Sh. Bhagwat Singh (Since Deceased) Through Lrs vs Sh. Kishori Lal (Since Deceased) Through Lrs
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~76
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 28.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010515752026
+ RC.REV. 411/2026, CM APPL. 74038/2026 (Ex.) & CM
APPL. 74039/2026 (Delay of 265 days in Re-filing the petition)
SH. BHAGWAT SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH
LRS .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. P.K. Bhardwaj, Advocate.
versus
SH. KISHORI LAL (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS
.....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition, has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of
1
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Order dated
2
06.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional Rent Control -01,
3
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in the Objection
Petition, being M-598171/2016 (Old No. M-43/2009) in Execution
4
bearing No. 597928/2016 (Old No. 78/2009) , titled as “ Bhagwant
Singh vs. Kishori Lal” , whereby the objections filed by the Objector
[“ Petitioner herein ”] were dismissed by the learned ARC.
1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
Learned ARC
4
Execution
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 1 of 20
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner confines
the challenge to the Impugned Order to two principal grounds, both of
which, according to him, go to the root of the maintainability of the
execution proceedings and the enforceability of the eviction order
against the Petitioner.
3. Firstly, learned counsel contends that the execution proceedings
and the objection proceedings have been prosecuted by the son of the
original landlord who, subsequent to the passing of the eviction order,
had relinquished his right, title and interest in the subject property in
favour of his mother (wife of the original landlord), by way of a
Relinquishment Deed dated 21.06.2016. It is submitted that the said
beneficiary of the Relinquishment Deed was neither a party to the
original eviction proceedings nor had she participated in the
adjudication culminating in the eviction order dated 17.02.2009.
According to learned counsel, once the person who had prosecuted the
original eviction proceedings had divested himself of his interest in
the property, he could not have continued to prosecute the objection
proceedings, and the entire process stands vitiated.
4. Secondly, learned counsel submits that the Petitioner herein was
the person in actual and exclusive occupation of the subject premises,
whereas the other legal heirs of Late Sh. Deva Singh, including the
person through whom the eviction proceedings were pursued, were
not residing therein. It is contended that the original tenant against
whom the eviction proceedings were instituted was the Petitioner's
brother, who, despite being one of the legal heirs of Late Sh. Deva
Singh, was residing in Uttar Pradesh and had no actual occupation of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 2 of 20
the premises. Learned counsel further submits that Smt. Sheela Saini,
being neither in occupation nor in actual possession of the subject
premises, could not have been treated as the proper representative of
the tenancy to the exclusion of the Petitioner. On this premise, it is
urged that the Petitioner, being the person actually occupying the
premises, had an independent right to resist the execution of the
eviction order and that the learned ARC erred in holding otherwise.
5. No other submissions have been advanced by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner.
ANALYSIS:
6. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Petitioner and, with his able assistance, perused the material
available on record, including the Impugned Judgment.
7. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
8. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
5
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
6 7
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
5
(1998) 8 SCC 119
6
(2014) 9 SCC 78
7
(2022) 6 SCC 30
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 3 of 20
appellate jurisdiction.
9. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
8
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
9
Grover .
10. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
8
2024:DHC:9322
9
2025:DHC:11285
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 4 of 20
11. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
13. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Judgment are required to be
examined.
14. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, for the sake of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 5 of 20
completeness and clarity, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the
findings returned by the learned ARC, which reads as under:
“17. Lastly, the main contention which has been pressed on behalf
of the objector is that he is not bound by the eviction order dated
17.02.2009 obtained by the decree holder against Sheela Saini
since he is claiming independent right in the premises as a tenant
which is neither through Sheela Saini or her late husband Babu Lal
(brother of the objector). In this regard, evidence of OW1 Brijbala,
OW2 Arun Saini and OW3 Tarun Saini has been relied upon
whereby they have deposed that after the demise of Deva Singh in
1972, the tenancy was inherited by Bhagwant Singh to the
exclusion of other children of Deva Singh. Further, reliance has
been placed upon the various documents i.e. death certificate, voter
ID card, electricity bills, school leaving certificate, ration card etc.
