DR AMRIT KEJRIWAL vs DR JAYA KEJRIWAL

Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:JHHC:32541-DB )


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No. 206 of 2018

Dr. Amrit Kejriwal, aged about 48 years, son of Dr. N. L.
Kejriwal, resident of Bakshi Compound, Bariatu, P.O. & P.S.
Bariatu, District Ranchi, at present residing at D-6, Jeevan
Sagar, Sector-II, Kharghar, Navi Mumbai, P.O. & P.S. Navi
Mumbai, District Mumbai (Maharashtra).
... ... ... Appellant

Versus
Dr. Jaya Kejriwal, Wife of Dr. Amrit Kejriwal, Daughter of P.P.
Khemka, Resident of Plot No.88-A, Co-operative Colony,
Bokaro, P.O & P.S. Bokaro Steel City, District Bokaro.
… … ... Respondent
---------
CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
---------
For the Appellant : Mr Mahesh Tewari, Advocate
Mr Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr Srijit Choudhary, Advocate
---------

Reserved On : 06/10/2026 Pronounced On: 05 /11/2026
Per: Manoj Prasad, J.
1. Heard Mr Mahesh Tewari, for the appellant, who appears
with Mr Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Mr Srijit Choudhary, for the
respondent.
2. The present appeal has been filed by the petitioner-
appellant Dr. Amrit Kejriwal, impleading his wife as respondent who
was opposite party before the Court below.
3. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated
th th
28 March 2018 and decree dated 05 April 2018 passed by the
Court of learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro in Title
F.A. No.206 of 2018

(Matrimonial) Suit No. 204 of 2012, which was filed under Sections
13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of
marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The learned Trial
Judge by the impugned Judgment and Decree, dismissed the suit
of the petitioner-appellant, holding that the case of cruelty and
desertion was not made out.
4. Before coming to the facts of the case, it is important to
mention that the application for dissolution of marriage was filed
before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi, registered as
M.T.S. Case No. 112 of 2008. Consequent to an order passed by
this Court in Transfer Petition (C) No.19 of 2008, arising out of
M.T.S. Case No. 112 of 2008 on 07.08.2012. The case was
transferred from the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court,
Ranchi to the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro
and thereafter by order dated 24.08.2012, on receipt of the record
by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro, it was re-registered
as Title Matrimonial Suit No. 204 of 2012 and the suit was
proceeded before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro and
decided by the said Court by the impugned judgment and decree.
5. The petitioner-appellant instituted the suit for dissolution of
marriage on the ground of cruelty, i.e. under Section 13(1) (i-a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, alleging inter-alia that the respondent lived
with the appellant for about a month and thereafter, left the
appellant and went to Bokaro to stay with her parents. In course of
time, the appellant had to move to Delhi for his education and
subsequently, he joined Escorts Heart Institute at Delhi. In the year
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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2002, the appellant came to Ranchi to join a family function. The
respondent misbehaved with the parents of the appellant and
despite interference of the appellant, such behavior continued. In
the meantime, the respondent had also completed her internship
and the appellant brought the respondent with him to Delhi and
stayed with the brother’s family but within a few days, finding the
behavior with the other family members not to be compatible, the
appellant along-with his wife shifted to Noida so as to maintain
peace and avoid conflicts in the family. It is stated that the
respondent became ill in the year 2003 and was suffering from
Jaundice and as such, she was hospitalized and when the parents
of the respondent came, allegation was leveled against the
accused-appellant for making their daughter ill, and for not taking
proper care of their daughter. This all caused great mental cruelty
to the present appellant. The appellant further alleges that the
petitioner was scheduled to go to U.K. in May 2003 but before
going abroad when he came to Ranchi and was with his parents,
the respondent also accompanied him but she picked-up quarrel
with her parents and this all caused mental cruelty to the present
appellant. Such behavior of the respondent compelled the appellant
to return from U.K. in November 2003. In December 2003, the
appellant went to Mumbai and joined MGM Medical College as a
Lecturer. The respondent also came to Mumbai with her father and
joined Rajiv Gandhi Medical College but shifted to a hostel and
