissive possession as owner became
adverse to the true owners, i.e., the plaintiffs
and what overt act was done by him to show
his hostile title to the suit land. There were no
allegations as to when the possession became
adverse, in which year or month or in what
manner and the simple general allegation
made by the defendant in the alternative were
accepted by the trial Court without looking
into the question that the original possession
of the defendant over the suit land or that of
his father was permissive being an owner and
it never became adverse as against the true
owner and if it became adverse in what
manner and from which date, month or year.
The permissive possession as the owner does
not itself become adverse as against the true
owner until and unless some overt act is done
by the defendant to show his hostile title
towards the true owner, which pleadings were
very much lacking in the written statement
and as such, the defendant was never proved
to be in adverse possession of the suit land as
owner. Those findings were rightly reversed
by the learned First Appellate Court, and the
learned First Appellate Court had rightly
observed that there was a complete lack of
animus on the part of the defendant to hold
the suit land adversely to the plaintiffs. It was
also observed that it has also not been shown
as to what time possession of the defendant
became hostile to that of the plaintiffs, which
had ripened into ownership. To my mind,
there was nothing for the trial Court to
conclude that the defendant has become
owner by way of adverse possession in the
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absence of specific pleadings or proof and,
therefore, the learned first appellate Court had
come to the right conclusion in reversing the
findings under Issue No. 1 in regard to the plea
of adverse possession. Once the defendant had
failed to prove adverse possession over the
suit land, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that the plaintiffs were entitled to the
relief of possession and it was rightly given by
the first appellate Court."
24. This court in Brij Mohan Sood v. Parshotam Singh
and others, 2014(1) Him. L.R. 556 , has held as
follows:-
"11. Adverse possession is a hostile possession
by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of
the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled
principle that a party claiming adverse
possession must prove that his possession is "
nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", i.e. peaceful,
open and continuous. The possession must be
adequate in continuity, in publicity and in
extent to show that their possession is adverse
to the true owner. It must start with a
wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner
and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and
continued over the statutory period.
Therefore, a person who claims adverse
possession has to show (a) on what date he
came into possession; (b) what was the nature
of his possession; (c) whether the factum of
possession was known to the other party ; (d)
how long his possession is continued; and (e)
his possession was open and undisturbed. It
has to be remembered that the person
pleading adverse possession has no equity in
his favour since he is trying to defeat the right
of the true owner; therefore, it is for him to
clearly plead and establish all facts necessary
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to establish his adverse possession (Refer Dr
Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma
(Smt.) and others (1996) 8 SCC 128 ).
12. Having observed so, it is clear from the
pleadings of the defendant that he has failed
to plead the essential ingredients of adverse
possession. In the absence of the essential
ingredients of adverse possession, no amount
of evidence can be looked into by this Court.
Even otherwise, the defendant has set up a
title in himself and has not acknowledged or
attorned the plaintiffs to be the owners. Apart
from preliminary objection No.1 (supra), in
paragraph3 of the preliminary objection, the
defendant has made the following averments:
"The plaintiffs are not the owners of the
land; rather the defendants are its
owners and the plaintiffs have got no
locus standi to file the suit."
Throughout the written statement, the
defendants have claimed themselves to
be the owners of the suit property, and
thus the plea of adverse possession is
not available to them. "
25. This Court further, in Deepak Parkash v. Sunil
Kumar 2014 (1) Him. L.R. 654 has emphasised the
requirement of the law of pleading the exact date
from which the possession became adverse, in the
following terms:
"14. It appears that the learned lower
Appellate Court completely ignored the
pleadings of the parties or else the judgment
and decree passed by the learned trial Court on
the basis of such pleadings would not have
been disturbed much less reversed. A perusal
of the written statement would show that
pleadings with regard to adverse possession
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were not only deficient but, in fact, did not
meet the requirement of law. The defendant
even failed to specify the definite date on
which his possession became adverse.
16. Faced with such a situation, learned
counsel for the respondent/defendant would
contend that he had led sufficient evidence to
prove his plea of adverse possession. I am
afraid that I cannot agree with the
submissions made by learned counsel for the
respondent/defendant.
17. It is a settled law that no amount of
evidence beyond pleadings can be looked into.
It is further the well-settled principle of law
that the evidence adduced beyond the
pleadings would not be admissible nor can any
evidence be permitted to be adduced which is
at variance with the pleadings. The Court at
the later stage of the trial, as also the
Appellate Court, having regard to the rule of
pleading, would be entitled to reject the
evidence wherefore there does not exist any
pleading."
26. In Om Parkash&ors. v. Gian Chand &Ors. 2014(2)
Him. L.R. 1071, one of us (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J)
dealt in detail with the question of adverse
possession, particularly when the defendant therein
had not spelt out any specific date from which his
possession became adverse, and it was observed as
follows:-
"11. Therefore, the moot question is as to
whether the pleadings set out by the
defendants can meet the requirements of the
law or not. This question assumes importance
because admittedly, the defendants have not
spelt out any specific date from which their
possession became adverse."
