Smt. Rampyari vs Kamal Singh

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:84926
1 MA-1591-2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
nd
ON THE 22 OF OCTOBER, 2026
MISC. APPEAL No. 1591 of 2012
CNR No.: MPHC010221852012
SMT. RAMPYARI AND OTHERS
Versus
KAMAL SINGH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sandeep Koshta- Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Neeraj Jain-Advocate for the respondent No. 1.
Shri Shafiqullah-Advocate for respondent No. 2.
Shri Takmeel Nasir-Advocate for the respondent No. 3.
WITH
MISC. APPEAL No. 1584 of 2012
CNR No.: MPHC010221782012
SMT. AARTI AND OTHERS
Versus
KAMAL SINGH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sandeep Koshta- Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Takmeel Nasir-Advocate for the respondent No. 3.
ORDER
Present appeals under Section 173(1) of Motor Vehicles Act have been
filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the
Claims Tribunal of Ist MACT Sagar in Claim Case No. 110/2010 and Claim
Case No. 111/2010 arising out of death of deceased Arvind Sharma and
deceased Ram Charan Gupta respectively.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
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2 MA-1591-2012
MA No. 1591/2012 arises from Claim Case No. 111/2010 while MA No.

1584/2012 arises from Claim Case No. 110/2010.
2. Both the claim cases have been allowed by the Claims Tribunal,
but while allowing these cases, the Claims Tribunal has not granted any
future prospects and has also made deduction from the total claim amount to
the tune of 50% as the Claims Tribunal found it to be a case of contributory
negligence. Further, this is because three persons were riding the motorcycle
in question, which is meant for two persons.
3. In MA No. 1591/2012, further deduction has been made from the
claim amount by following the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal, (2008) 11 SCC
366 by making further deduction even from the 50% compensation on
account of the fact that the wife of the deceased is getting family pension
from the department of the deceased and his son has been granted
compassionate appointment, and therefore, even deduction has been made
from the 50% compensation which was arrived at Rs. 7,10,926/-, to reduce it
to Rs. 5,00,000/-.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants in the two appeals have
vehemently argued that, no doubt, it is true that three persons were riding the
motorcycle in question, but the said question has been recently considered by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Siddique Vs National
Insurance Company, Civil Appeal No. 79/2020. It is argued that in the
aforesaid case, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there must
either be a causal connection between violation and the accident or a causal
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3 MA-1591-2012
connection between violation and impact of the accident upon the victim. It

is argued that in such cases, but for the violation of law, either the accident
could have been averted, or the impact could have been minimized, only
then the principle of contributory negligence can be invoked.
5. Learned counsel vehemently argued that in the present case,
nothing of this sort has been found out by the Tribunal that either the impact
of the accident could be minimized or the accident itself could be averted if
three persons had not been there on the motorcycle. It is therefore argued
that the award of the Tribunal be modified, and the amount deducted towards
contributory negligence be restored back to the claimants.
6. It is further argued that in MA No. 1584/2012, by relying on the
dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanta Aggarwal (supra)
the deduction even from 50% of the amount has been made, which is not
proper because there is no such ratio in Kanta Aggarwal (supra) to that
effect.
7 . Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has
vehemently argued that 50% amount has been rightly deducted towards
contributory negligence because it was a case of triple riding on motorcycle
and for this reason, there has been deduction of 50% of the amount.
8. The question of deduction of 50% of the amount towards
contributory negligence is taken up first.
9. It is not in dispute that it is a case of head-on collision between
offending vehicle Bolero Jeep MP 04 CE 5685 with motorcycle registration
no. MP 15 ME 2915.
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10. As per deposition of Aashish Jain, who was the third person

