State Of Punjab And Ors vs The Pred. Offi. Indu. Trib And Anr

CWP No.3935 of 2013
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

CWP No.3935 of 2013 (O&M)

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
....PETITIONERS
Versus

THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BATHINDA
AND ANOTHER
....RESPONDENTS

1 The date when the judgment is reserved 14.10.2026
2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 31.10.2026
3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 03.11.2026
4 Whether only operative part of the judgment is
pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced
Full
5 The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full
judgment, and reasons thereof.
N.A.

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Argued by : Ms. Aakanksha Gupta, AAG, Punjab,
for the petitioners.

Mr. Ankur Goyat, Advocate (Amicus Curiae)
for respondent No.2.

*
KIRTI SINGH, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the Award dated 04.10.2010
(Annexure P-7) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal,
Bathinda (respondent No.1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Tribunal’),
in Reference No.45 of 2004, whereby the reference raised by respondent No.2-
SWARNJIT SINGH workman was answered in his favour and he was held entitled to reinstatement
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with continuity of service and 50% back wages from the date of the demand
notice, i.e. 24.06.2003.
2. Briefly stated, as per the pleaded case of respondent No.2-
workman, he was appointed as a Ward Attendant (Class-IV) in the Health and
Family Welfare Department on 02.09.1993 and continued to work until his
services came to an end on 06.07.1997. He challenged the cessation of his
services on the ground that it was effected without issuing any chargesheet,
conducting an enquiry or paying retrenchment compensation. He further
contended that the action was contrary to the Government of Punjab
instructions/circular dated 26.05.2003, stated to have been issued pursuant to
the order dated 08.04.2003 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal No.5059 of 1997, regarding regularisation of services of employees
appointed on or before 13.06.1996 on 89 days/temporary/ad hoc basis.
According to him, he was on duty on 13.06.1996 and had completed more than
240 days of service in the preceding twelve months. He further alleged that
despite being eligible for the benefit of the aforesaid instructions, he was neither
reinstated nor regularised, whereas his juniors were retained and fresh
appointments were made after his services had come to an end. Accordingly, he
raised an industrial dispute by serving a demand notice dated 24.06.2003
(Annexure P-4) under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for
short, ‘the Act’).
3. The petitioners contested the claim, primarily asserting that the
workman had been engaged purely on ad hoc basis through successive
appointment letters for a period of 89 days and that his services came to an end
on 06.07.1997 after he was not selected by the Selection Committee in the
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recruitment process conducted on 27.06.1997. It was stated that the workman
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had appeared before the Selection Committee along with other candidates, but
was not found suitable, whereas suitable candidates were selected and
appointed on regular basis. The petitioners further asserted that all payments
due to the workman had been made. Preliminary objections were also raised
that the claim was belated, having been raised approximately six years after the
cessation of service, and that the Act was inapplicable to the Health and Family
Welfare Department, being a service department dependent upon public funds.
The applicability of the Government instructions relied upon by the workman
was also disputed.
4. Upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence, the learned
Tribunal framed the following issues:
(i) Whether the services of the workman stood validly
terminated by the management? If not so, to what relief is
he entitled? (OPR)
(ii) Whether the claim was barred by time? (OPR)
(iii) Whether the respondent department does not fall
within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act, if so, its
effect? (OPR)
(iv) Relief.
5. The learned Tribunal held that the claim of the workman was
covered by the Government instructions relating to regularisation of ad hoc
employees appointed on or before 13.06.1996. All the three issues were
decided in favour of the workman and against the management.
Consequently, vide the Award dated 04.10.2010, the learned Tribunal
directed reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and 50%
back wages from 24.06.2003, with a direction to report for duty within 30
days of publication of the Award.
SWARNJIT SINGH
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6. Learned State counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
contends that the impugned Award has been passed without proper
appreciation of the nature of the workman’s engagement and the
documentary material available on record. It is submitted that respondent
No.2-workman was engaged purely on ad hoc basis as Ward Attendant,
Class-IV, and appointment letters were issued to him from time to time for
