M/S Universal Steel Supply Co & Ors. vs Pawan Kumar Saraf & Anr.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Reserved on: 27 July,2026
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Pronounced on: 17 November, 2026
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Uploaded on: 18 November, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010157172026
+ RFA 370/2026, CM APPL. 24829/2026, CM APPL. 24831/2026,
CM APPL. 35201/2026
1. M/S UNIVERSAL STEEL SUPPLY CO
Through its Proprietor Shri Umesh Kumar Garg,
Y-7, Loha Mandi, Naraina,
New Delhi-110028 .....Appellant No.1
2. SHRI UMESH KUMAR GARG
S/o Shri D.R. Garg,
R/o House No.3966, Sector-23,
Gurgaon-122017 .....Appellant No.2
3. SHRI YOGESH KUMAR GARG,
S/o Shri D.R. Garg,
R/o House No. 3966,
Sector-23, Gurgaon122017. ....Appellant No.3
Through: Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta Senior
Advocate with Mr. Abhiesumat
Gupta, Mr. Rishi Bharadwaj, Mr.
Ishan Parashar and Mr. Ashish Singh,
Advocates.
versus
1. SHRI PAWAN KUMAR SARAF
S/o Late Shri Jeewan Ram Saraf ...Respondent No.1
2. SHRI SAILESH SARAF
Signature Not Verified
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By:VIKAS ARORA
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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RFA 370/2026 Page 1 of 34
S/o Late Shri Satya Narain Saraf ....Respondent No.2
3. SHRI SACHET SARAF,
S/o Late Shri Pramod Kumar Saraf
All residents of : 23-A, B.D.Estate,
Timarpur, Delhi-110054. ....Respondent No.3
Through: Mr. Kapil Sankhla, Ms. Richa Sharma
and Mr. Vipul Grover, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. The present Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”), read with Section
10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, has been preferred by the
Appellants/Defendants, M/s Universal Steel Supply Co., Mr. Umesh
Kumar Garg and Mr. Yogesh Kumar Garg , against the Judgment and
Decree dated 13.03.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, New Delhi,
whereby the Suit of the Respondents/Plaintiffs for Recovery of Possession
was decreed, under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
2. The Plaintiffs filed a Suit bearing CS(OS)No.1453/2010 for
Possession and Mesne Profits amounting to Rs.10,08,000/-, from the date of
filing of the Suit as well as, Mesne Profits @Rs.50,000/- per month till the
possession of the suit property, was handed over to the Plaintiffs.
3. The facts in brief , as narrated in the Plaint, are that the Plaintiffs, Mr.
Pawan Kumar Saraf, Mr. Sailesh Saraf and Mr. Sachet Saraf, were the co-
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owners and in possession of Plot No. Y-7 situated at Loha Mandi, Naraina,
New Delhi ( hereinafter referred to as „the suit property‟ ).
4. The Defendant No. 1, M/s Universal Steel Supply Co ., was a
partnership firm of which Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, Mr. Umesh Kumar
Garg and Mr. Yogesh Kumar Garg , were the partners. The Plaintiffs
stated that the Defendants were engaged in the iron and steel business.
Defendant No. 1 was permitted to use the middle portion of Plot No. Y-7,
Loha Mandi, Naraina, measuring 90 feet × 22 feet 6 inches (225 sq. yds.)
( hereinafter referred to as „the suit property‟ ), to store and sell iron and steel
goods, under a Licence Agreement dated 05.05.1994 . The arrangement
was renewed from time to time, with the last Agreement being dated
01.04.2002 . The Plaintiffs further asserted that, under the Licence
Arrangement, actual, physical and legal possession of the suit property
remained with them and the other co-owners.
5. The Plaintiffs further stated that the arrangement required Defendant
No. 1 to pay commission of ₹25 per metric tonne, on the sale proceeds. It
was explained that Plot No. Y-7 had no construction apart from a small
portion temporarily covered by a tin shed, and that the other portions,
marked „A‟ and „C‟, were occupied by M/s H.V. Steels and M/s Sarawagi
Sales , respectively, as licensees. The commission of ₹25 per metric tonne,
was to be calculated on the basis of the Defendants‟ quarterly sales, as
disclosed in their Sales Tax Returns and was reflected in the Accounts as
licence fee. According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants failed to disclose
their actual sales and render true accounts to avoid payment of the
commission, which, they alleged, exceeded ₹84,000 per quarter.
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6. Upon expiry of the Agreement dated 01.04.2002 , the Plaintiffs
claimed that on 31.03.2004, they called upon the Defendants to remove their
goods and material from the suit property. When the Defendants failed to
comply, a Notice dated 19.11.2005 was served, calling them to remove the
goods and pay the commission due on sales, which allegedly exceeded
₹84,000 per quarter. The Defendants gave a false and frivolous Reply dated
06.12.2005 , disputing the Licence Agreement dated 01.04.2002 .
7. On 27.12.2005, the Plaintiffs referred their dispute to Mr. Ram Singh
Goyal, the sole Arbitrator , by filing the Claim Petition. They sought
directions requiring the Defendants to provide their sales accounts and
Sales Tax Returns, pay the commission due with interest, and remove their
goods from the portion in dispute.
8. The Defendants in their Counter-statement and Reply, dated
01.04.2006, to the Plaintiff‟s Claim Petition in the Arbitration proceedings,
denied the licence arrangement and challenged the Arbitrator‟s appointment
and jurisdiction. They contended that the Arbitration proceedings and the
reliefs claimed, were not maintainable and were illegal. The Award dated
08.05.2006 was pronounced by the Sole Arbitrator, against which the
Defendants then filed objections, registered as CS No. 82/2006 , invoking
Sections 12, 13, 16 and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
9. The learned Additional District Judge, Tis Hazari Courts vide
Judgment dated 02.02.2010 , allowed the objections and set aside the
arbitral proceedings and the Award dated 08.05.2006 . At the parties‟ joint
request, the matter was referred to the Mediation Cell. The parties appeared
for mediation on 24.02.2010 , but did not reach a settlement.
