Premier Cables And Conductors Private Limited vs Capital Trade Links Ltd.

$~26
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 16.04.2026
+ O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 255/2024
PREMIER CABLES AND CONDUCTORS PRIVATE
LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Deepak Vohra and Mr.
Yuvv Wadhwa, Advocates.
versus

CAPITAL TRADE LINKS LTD. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Vijay Singh, Mr. Ashwini
Kumar and Mr. Shubh Goyai,
Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

JUDGMENT (ORAL)

1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 9 of the
1
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , seeking the following
reliefs:
“.....
a) pass an interim injunction in favour of the petitioner and against
the Respondent whereby directing the Respondent to deposit the
original loan agreement dated 08.07.2023 with the Registry or
any other responsible person / official as appointed by this
Hon'ble Court; and

b) Pass an interim injunction in favour of the Petitioner and against
the Respondent thereby directing the Respondent to not to act
upon or proceed in any manner arising out of or related to the
loan agreement dated 08.07.2023; and
c) Pass an interim injunction thereby directing the Respondents not
to assign or create any third party interest with respect to the
loan agreement dated 08.07.2023; and
d) Pass an ex parte ad interim order/s in terms of the reliefs "a" to

1
Act
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"c" hereinabove.
e) Any other and further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
and proper in the circumstances of the case be passed in favour
of the petitioner.”

2. At the outset, this Court takes note of the fact that the present
Petition has remained pending before this Court for a considerable
period of nearly twenty (20) months.
3. During the course of the hearing today, a specific query was put
to learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner as to whether any steps
had been taken towards the invocation or commencement of arbitral
proceedings in terms of the arbitration agreement between the parties.
In response thereto, learned counsel fairly submitted that no
instructions have been received indicating that any such steps have
been undertaken by the Petitioner till date.
4. At this stage, this Court deems it apposite to refer to Section 9
of the Act, which reads as follows:
“ 9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.- (1) A party may, before or
during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the
arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section
36, apply to a court-
(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of
unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the
following matters, namely:-
(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods
which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;
(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property
or thing which is the subject matter of the dispute in
arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein
and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any
person to enter upon any land or building in the possession
of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any
observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which
may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of
obtaining full information or evidence;
(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e)
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such other interim measure of protection as may appear to
the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall
have the same power for making orders as it has for the
purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.
(2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a
Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under
sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within
a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such
further time as the Court may determine.
(3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall
not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court
finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy
provided under section 17 efficacious.”


5. This Court further takes note of the submissions recorded in the
Order dated 25.02.2025, wherein learned counsel for the Petitioner
had stated before this Court that the Petitioner was in the process of
invoking arbitration.
6. However, despite the lapse of more than fourteen months since
the aforesaid statement was made, no material has been placed on
record to demonstrate that any concrete steps have thereafter been
taken towards the invocation of arbitration, issuance of notice under
Section 21 of the Act, constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or
commencement of arbitral proceedings. The position, therefore,
remains wholly stagnant.
7. In this backdrop, this Court is constrained to observe that a
petition under Section 9 of the Act cannot be permitted to remain
pending indefinitely, particularly when the Petitioner, despite availing
the jurisdiction of this Court, fails to exhibit any bona fide intention to
pursue the substantive arbitral remedy. The present Petition has
remained pending for nearly twenty months from the date of
institution, and yet no discernible progress has been made towards the
commencement of arbitration.
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8. It is well settled that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court
under Section 9 of the Act is ancillary, protective, and facilitative in
nature. It is not an independent or substantive remedy in itself, but one
intended to preserve the subject matter of disputes and protect the
efficacy of arbitral proceedings.
9. The very text of Section 9(1) makes it abundantly clear that
interim measures may be sought “ before or during arbitral
proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but
before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36 ”. Thus, where a
petition is instituted before commencement of arbitration, the
jurisdiction of the Court is necessarily premised upon the existence of
a genuine and manifest intention on the part of the applicant to refer
disputes to arbitration within a reasonable period of time.
10. The legislative object underlying Section 9 of the Act is not to
create a parallel or perpetual forum for litigants who seek, or profess
an intention to seek, interim orders while indefinitely postponing
recourse to arbitration. Petitions under the said provision cannot be
permitted to operate as instruments for securing tactical advantage, for
indefinitely continuing ad interim arrangements, or for burdening the
docket of Courts without any genuine pursuit of the principal remedy.
A petition under Section 9 of the Act can survive only as an adjunct to
arbitral proceedings, whether imminent, pending, or concluded but
awaiting enforcement. It cannot be allowed to subsist in isolation or
continue in perpetuity.
2
11. In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court categorically held that, though an application under