relationship between the husband and wife became bitter as the
respondent did not allow access to the present appellant and she
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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continued living in a hostel. In the year 2006, the respondent after
clearing her D.G.O. Examination vacated the hostel and remained
with the appellant, but there was no improvement in her behavior
and attitude. In September 2006, the respondent informed the
appellant of some illness, for which, she was admitted to a hospital
and finally, the appellant brought back the respondent to Ranchi for
better treatment with the help of his family members, particularly his
father, who was also a doctor at Ranchi. Subsequently, the
respondent returned to Bokaro where she also gave birth to a child
with no information to the appellant. On 27.10.2007 the respondent
along with her sister and cousin came to the residence of the
appellant at Mumbai and stayed there for two days to collect some
certificates from the institute. During her stay, her behavior with the
appellant was rude and even during that period, did not maintain
any matrimonial relationship with the appellant and she insisted that
if the appellant want to restore the conjugal life, he has to stay with
the respondent at Bokaro. It is stated that such acts of the
respondent amounted to cruelty and also desertion on the appellant
and hence, cause of action of the suit arose for dissolution of
marriage. Prior to instituting the suit for dissolution of marriage on
the grounds of cruelty and desertion, a notice was sent through the
lawyer of the appellant for dissolution of marriage by mutual
consent on 21.04.2008, but the respondent replied to the said
notice, denying the statements made by the appellant therein and
also threatened the appellant of implication in criminal cases,
resultantly, the present suit was instituted for dissolution of
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marriage by a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and
th
desertion on 9 June, 2008.
6. The respondent after appearance filed a written statement,
denying the entire allegations made by the appellant and also
denying the allegations of erratic behavior of present respondent.
On the contrary, she alleges that the appellant along-with his family
members behaved in a very rude manner with the present
respondent. The respondent further states that on account of
negligence by the present appellant, she suffered Jaundice and
other illnesses. It is also stated that with the assistance of the father
of the respondent, the appellant went to U.K., but without
completing his course, he returned from U.K. and the entire other
contrary allegations were denied by this respondent. Further, she
alleges that she studied at Mumbai at the expenses of her father
and the appellant did not bother to pay a single penny towards the
expenses of the present respondent. The respondent admittedly
cleared her DGO examination and vacated the hostel and remained
with the appellant, who neglected to take care of the present
respondent. The appellant deliberately, with an intention to leave
the respondent at Bokaro, but in absence of any direct flight from
Mumbai to Bokaro, came to Ranchi and considering the medical
emergency admitted the respondent in a hospital for a day and on
the very next day, moved the respondent to Bokaro. The entire
allegations of cruelty and desertion are denied. On the contrary,
allegations of cruelty are leveled by the respondent on the present
appellant. It is alleged that the respondent along-with her sister and
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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cousin had come to Mumbai to the house of the appellant but they
were misbehaved and ousted from the house and other contrary
allegations are denied. The respondent never wanted to live
separately, rather wanted to restore the conjugal life and reply a
was given to the advocate’s notice, given on behalf of the appellant
to the respondent. The prayer was made to dismiss the suit of the
appellant.
TRIAL COURT FINDINGS
7. Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro, based on the
pleadings, framed the following issues: -
(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?
(ii)Whether there is any valid cause of action for filing of the suit?
(iii)Whether after solemnization of marriage, the respondent
treated the plaintiff-petitioner/present appellant and his family
members with cruelty and also deserted the plaintiffs-petitioner
without any reasonable cause?
(iv)Whether the plaintiff petitioner and his family members have
treated the respondent with cruelty and she was driven out of the
matrimonial house in the month of October 2007?
(v)Whether the plaintiff petitioner is entitled to get the relief as
prayed for by him?