to show that Bhagwant Singh was in possession of the premises
after the demise of Deva Singh. However, even if, the possession
of Bhagwant Singh, is conceded on the basis of said documents,
the relevant question to be determined is whether the said
possession was to the exclusion of his siblings, and therefore,
whether Bhagwant Singh was the sole tenant after the demise of
Deva Singh. It is not in dispute that Babu Lal (husband of Sheela
Saini) was the elder brother of Bhagwant Singh and therefore,
being son of erstwhile tenant also entitled to succeed as joint tenant
in the premises in question. OW1 in her cross examination has
categorically admitted that she was not present in the year 1972 in
the tenanted premises since her marriage with objector Bhagwant
Singh had been solemnized at a later stage. Similarly, OW2 and
OW3 have also admitted that being sons of Bhagwant Singh, they
too were not present in 1972 and do not have personal knowledge
qua the succession of tenancy of Deva Singh. All the three
witnesses have admitted that they have deposed in this regard on
the basis of what was told to them by Bhagwant Singh in his
lifetime. Hence, it is essential to determine if reliance can be placed
upon the testimony of the said witnesses in this regard.
18. It is pertinent to note that OW1 has relied upon a letter dated
30.08.1972 i.e. Ex. OW1/12 to contend that Bhagwant Singh was
residing in the tenanted premises during the lifetime of Deva
Singh. However, perusal of said letter shows that the same was also
addressed simultaneously to his siblings Anand Prakash, Om
Prakash as well as Babu Lal (husband of Sheela Singh). Therefore,
the testimony of the witnesses OW1, OW2 and OW3 and
document Ex. OW1/12 relied by them itself shows that the other
siblings of the deceased Deva Singh were also residing in the
tenanted premises in dispute at the time of his death. Admittedly,
there is no written letter or document to show that the other
siblings had surrendered the tenancy in favour of Bhagwant Singh.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 6 of 20
19. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that OW1 in her cross
examination dated 15.12.2022 has admitted that before October,
1974, Late Kishori Lal was issuing rent receipt in the name of
Babu Lal Saini (husband of Sheela Saini). Therefore, from the said
fact, it is apparent that Babu Lal Saini had not surrendered his joint
tenancy in favour of Bhagwant Singh. Though, it is contended that
Bhagwant Singh had raised objections in this regard and thereafter,
rent receipt was issued in the name of Late Deva Singh, which is
Ex. OW1/1, but the said fact only shows that there was dispute
amongst the successors of Deva Singh. As no single successor was
attorned as exclusive tenant, therefore, the rent receipt was issued
in the name of erstwhile original tenant who had demised. This fact
in no way supports the claim of the objector that he was the
exclusive tenant in possession on demise of Deva Singh. It is also
pertinent to note that OW1 has admitted in her cross examination
that the rent receipt was not issued in her presence and she has
deposed in this regard on the basis of what was informed to her by
her late husband Bhagwant Singh.
20. It is also relevant to note that the objector has relied upon
money-order receipts Ex. OW1/2 to Ex. OW1/7 to contend that
rent was being tendered by Bhagwant Singh as exclusive tenant,
but the same was refused by the landlord. However, admittedly, no
deposit of rent petition was filed by Bhagwant Singh as per Section
26/27 DRC Act. Here, I find it pertinent to refer the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy
(D) By LRs & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 153, wherein it was held that
equitable consideration have no place in rent legislation and statute
contains express provisions. In the absence of filing of DR
petitions, pursuant to the purported refusal by the landlord, the said
money orders cannot be considered valid tender of rent and
therefore, are of no assistance to the claim of the objector.
21. With respect to the credibility of OW1 as a witness, I also find
it relevant to note that despite being specifically confronted during
cross examination about the ownership of property at Khasra No.