2
(1999) 2 SCC 479
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Section 9 of the Act may be maintainable even before issuance of
notice invoking arbitration, the applicant must nevertheless
demonstrate a manifest intention to commence arbitral proceedings.
The relevant portion of the said Judgement reads as under:
“ 19. When a party applies under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, it is
implicit that it accepts that there is a final and binding arbitration
agreement in existence. It is also implicit that a dispute must have
arisen which is referable to the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 9 further
contemplates arbitration proceedings taking place between the
parties. Mr. Subramanium is, therefore, right in submitting that
when an application under Section 9 is filed before the
commencement of the arbitral proceedings, there has to be
manifest intention on the part of the applicant to take recourse to
the arbitral proceedings if, at the time when the application under
Section 9 is filed, the proceedings have not commenced under
Section 21 of the 1996 Act. In order to give full effect to the words
“before or during arbitral proceedings” occurring in Section 9, it
would not be necessary that a notice invoking the arbitration clause
must be issued to the opposite party before an application under
Section 9 can be filed. The issuance of a notice may, in a given
case, be sufficient to establish the manifest intention to have the
dispute referred to an Arbitral Tribunal. But a situation may so
demand that a party may choose to apply under Section 9 for an
interim measure even before issuing a notice contemplated by
Section 21 of the said Act. If an application is so made, the court
will first have to be satisfied that there exists a valid arbitration
agreement and the applicant intends to take the dispute to
arbitration. Once it is so satisfied, the court will have the
jurisdiction to pass orders under Section 9 giving such interim
protection as the facts and circumstances warrant. While passing
such an order and in order to ensure that effective steps are taken to
commence the arbitral proceedings, the court while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 9 can pass a conditional order to put the
applicant to such terms as it may deem fit with a view to see that
effective steps are taken by the applicant for commencing the
arbitral proceedings. What is apparent, however, is that the court is
not debarred from dealing with an application under Section 9
merely because no notice has been issued under Section 21 of the
1996 Act.”
( emphasis supplied )


12. In the present case, the record does not disclose any manifest
intention on the part of the Petitioner to genuinely pursue arbitration,
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notwithstanding the specific statement made in that regard before this
Court. On the contrary, the prolonged inaction of the Petitioner, the
absence of any notice invoking arbitration, and the failure to take any
consequential steps even after representing before this Court in
February, 2025 that arbitration was in the process of being invoked,
all militate against the very foundational premise upon which
jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act is based.
13. Furthermore, during the pendency of the present Petition, the
Petitioner has never pressed for any urgent or substantive interim
directions. Such conduct clearly indicates that there existed no
immediate necessity, imminent danger, or pressing urgency
warranting the grant of the reliefs sought in the Petition. On the
contrary, the circumstances suggest that the Petition has merely been
kept pending without any genuine intention of pursuing either the
interim reliefs claimed or the arbitral remedy contemplated under law.
14. This Court also notes that Section 9(2) of the Act mandates that
where interim protection is granted by the Court before
commencement of arbitral proceedings, the arbitral proceedings are to
be commenced within ninety days from the date of such order, unless
extended by the Court.
15. Though in the present case no interim order attracting Section
9(2) appears to have been passed, the absence of such an order cannot
be construed as a licence for indefinite delay or procedural indolence.
The statutory framework clearly reflects legislative intent that
recourse to Section 9 of the Act prior to arbitration must be closely
followed by commencement of arbitral proceedings within a
proximate timeframe.
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16. The Court cannot countenance a situation where a party
approaches the Court invoking urgent interim jurisdiction, asserts the
existence of arbitrable disputes requiring immediate protection, and
thereafter remains supine for months and years together without
initiating arbitration. Such conduct is inconsistent with the scheme of
the Act and undermines the expeditious dispute resolution mechanism
contemplated therein.
17. Judicial time is a scarce public resource. The processes of the
Court cannot be utilised to indefinitely keep matters pending where
the litigant itself displays no diligence in prosecuting the substantive
remedy available under law. Courts exist to adjudicate live disputes
and facilitate lawful remedies, not to preserve dormant proceedings at
the instance of parties who choose not to act despite opportunity.
18. In the considered opinion of this Court, no useful purpose
would be served in keeping the present Petition pending any further.
The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate bona fide steps towards
commencement of arbitration despite repeated opportunities and
despite lapse of substantial time. The continuation of the present
proceedings would therefore be contrary to the object and scheme of
Section 9 of the Act.
19. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application, if any, is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
20. No Order as to costs.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
APRIL 16, 2026/tk/kr/sg
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