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27. What is adverse possession has been dealt with in
detail in Para 10 of Satpal's case supra , which reads thus:
"10. Now, adverting to the question of adverse
possession, it is a well-recognised proposition in
law that mere possession, however long, does not
necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner.
Adverse possession really means the hostile
possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial
of the title of the true owner and, in order to
constitute adverse possession, the possession
proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity
and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the
true owner. The classical requirements of
acquisition of title by adverse possession are that
such possession in denial of the true owner's title
must be peaceful, open and continuous. It is equally
settled that a person pleading adverse possession
has no equities in his favour, and since such a
person is trying to defeat the rights of the true
owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish the
necessary facts to establish his adverse possession.
In the eyes of the law, an owner would be deemed to
be in possession of the property so long as there is
no intrusion. Even non-use of the property by the
owner for a long time won't affect his title."
27. A similar view was taken by this Court in Pritu alias
Pritam Singh v. Balwant Singh, 2023:HHC:20655, wherein it was
observed:-
33. Animus possidendi, as is well known, is a requisite
ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does
not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds
property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said
purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is
required to establish the date on which he came in
possession, nature of possession, the factum of
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possession, knowledge of the true owner, duration of
possession and that possession was open and undisturbed.
A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in
his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true
owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and
establish all facts necessary to establish adverse
possession. The courts always take an unkind view
towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights.
Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but
a blended one of fact and law.
xxxx
34. Therefore, in order to acquire title by way of adverse
possession, a party is required to plead, prove and place on
record showing particulars, date, month and year when
the adverse possession commenced and remained
peaceful, and is continuous to the knowledge of the true
owner. In the instant case, the pleadings and proof qua
that aspect is totally missing and perusal of the written
statement as filed by defendants No. 1 to 4 only states that
defendants No. 1 to 4 being vendees of the land are in
possession of 5 Bighas 1 Biswa of the land for the last 53
years. The possession of the defendants No. 1 to 4 of the
land is open, peaceful and uninterrupted for the last about
53 years and the said hostile possession of defendants No.
1 to 4 has ripened into ownership by way of adverse
possession. Neither is there any averment about the date
or month or the year, and all the ingredients as laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments
are lacking in the pleadings.
28. This position was reiterated in Bhag Singh v. Basant
Kaur, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1822 wherein it was observed:
30. It is equally significant that neither the pleadings nor
the evidence disclose the point in time at which the
appellants' possession allegedly became hostile to the true
owners. There is no pleading identifying the date from
which the title of the recorded proprietors was openly
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repudiated, nor is there evidence demonstrating any overt
act by which such hostility was asserted to the knowledge
of the true owners. The absence of these foundational
pleadings is not a mere technical defect. They constitute
the very basis upon which a plea of adverse possession
rests. Unless the commencement of hostile possession is
pleaded and proved, the statutory period prescribed under
the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot even begin to run.
31. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court appear to
have equated long and uninterrupted possession with
adverse possession. Such an approach, with respect,
overlooks the settled distinction between the two
concepts. Long possession may furnish evidence of
physical occupation; however it does not, by itself,
establish that such possession was adverse in law. The
doctrine of adverse possession does not reward longevity
of occupation alone. It protects only such possession as is
accompanied by a conscious and hostile assertion of
ownership in denial of the rights of the true owner. Unless
the element of hostility is affirmatively established, the
plea must necessarily fail. [See: Government of Kerala v.

Joseph (2023) 17 SCC 400 at Para 35, 47 to 54 ]
29. In the present case, there is no evidence that the
defendant had ever asserted his title in denial of the real owner.
He has not produced the copy of the application filed by him
before the revenue authorities to establish that he had claimed
his possession to be in denial of the real owners. Thus, the
learned Appellate Court had no material to conclude that the
defendant’s possession was adverse to the real owner, and the
learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the defendant had
become the owner by way of adverse possession.
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30. It was submitted that the suit was not within
limitation and the learned Trial Court erred in decreeing it. This
submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by this Court in
Tilak Raj vs. Bhagat Ram & Another, 1997 (1) Sim. LC 281 that a suit
based on the title where a plea of adverse possession had not
been raised could not be barred by limitation on the ground that
it was filed after more than 12 years from the date of
dispossession. It was observed:-
“ 10. The present suit is for possession on the basis of
title. Article 63, Limitation Act, 1963, governs the
present case. It provides that for possession of
immovable property or any interest therein based on
the title, the limitation of twelve years begins to run
from the date the defendant's interest becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.
11. It is well settled that adverse possession means a
hostile assertion, that is, a possession which is
expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true
owner.
12. It is also well settled that a person who bases his
title on adverse possession must plead and prove by
clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession
was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial
of his title to the property claimed. In deciding
whether the acts of the defendant constitute adverse
possession, regard has to be had to the animus of such
defendant which has to be ascertained from the facts
and circumstances of each case.
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13. It is equally well settled that mere possession for
howsoever long a period is not enough to claim title,
in as much as the possession has to be adverse.