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10. The Plaintiffs in the present Suit, claimed that the Agreement dated
01.04.2002 expired on 31.03.2004, by efflux of time. The Legal Notice
dated 19.11.2005 was duly served and therefore, the Suit was filed for
directing the Defendants, to remove their goods from the suit property and
for Damages/Mesne Profits in the sum of Rs.10,08,000/- till the date of
filing and further Mesne Profits @Rs.50,000/- per month, till the decision of
the suit.
11. The Defendants, in their Written Statement , raised a preliminary
objection that the suit was not maintainable because no valid Notice under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, had been issued. They
asserted that the tenancy had not been determined, because the Notice had
not been issued by all the co-owners.
12. According to the Defendants, the property in question had been
allotted to Mr. Satya Narain, Mr. Pawan Kumar Saraf, Mr. Pramod Kumar
and Smt. Parvati Devi , under a Perpetual Lease Deed dated 28.04.1982,
executed by the Delhi Development Authority on behalf of the President of
India. The Notice dated 19.11.2005 , however, had been issued only by Smt.
Parvati Devi Saraf and Mr. Pawan Kumar Saraf; neither Mr. Satya Narain
nor Mr. Pramod Kumar had issued a Notice, which was contended to be
defective.
13. The Defendants also contended that the Suit was barred by Section 50
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 since the monthly rent was ₹2,500, i.e.
below ₹3,500. They claimed to have paid ₹25,000 to Smt. Parvati Devi for
the period from 01.04.2004 to 31.01.2005 by cheque, which, according to
them, she accepted and encashed. Relying on that payment, they asserted
that the Plaintiffs were barred from denying the tenancy.
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14. Defendants claimed that they had been tenants on a month-to-month
basis, since 1994. They contended that the Agreements relied upon by the
Plaintiffs supported a landlord–tenant relationship, rather than a licence and
that their tenancy was protected by the Delhi Rent Control Act; and that the
Suit for Possession and Mesne Profits, was not maintainable.
15. The Defendants further claimed that they had remained in continuous
physical possession of the suit property since 1994, with the Plaintiffs‟
permission and without interference. They asserted that they ran their iron
and steel business independently from the premises, using their own
employees and retaining control over the business.
16. They also contended that the other co-owners, Mr. Satya Narain and
Mr. Pramod Kumar, had never alleged that the Defendants occupied the
property, under a licence. The Defendants further stated that, Plaintiff Nos. 2
and 3, as successors-in-interest of the deceased co-owners, could not now
dispute the Defendants‟ status as tenants, which the deceased co-owners had
never challenged. Lastly, the Defendants objected that Smt. Parvati Devi,
whom they claimed was a co-owner, had not been impleaded as a party to
the Suit.
17. The Defendants also claimed that the Suit was barred by res judicata .
They relied on the Arbitral Award dated 08.05.2006, which had upheld the
validity of the Notice dated 19.11.2005, and the subsequent Judgment dated
02.02.2010, by which the learned ADJ set aside the Award, under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. They claimed that Smt.
Parvati Devi had not challenged the Judgment, which had therefore, attained
finality and was binding on her and the other co-owners.
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18. The Defendants further objected that the plaint should be rejected as
Plaintiff No. 3 had not filed an affidavit in support of the plaint.
19. On merits , the Defendants reiterated that Smt. Parvati Devi was a co-
owner of the suit property. The Defendants admitted that Defendant No. 1
was a partnership Firm and that Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were its partners,
and that the Firm dealt in the storage and sale of iron and steel. They denied,
however, that they had taken the middle portion of the plot on licence or that
the parties had entered into Licence Agreements dated 05.05.1994 and
01.04.2002. Their case was that they had been inducted as month-to-month
tenants in 1994 and had remained tenants since then.
20. Furthermore, the Defendants denied agreeing to pay commission of
₹25 per metric tonne as licence fee or to provide quarterly sales figures
based on their Sales Tax Returns and also denied that the commission
exceeded ₹84,000 per quarter. It was maintained that the arrangement was a
tenancy, not a temporary licence, and that there was no special relationship
between the parties that would support the Plaintiffs‟ claim of a licence and
that they had made this position clear in their Reply dated 06.12.2005, to the
Plaintiffs‟ Legal Notice dated 19.11.2005.
21. They also disputed the accuracy of the Plaintiffs‟ site plan, and
claimed that the Defendants had exclusive possession of the premises and
that the Plaintiffs were not in possession of any part of the suit property.
According to them, the premises included an Office measuring 6 feet × 17
feet, sheds at the front and rear, and the 225-square-yard area they claimed
to occupy as tenants. They also claimed a right to use an area measuring 11
feet × 5 feet to open and close the shutter.
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22. The Defendants further claimed that they had regularly paid rent at
₹2,500 per month from 01.04.2004. They stated that ₹25,000 had been paid
to Smt. Parvati Devi as rent, for the period from 01.04.2004 to 31.01.2005,
and that a further ₹27,500 had been paid to the Plaintiffs as rent for the
period from 01.02.2005 to 31.12.2005. Thus, the relationship was that of
landlord and tenant, not licensor and licensee. It was denied that the plot/suit
property had no construction and claimed that the Plaintiffs had only
symbolic possession, while actual possession remained with the Defendants.
23. The Defendants alleged that the Plaintiffs had suppressed material
facts and taken inconsistent positions, before different forums. They relied
on FIR No. 297/2005, which Plaintiff No. 1 had caused to be registered at
Police Station Naraina on 23.08.2005, against the Defendants and their
brother, Mr. Mukesh Garg. The Defendants described the FIR as false and
malicious, wherein it was alleged that they had threatened a relative of the
Plaintiffs with the help of goons and prevented him from entering the
premises. The FIR referred to an agreement to pay commission initially at
₹25 per metric tonne, increasing to ₹50 per metric tonne. The Defendants
contended that the Plaint did not mention these allegations and took a
contrary position. On that basis, they sought dismissal of the suit.