8. After framing of issues, the appellant examined four
witnesses including himself, his brother, sister and one Vimal Kant
Jha. Three documents were marked as exhibit being the legal
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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notice to Dr. Jaya Kejriwal through the advocate for the appellant
marked as Exhibit-1, Exhibit-2 is the reply to the legal notice and
Exhibit-3 is the certified copy of the complaint case No.372 of 2008
filed by Dr. Jaya Kejriwal against Dr. Amrit Kejriwal and others in
the Court of the C.J.M., Bokaro. On behalf of the respondent, six
witnesses were examined namely Sushil Lachi Ramka,
Kamleshwar Prasad Choudhary, Nageshwar Singh, Sheela
Khemka, the mother of the respondent, Parmeshwar Prasad
Khemka, the father of the respondent and Dr. Jaya Kejriwal, the
respondent herself. No documentary evidence is there on behalf of
the respondent.
9. The learned Trial Court, thereafter, took up Issue Nos. 3 and
4 for determination, i.e., the issue as to whether the respondent had
meted out cruelty on the appellant and had deserted the appellant
and secondly, whether the appellant and his family members had
treated the respondent with cruelty and the respondent was driven
out of her matrimonial house in the month of October, 2007.
10. The learned Trial Court, after discussing the oral and
documentary evidence on behalf of the parties and considering that
cruelty, though not defined under the Hindu Marriage Act, has
varied dimensions and no straight-jacket definition can be given,
held that, in every case, the aspects of cruelty have to be
examined. After discussing these aspects of the case, the learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, concluded that, in the facts of the
present case, the appellant himself had created such a situation
which compelled the respondent to leave her matrimonial home,
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and that the respondent's leaving the matrimonial home under such
circumstances cannot be categorised as either cruelty or desertion.
Regarding Exhibits 1 and 2, the learned Trial Court concluded that,
in the reply notice given by the present respondent, she expressed
her desire to live with the appellant, and instead of making efforts
for restitution of conjugal rights, an application for dissolution of
marriage was filed. The learned Trial Court, therefore, concluded
that no case of cruelty was proved. The appellant failed to prove
that the respondent committed acts of cruelty against the appellant.
11. Considering the ground of desertion, the learned Principal
Judge, Family Court observed that desertion for a continuous
period of two years immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition without reasonable cause and without the consent or
against the wish of the appellant was necessary to be established
to make out a case. It has also been observed that mere physical
act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that
spouse the deserting party. The desertion has to be both actual act
of separation, coupled with an intention, it is the animus deserendi
to live separately with an intention not to cohabit or restore conjugal
life. The party alleging desertion must prove intentional permanent
abandonment of one spouse by the other, without that others
consent and without reasonable cause. Thus, there should be total
repudiation of the obligation of marriage. In the facts of the present
case, it was observed that the parties last resided together till
29.10.2007, which fact is admitted by the present appellant while
the suit for divorce was filed on 09.06.2008 and thus, the statutory
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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requirement of continuous desertion for a period of not less than
two years was not fulfilled and accordingly, the case of desertion
was also not made out.
12. Thus, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court dismissed
the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by the present appellant,
holding that the appellant failed to make out a case under Section
13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
ARGUMENTS
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
13.
submits that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the oral and
documentary evidence in the proper perspective. Much reliance is
placed on Exhibit-2, i.e., the respondent’s reply, and it is
emphasised that the language of the reply would predominantly
show the respondent’s intention and the threat meted out by the
respondent to the appellant, which is evidence of cruelty. Apart
from that, other acts of cruelty were also present, which were not
considered by the learned Trial Court. The deposition of the
witnesses on behalf of the appellant supported the appellant’s
contention regarding cruelty, which was not considered by the
learned Trial Court. Similarly, the learned Trial Court failed to
appreciate the ambit and scope of the expression ‘desertion’. It is
true that the respondent came to Mumbai in October 2007, but the
mere physical act of coming to the appellant’s house does not
amount to the restoration of conjugal life when there was no
restitution of conjugal rights; rather, the respondent had come only
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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to obtain her documents. Learned counsel submits that, in
appropriate cases, desertion can also be considered even where
the husband and wife are living under the same roof, but there is no
restitution of matrimonial obligation between the parties and no
restoration of conjugal life between the parties. The learned Trial
Court has taken a hyper-technical view in holding that merely
because the respondent had come to Mumbai and stayed in the
appellant’s house for two days, the case of desertion was not
proved. Under the circumstances, learned counsel submits that the
impugned judgment and decree are fit to be set aside.