89 days (Annexures P-1 and P-2). Learned State counsel further submits that
the workman was called for interview along with other candidates and
appeared before the Selection Committee on 27.06.1997 (Annexure P-3).
However, he was not found suitable, whereas suitable candidates were
selected on regular basis and issued appointment letters. It is contended that,
in terms of the conditions of his appointment, the workman’s engagement
came to an end on 06.07.1997. It is further submitted that the workman
served the demand notice dated 24.06.2003 (Annexure P-4) after a period of
approximately six years and that the petitioners had specifically raised
objections regarding delay and the applicability of the Act. The claim was
also denied on merits on the ground that the workman had not been selected
by the Selection Committee.
7. None has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No.2.
Accordingly, vide order dated 04.11.2025, this Court appointed an Amicus
Curiae to represent respondent No.2.
8. Per contra, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for respondent
No.2-workman submits that the workman had worked as Ward
Servant/Attendant, a Class-IV post, from 02.09.1993 till 06.07.1997 to the
satisfaction of the petitioners, when his services were brought to an end
SWARNJIT SINGH
without any notice, chargesheet, enquiry or compensation, despite there
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being no allegation of misconduct against him. It is contended that the
cessation of his services was intended to deprive him of the benefit of
regularisation, as the work of Ward Servant/Attendant was continuing in
nature and had not ceased to exist. Reliance is placed upon the circular dated
25.07.1997 (Annexure R-2/1) issued by the Government of Punjab,
Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, referring to the letter
dated 12.06.1997, whereby, in view of the orders passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, it was directed that the services of employees appointed on
ad hoc/89 days basis should not be terminated and that they would continue
till further orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that the
petitioners failed to take this circular into consideration. Further reliance is
placed upon the office order dated 29.10.2003 (Ex.W/22, Annexure R-2/4)
issued by the office of the Civil Surgeon, Mansa, in pursuance of the
instructions dated 26.05.2003, whereby the services of certain Class-IV
employees and sweepers working on 89 days basis on 13.06.1996 or before
in District Mansa were regularised. It is contended that the case of the
workman was covered by the said instructions and that the petitioners,
without justification, failed to take him back in service.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned
Amicus Curiae appearing for respondent No.2-workman and have perused
the relevant material on record.
10. Vide order dated 22.02.2013, this Court had stayed the
operation of the impugned Award.
11. The principal question arising for consideration is whether the
learned Tribunal was justified in holding the cessation of the workman’s
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services to be illegal and in directing his reinstatement with continuity of
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service and 50% back wages, particularly when his engagement was on
successive 89-day appointments and his claim was also founded upon the
Government instructions relating to regularisation.
12. It is well settled that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India over the awards of
Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, this Court does not sit in appeal over
the findings of fact or undertake a reappreciation of evidence merely because
another view may be possible. Interference is, however, warranted where the
decision suffers from an error of law, perversity or failure to consider
material evidence and the issues arising for adjudication. The scrutiny in the
present case has to be therefore, directed towards examining whether the
learned Tribunal adjudicated the material issues arising from the pleadings
and evidence before it.
13. A perusal of the material on record reveals that the reference
made to the learned Tribunal was essentially concerned with the legality of
the cessation of the workman’s services on 06.07.1997 and the consequential
relief, if any, to which he was entitled. The question, therefore, required
examination of the nature of his engagement, the terms and conditions
governing his successive appointments and the circumstances in which the
engagement came to an end. The learned Tribunal, however, proceeded
primarily on the basis of Ex.W/22 and the Government instructions relating
to regularisation of employees engaged on 89 days basis, without first
examining whether the cessation of the workman’s engagement was
otherwise permissible under the provisions of the Act. The entitlement to
regularisation under an executive instruction and the legality of termination
SWARNJIT SINGH
under the Industrial Disputes Act are distinct questions. Even if an employee
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claims to fall within the ambit of a regularisation policy, such claim does
not, by itself, establish that the cessation of his earlier engagement was
illegal. The objections concerning limitation and the applicability of the Act