553, Gyanodya Public School, Village Alipur, Delhi-110036, she
denied the same. She was specifically shown the online DORIS
record as per which, property is jointly owned by her and her
brother Ajit Kumar. It is pertinent to note that OW3, son of OW1
has admitted that the „Barat‟ for his marriage had assembled at the
aforesaid address and that her mother is the owner of the said
property. The said fact impeaches the credibility of OW1 as a
witness, and therefore, it is difficult to place reliance upon her
testimony.
22. It is also pertinent to mention that the witnesses have placed
reliance upon Ex. OW1/8 to contend that Sheela Saini has admitted
that the address of the objector Bhagwant Singh was the tenanted
premises and that she was residing at a different address. However,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 7 of 20
it is pertinent to note that OW2 in his cross examination dated
01.06.2023 categorically admitted that despite issuance of Ex.
OW1/8, relation between Sheela Saini and his parents i.e. OW1
Brijbala and objector Bhagwant Singh remained cordial and never
deteriorated. Perusal of the contents of Ex. OW1/8 shows that
OW1 had raised allegations of forcible entry in her locked room
and theft/destruction of her articles by Bhagwant Singh. The said
letter is dated 14.05.1999, however, OW2 categorically stated in
his cross examination that in the year 1999 there was no dispute
between Late Smt. Sheela Saini and his parents and further that she
used to regularly visit his parents and their family. It is hard to
fathom that despite serious allegations of commission of an
offence, the relations between the parties would remain normal.
Furthermore, the admission of OW2 that Sheela Saini never filed
any complaint against his parents and that his parents too never
filed any complaint against Sheela Saini, brings into question the
authenticity and genuineness of letter Ex. OW1/8. Therefore,
reliance cannot be placed upon the same.
23. It is also relevant to note that the objectors have admitted that
Babu Lal demised in Delhi. Furthermore, perusal of death
certificate of Babu Lal shows that the address and place of death of
Babu Lal in the death certificate is recorded as 3373, Kucha
Sayeed Jalal Bukhari, Delhi Gate, Delhi, which is the same as the
tenanted premises in question. Therefore, the contention of the
objector that Babu Lal had surrendered the tenancy due to
obtaining job in UP is contradicted by the record. Even if, it is
assumed that Babu Lal due to his job was working at UP or other
places, prima facie he continued to maintain his domicile at the
tenanted premises itself. Hence, it cannot be assumed that the
objector succeeded the tenancy on the demise of Deva Singh to the
exclusion of other legal heirs. In this regard it is also relevant to
note that OW1 has conceded in her cross examination that
marriage of Babu Lal with Sheela Saini was solemnized at the
tenanted premises itself. Therefore, Sheela Saini's matrimonial
home on marriage was the tenanted premises in question. Except
Ex. OW1/8, there is no document on record to show that Sheela
Saini was not residing at the tenanted premises. As discussed
above, reliance cannot be placed upon Ex. OW1/8. Furthermore,
the envelope vide which the purported letter was sent was also not
placed upon record despite specific question in this regard being
put to OW3 and he seeking time to produce the same on
23.09.2023.
24. The crux of the objections, on which the execution of the
eviction order is being opposed is that on the demise of Deva
Singh, objector Bhagwant Singh succeeded the tenancy to the
exclusion of other legal heirs. It is trite to state that whoever desires
any court to give judgment as to any legal right, dependent upon
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 8 of 20
the existence of facts which he asserts, he must prove that those
facts exist. Thus, the burden of proving fact always lies upon the
person who assert it and unless such burden is discharged, the other
party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. Reliance
in this regard is placed upon Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami, AIR
2011 SCC 2344 . A bald self-serving ipso dixit averment has been
made by the objector that Babu Lal had surrendered the tenancy
and the objector was the exclusive tenant in possession of the
premises. But the said bald assertion is not sufficient to resist the
execution of eviction order.
25. Hence, the burden to prove the same was on the objector and he
cannot rely upon the fact that there are weaknesses in the reply of
the decree holder. The objections of the Bhagwant Singh cannot
stand on their own legs and therefore, he cannot contend that the
decree holder must prove to the contrary. It is also well settled that
on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the
contrary either negating or limiting the succession, the tenancy
rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The incidence of
the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant. It
is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs. There is no
division of the premises or of the rent payable thereof. That is the
position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased
tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint
tenants. Reliance in this regard is placed upon H.C. Pandey vs.
