KARNA RAM vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 5860/2026
CNR: RJHC010442842026 | URN: CRLMB / 13031U / 2026
Karna Ram S/o Lichhman Ram, Aged About 19 Years, R/o
Gaurera,shri Balaji, Nagaur, Rajasthan Presently Accused
Confined In District Jail, Nagaur
----Petitioner
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through Special Public Prosecutor
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Tapendra Sankhla
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Choudhary, AAG with
Mr. Sameer Pareek, PP
Mr. Om Prakash Gora, CI, Police Line,
Nagaur
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT
Order
Reportable
1. Date of conclusion of arguments : 05/11/2026
2. Date of which order was reserved : 05/11/2026
3. Whether the full order or only the
operative part is pronounced : Full Order
4. Date of pronouncement : 18/11/2026
1. The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by way of
filing an application under Section 483 B.N.S.S. at the instance of
accused-applicant. The requisite details of the matter are
tabulated herein below:
S.No. Particulars of the Case
1. FIR Number 22/2026
2. Concerned Police Station Shri Balaji
3. District Nagaur
4. Offences alleged 137(2), 64(2)(m), 127(4) of
BNS, 2023 & 3/4
POCSO Act
5. Date of passing of impugned order 28.04.2026
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2. Learned counsel for the accused-applicant submits that the
applicant has been falsely implicated in this case and the
investigation against him is complete. He further submits that
there are no chance of applicant-accused fleeing from the
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.
2.1 Learned counsel for applicant contended that the FIR in
question has been lodged involving false and concocted allegation.
FIR was lodged by the father of the victim upon finding his minor
daughter missing. As per the FIR, on 15.02.2026, at around 3:00
A.M., the applicant-Karanaram, allegedly lured away and abducted
his 14-year-old daughter, victim-‘J’. It was further alleged therein
that one Dinesh, son of Kishorram, had dropped the applicant and
the victim at Jodhpur on his motorcycle and informed the
complainant that the applicant had paid him Rs. 500/- for the
same. The complainant also alleged that the victim had taken a
keypad mobile phone belonging to the family and that the
applicant had broken the same after removing its SIM card.
2.2 Learned counsel submits that, contrary to the allegations in
the FIR, the applicant and the victim ‘J’ were in a consensual
relationship and the victim ‘J’ had voluntarily accompanied the
applicant and remained with him for more than a month at
Nippani, Karnataka, without raising any alarm or seeking
assistance. It is further submitted that the applicant and the
victim were subsequently traced by the police and brought to
Nagaur. Upon their arrival, the victim was counselled and a
conversation was arranged between her and her parents. She was
also produced before the Child Welfare Committee, which directed
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that she be handed over to her parents. It is contended that,
pursuant thereto, the victim was sent with her parents, whereas
the applicant was taken into custody.
2.3 Learned counsel has also raised serious objections regarding
the legality of the applicant's arrest and subsequent extension of
remand. In this regard, an additional affidavit has been filed on
behalf of the applicant, alleging that he was arrested on
15.03.2026 at Nippani, Karnataka, and was thereafter brought to
Rajasthan without being produced before any Magistrate during
transit. It is submitted that the applicant remained in continuous
custody from the date of his apprehension and was not released at
any point thereafter. However, his formal arrest was shown at
10:45 P.M. on 19.03.2026, and the arrest-related documents also
reflect discrepancies regarding the actual date of arrest. The
applicant was eventually produced before the learned Additional
Judicial Magistrate No. 1 on 20.03.2026 at around 2:10 P.M. and
remanded to police custody. Learned counsel contends that the
period during which the applicant remained in custody without
being produced before a Magistrate amounts to unauthorised
detention and by itself, warrants his release on bail.
2.4 It is further contended that even after formally showing the
applicant's arrest, the mandatory procedure prescribed under the
Section 187 BNSS for authorisation of remand was not followed.
Learned counsel submits that the remand orders indicate that the
applicant was not physically produced before the learned
authority, either personally or through video conferencing, when
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his remand was extended, thereby rendering the subsequent
remand proceedings legally unsustainable.