24. The Plaintiffs, in their Replication , reaffirmed the averments in the
plaint and denied the contrary allegations made in the Written Statement.
25. The Issues on the pleadings were framed on 04.02.2011, which are
as under:-
(i) Whether the defendants are tenants in respect of
the property in dispute as alleged in the written
statement? OPD
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(ii) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Smt.
Parvati Devi Saraf and Mr. Pawan Kumar Saraf as
alleged in the written statement? OPD
(iii) Whether the suit is barred by res judicata as
alleged in the preliminary objection No. 7 in the
written statement? OPD
(iv) Whether construction existed on the property in
dispute at the time it came to be occupied by the
defendants? OPD
(v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profit
and if so to what amount and at what rate? OPP
(vi) Relief.
26. Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Pawan Kumar Saraf, appeared as PW-1 and
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit in support of the Plaintiffs‟ case.
He relied upon the following documents:
Exhibit Number /
Name / Description of Document
Mark
Initial Affidavit of PW-1 Ex. PW-1/A
Corrected Affidavit of PW-1 Ex. PW-1/CA
Site Plan Ex. PW-1/1
Photocopy of Agreement dated 05.05.1994 Mark A
Agreement dated 15.05.1996 Ex. PW-1/2
Commission Certificate dated 23.04.1999 Ex. PW-1/3
Commission Certificate dated 13.04.2000 Ex. PW-1/4
Commission Certificate dated 11.04.2001 Ex. PW-1/5
Commission Certificate dated 01.04.2002 Ex. PW-1/6
Original Income Tax Assessment Form for Assessment
Ex. PW-1/7
Year 2002–2003
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Computation of Income for Assessment Year 2002–
Ex. PW-1/8
2003
Certified Details of Commission from 1994 to 2003–
Ex. PW-1/9
2004
27. Defendant No. 2, Mr. Umesh Kumar Garg, appeared as DW-1 ,
tendered his evidence by affidavit Ex. DW-1/A , and was partly cross-
examined.
28. The request for a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was made
orally by the Plaintiffs‟ counsel, while DW-1 was being partly cross-
examined. Counsel for the Plaintiff also stated that the Plaintiffs were
confining their claim to possession and were no longer pursuing Mesne
profits.
29. In considering whether the Suit could be decided before the
Defendants‟ evidence was completed, the learned District Judge referred to
both Order XII Rule 6 and Order XV Rule 3 CPC and relied on Master Ansh
Kapoor v. K.B. Kapur , CS(OS) 3438/2014, decided on 12.02.2021, in
support of deciding a matter without completing a full trial where no further
evidence was considered necessary.
30. The learned Trial Court considered the submission, but observed that
the Defendants should be given Notice before the matter was decided,
accordingly the matter was listed for arguments on 13.03.2026.
31. The learned District Judge vide impugned Judgment dated
13.03.2026 referred to the Agreements from 1994 till 2002, to conclude that
they were License Agreements inter se the parties and the claim of the
Defendants that they were tenants @Rs.2,500/- per month, was rejected.
32. The learned District Judge further held that the Suit was held to be not
barred by res judicata , in terms of the Award of the Arbitrator or bad for
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non-joinder of Smt. Parvati Devi Saraf, the co-owner of the property. The
Plaintiffs‟ claim for Mesne profits had been abandoned during the trial, so
no finding was made on that claim. It was held that the Plaintiffs were
entitled to decree for Possession and consequently, the Suit of the
Plaintiffs for Possession, was allowed.
33. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 13.03.2026, the
Defendants have preferred the present Regular First Appeal, RFA No.
370/2026 .
34. The grounds of challenge are that the Suit of the Plaintiffs, was not
maintainable in view of the setting-aside of the Award of the Arbitrator,
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The
Defendants/Appellants contend that, after the arbitral Award was set aside,
the Plaintiffs‟ only remedy was to initiate fresh arbitration proceedings and
seek the appointment of an arbitrator by this Court. They further submitted
that the objection concerning arbitration, is a legal objection that may be
raised at any stage, relying on R. Kandasamy (since dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K.
Sarawathy & Ors. , (2025) 3 SCC 513, and McDermott International Inc. v.
Burn Standard Co. Ltd. , (2006) 11 SCC 181.
35. The Defendants/Appellants further contended that the Agreement
dated 01.04.2002 had been executed by Smt. Parvati Devi Saraf and that she
alone could have instituted the Suit. She had initiated the arbitration
proceedings during her lifetime, but had not been impleaded as a Plaintiff, in
the Suit which was subsequently instituted, in 2010. She was claimed to
have executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Plaintiff No. 1, Mr. Pawan
Kumar Saraf. Even assuming that he had acted under that authority, he could
not have instituted the Suit in his own name without joining Smt. Parvati
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Devi Saraf, the principal, as a party. Moreover, the Power of Attorney had
neither been placed on record nor proved and that the impugned judgment
was therefore, bad in law.
36. The Issue about non-joinder of necessary party had been framed and
evidence was required to be completed for adjudication of this Issue. Also,
the applicability of the bar under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
had not been considered.
37. The learned District Judge had decided the Suit, while the
Defendants‟ evidence was still underway and before they had been given an
opportunity to complete it. The Order XII Rule 6 CPC could have been
invoked only if there had been clear and unambiguous admissions, whereas
they had made no admission that they occupied the premises, as licensees.
They challenged the findings on the issues, on the ground that they had not
been allowed to lead evidence.
38. The Written Statement and documents, read as a whole, supported
their case that they had actual physical possession and that the relationship
between the parties was that of landlord and tenant. The learned District
Judge had failed to consider their denial of the alleged Commission
Arrangement and their plea that they were tenants.