G.C. Paul (1989) 3 SCC 77 and Suresh kumar kohli vs Rakesh
Jain & Anr Civil Appeal no 3996/2018 . It is also pertinent to note
that the tenancy cannot be split and bifurcated and therefore, the
unity and integrity of the tenancy cannot be destroyed either by the
landlord or the tenant. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the
case of S. S. Rikhy Vs. Hermes Travels and Cargo Pvt. Ltd,
2001 SCC Online Del 422.
26. Therefore, merely because the objector was also in
possession does not imply that the other siblings were not the
joint tenants in the premises in question. Hence, Sheela Saini
being successor in interest of Deva Singh was a joint tenant in the
premises. It is trite to state that any one joint tenant can represent
the interest of all joint tenants and there is no splitting of tenancy in
this regard. Hence, the objector cannot claim to have an
independent right to continue in possession of the property.
Section 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides that an
eviction order shall be binding on all persons who are in
occupation of the premises and vacant possession shall be given
to the landlord by evicting all such persons. It is however
provided that this section shall not apply to persons who have an
independent title over the premises. In the case of Rattan Devi Vs.
Bal Kishan SAO No. 164 of 1977 , the Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi held that mere possession of a premises cannot save the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 9 of 20
person in possession from eviction in view of section 25 of the
Delhi Rent Control Act. The proviso to Section 25 of the Delhi
Rent Control Act only empowers the person who has an
independent title to the tenanted premises, to file objections and
resist execution of the eviction order passed under the Delhi Rent
Control Act. It is apparent that the predecessor-in-interest of the
objector was a tenant under the landlord/Kishori Lal. Therefore, the
objector was also a joint tenant in the premises alongwith his
siblings on the demise of his father.
27. In the case of Bhikobai Kanhaiyala & Ors. Vs. Dhannalal
Chintaman & Ors. Misc. Appeal No. 147/1971 decided by the
Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 18.02.1975, it was held
that a mere claim to an independent title is not sufficient to get the
benefit of the proviso. It was held that when a person claims an
independent title, it must be found on an inquiry that he possesses
the title as claimed by him. It was held that unless it is so found,
benefit of the proviso is not available. It was observed that use of
the word 'has' in the proviso must necessarily lead to this
conclusion. The Hon'ble High Court noted that if the intention of
the legislature was to provide benefit of the proviso even to a
person who makes such a claim even though he is unable to prove
the same to the satisfaction of the Court, then instead of using the
word "has", the word used would have been "claims". The use of
the word "has" in the context must mean that the claim to an
independent title has been substantiated in an enquiry. But the
claim of the objector that he is not bound by eviction order dated
17.02.2009 since he has independent title in the premises has
remained unsubstantiated. Hence, his objections for resisting the
execution of the eviction order are devoid of merits. ”
15. The first objection raised on behalf of the Petitioner pertains to
the effect of the Relinquishment Deed dated 21.06.2016 upon the
continuation of the execution and objection proceedings. The
submission is that the son of the original decree holder, who had been
prosecuting the eviction proceedings, relinquished his right, title and
interest in the subject property in favour of his mother, who was
neither a party to the original eviction proceedings nor had
participated in the adjudication culminating in the Eviction Order
dated 17.02.2009. It is, therefore, contended that upon execution of the
said Relinquishment Deed, the person prosecuting the proceedings
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 10 of 20
ceased to possess any subsisting interest in the property and was
consequently disentitled from continuing the execution proceedings.
The aforesaid contention, however, proceeds on an incomplete
appreciation of the legal effect of the said document.