2.5 Lastly, learned counsel submits that the grounds of arrest
were never communicated to the applicant at the time of his
arrest, in violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and
Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, corresponding
to Section 47 of the BNSS. Placing reliance upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar v. State of
Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799 , learned counsel contends that
non-communication of the grounds of arrest vitiates the arrest
and entitles the applicant to be released on bail.
2.6 Learned counsel for the applicant further contends that there
are material inconsistencies between the statements of the victim
recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS and her
subsequent testimony before the Court. It is submitted that, in
her earlier statements, the victim specifically named one Dinesh
as the person who had accompanied the applicant on a motorcycle
on 15.02.2026 and had allegedly dropped the applicant and the
victim at Jodhpur. However, in her subsequent testimony before
the Court, she neither referred to Dinesh nor attributed any role to
him and instead stated that the applicant alone had taken her to
Jodhpur. It is further pointed out that, while the victim stated in
her statement under Section 183 of the BNSS that the applicant
had taken her to Goa, she subsequently deposed before the Court
that she had been taken to Nippani in Karnataka.
Learned counsel submits that these material variations,
coupled with the fact that the victim allegedly remained with the
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applicant for about a month without raising any alarm or seeking
assistance, cast doubt on the prosecution version.
2.7 Learned counsel further submits that the victim's allegations
of forcible sexual assault are not corroborated by the medical
examination, which does not disclose any visible bodily injury. The
final medical opinion has also been reserved pending receipt of the
FSL report. It is, therefore, contended that the material collected
during investigation does not sufficiently support the allegations
levelled against the applicant.
2.8 Lastly, learned counsel submits that the applicant is a young
boy aged about 19 years, has no criminal antecedents and that his
continued incarceration may adversely affect his mental and
physical well-being. On these grounds, learned counsel prays that
the applicant be enlarged on bail.
3. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Deepak
Choudhary, assisted by learned Public Prosecutor as well as
investigating officer, vehemently opposed the bail application. It is
contended that, having regard to the nature and gravity of the
alleged offences and the fact that the victim was aged 14 years
and 5 months at the time of the incident, the applicant does not
deserve the concession of bail.
4. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the
Investigating Officer, denying the allegation of the applicant
having been kept in illegal detention from 15.03.2026 to
19.03.2026. This Court, vide order dated 02.11.2026, directed the
Investigating Officer to place on record the CCTV footage of the
police station for the date on which the applicant's arrest was
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formally shown, as well as the call detail records and tower
location of the applicant's mobile phone. In compliance with the
aforesaid directions, the Investigating Officer, in the counter-
affidavit, has stated that the alleged incident pertains to March
2026 and that the digital video recorder (DVR) of the CCTV
cameras installed at the concerned police station does not retain
footage beyond 180 days. Consequently, the CCTV footage dated
19.03.2026 is no longer available.
4.1 With regard to the call detail records and tower location
data, it is stated that, as per the information furnished by the
service provider, Jio, to the Superintendent of Police, Nagaur, the
applicant's mobile phone was located at Nippani on 13.03.2026,
thereafter at certain locations in Maharashtra, and was
subsequently found to be switched-off. Accordingly, the call detail
records and tower location data were available only for the period
from 10.03.2026 to 15.03.2026, and no further data could be
obtained thereafter. Thus, apart from the mere allegation of illegal
detention from 15.03.2026 to 19.03.2026, no material has been
placed on record by way of the additional affidavit to substantiate
such detention. Moreover, the said allegation has been specifically
denied in the counter-affidavit. Hence, there is no prima facie
material on record to suggest that the applicant was kept in illegal
detention during the said period from 15.03.2026 to 19.03.2026.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
6. Although the applicant has alleged that he was taken into
custody on 15.03.2026, whereas his formal arrest was recorded
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on 19.03.2026, no material has been placed on record to
substantiate the allegation of his illegal detention during the
intervening period. The charge-sheet indicates that, upon the
applicant and the prosecutrix being brought back to the town,
their respective parents were called and, having regard to their
age, both were handed over to their family members. Neither the
additional affidavit nor the counter-affidavit brings forth any
material to suggest that the applicant was kept in police custody
between 15.03.2026 and 19.03.2026. In the absence of any such
material, the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the
applicant, namely Vihaan Kumar (supra) , does not advance his
case.