39. The Appellants contended that, according to the Plaintiffs, the licence
Agreement had expired by efflux of time on 31.03.2004 and a Notice dated
19.11.2005 had thereafter, had been served on the Defendants. The Plaintiffs
however, had not approached the Court with promptitude and that the Suit
for possession and mesne profits was not maintainable, for which reliance is
placed on Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de
Sequeria , (2012) 5 SCC 370.
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40. Both the Appellants and the Respondents filed Written Submissions,
which largely reiterated the grounds set out in their respective pleadings.
Submissions heard and the record perused .
41. The Plaintiffs/Respondents had pleaded that the
Defendants/Appellants were permitted to occupy the premises under
successive Licence Agreements, beginning with the Agreement dated
05.05.1994 and ending with the Agreement dated 01.04.2002.
42. The Defendants/Appellants had categorically in their Written
Statement, admitted being in possession of the suit property w.e.f.
05.05.1994, but maintained that they had been inducted as month-to-month
tenants.
I. Whether the Plaintiffs have a Locus Standi, to File the Suit:
43. The Appellants had taken a preliminary objection that the Plaintiffs,
Mr. Pawan Kumar Saraf, Mr. Sailesh Saraf and Mr. Sachet Saraf, who had
filed the Suit, had no locus standi to file the present Suit.
44. The Plaintiffs had relied upon the Agreement of 1994, which was
entered with the Defendants, by Mr. Pawan Saraf and the last Agreement
dated 01.04.2002 which was executed by Smt. Parvati Devi, to assert that
though the last Agreement was signed by Smt. Parvati Devi, but she was not
the plaintiff who filed the Suit.
45. This contention is not tenable as the Defendants themselves have
explained in their Written Statement that the Perpetual Lease Deed dated
28.04.1982 was executed by the DDA in favour of Mr. Satya Narain, Mr.
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Pawan Kumar, Mr. Pramod Kumar and Smt. Parvati Devi. Therefore, as per
the own admissions of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs were the owners of the
property. Even if it is accepted that the Last Agreement of 01.04.2002 was
executed by Smt. Parvati Devi, it cannot be overlooked that the Plaintiffs as
per the admissions of the Defendant itself, are the owners of the suit
property.
46. Insofar as the Plaintiffs‟ entitlement to institute the Suit is concerned,
reference may also be made to Ambica Prasad v. Mohd. Alam, (2015) 13
SCC 13, wherein the Supreme Court held that the established owner‟s right
to seek eviction was not defeated merely because his brother had acted as
the landlord, collected rent and executed a subsequent tenancy Agreement.
The fact that the Agreement had been executed by another person did not,
by itself, exclude the rights of the person whose ownership stood
established.
47. More specifically, in India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v.
Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) through LRs , (2004) 3 SCC 178, the
Supreme Court held that one co-owner could institute eviction
proceedings in his own right and on behalf of the other co-owners . Their
consent was presumed unless it was shown that they opposed the eviction
and that the proceedings had been instituted despite their disagreement.
Thus, the mere fact that the last Agreement had been executed by another
co-owner did not, by itself, deprive a co-owner of the right to seek
possession.
48. The Defendants acknowledged in their Written Statement that Mr.
Pawan Kumar Saraf was a co-lessee of the suit property, under the Perpetual
Lease Deed. The mere fact that the last Agreement had been executed by
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Smt. Parvati Devi, did not deprive him of the locus standi to institute the
Suit for Possession. The Appellants‟ objection on this ground is, therefore,
without merit.
49. The Suit filed by the plaintiffs, who are the owners, is
maintainable.
II. Whether the Suit is Barred under Delhi Rent Control Act:
50. It is pertinent to first consider the Defendants‟ objection that the Suit
was barred under the Delhi Rent Control Act. For this purpose, it is first
necessary to examine whether the property let to the Defendants constituted
“ premises”, within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the DRC Act.
51. The Defendants admittedly occupied the suit property, measuring 90
feet × 22 feet 6 inches (225 sq. yds.), forming part of Plot No. Y-7, Loha
Mandi, Naraina. The Plaintiffs claimed that it was a plot of land, except for a
small portion temporarily covered by a tin shed.
52. The Defendants, on the other hand, asserted in their Written Statement
that the property included an office in the front portion and sheds at the front
and rear. Pertinently, in paragraph 1 of their reply on merits in the Written
Statement, the Defendants themselves stated as under:
“the suit property consists of an office measuring 6 ft X 17 ft
and a shed at the front and rear portion constructed on the
plot. Besides having 225 Sq. Yds. under their tenancy, the
Defendants have constructed on the same an office space
in the front side along with the shed etc.”
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53. The Plaintiffs thus, described the property as a plot of land having a
temporary tin shed, and the Defendants themselves admitted that they had
constructed an office and sheds on the plot. The suit property was thus, a
plot of land with temporary structures. The question which arises is whether
a plot of land with temporary structures would qualify as “premises”, under
Section 2(i) of the DRC Act.
54. It is thus, relevant to produce Section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958, which reads as follows:
“„premises‟ means any building or part of a building which is, or is
intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for
commercial use or for any other purpose , and includes—
(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such
building or part of the building;
(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or
part of the building;
but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house;”
55. The “premises” has thus, been defined to include a building or part of
a building let for residential, commercial or any other purpose.
56. Whether a plot of land with temporary structure would come within
the definition of “premises”, was considered by the Supreme Court in the
case of Prabha Manufacturing Industrial Co-operative Society v. Banwari
Lal, AIR 1989 SC 1101, wherein it was held that the property let out was a
plot of land and that the shed constructed by the tenant, did not alter the
nature of the subject matter of the letting. The landlord was, therefore,
entitled to seek possession through a Civil Suit.
57. In Surinder Kumar Jhamb v. Om Parkash Shokeen , 82 (1999) DLT
569 (DB), it was held that where the property let was only land with a
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temporary structure, it could not be termed a building so as to fall within the
definition of “premises” under Section 2(i) of the DRC Act.