16. At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between a
relinquishment which results in the transfer of an interest in favour of
an independent third party and an arrangement whereby one legal
representative of the original decree holder relinquishes his interest in
favour of another legal representative of the same decree holder. In the
present case, the Relinquishment Deed was executed in favour of the
mother of the executant, who is herself a legal representative of the
original decree holder. Thus, the transaction did not introduce an
independent third-party interest in the subject property, nor did it
result in the property passing outside the body of legal representatives
of the original decree holder. The fact that the beneficiary of the deed
was not a party to the original eviction proceedings does not, by itself,
extinguish the rights flowing from the Eviction Order or render the
same incapable of enforcement. The beneficiary derived her interest
through the original decree holder and not under an independent or
competing title. Consequently, the execution of the said document
cannot, merely on that account, be construed as a circumstance
resulting in the disappearance of the decree holder's interest in the
subject property or the cessation of the right to seek enforcement of
the Eviction Order.
17. In this regard, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s
10
India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla ,
10
(2004) 3 SCC 178
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 11 of 20
assumes significance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that one co-
owner is competent to institute and prosecute eviction proceedings
against a tenant, the underlying principle being that a co-owner acts
not merely in his individual capacity but also in a representative
capacity on behalf of the other co-owners, in the absence of any
demonstrated disagreement. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held
that the entitlement of the co-owners to seek eviction is ordinarily to
be adjudged with reference to the date of institution of the
proceedings, except where, by virtue of a subsequent event, the
entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject the tenant comes to an
end by an act of parties or by operation of law. The relevant portion of
the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are
satisfied that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well settled
that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in
the property generally owned by the co-owners. (See Sri Ram
Pasricha v. Jagannath [(1976) 4 SCC 184] and Dhannalal v.
Kalawatibai [(2002) 6 SCC 16] , SCC para 25.) This principle is
based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for
eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own
right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other
co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-
owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed
in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit was filed
by both the co-owners. One of the co-owners cannot withdraw his
consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The
suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the
date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek
ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution
of the suit; the only exception being when by virtue of a
subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject
the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of
law.”
18. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case,
the subsequent Relinquishment Deed does not demonstrate the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 12 of 20
cessation of the collective entitlement of the legal representatives of
the original decree holder to seek possession. On the contrary, the
interest relinquished by one legal representative came to vest in
another legal representative of the original decree holder. There is no
material to demonstrate that the beneficiary of the said deed ever
disputed the Eviction Order or objected to its enforcement. Thus, the
subsequent arrangement merely altered the distribution of interests
amongst the legal representatives of the original decree holder and did
not, by itself, extinguish the subsisting right to seek possession. The
Petitioner, who claims his own right through the original tenant,
cannot derive any independent advantage from such an inter se
arrangement so as to defeat an eviction order which had already
attained finality.
19. It is also material to note that the Relinquishment Deed was
executed during the pendency of the objection proceedings. However,
the mere fact that the person who had initially prosecuted the eviction
proceedings subsequently relinquished his interest cannot, without
more, render the adjudication of the pending objections or the
enforcement of the Eviction Order a nullity. The Petitioner was
required to demonstrate that, as a consequence of the said
relinquishment, the person pursuing the execution proceedings had
become legally disentitled from doing so and that no other person
claiming through the original decree holder was competent to seek
enforcement of the order. No such consequence has been established.
The beneficiary of the Relinquishment Deed being herself a legal
representative of the original decree holder, and there being no
challenge to the Eviction Order at her instance, the aforesaid objection
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 13 of 20
cannot be sustained merely on the basis of the inter se arrangement
between the legal representatives. Accordingly, this Court finds no
merit in the first objection.
20. The next objection raised by the Objector is that he is not bound
by the Eviction Order dated 17.02.2009, as he claims to have
succeeded exclusively to the tenancy upon the demise of his father,
Deva Singh, in the year 1972. It is his case that, while he continued to
reside in and occupy the subject premises after the demise of Deva
Singh, his elder brother, Babu Lal, had shifted to Uttar Pradesh on
account of his employment and never resided in the premises. It is,
accordingly, contended that Babu Lal never acquired or retained any
tenancy rights therein and that Sheela Saini, being his wife, could not
have been recognised as a tenant. The Decree Holder, on the other
hand, maintains that Babu Lal had attorned to the landlord upon the
demise of Deva Singh, had paid rent in respect of the premises and
that the Objector, being one of the legal heirs of the original tenant,
could not claim an exclusive tenancy to the exclusion of the other
heirs.