6.1 A perusal of the order-sheets reveals that the applicant was
arrested on 19.03.2026 at 10:45 P.M. and was physically produced
before the learned ACJM No. 1, Nagaur, at 2:10 P.M. on
20.03.2026. Vide order dated 20.03.2026 (Annexure-3), the
learned ACJM No. 1, Nagaur, allowed the application seeking police
custody of the applicant for the period from 20.03.2026 to
27.03.2026. The remand application records that the investigation
was also required to be undertaken at Nipani, Karnataka, where
the alleged offence of sexual penetration had taken place.
Pursuant to the information recorded under Section 23 of the BSA,
the place of occurrence was identified in Karnataka, necessitating
the police to undertake a journey of approximately 2,000
kilometres to and fro from Nagaur.
6.2 Thereafter, on 26.03.2026, the Investigating Officer moved
another remand application seeking 15 days' judicial custody of
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the applicant. Since the learned Special Judge, POCSO Cases, was
on leave, the application was presented before the learned Judicial
Magistrate, Khimsar, who, upon the applicant being produced
before the Court, remanded him to judicial custody until
27.03.2026, taking note of the nature of the alleged offence and
the contents of the case diary.
Subsequently, on 28.03.2026 the remand papers were
forwarded to the learned Special Judge, POCSO Cases, through
the District Jail, Nagaur. Since learned judge was on leave, the
matter was placed before link Court. The applicant was not
physically produced before the link Court on that date. However,
the judicial custody warrant and remand papers received from the
District Jail, Nagaur, were placed before the Court, whereupon the
link Court extended his judicial custody until 10.04.2026,
observing that the charge-sheet had not yet been filed and
granting further time to the prosecution for its submission.
6.3 It is the case of the applicant that the extension of his
judicial custody vide order dated 28.03.2026, without his
production before the link Court either physically or through
audio-video electronic means, was contrary to the mandate of the
proviso to Section 187(4) of the BNSS. It is submitted that the
said provision mandates the production of an accused before the
Magistrate, either physically or through audio-video electronic
means, before authorising further detention. Reliance is also
placed upon Section 530 of the BNSS, which permits proceedings,
including remand proceedings, to be conducted through electronic
communication or audio-video electronic means.
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6.4 This Court has considered the aforesaid submissions and
perused the relevant remand orders. The record reveals that the
applicant was physically produced before the remand Magistrate
on 23.03.2026 and again on 26.03.2026, when he was remanded
to judicial custody. The controversy is confined to the subsequent
extension of judicial custody by the link Court on 28.03.2026 in
the absence of the applicant.
6.5 A perusal of the order dated 28.03.2026 reveals that the link
Court, after examining the remand papers, specifically recorded
that the petitioner had already been remanded to judicial custody
on 26.03.2026 and extended the period of such custody until
10.04.2026. Thus, the order dated 28.03.2026 did not authorise
detention afresh but merely extended the judicial custody already
authorised by the competent Court.
6.6 For convenience, Section 187(4) BNSS is reproduced herein
below:
“No Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in
custody of the police under this section unless the accused
is produced before him in person for the first time and
subsequently every time till the accused remains in the
custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend
further detention in judicial custody on production of
the accused either in person or through the audio-
video electronic means. ”
(emphasis supplied)
6.7 A plain reading of Section 187(4) BNSS indicates that the
provision makes a clear distinction between the procedure
prescribed for authorising police custody and that governing the
extension of detention in judicial custody. While the legislature has
employed the expression “shall” in respect of the personal
production of the accused before the Magistrate for authorising
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police custody, it has used the expression “may” in relation to the
production of the accused, either in person or through audio-video
electronic means, for the purpose of authorising further detention
in judicial custody. This distinction reflects the legislative intent to
make physical production of the accused mandatory before an
order of police remand is passed, while providing procedural
flexibility in cases of judicial remand.
The requirement of personal production for police custody
serves as an important safeguard against arbitrary exercise of
power and custodial coercion, ensuring that the Magistrate has an
opportunity to interact with the accused and independently assess
the necessity and legality of the proposed police custody.