riding on the motorcycle, the two other riders having expired in the accident,
he stated that it was a case of head-on collision between the two vehicles, and
he further admits in his deposition that the motorcycle was climbing uphill at
the time of accident. The accident took place in the night and it was dark
when the accident took place.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Siddique
(supra) has held that if there is violation of any statutory provision like which
in the present case is three persons riding the motorcycle, then it is to be seen
as to whether, by following the law, the accident could be averted or the
impact could be reduced, but in other words, there must be a causal
connection between the violation and the accident or violation and impact of
accident.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"13. But the above reason, in our view, is flawed. The fact that the deceased
was riding on a motor cycle along with the driver and another, may not, by
itself, without anything more, make him guilty of contributory negligence. At
the most it would make him guilty of being a party to the violation of the law.
Section 128 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, imposes a restriction on the
driver of a two wheeled motor cycle, not to carry more than one person on the
motor cycle. Section 194C inserted by the Amendment Act 32 of
2019, prescribes a penalty for violation of safety measures for motor
cycle drivers and pillion riders. Therefore, the fact that a person was a pillion
rider on a motor cycle along with the driver and one more person on the
pillion, may be a violation of the law. But such violation by itself, without
anything more, cannot lead to a finding of contributory negligence, unless it is
established that his very act of riding along with two others, contributed either
to the accident or to the impact of the accident upon the victim. There must
either be a causal connection between the violation and the accident or a causal
connection between the violation and the impact of the accident upon the
victim. It may so happen at times, that the accident could have been averted or
the injuries sustained could have been of a lesser degree, if there had been no
violation of the law by the victim. What could otherwise have resulted in a
simple injury, might have resulted in a grievous injury or even death due to the
violation of the law by the victim. It is in such cases, where, but for
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the violation of the law, either the accident could have been averted or the
impact could have been minimized, that the principle of contributory
negligence could be invoked. It is not the case of the insurer that the accident
itself occurred as a result of three persons riding on a motor cycle. It is not
even the case of the insurer that the accident would have been averted, if three
persons were not riding on the motor cycle. The fact that the motor cycle was
hit by the car from behind, is admitted. Interestingly, the finding recorded by
the Tribunal that the deceased was wearing a helmet and that the deceased
was knocked down after the car hit the motor cycle from behind, are all not
assailed. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that 2 persons on the pillion
of the motor cycle, could have added to the imbalance, is nothing but
presumptuous and is not based either upon pleading or upon the evidence on
record. Nothing was extracted from PW3 to the effect that 2 persons on the
pillion added to the imbalance.
14. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that the wrongful act on
the part of the deceased victim contributed either to the accident or to the
nature of the injuries sustained, the victim could not have been held guilty of
contributory negligence. Hence the reduction of 10% towards contributory
negligence, is clearly unjustified and the same has to be set aside."

13. If the accident in the present case is seen, then it would be clear
that the motorcycle was going uphill with three persons in the darkness of
night. The Bolero vehicle was coming downhill. It is not the case where the
motorcycle is dashed from behind by an over-speeding vehicle, but it is a
case where there was head-on collision, that too, while one of the vehicles is
climbing and another vehicle is descending the hill. If three persons are
riding the motorcycle which is climbing uphill, then it can be inferred that
there would be some compromise on the control of the vehicle, which is
meant for two persons, if three persons are riding it and the vehicle is going
uphill. In the case of Mohammed Siddique (supra), it was the case of
motorcycle being dashed from behind by the over-speeding vehicle, but in
the present case, it is not the case of over-speeding vehicle dashing the
motorcycle from behind, but it is a case of head-on collision, that too, on an
hill in the night, when there were three persons riding the motorcycle.
Therefore, this court is unable to disturb the finding of contributory
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6 MA-1591-2012
negligence and the reduction of 50% made by the Claims Tribunal.