21. The controversy, therefore, is not with respect to the Objector's
physical possession of the subject premises, which, in fact, finds
acknowledgment in the Eviction Petition No. 365/2008 (Old No.
193/2005) itself. The Eviction Petition establishes the Objector's
possession and control over the premises; however, it does not
establish that the tenancy had devolved exclusively upon him. The
distinction between possession of the tenanted premises and exclusive
succession to the tenancy is material. It is not in dispute that Deva
Singh was a contractual tenant at the time of his demise in 1972 and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 14 of 20
that his contractual tenancy had not been terminated prior thereto.
Consequently, the succession to the tenancy rights upon his death
would be governed by the ordinary law of inheritance, and the
restrictions governing succession to the interest of a statutory tenant
under Section 2(l)(iii) of the DRC Act would have no application to
the present case. The legal heirs of Deva Singh, therefore, succeeded
to the tenancy rights in accordance with the applicable law of
succession, subject to any legally established relinquishment or
cessation of such rights.
11
22. In H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
held that, upon the death of a tenant, the tenancy devolves upon the
legal heirs as a single and indivisible tenancy. The said principle was
12
reiterated in Suresh Kumar Kohli v. Rakesh Jain . Thus, the mere
fact that one heir continues in occupation cannot, without more, lead
to the conclusion that the tenancy devolved exclusively upon such
heir. The Objector was, therefore, required to establish that the other
legal heirs, particularly Babu Lal, had surrendered or relinquished
their rights in the tenancy. The relevant portion of H.C. Pandey
(supra) is reproduced hereinbelow:
“4. It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant,
subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or
limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of
the deceased tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as
those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which
devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises or of the
rent payable therefor. That is the position as between the landlord
and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs
succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it
appears that the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he
paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of
11
(1989) 3 SCC 77
12
(2018) 6 SCC 708
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 15 of 20
all. In the circumstances, the notice served on the respondent was
sufficient. It seems to us that the view taken in Ramesh Chand
Bose [AIR 1977 All 38 : 1976 AWC 301 : 1976 Ren CJ 380 :
(1976) 2 ALR 711] is erroneous where the High Court lays down
that the heirs of the deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common.
In our opinion, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act served by the appellant on the respondent is a valid
notice and therefore the suit must succeed.”
23. The material placed on record does not establish such exclusive
succession. The Objector relies upon documents such as his voter
identity card, electricity bills, school leaving certificate and ration card
to demonstrate his residence in the subject premises. These documents
may establish his continued occupation, but do not establish the
exclusion of the other legal heirs from the tenancy. Significantly, the
letter dated 30.08.1972 (Ex. OW1/12), relied upon by the Objector
himself, is addressed not only to him but also to his brothers,
including Babu Lal. Further, OW1 admitted that rent receipts had been
issued by the landlord in the name of Babu Lal prior to October 1974.
The Objector's allegation that such receipts were issued collusively
does not find adequate corroboration on the record. The subsequent
issuance of a rent receipt dated 08.10.1974 in the name of Deva Singh,
after the Objector allegedly raised an objection, does not establish that
the other legal heirs had relinquished their rights. Rather, the material,
taken cumulatively, does not support the assertion that the Objector
alone had succeeded to the tenancy. No document evidencing
surrender or relinquishment by Babu Lal or the other legal heirs has
been produced.
24. The further assertion that Babu Lal had abandoned the tenancy
on account of his employment in Uttar Pradesh also remains
unsubstantiated. The death certificate of Babu Lal records the subject
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 16 of 20
premises as his address/place of death, while OW1 admitted that his
marriage with Sheela Saini had been solemnised at the subject
premises. These circumstances are inconsistent with the categorical
assertion that Babu Lal had severed all connection with the premises.