6.8 However, the provision does not, by itself, confer any
entitlement to bail upon non-production of the accused at the time
of extension of judicial custody. The legality of an order extending
judicial custody must be examined in the light of the statutory
scheme and the circumstances in which such an order was passed.
Mere non-production, whether physically or through audio-video
electronic means, would not, in itself, render the detention illegal
so as to entitle the accused to release on bail. Consequently, in
the present case, the applicant's non-production before the link
Court, either physically or through audio-video electronic means,
does not, by itself, furnish a ground for his release on bail.
6.9 The aforesaid view also finds support in the decision of the
Karnataka High Court in D. Gundappa v. State of Karnataka,
2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1149 , decided on 05.06.2017. The
relevant observations are reproduced below:
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“17. It is held in the above case by the Division Bench that
the decision in Raj Narain's case holds good even under the
new Code of 1973 that wherever it is not possible to
produce the accused before the court bodily, the court
cannot insist upon the production of the accused and cannot
refuse to pass an order of remand. Therefore, it follows
that mere non-production of the accused before
extending the remand does not render the custody of
the accused illegal. In the instant case, the custody of the
petitioner/accused is seen to have been continued without
there being specific order of remand by the learned
Magistrate; but that by itself, in the light of the proposition
referred above, does not render the custody of the
petitioner illegal even though the continuation of the
custody without authorization may give rise to a cause of
action to the petitioner for the remedy of habeas corpus or
for damages depending upon the circumstances of the case.
In the absence of any provision either in Section 167 or
section 209 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot seek his release
on bail on the ground that the custody was extended
without an order of remand or without his production before
the Magistrate. The very same question fell for consideration
before another Division Bench of this High Court in the case
of SAJJAD v. STATE OF KARNATAKA by IG Prisons, ILR
2005 KAR 3313 and relying on the ratio laid down in Raj
Narain's case, it was held that an order of remand in
the absence of the accused is not an illegality and that
merely on the ground that the remand order was
passed in the absence of an accused, the accused
cannot be released on bail. We are in agreement with
this proposition and therefore, the contrary view taken by
the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the
case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in A.
Narayana Reddy v. State of A.P., 1991 (3) Crimes 873 does
not commend to us.”
(emphasis supplied)
6.10 The aforesaid legal position has also been considered by
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in in Ashish Shakya (Dr) v. CBI,
2026 SCC OnLine All 7644 , decided on 22.05.2026. Interpreting
Section 187(4) of the BNSS, 2023, the Hon'ble Court observed
that while negative and mandatory language governs police
custody, the provision for extending judicial custody is enabling,
using the word “may” . Relying upon the Constitution Bench ruling
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in Raj Narain v. Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi;
AIR 1971 SC 178 , the Court held that mere non-production,
either physically or via audio-video means does not per se vitiate
an order extending judicial custody when rendered impossible by
circumstances beyond control, nor does it entitle the accused to
automatic release or default bail. Relevant paragraphs are
reproduced herein below:
“16. It is to be noted that Section 187(4) of BNSS,
2023 further provides that no Magistrate shall authorise
detention of accused in custody of police under this section
unless accused is produced before him in person for first
time and subsequently every time till accused remains in
the custody of police, but the Magistrate may extend further
detention in judicial custody on production of accused either
in person or through audio-video electronic means. A
perusal of said provision would show that insofar as police
custody is concerned, provision employs negative language
creating a protective bar against arbitrary arrest or
detention by police. However, insofar as judicial custody
of accused is concerned, the language under
Section 187(4) of BNSS, 2023 is in nature of
empowering Magistrate to extend judicial custody of
accused on production in person or through the
audio-video electronic means .