14. Learned counsel, during the course of the arguments, has
also submitted that an interlocutory application has been filed for
the maintenance of the daughter. The present appellant proposed
to pay one-time maintenance towards the daughter's educational
and other expenses to the tune of Rs.15 Lakhs, but this was not
agreed upon. The appellant has also filed salary documents
showing the salary received by him. However, learned counsel
submits that, as no settlement was arrived at, no order was passed
in the said petition.
15. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent submits that since no decree for dissolution of marriage
was passed, no order of alimony was required to be passed, qua
the present respondent, but the daughter was entitled to interim
maintenance and surprisingly, a meager amount of Rs.15 Lakhs
was offered, which was not settled between the parties. Thus,
prayer is made to pass appropriate order on the interlocutory
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application for interim maintenance of the daughter, for which, I.A.
No.702 of 2021 was filed and is pending.
16. However, on the merits of the appeal, learned counsel
submits that, except for a vague allegation of cruelty and desertion,
no material has been brought on record to substantiate the same. It
has been stated that the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Bokaro, has discussed at length the evidence of the parties and the
documents brought on record by the present appellant, and has
also considered the mandate of law. Learned counsel further
submits that the protection of marriage is the mandate of law, and
marriage can be dissolved only on the grounds contained in the
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. Though cruelty has no
standard definition, to dissolve the marriage on the ground of
cruelty, the appellant was bound to establish such acts on the part
of the respondent that made the continuation of matrimonial life
impossible.
17. Under the circumstances, the finding of the learned Trial
Court that no ground of cruelty is made out does not require any
interference. Similarly, the basic requirement for instituting a suit on
the ground of desertion was not met, and therefore the dismissal of
the suit for want of a cause of action for dissolution of marriage on
the ground of desertion was rightly decided by the learned Trial
Court. The prayer is made to dismiss the present appeal.
18. Written arguments have also been filed on behalf of the
appellant, which are on record, reiterating the oral arguments made
F.A. No.206 of 2018
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earlier. They state that on 25. 02. 25.02.2001, the marriage was
solemnised, and in February 2002, the respondent began
misbehaving with the present appellant. In March 2003, due to the
respondent' s jaundice, she was admitted to hospital for treatment,
but subsequently her parents brought her back to Bokaro. In May
2003, the appellant went to England for education. In December
2003, the appellant joined MGM Medical College, Mumbai, as a
lecturer, and the respondent was working at Rajiv Gandhi Medical
College, Mumbai, but was residing in the college hostel. In 2006,
after completing her education, the respondent came to the
appellant' s residence, and they lived together. In September 2006,
the respondent became pregnant. Thereafter, they came to Ranchi,
stayed with the appellant' s parents, and she was admitted to
hospital on 12. 10. 2006. She then went to Bokaro with her parents
and stayed at her parents’ house, where she gave birth to a female
child. On 27. 10. 27.10.2007, the respondent came to Mumbai to
the appellant' s house to collect her educational certificates. She
stayed there for two days, but her behaviour towards the appellant
remained rude and cruel, and during this period there was no
restoration of conjugal life between the parties. In April 2008, a
legal notice was sent by the appellant' s advocate seeking
dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. A reply was sent to the
said legal notice, withdrawing the notice with a threat of filing a
criminal case, and on 09. 06. 09.06.2008, the present matrimonial
suit was instituted for dissolution of marriage on the ground of
cruelty and desertion. On 14. 07. 14.07.2008, Complaint Case No.