58. In Kamla Devi v. Laxmi Devi, (2000) 5 SCC 646, the Supreme Court
explained that the relevant consideration was whether land alone or land
together with a structure, had been let. A structure erected by the tenant did
not, by itself, alter the subject matter of the letting. Similar reasoning was
adopted by the Delhi High Court in Ajit Singh v. Ram Saroopi Devi, 55
(1994) DLT 759.
59. In the present case, the Plaintiffs‟ case was that the property had been
given for the storage and sale of iron and steel and comprised a plot of land
with only a small portion temporarily covered by a tin shed. The office
relied upon by the Defendants was, according to their own pleading,
constructed by them. The relevant consideration was, therefore, the nature of
the property originally let, rather than the structures subsequently raised by
the Defendants.
60. Therefore, the entire arguments of the Appellants that there was no
admission in respect of the crucial facts, is incorrect and there is a clear
admission of the Defendants of being inducted in the suit premises, which
are not covered by the DRC Act. Since the subject matter of the letting was
only a plot of land with a temporary shed, it would not fall within the
definition of “ premises” under Section 2(i) of the DRC Act, and the bar
under Section 50 would not be attracted.
61. Consequently, it is a Civil Suit which is maintainable for Recovery of
Possession, irrespective of whether the premises having been given on lease
or license.
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III. Whether the Suit Premises were Given on Lease or License:
62. Though it has been held that the relevance of the premises being let
out on License or lease, has become irrelevant because the premises have
been held to be not covered under Delhi Rent control Act, but still the
principal contention of the Appellants that they had been inducted into the
suit property as tenants, not as licensees, may still be considered.
63. The Defendants asserted that the Agreements entered into by the
Defendants, can by no stretch of imagination, be termed or equated to the
Agreement of License. To comprehend the contentions of the
Defendants/Appellants, it would be pertinent to refer to the Agreement dated
05.05.1994, which is the First Agreement entered into, between the parties.
The relevant Clauses of the said Agreement are as under:-
AND WHEREAS the party of the Second Part is desirous of
entering into Iron & Steel trade and has approached the party
of the First Part Mr. Pawan Saraf to look after and supervise
their business to which the party of the First Part Mr. Pawan
Saraf has given his consented his services on the following
terms and conditions.
… … …
NOW THIS DEED WITNESSTH AS UNDER:-
1. The second party shall employ its own man to conduct
the sale of product dealt in by it. Under the supervision of the
First party from the premises No. Y-7, Loha Mandi, Naraina,
New Delhi-110028. The salaries of the employees etc. engaged
in the sale of the products of the Second Party by the First Party
shall be paid out of the sale proceeds of the products of the
Second Party.
2. The Second Party shall alone be liable for issuing of bills,
Invoices etc. filing the Sales Tax and Income Tax returns and
shall alone by responsible for all the 1iabilities and obligations
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arising out of or incidental to the conduct of the sales of the
products dealt in by it from the above said premises. The First
Party shall under no circumstances, be liable in respect of the
foresaid matters.
3. The Second Party does not and shall not claim any
interest whatsoever, in any portion of the whole of the said
premises of which the actual, physical and legal possession is
and shall remain with the First Party . The Second Party shall
without any previous notice from the First Party be bound to
remove its goods from the said premises and when require by
the First Party.
4. The Second Party shall have no objection whatsoever , if
the First Party it self deals in or supervises the sales etc. of the
any other party at the above said premises.
5. The Second Party shall be entitled to pay the First Party a
net commission of at the rate of Rs.20/- (Rupees Twenty Only)
per metric ton. On sales proceeds affected by it at the said
premises quarterly. The quarterly sales shall be computed in
accordance with the Sales Tax Returns to be filled by the Second
Party in connection with the above premises. However, the First
Party shall be entitled to check and sign periodically through
its proprietor or any other authorised person, the bills and
invoices showing the sales conducted by the Second Party .
6. That the commission payable to the First Party by the
Second Party shall be calculated only on the sales conducted
from the above said premises and on no other sales conducted
by the Second Party from its other sales offices.
7. The Second Party alone shall be responsible for
maintenance or proper books of accounts and other books to be
shown to the Govt. Authorities and no liability, whatsoever, in
this, connection shall be borne by the First Party.
64. The parties thereafter, entered into successive Agreements dated
15.05.1996, 01.04.1998 and 01.04.2001; the last Agreement was executed
on 01.04.2002. These Agreements contained provisions, similar to those set
out above.
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65. The issue, therefore, was whether the successive Agreements, read
as a whole and in light of the rights and obligations they created,
established a relationship of landlord–tenant or a licensor–licensee.
66. The distinction between a lease and a licence was considered by the
Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor , AIR 1959
SC 1262. The dispute concerned two cloakrooms in the Imperial Hotel that
had been occupied by a hairdresser, under an Agreement framed in language
appropriate to a licence. K. Subba Rao, J. considered the Agreement inter se
the parties and observed that, although the document used phraseology
appropriate to a licence, it was the substance of the Agreement, and not its
form, that mattered; otherwise, clever drafting could camouflage the real
intention of the parties.
67. Reference in this judgement was made in Errington v. Errington,
[1952] 1 All E.R. 149 , wherein Lord Denning stated:
“ The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is
let into exclusive possession is prima facie, to be considered as a
tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the
circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy.”
…. … …
“The question in all these cases is one of the intention: Did the
circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that all that
was intended was that the occupier should have a personal
privilege with no interest in the land?”
The proposition of law was thus stated to be well established (i)
To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease,
the substance of the document must be preferred to the form;
(2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they
intended to create a lease or a license and (3) if the document
creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but if it only
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permits another to make use of the property, of which the
legal possession continues with the owner, it is a license; and
(4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of
the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but
circumstances may be established which negative the
intention to create a lease. Judged by the said tests, it is not
possible to hold that the document is one of licence. Certainly it
does not confer only a bare personal privilege on the
respondent to make use of the rooms. It puts him in exclusive
possession of them, untrammelled by the control and free from
the directions of the appellants. The covenants are those that
are usually found or expected to be included in a lease deed.