xxxx
40. It is further to be noted that law does not
contemplate default bail or release of accused in the
event of non-production of accused before the court
concerned (as is the case under
Section 187(3) of BNSS, 2023) at the time of
extension of judicial custody. The question of validity of
remand (to judicial custody) of accused by court concerned
without production of accused is to be examined in facts and
circumstances of each case in the light of impossibility.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. Although the applicant has alleged that the grounds of arrest
were not communicated to him at the time of his arrest, the arrest
memo placed on record reflects that the particulars of the FIR,
along with the offences alleged therein, were duly recorded and
served upon the applicant. The applicant's contention is that mere
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disclosure of these particulars does not satisfy the mandate of
Section 47 BNSS; rather, the basic facts constituting the alleged
offence must also be set out. In support of this submission,
reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Vihaan (supra) . In considered opinion of this
Court, the objection raised by the applicant cannot be considered
in isolation or as an automatic ground for grant of bail. In State
of Rajasthan v. Jhabra Ram, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 2270 , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, while recognising the importance of
communicating the grounds of arrest as a constitutional and
statutory safeguard, has observed as under:
“16. We have no hesitation in observing that the
communication of grounds of arrest is a crucial
constitutional and statutory safeguard under Article 22(1)
of the Constitution and Section 47 of the BNSS, designed
to ensure that an arrested person is promptly
apprised of the reasons for his apprehension so as to enable
him to consult legal counsel, oppose remand, and seek legal
remedies effectively. There can be no dispute as to the
principles reflected in the judgments of this Court in Pankaj
Bansal (supra), Prabir Purkayastha (supra) and Mihir Rajesh
Shah (supra), but the facts emerging from the material on
record in the present case unequivocally establish that there
was substantial and effective compliance with this
mandate of law.
17. In an application seeking regular bail under
Section 483 of the BNSS, the Court is mandated to consider
well-settled statutory and judicial parameters, including: (i)
the nature and gravity of the accusation; (ii) the
severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iii)
the danger of the accused absconding or tampering with
evidence; and (iv) the overarching impact on public interest
and national security. A hyper-technical objection
regarding the form or mode of communicating
grounds of arrest cannot be treated as a self-
executing, blanket key to unlock regular bail,
bypassing the core parameters governing bail
jurisprudence. ”
(emphasis supplied)
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7.1 In view of the aforesaid, the arrest memo, which records the
particulars of the FIR and the offences alleged therein, cannot be
said to be wholly devoid of information concerning the basis of the
applicant's arrest. Further, the applicant has not demonstrated any
prejudice caused to him on account of the alleged deficiency in
communicating the elaborate grounds of arrest. Having regard to
the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jhabra Ram
(supra) , this Court is of the opinion that the objection, in the
facts of the present case, does not independently warrant grant of
bail, particularly when the applicant is facing serious allegations
under the POCSO Act, enacted for the protection of children from
sexual offences.
8. This Court has also considered the merits of the case.
Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the relationship
between the applicant and the victim was consensual; that the
victim accompanied him of her own free will; and that she neither
raised any alarm nor attempted to escape during her stay at
Neppani. This Court finds no merit in these submissions.
Admittedly, the victim was only 14 years old at the relevant time
and, therefore, her consent has no legal recognition. Further, her
failure to raise an alarm or attempt to escape cannot, by itself, be
construed as indicative of consent, particularly when she has
stated in her statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of
the BNSS that she was subjected to threats during her stay with
the applicant.
8.1 As regards the inconsistencies and improvements alleged in
the victim's statements, this Court refrains from undertaking a
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detailed assessment of her testimony, as the same falls within the
domain of the learned Trial Court. However, a perusal of her
statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS, as
well as her statement before the Court, reveals that she has
consistently levelled allegations of sexual assault against the
applicant. The discrepancies pointed out by learned counsel do
not, at this stage, persuade this Court to discard the prosecution
case. The evidentiary value of these statements and the alleged
inconsistencies shall be examined during trial, without this Court
expressing any concluded opinion on the merits of the allegations.
9. In view of the foregoing discussion, particularly the age of
the victim, the nature of the allegations and the material available
on record, this Court does not find it to be a fit case for grant of
bail to the applicant. Accordingly, the bail application is hereby,
dismissed .
10. However, considering that the applicant himself is a young
boy aged about 19 years, the learned Trial Court is directed to
make all endeavours to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably
within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified
copy of this order.
11. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined
to the present bail application and shall not influence the learned
Trial Court, which shall decide the case independently on its merits
and in accordance with law.
(SANJEET PUROHIT),J
Crt_22 (2020)
S-A/
Anil Kumar Choudhary
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