14. In Liaq Mohammad v D. D. A. and others, AIR 1994
NOC (Delhi) 35 , it has been held that a suit for
possession based on the title, where a plea of adverse
possession has been raised, would not be barred by
limitation on the ground that it has been filed after the
expiry of twelve years from the date of dispossession.
15. Equally, it can be said that once the defendant has
failed to establish his adverse possession for the
statutory period, a suit for possession based on title
cannot be dismissed as being time-barred on the
ground that the same was filed after the expiry of
twelve years from the date of dispossession .”
31. Similarly, it was held in Indira v. Arumugam, (1998) 1
SCC 614 that a suit based on the title cannot be defeated on the
ground of limitation unless the plea of adverse possession is
established. It was observed: -
4. The aforesaid reasoning of the learned Judge, with
“
respect, cannot be sustained as it proceeds on the
assumption as if old Article 142 of the earlier
Limitation Act was in force wherein the plaintiff who
based his case on the title had to prove not only the
title but also possession within 12 years of the date of
the suit. The said provision of law has undergone a
metamorphic sea change as we find under the
Limitation Act, 1963, Article 65, which reads as under:
Description of
the suit:- For
possession of
immovable
property or any
interest therein
Period of
limitation:-
Twelve years
Time from
which period
begins to run:-
When the
possession of
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based on the
title
the defendant
becomes
adverse to the
plaintiff.
5. It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based
on the title for possession, once the title is established
on the basis of relevant documents and other
evidence, unless the defendant proves adverse
possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff
cannot be non-suited. Unfortunately, this aspect of
the matter was missed by the learned Judge and,
therefore, the entire reasoning for disposing of the
Second Appeal has been vitiated. Only on that short
ground and without expressing any opinion on the
merits of the question of law framed by the learned
Judge for disposing of the Second Appeal, this appeal
is allowed.
”
32. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Shishi Ram v.
Megh Chand, 2012 SCC OnLine HP 5133 = AIR 2013 HP 65 , wherein
it was held: -
“ 12. It is settled law that mere possession, however
long, does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to
the true owner. Adverse possession really means
hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in
denial of the title of the true owner, and in order to
constitute adverse possession, the possession/ roved
must be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent
so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The
classical requirements of acquisition of title by
adverse possession are that such possession in denial
of the true owner's must be peaceful, open and
continuous. The possession must be open and hostile
enough to be capable of being known by the parties
interested in the property, though it is not necessary
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that there should be evidence of the adverse
possession actually informing the real owner of the
former's hostile action.
…………………..
14. The learned first Appellate Court thus rightly
concluded that when the plaintiff had filed a suit for
possession based upon the title and the defendant had
taken a plea of adverse possession to defend his title,
in that eventuality of the defendant, 's failure to prove
his adverse possession, the suit filed by the plaintiff
could not have been dismissed on the ground that the
defendant failed to prove the possession within a
period of 12 years prior to the filing of the suit as held
by the Apex Court in Indira v. Arumugam AIR 1999 SC
1549 . ”
33. It was held in Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846 that earlier the plaintiff was required to
prove his possession within twelve years under Article 142 of the
Limitation Act 1908, but now the suit becomes barred by
limitation if the defendant proves adverse possession and the
suit is not filed within twelve years. It was observed:
“17. Article 65 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:
“Description
of suit
Period of
Limitation
Time from which period
begins to run
For possession
of immovable
property or
any interest
therein based
on title
Twelve
years
When the possession of
the defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff”
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From a plain reading of the said Article, it is made clear
that a suit filed for recovery of possession based on title
should be filed within a period of 12 years when possession
of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff
concerned.
18. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 corresponds to
Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, wherein it is stated
that the plaintiff who based his case on title has to prove
not only title, but also possession within 12 years of the
date of suit. The said Article has undergone a metamorphic
change in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The vital distinction between Article 142 of the Limitation
Act, 1908 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is that
as per Article 142 of the 1908 Act, the plaintiff has to prove
not only title, but also possession within 12 years of the
date of suit, whereas, as per Article 65 of the 1963 Act, a
suit for possession based on title has to be filed within 12
years when possession becomes adverse to the concerned
plaintiff.
34. In the present case, the defendant failed to prove
adverse possession, and a suit based on title cannot be said to be
barred by limitation.
35. In Ramiah (supra), it was held that a suit for
possession based on dispossession falls under Article 64 of the
Limitation Act, whereas a suit for possession based on title falls
under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, the
suit was not filed based on dispossession but was filed on title;
therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case.
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36. It was held in R. Nagaraj (supra) that the question of
limitation can be raised even though no such plea was taken
before the Trial Court. There can be no dispute with this
proposition of law; however, the question of limitation does not
arise in the present case, as noted above, and no advantage can
be derived from the cited judgment.
37. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court erred in
holding that the defendant was in adverse possession, and this
substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
Final order:
38. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed,
and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate
Court are ordered to be set aside, while those passed by the
learned Trial Court are ordered to be restored.
39. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed
of.
40. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down
forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
st
1 October, 2026
(Chander)
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