also required consideration in the light of the specific pleas raised by the
petitioners.
14. In this context, Ex.W/22 is an office order dated 29.10.2003
(Annexure R-2/4), issued by the office of the Civil Surgeon, Mansa, whereby
certain Class-IV employees and sweepers working on 89 days basis on
13.06.1996 or before were regularised in District Mansa. The said order
refers to the Government instructions dated 26.05.2003. However, the
underlying instructions have not been placed on record before this Court.
Consequently, their precise terms, scope and conditions of eligibility cannot
be ascertained from Ex.W/22 alone. Further, the order relied upon pertains to
employees working in District Mansa, whereas the workman in the present
case was engaged in District Ferozepur. The mere fact that certain
employees in another district were regularised pursuant to the said
instructions could not, without examining the policy itself and the conditions
prescribed therein, establish the workman’s entitlement to the same benefit.
The learned Tribunal was, therefore, required to examine whether the
instructions dated 26.05.2003 extended to the workman’s category of
engagement, whether he fulfilled the stipulated conditions and, more
importantly, what bearing, if any, the said instructions had upon the legality
of the cessation of his services in July 1997. In the absence of such
examination, Ex.W/22 could not have been treated as a sufficient basis for
directing his reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages.
SWARNJIT SINGH
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15. It is also relevant that the workman’s services came to an end
on 06.07.1997, whereas the instructions relied upon by him are stated to
have been issued in the year 2003, almost six years thereafter. The order of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the workman is also dated
08.04.2003. An executive instruction providing for regularisation of
employees fulfilling specified conditions on a particular date cannot, merely
by its subsequent issuance, retrospectively render an earlier cessation of
engagement illegal. Such a consequence would depend upon the actual terms
and scope of the instructions. The learned Tribunal has neither examined
those terms nor recorded a finding that the workman was entitled to
regularisation thereunder. The direction for reinstatement, therefore, could
not have been founded solely upon the subsequent office order.
16. The other documents relied upon by the workman also required
consideration in their proper perspective. The circular dated 25.07.1997
(Annexure R-2/1) was issued after the workman’s services had come to an
end on 06.07.1997. It refers to the judgment of this Court dated 01.04.1997
passed in CWP No.3827 of 1997 and records that its operation had been
stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 24.07.1997. The circular thereafter
conveyed directions concerning the continuation of employees appointed on
ad hoc/89 days/temporary basis till further orders of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. Thus, the stay referred to in the circular came after the cessation of
the workman’s engagement. Similarly, the communications dated
21.01.1999 (Annexure R-2/2) and 15.02.1999 (Annexure R-2/3) relate to
employees working on 89 days basis on or before 13.06.1996 and continuing
in service, whose services were not to be terminated till the final decision of
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the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The learned Tribunal was required to examine
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whether and to what extent these communications applied to the workman,
whose engagement had already come to an end in July 1997. No such
examination is discernible from the Award.
17. The record, on the other hand, shows that the workman was
engaged under successive appointment orders, including Annexures P-1 and
P-2, on an 89-day basis or till the joining of a regular employee, whichever
was earlier. The appointment orders contained a stipulation that the
engagement would come to an end upon expiry of the stipulated period or on
the joining of a regular employee, without any separate notice. MW-1, in his
statement, furnished the dates of the successive spells during which the
workman was engaged between 02.09.1993 and 06.07.1997, with
intervening breaks. According to the said statement, the last spell of
engagement commenced on 09.04.1997 and continued till 06.07.1997. It is
also borne out from Annexure P-3 that a selection process for recruitment of
regular employees was held on 27.06.1997, in which the workman himself
appeared but was not selected. His engagement came to an end shortly
thereafter. These circumstances are material for determining the nature of the
engagement and the circumstances in which it came to an end.
18. In the present case, the workman was engaged under separate
appointment orders for specified periods, with intervening breaks in service;
the appointment orders expressly stipulated the period of engagement or the
joining of a regular employee, whichever was earlier; and a regular selection
process was in fact undertaken on 27.06.1997, in which the workman
participated but was not selected. His last spell of engagement, as stated by
MW-1, commenced on 09.04.1997 and ended on 06.07.1997. The cessation