The right of the respondent to transfer his interest under the
document, although with the consent of the appellants, is
destructive of any theory of licence.”
68. It was observed in Associated Hotels (supra) that there was a marked
distinction between a lease and a licence . Section 105 of the Transfer of
Property Act defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of the right
to enjoy the property for a specified time in consideration of a price paid or
promised. Under Section 108 of the Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in
possession of the property. A lease therefore, transfers an interest in land,
known as the leasehold interest. During the term of the lease, the lessor
parts with the right to enjoy the property, and the lessee acquires that right
to the exclusion of the lessor.
69. Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, defines a licence as under:
“Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number
of other persons, a right to do or continue to do in or upon the
immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in
the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not
amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right
is called a licence.”
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70. K. Subba Rao, J. explained that if a document gave a person only the
right to use property in a particular way or on specified terms, while
possession and control remained with the owner, the arrangement would
amount to a licence. Legal possession would remain with the owner, and
the licensee would be permitted to use the premises for a particular purpose.
The licence would not create an estate or interest in the property. The Apex
Court observed that the distinction between a lease and a licence was clear,
although the dividing line could sometimes become thin or blurred. It was
further noted that exclusive possession had once been treated as conclusive
proof of a lease, but that the later approach treated it as prima facie
evidence of tenancy, subject to circumstances showing that the parties did
not intend to create one .
71. The principles to elaborate the test to determine lease or licence in a
particular case, was defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Delta
International Ltd vs Shyam Sunder Ganeriwalla And Anr AIR 1999
SUPREME COURT 2607 as under:-
“(1) To find out whether the document creates a lease or a
license the real test is to find out "the intention of the parties";
keeping in mind that in cases where exclusive possession is
given, the line between a lease and a license is very thin.'
(2) The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the
document itself. Mainly, the intention is to be gathered from
the meaning and the words used in the document except
where it is alleged and proved that the document is a
camouflage . If the terms of the document evidencing the
agreement between the parties are not clear, the surrounding
circumstances and the conduct of the parties have also to be
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borne in mind for ascertaining the relationship between the
parties.
(3) In the absence of a written document and when somebody is
in exclusive possession with no special evidence how he got in
the intention is to be gathered from the other evidence which
may be available on record, and in such cases exclusive
possession of the property would be the most relevant
circumstances to arrive at the conclusion that the intention of
the parties was to create a lease.
(4) If the dispute arises between the very parties to the written
instrument, the intention is to be gathered from the document
read as a whole. But in cases where the landlord alleges that
the tenant has sublet the premises and where the tenant in
support of his own defense sets up the plea of a mere licensee
and relies upon a deed entered into, inter se, between himself
and the alleged licensee, the landlord who is not a party to the
deed is not bound by what emanates from the construction of
the deed; the tenant and the sub-tenant may jointly set up the
plea of a license against the landlord which is a camouflage;
in such cases, the mask is to be removed or the veil is to be
lifted and the true intention behind a facade of a self-serving
conveniently drafted instrument is to be gathered from all the
relevant circumstances. Same would be the position where the
owner of the premises and the person in need of the premises
executes a deed labelling it as a license deed to avoid the
operation of rent legislation.
(5) Prima facie, in the absence of a sufficient title or interest to
carve out or to create a similar tenancy by the sitting tenant in
favor of a third person, the person in possession to whom the
possession is handed over cannot claim that the sub-tenancy
was created in his favor; because a person having no right
cannot confer any title of tenancy or sub-tenancy. A tenant
protected under statutory provisions with regard to occupation
of the premises having no right to sub-let or transfer the
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premises, cannot confer any better title. But, this question is not
required to be finally determined in this matter.
(6) Further lease or license is a matter of contract between the
parties. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 inter
alia provides that leases of immovable property may be made
either by a registered instrument or by an oral agreement
accompanied by delivery of possession; if it is a registered
instrument, it shall be executed by both the lessee and the
Lesser. This contract between the parties is to be interpreted or
construed on the well-laid principles for construction of
contractual terms, viz., for the purpose of construction of
contracts, the intention of the parties is the meaning of the
words they have used and there can be no intention
independent of that meaning; when the terms of the contract
are vague or having double intendment, one which is lawful
should be preferred; and the construction may be put on the
instrument perfectly consistent with his doing only what he
had a right to do."
72. The application of these principles to the present case, requires
consideration of the parties‟ pleadings, to ascertain the admitted facts and
the aspects in dispute. The Defendants admitted that they had been in
possession of the suit premises since 1994, but claimed that they occupied it
as tenants. Though the Agreements are not denied, it was claimed that they
were not the License Agreement. The Defendants contended that the
documents relied upon by the Plaintiffs, did not create a licence; instead
evidenced a lease. They asserted that “to the contrary, the Defendants had
entered into a Lease Agreement and by no stretch of imagination, various
documents which have been filed by the Plaintiffs, can be termed or equated
to be Agreement of License .”
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73. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied on a series of Agreements, the
last of which was dated 01.04.2002 which according to its terms, expired on
31.03.2004. It was specifically provided in these Agreements that the
Defendant who was desirous of entering into the iron and steel trade had
approached Pawan Kumar Saraf to look after and supervise the business to
which Mr. Pawan Kumar had consented to render his services on the
following terms.
74. It was further stipulated that the Defendant shall not claim any
interest, whatsoever, in any portion or whole of the Suit premises of which
the actual, physical and legal possession would remain with the Plaintiff. It
further stipulated that Defendant shall not have any objection, whatsoever, if
the Plaintiff itself deals or supervises the sales etc. of any other party from
the Suit premises. Moreover, it was agreed that the Plaintiff would be
entitled to the commission @ Rs.20/- per metric ton. Moreover, the Plaintiff
would be entitled to check and sign periodically through its Proprietor of
any other person the Bills and the Invoices showing the sales conducted by
the Defendants.