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372 of 2008 was filed by the respondent before the Court of the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, with allegations under Section
498 A of the IPC, and on 25. 11. 25.11.2008, cognizance was taken
of the said offence against the present appellant and his parents.
He alleges that the present appellant' s parents died during the
pendency of the said criminal case due to shock caused by the
criminal case. He further alleges that the complaint was dismissed
for non- filing of necessary requisites. On 07. 08. 07.08.2012, the
case was transferred from the Court of the Principal Judge, Family
Court, Ranchi, to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro.
Thereafter, the written arguments mention the oral evidence
examined on behalf of the parties.
FINDINGS
19. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties in the rival
contentions raised therein, the following points for determination fall
for our consideration.
Whether the appellant had proved a case for cruelty
or desertion by the respondent so as to entitle him to
a decree of divorce under Sections 13(1) (ia) & (ib) of
the Hindu Marriage Act .
20. Before coming to the facts of the present case, we would like
to mention that there is no standard definition of cruelty under the
Hindu Marriage Act. Even if some definition is provided in certain
judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is subject to the rider that
such aspects of cruelty were considered in the facts of those cases,
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and therefore, cruelty for the purpose of divorce has to be
determined on the basis of the facts of each case itself.
21. In Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi, reported in (1988) 1
SCC, 105, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that cruelty is conduct
in relation to or in respect of the matrimonial relationship,
disregarding the matrimonial obligations. Such conduct should
adversely affect the other spouse; it can be mental or physical,
intentional or unintentional. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and
more a question of fact and degree of cruelty, while mental cruelty
has to be determined on the respective conduct of the parties.
22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijaykumar Ramchandra
Bhate Vs. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, reported in (2003) 6 SCC
334, observed that an allegation of ‘unchaste’ and indecent
familiarity with a person outside wedlock may constitute cruelty.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar Vs. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 742, held that, in order to
judge whether conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is
whether that conduct is sustained over a period of time and renders
the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to
live with the other.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya
Ghosh, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511, while making certain
illustrative but not exhaustive aspects of cruelty at Para-101 of the
Judgment, observed as hereunder: -
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“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for
guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some
instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in
dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The instances
indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative
and not exhaustive.
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the
parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as
would not make possible for the parties to live with each
other could come within the broad parameters of mental
cruelty.
(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial
life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that
situation is such, that the wronged party cannot
reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and
continue to live with other party.
(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to
cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of
manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a
degree that it makes the married life for the other
spouse absolutely intolerable.
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep
anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse
caused by the conduct of other, for a long time may
lead to mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render
miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one
spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of
the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the
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resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave,
substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,
indifference or total departure from the normal standard
of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or
deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental
cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,
selfishness, possessiveness, which causes
unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset
may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground
of mental cruelty.
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of
the married life which happens in day-to-day life would
not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of
mental cruelty.
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a
few isolated instances over a period of years will not
amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for
a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it
extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer,
may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of
sterilization without medical reasons and without the
consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife
undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical
reason or without the consent or knowledge of her
husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental
cruelty.
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(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for
considerable period without there being any physical
incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental
cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after
marriage not to have child from the marriage may
amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous
separation, it may fairly be concluded that the
matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage
becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By
refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases does
not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it
shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the
parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental
cruelty.”
24. With the mandate of the law in the background, we would like
to examine the oral and documentary evidence on record,
particularly the appellant's evidence. The appellant has been
examined as the first witness, and in his examination-in-chief on
affidavit, he has reiterated the case as pleaded. In his cross-
examination at Para-42, he admits that he saw his daughter for the
first time in October 2007, when his wife came to Mumbai with her
sister and cousin brother, while his daughter was admittedly born in
May 2007. Admittedly, from May 2007 to October 2007, he had not
bothered to see his daughter. The remaining facts that have come
up in the deposition are as per the respective parties' pleadings
regarding illness, hospital admission, etc. In her evidence in
examination-in-chief, the respondent once again reiterates the facts
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as per the pleadings. She says that at present she is working at
BGH and has been a regular employee there since 2010. She
admits to having replied to the notice received from her husband.