Further, the witnesses examined on behalf of the Objector admittedly
had no personal knowledge of the circumstances prevailing at the time
of Deva Singh's demise in 1972, and their testimony regarding
exclusive succession is substantially based on information received
from the Objector. The purported letter dated 14.05.1999 (Ex.
OW1/8), relied upon to suggest strained relations between the families
and the Objector's forcible occupation, does not inspire confidence in
view of OW2's admission that relations between the families
continued to remain cordial and that no complaints had been made by
either side. The absence of the envelope of the said communication
further detracts from the evidentiary value sought to be attributed to it.
Likewise, the money-order receipts (Ex. OW1/2 to Ex. OW1/7), even
if taken at face value, do not establish exclusive succession or
relinquishment by the other heirs. No proceedings for deposit of rent
under Section 27 of the DRC Act were initiated by the Objector. In
any event, the factum of attempted remittance of rent cannot, by itself,
determine the devolution of tenancy rights.
25. The burden of establishing the specific assertion that the
tenancy devolved exclusively upon the Objector, to the exclusion of
the other legal heirs, rested upon him. In Rangammal v.
13
Kuppuswami , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while explaining Section
101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reiterated that the burden of
13
(2011) 12 SCC 220
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 17 of 20
proving a fact lies upon the person who asserts it and that such burden
cannot be discharged merely by pointing to the weakness of the
opposing party's case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 21. Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 defines “burden of
proof” which clearly lays down that:
“ 101. Burden of proof .—Whoever desires any court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the
existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said
that the burden of proof lies on that person.”
Thus, the Evidence Act has clearly laid down that the burden of
proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts it. Until
such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be
called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to
whether the person upon whom the burden lies has been able to
discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he
cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of the other party .”
26. Applying the aforesaid principle, it was incumbent upon the
Objector to establish, through cogent evidence, that Babu Lal and the
other legal heirs had surrendered or abandoned their tenancy rights.
The evidence led by him falls short of discharging this burden. It is
also relevant that the Objector had sought his impleadment in the
eviction proceedings by moving an application under Order I Rule 10
CPC, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 17.02.2009, and
the appeal preferred against the said order was also dismissed on
18.04.2016. While the dismissal of the said application cannot, in
itself, be treated as an adjudication of the Objector's substantive claim
to tenancy, it does establish that he had knowledge of the eviction
proceedings and had sought to participate therein. The said procedural
history, therefore, cannot be ignored while considering his subsequent
challenge at the stage of execution.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 18 of 20
27. The Objector's claim to protection under Section 25 of the DRC
Act must also be examined in this factual backdrop. The statutory
protection is available to a person in occupation who establishes a title
independent of the tenant against whom the eviction order has been
passed. In the present case, the Objector does not assert any title
independent of the original tenancy held by Deva Singh; rather, his
claim is founded upon the alleged exclusive devolution of that very
tenancy upon him coupled with the exclusive occupation of the
subject premises. Having failed to establish that the other legal heirs,
particularly Babu Lal, had surrendered or relinquished their tenancy
rights, the Objector cannot, merely on the strength of his physical
possession, characterise his claim as one founded upon an independent
title.
28. In the present case, the Objector has failed to substantiate any
title independent of the original tenancy or to establish his claim of
exclusive succession thereto. Consequently, the Objector has failed to
establish a legally sustainable basis to resist execution of the Eviction
Order on the ground that he alone had succeeded to the tenancy or that
his claim is founded upon a title independent of the tenancy rights of
Babu Lal and the other legal heirs.
29. Viewed in its entirety, the objections raised by the Petitioner are
founded upon an erroneous understanding of the legal consequences
flowing from the devolution of tenancy rights and the operation of
Section 25 of the DRC Act. The learned ARC has considered the
material aspects of the controversy, applied the settled principles
governing succession to tenancy and correctly concluded that the
Petitioner had failed to establish any independent right capable of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 19 of 20
resisting execution of the eviction order.
30. This Court finds no perversity, manifest illegality or material
irregularity in the said findings. Consequently, the present Petition,
being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
31. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 28, 2026/tk/ma
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
13:35:32
RC.REV. 411/2026 Page 20 of 20