75. Not only this, the Plaintiff along with the Plaint had placed on record
the Annual Commission Receipts reflecting the payment of commission
from 1994-95 which varied from Rs.11000/- to Rs.22,000/- in 2003-04.
76. It is admitted by the Defendant that the Claim Petition before the
Arbitrator was preferred by the Petitioner, wherein he had filed his Reply,
wherein he had admitted that it was agreed that the rent would be paid by
way of annual commission, in order to avoid the consequences arising out of
Municipal/DDA by-laws and the relationship of the parties was mutually
regulated through the Agreement meant for showing the payment of rent as
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commission, but in fact, it was rent only. The relevant portion of Ex.P9 is as
under :
“Since the very beginning, the parties had agreed to the
effect that their relationship shall be that of the landlord
and tenant but in order to avoid the consequences arising
out of the Muncipal/DDA bya-law, the nature of
relationship of the parties was being mutually regulated
through the, agreements meant for showing the payments
of rent as under the head, "commission" but in fact was
rent only. In fact the commission amount was mutually
agreed to be the rent amount. But after perishment of said
alleged agreement dt. 31-3-2004, due to system of
showing the payment of rent as commission created
difficulties in book-keeping of the parties arose as pointed
out by accountant and therefore parties decided to have
the correct system of payment of rent from commission
head to the fixed rent of Rs 2,500/- per month. In this way
after 31-03-2004 (expiry of agreement) the parties had
agreed that henceforth the fixed rent of Rs. 2500/- were to
be paid by the respondents to the claimants and
accordingly with effect from 01-04-2004 the respondents
have been paying the rent of the premises in question at
the fixed rate of Rs. 2500/- per month. The rent for the
period of 01-04-2004 to 31-01- 31-01-2005 amounting to
Rs: 25,000/- was paid by the respondents vide cheque
bearing No. 067107 dated 14-01-2005 issued in favour of
Smt. Parvati Devi Sarraf.”
77. The Defendant while was silent in the Written Statement about the
mode of payment, but had specifically admitted in his Counter Statement
filed in the Arbitration proceedings that the monthly charges were being
paid as a commission @ Rs.25 per metric ton. From these specific Clauses
and the mode of payment of the annual charges, it can easily be inferred that
the intention of the parties was not to create any tenancy, but only a license
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permitting the Defendant to use the property for the purpose of storage and
sales of iron and steel.
78. The question which arises is whether the admissions made by the
Defendants in their Counter-Statement filed in the Arbitration proceedings,
can be read against them in the present Suit, more so when the Arbitral
Award dated 08.05.2006 has since been set aside. Order XII Rule 6 CPC
empowers the Court to pass a judgment where “admissions of fact have
been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in
writing” .
79. The scope of the expression “or otherwise” was explained by the
Supreme Court in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal , 2025 INSC 467, as
under:
“35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to include
all cases of admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the
pleadings. Under Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held
that the words “or otherwise” without the words “in
writing” used in Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be
given upon oral or verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re,
(1894) 1 Ch D 499] The Amendment Act of 1976, however,
made the position clear stating that such admissions may be
“in the pleading or otherwise” and “whether orally or in
writing”. Thus, after the amendment in Rule 6, the
admissions are not confined to Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 6,
but are of general application. Such admissions may be
express or implied (constructive); may be in writing or oral;
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or may be before the institution of the suit, after the suit is
brought or during the pendency of proceedings.”
80. The Counter-Statement dated 01.04.2006 was filed by the Defendants
themselves, in proceedings between the same parties and in respect of the
same suit property, much before the institution of the present Suit, in 2010.
The admissions contained therein are thus, admissions made “before the
institution of the Suit” , which may be read against the Defendants under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The setting aside of the Award on the ground
concerning the appointment of the Arbitrator, does not efface these
admissions. What was set aside was the adjudication by the Arbitrator, not
the statements of fact made by the Defendants in their own pleading. Nor is
the admission diluted by the Defendants‟ assertion that the commission was
“in fact rent” .
81. The averments in the Counter-Reply, admitted are that the
relationship between the parties “since the very beginning” was regulated
through the Agreements and that the payments were made under the head
“commission” . Whether these payments were rent is only the Defendants‟
characterisation of the arrangement, which is for the Court to determine on
the terms of the Agreements, as discussed above.
82. Pertinently, in their Written Statement, the Defendants denied having
agreed to pay commission @Rs.25 per metric tonne or to furnish quarterly
sales figures on the basis of their Sales Tax Returns. This denial stands
belied by their own Counter-Statement. In Rajiv Ghosh (supra), the Supreme
Court declined to accept the defendant‟s plea that the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997 was not applicable to him, observing that if the Act did
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not apply, there was no good reason for him to have filed an Application
under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of that Act. Similarly, the Defendants having
themselves admitted the Commission arrangement in the arbitration
proceedings, cannot be permitted to deny it in the present Suit.
83. From the terms of the Agreement coupled with the conduct of the
parties, it is evident that it was a license which was created in favour of the
Respondent for which the charges had been fixed on commission basis; it
cannot be said that there was a tenancy created in favour of the Respondent.
84. It is also pertinent to refer to the Site Plan, the correctness of which
has not been denied by the Defendants, wherein it is shown that the entire
property in question is one plot of land and the suit premises is the middle
portion which has been demarcated by pillars, while the portion of the
property on left and the right side, have been given to third parties on
commission basis.
85. Also, the site plan reflects that the shutter giving access to the suit
property which is in the middle of the plot, also extends to the adjoining part
of the plot which has been given on commission basis to the third party.
This further corroborates that the Defendant was inducted as a licensee in
the subject suit premises. It all shows that the intention of the parties was to
create a license and not the Lease, on the comprehensive reading of the
document.