After receiving the notice, she tried to contact her husband and
even spoke with him on the telephone. Efforts were made by all the
family members and even common friends, as mentioned at Para
24 of the cross-examination, and then she denied the suggestions
of having meted out cruelty or deserted her husband. Exhibits 1 and
2 are significant. In the notice sent to the present respondent
through the advocate of the present appellant, the allegation of
misbehaviour with the family members since February 2002 is set
out. The notice also alleges desertion and cruelty and demands a
decree for divorce by mutual consent. In the reply notice, which is
marked Exhibit-2, it is categorically stated that the allegations of
cruelty and desertion are false, and that the respondent was treated
with cruelty by the husband and other family members. The date of
birth of the child mentioned in the notice is also stated to be wrong,
which shows his apathy for the family.
The allegation of dowry demand is also there, and it is stated
25.
that, for non-fulfilment of the dowry demand, she was tortured by
the husband and his family members. The allegation of ousting the
respondent from the appellant's house in Mumbai along with her
sister is also stated. Despite this, no legal action was taken, and the
respondent still desired to restore conjugal life. The allegation of
taking away the jewellery and other belongings of the respondent is
also denied, and finally it is stated that, if such a legal notice is not
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withdrawn, the respondent would be compelled to file an
appropriate case before a Court of competent jurisdiction. It was
categorically stated that the respondent was not ready to take any
divorce and would contest any such application made by the
present appellant.
26. On evaluation, we agree with the learned trial court’s view
that no case of cruelty was made out by the appellant to be entitled
to a decree of divorce. With the facts and the mandate of law, the
Filing of a complaint cannot be considered to be an act of cruelty,
and the allegation that the parents of the appellant died due to
shock on account of a complaint filed by the respondent is also
misplaced. No evidence regarding cause of death of the parents of
the appellant has been brought on record. It is admitted that in the
said complaint filed by the present respondent, cognisance of the
offence was taken, which prima facie establishes the correctness of
the allegation.
27. The complaint was dismissed not on the allegation that it was
false or unsubstantiated; rather, it was dismissed for non-filing of
requisites, i.e., on account of non-prosecution. Thus, mere filing of
a complaint and its dismissal for non-filing of requisites under
Section 204(4) of the Cr.P.C. will not amount to cruelty on the
husband. As the aspects of cruelty have not been proved, we are of
the considered view that no interference with the findings qua
cruelty, as returned by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Bokaro, is required . Hence, it is concluded that no case of cruelty
was established by the appellant-husband.
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28. Coming to the case of desertion, since the Trial Court record
is available before us and on perusal of the same, it appears that
the suit was not instituted on the ground of desertion, rather it was
instituted only on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1) (i-a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act. However, in the application for dissolution
of marriage, the ground of desertion was also taken, but there was
no specific pleading as to when the respondent had deserted the
appellant; still, the trial Court framed the issue, and evidence was
taken on behalf of the parties. The learned Trial Court concluded
that sufficient evidence showed the respondent had lived with the
appellant till October 2007; thus, the cause of action for filing an
application for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion
was premature.
29. We are of the considered view that the learned Trial Court's
findings on these aspects also do not require any interference.
Moreover, if Exhibit-2, as brought on record on behalf of the
appellant, is considered, it is apparent that the respondent, in her
reply to the notice issued by the appellant's advocate, categorically
stated that she was still desirous of restoring conjugal life. Thus, the
Animus Deserendi was completely lacking.