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of his engagement thus coincided with the conclusion of the specified period
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of the last spell. These circumstances, considered cumulatively, are material
in assessing the genuineness of the fixed-term engagement and distinguish
the present case from one where successive short-term appointments and
artificial breaks are established to have been adopted merely to circumvent
the statutory safeguards. The fact that the workman had earlier been engaged
on similar terms, or that the nature of the work continued to be available,
would not by itself confer upon him a right to continue indefinitely or
convert his ad hoc engagement into a regular appointment.
20. It is true that the statement of MW-1 discloses several spells of
engagement falling within the twelve months preceding 06.07.1997 and that
the workman’s claim under Section 25-F of the Act required consideration.
MW-1 also admitted that no notice, chargesheet, enquiry or retrenchment
compensation was given to the workman when his engagement came to an
end. However, the question of compliance with Section 25-F arises only
where the cessation constitutes retrenchment within the meaning of the Act.
The mere completion of 240 days of work, even if established, does not
dispense with the requirement of examining whether the cessation falls
within the definition of retrenchment or is covered by one of the statutory
exclusions. In the present case, the learned Tribunal did not examine the
applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb), the terms of the successive appointment
orders or the effect of the regular selection process. It proceeded to grant
relief on the basis of the subsequent regularisation instructions. The
admission of MW-1 regarding non-payment of compensation, therefore,
could not have been treated in isolation, without first determining the nature
of the cessation of service. The issue had to be decided by applying the
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tautory provisions to the actual engagement history.
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21. The other objections raised by the petitioners, namely, that the
claim was belated and that the Health and Family Welfare Department does
not fall within the ambit of the Act, have also not been dealt with by the
learned Tribunal through a reasoned discussion. The mere fact that a
department is funded from public revenue would not, by itself, be
determinative of the question whether the establishment or activity in
question falls within the scope of the Act. The nature of the activity and the
applicable legal principles would have to be examined. Likewise, the delay
in raising the industrial dispute, though a relevant consideration while
determining the appropriate relief, cannot be treated as an automatic
statutory bar without examining the facts and the explanation, if any,
available on record. The learned Tribunal has not undertaken such
examination.
22. The requirement of recording reasons by a judicial or quasi-
judicial forum is not an empty formality. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v.
Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated that reasons are an indispensable component of judicial and quasi-
judicial decision-making, as they demonstrate that the relevant material and
legal considerations have been objectively examined and facilitate effective
judicial review. In the present case, the learned Tribunal was required to
consider the effect of the appointment orders, the successive spells of
engagement, the circumstances surrounding the cessation of service, the
statutory provisions governing retrenchment and the Government
instructions relied upon by the workman. The failure to examine these
material aspects has resulted in an Award which does not disclose a proper
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adjudication of the controversy referred to it.
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23. In view of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion of the
learned Tribunal that the workman was entitled to reinstatement with
continuity of service and 50% back wages, substantially on the basis of
Ex.W/22, cannot be sustained. The subsequent office order relating to
regularisation of certain employees in District Mansa did not, by itself,
establish the illegality of the cessation of the workman’s engagement in
District Ferozepur in July 1997. Further, the terms of the workman’s
successive engagements and the circumstances in which the last engagement
came to an end were material considerations which the learned Tribunal
failed to examine. The Award, therefore, suffers from non-consideration of
relevant material and an error in the approach to the controversy, warranting
interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India.
24. For the foregoing reasons, the present writ petition is allowed.
The Award dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure P-7), passed by the learned
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda, in Reference No.45 of 2004,
is set aside.
25. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.

(KIRTI SINGH)
31.10.2026. JUDGE

SwarnjitS

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes

Whether reportable: No
SWARNJIT SINGH
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