86. The ancillary objection was taken that the rate of rent was Rs.2,500/-
p.m., instead of the earlier mode of payment. The Appellants have nowhere
denied or challenged the contents of the Agreements relied upon by the
Plaintiffs, but have asserted that after the expiry of the license in 2004, it had
approached the Plaintiffs, to enter into an oral Agreement of tenancy on
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payment of the rent of Rs.2,500/- per month. There is not a whisper in the
Written Statement as to how and when the parties entered into an
Agreement, whereby the rate of rent was affixed.
87. In order to buttress this contention, it was asserted that the rent
@Rs.2,500/- per month amounting to Rs.25,000/- for the period 01.04.2004
to 31.01.2005, was paid through cheque to Smt. Parvati Devi, which was
encashed by her. Merely tendering an amount to Smt. Parvati Devi, would
not constitute a creation of tenancy especially when the relationship is traced
from 1994, which was by virtue of the Agreements and after the expiry of
the Agreement in 2004 did not enter into any fresh Agreement.
88. Pertinently, the Defendant had tendered an additional amount of
Rs.27,500/- by cheque by the same was not encashed and the amount was
returned by the Plaintiff.
89. In view of the aforesaid, since it was a license created in respect of a
plot of land with the temporary shed, it cannot be said that the bar of Delhi
Rent Control Act is attracted in the present case.
IV. Whether the license/lease of the Plaintiffs, was Validly Terminated:
90. The other significant consideration was that the license/lease of the
Plaintiffs, was admittedly terminated vide Legal Notice dated 19.11.2005 to
which, the Reply dated 06.12.2005 was admittedly given by the Defendants.
The license/lease of the Defendants, having been terminated validly, the
Plaintiffs/Respondents were entitled to recovery of possession of the suit
property, which has been rightly decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC by
the learned District Judge.
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V. Whether the Suit is barred by Res-judicata, in View of the
Arbitration Proceedings:
91. Another objection raised by the Appellants was that the Plaintiffs had
initiated arbitration proceedings, in which an Award dated 08.05.2006 had
been passed by the learned Arbitrator. Although the Award had been set
aside by the learned ADJ vide Order dated 02.02.2010, the Appellants
contended that the findings recorded in those proceedings, had attained
finality, having remained unchallenged by the Plaintiffs, and barred the
institution of the present Suit.
92. The plaintiffs had undeniably, filed for arbitration, in terms of their
Agreements, in which an Award dated 08.05.2006 , was passed in favour of
the Plaintiffs. However, the objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, filed by the Defendants, was allowed by the
learned ADJ, and the Award was set aside on grounds concerning the
independence of the appointment of the Arbitrator, under Section 12 of the
Act. Thereafter, the parties had sought permission to appear before the
Mediation Centre, which was granted. It was further directed that, if the
parties were unable to settle their disputes amicably, they would be at
liberty to take steps for the appointment of a new Arbitrator.
93. The Plaintiffs, instead of commencing fresh arbitration proceedings,
instituted the present Suit for Recovery of Possession. The
Defendants/Appellants did not seek a reference to arbitration, under Section
8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In the absence of a timely request
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for such a reference, the existence of the Arbitration Agreement did not, by
itself, bar the Civil Suit. The liberty granted to seek the appointment of a
new Arbitrator likewise did not, by itself, exclude the civil remedy.
94. Moreover, the Arbitral Award had been set aside on grounds
concerning the independence of the Arbitrator. Its findings could not,
therefore, be treated as subsisting findings, binding upon the parties in the
present Suit. The finality of the Order setting aside the Award, did not revive
the findings contained in that Award. Nor did the setting aside of the Award
amounted to an adjudication on the merits of the Plaintiffs‟ claim for
possession. Consequently, the plea that the present Suit was barred by res
judicata, is without merit.
VI. Whether Order XII Rule 6 CPC was Rightly Invoked at the Stage
When the Evidence of Defendant was being Recorded:
95. Lastly, the Appellants objected that the Suit was at the stage of cross-
examination of DW-1, when Order XII Rule 6 CPC was invoked for passing
the decree for possession. It was contended that there were several disputed
facts which required evidence and that it was inappropriate to pass a decree
on admissions, when almost the entire evidence had been recorded over a
period of more than fifteen years, since the institution of the Suit in 2010.
96. This contention is without merit as the stage of the proceedings did
not, by itself, preclude the passing of a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
The relevant consideration was whether the material facts necessary for
granting the relief stood clearly and unequivocally admitted.
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97. In this regard, the learned District Judge relied upon Charanjit Lal
Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan , AIR 2005 SC 2765, wherein reference was
made to Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India & Ors. ,
(2000) 7 SCC 120. The object of Order XII Rule 6 CPC was explained as
enabling a party to obtain a speedy judgment, at least to the extent of the
relief to which the admissions of the opposite party, established an
entitlement. Consequently, where the requisite admissions were available,
the mere fact that evidence had commenced and recorded over ten years, did
not require the Suit to proceed through the remainder of the trial.
98. In Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment
Corporation , (1976) 4 SCC 687, the Supreme Court explained, in the
context of Order XXXVII CPC, that Leave to Defend could be refused
where the defence was illusory, sham or practically moonshine.
99. This principle could be referred to by analogy; where there are clear
and unequivocal admissions establishing the entitlement to the relief
claimed, a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC could well be passed, as
recording evidence in regard to admitted facts, is an exercise in futility.
Conclusion :
100. The aforesaid discussion establishes that the Defendants occupied the
suit plot under the Plaintiffs, whether as lessees or licensees, that their right
to continue in possession was validly terminated by the Legal Notice, and
that the Suit was not barred under Section 50 of the DRC Act.
Consequently, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession.
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101. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the Suit for
Possession, has been rightly decreed by the learned District Judge under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
102. There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby, dismissed .
The pending Applications are also disposed of, accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 17, 2026/RS
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