30. It is reiterated that no specific averment of the date of
desertion has been made and merely arguing that the respondent
joining the appellant in the month of October 2007 still did not
amount to breaking of the period of desertion, as such living
together, was without any intent to restore the conjugal life, is
insufficient pleading and evidence on the point of desertion. The
F.A. No.206 of 2018
20

child was born in May 2007, while the present suit for dissolution of
marriage was instituted in June 2008. These facts negate the plea
of desertion. We are therefore of the considered view that no
ground of desertion is made out and the finding of the learned Trial
Court on this aspect is also affirmed.
31. In view of the findings made hereinabove, the point for
determination formulated by this Court is decided in favour of the
respondent and against the appellant and it is held that no case of
cruelty by the respondent on the appellant or desertion by the
respondent as alleged by the appellant was made out, sufficient for
the purpose of granting a decree for dissolution of marriage under
Section 13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
I.A. No.702 of 2021
32. This I. A is still pending, which was filed under Section 24 of
the Hindu Marriage Act for maintenance pendentilite for the
respondent and her daughter, Baby Khushi, represented by the
present respondent.
Rejoinder has also been filed to this I.A, where once again
33.
similar plea has been taken, as taken in course of arguments i.e.
filing of a complaint case No.372 of 2008 and subsequent dismissal
of the said case for non-filing of requisites, transfer of the case etc.
The allegations are that such demand is arbitrary and excessive.
34. The affidavit in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Rajnish Vs Neha, reported in
(2021) 2 SCC 324 , has also been filed, which is on record. The
F.A. No.206 of 2018
21

present record also reveals that on several occasions, efforts for
settlement were made, but to no effect. Even the Coordinate Bench
of this Court, while hearing this matter, had made efforts for
reconciliation, having sittings in the chamber, but finally, all such
efforts failed and the possibility of reconciliation in this case has
come to an end.
35. Subsequently, the matter of alimony was also discussed, and
maintenance for the daughter was also under consideration. The
record shows that the directions were given to file salary statements
by both the parties. In compliance thereof, the affidavits were also
th
filed. The order No.42 dated 29 April 2025, shows that the
appellant-husband was ready for settlement on payment of Rupees
Fifteen Lakhs for the proper upbringing of the daughter and the cost
which will be incurred in her marriage and education.
36. For the sake of convenience, the same is quoted as
hereunder: -
th
Order No.42 / Dated : 29 April, 2025
1. Heard Mr. Mahesh Tewari, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant-husband and Mr. Srijit
Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-wife.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted that the husband is ready for settlement on
payment of Rs.15 Lakhs for proper upbringing of the
daughter and the cost which will be incurred in her
marriage and education.
F.A. No.206 of 2018
22

3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife
has not agreed for the same, however, he has submitted
that he will come forth with the proposal of the
respondent-wife on the next date of hearing.
4. Considering the same, let this matter be listed on
08.05.2025.
37. Since no consensus was arrived at, on the point of
pendentilite maintenance to be paid for the daughter and also
considering the proposal made by the husband, we are of the
considered view, that while reserving the right to the parties to file
proper application for maintenance which the daughter has against
her father, the present appellant is directed to deposit Rupees
Fifteen Lakhs before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro,
which shall be deposited in her account to be opened in the name
of minor daughter through her mother to be used for the education
and other expenses of the minor daughter .
38. This is without prejudice to the right of the child to claim
maintenance under the appropriate provisions of law. However, any
such final order of maintenance, if passed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, shall consider the payment of Rupees Fifteen Lakhs,
which shall be deposited by the present appellant in the name of his
minor daughter. The respondent has not claimed any expenses for
herself at this stage. Accordingly, with the above direction, I.A.
No.702 of 2021 stands disposed of.
F.A. No.206 of 2018
23

39. In view of the findings given above, it is held that the present
appeal is meritless and the same is accordingly dismissed, without
any costs.
40. Other I.As, if any pending, do not survive and also stand
disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Manoj Prasad, J.)

th
November, 5 , 2026
BS/-
A.F.R.
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