14. Now coming to the other aspect of deduction made in MA
1584/2012 in terms of judgment in the case of Kanta Aggarwal is taken
up. The case of Kanta Aggarwal (supra) came up for consideration by a
Larger Bench comprising of three Judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma, (2016) 9 SCC
627. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered the position that prior to the case of
Kanta Aggarwal (supra), an earlier view prevails in the case of Helen C.
Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90, wherein it has been held
that the common law principle of adjusting pecuniary advantages coming
from whatever source by reason of death has to be interpreted in such cases
as referring to pecuniary advantages coming on account of accidental death
and not other forms of death. In other words, if the benefit has accrued to the
dependents on account of death being caused by accident, then it can be
argued by the owner, driver, and insurance company that the benefits may be
adjusted from the amount of claim. However, if the benefits have accrued
only on account of death and not by the specific nature of death, i.e.
accidental death, then there can be no deduction.
15. In the present case, the compassionate appointment would have
been granted to the son of the deceased and family pension would have been
granted to the wife of the deceased even if the deceased Ram Charan Gupta
had died a natural death.
16. The case of Kanta Agarwal (supra) was explained by the Larger
Bench in the case of Reliance General Insurance (Supra) in the following
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MISHRA
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terms:

"9. The Insurance Companies, on the other hand, have relied on the decision of
the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta
Aggarwal [Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal, (2008) 11
SCC 366 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 154] , to contend that the plea of the appellant in
that case that the claimants have received financial assistance from other
sources due to the death of her husband—by way of salary amount on account
of compassionate appointment and also residence provided to her was
deductible, has been accepted by this Court; and was so deducted while
determining a just compensation amount payable under the Motor Vehicles
Act. Reliance is also placed on the dictum of three-Judge Bench in Gobald
Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami [Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v.
R.M.K. Veluswami, (1962) 1 SCR 929 : AIR 1962 SC 1] , which, according to
the Insurance Company, permits deduction of benefits such as compensation
received by the dependants of the deceased from the employer. Reliance is also
placed on the two-Judge Bench decision in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v.
Northern India Transport Insurance Co. [Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v.
Northern India Transport Insurance Co., (1971) 1 SCC 785] ; another two-
Judge Bench judgment in Vimal Kanwar v. Kishore Dan [Vimal Kanwar v.
Kishore Dan, (2013) 7 SCC 476 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 564 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 583 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 759] . Reliance is then placed on another
decision of the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Deo Patodi [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deo Patodi, (2009) 13 SCC 123 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 29 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 963] for the principles to be
reckoned to determine a just compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles
Act. In substance, the contention of the Insurance Companies is that the
claimants cannot be permitted to profiteer and receive double benefit on
account of the death of their family member on the same head of “Loss of
income” to them.

10. Besides the abovenoted stand of the Insurance Companies, the other
incidental question to be considered is whether there is any conflict of opinion
between the coordinate Benches (of two Judges) of this Court, in Bhakra Beas
Management Board [Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal,
(2008) 11 SCC 366 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 154] on the one hand, and that of
Helen C. Rebello [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 :
1999 SCC (Cri) 197] and Patricia Jean Mahajan [United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC 281 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1294] on
the other.

11. The decision in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. [Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v.
R.M.K. Veluswami, (1962) 1 SCR 929 : AIR 1962 SC 1] of the three-Judge
Bench of this Court has been carefully analysed and distinguished by the two-
Judge Bench in Helen case [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1
SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] . In that, the dictum in Gobald Motor case
[Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami, (1962) 1 SCR 929 : AIR
1962 SC 1] was in relation to the provisions regarding quantum of damages
payable in terms of Sections 1 and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, which
are held to be materially different. On the other hand, the provision of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 enlarges the scope for computation of compensation
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MISHRA
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amount. The Court in Helen case [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC,
(1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] held that the observation in Gobald
case [Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami, (1962) 1 SCR 929 :
AIR 1962 SC 1] cannot be the basis to claim deduction of amount receivable
by the dependants of the deceased from whatever source, in the context of the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as in force. Even the decision in
Sheikhupura Transport [Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India
Transport Insurance Co., (1971) 1 SCC 785] has been explained and
distinguished on the same lines.

12. The question is : whether the principle expounded by the two-Judge Bench
in Helen case [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 :
1999 SCC (Cri) 197] , in paras 32 to 35, in particular, can be doubted? In that
case, the Court was called upon to answer as to whether it will be permissible
to disallow the deduction of amount receivable by the dependants of the
deceased towards “Life Insurance Policy”, from the amount of compensation
payable under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (in that case Sections
110-B, 92-A and 92-B of the 1939 Act corresponding to Sections 168, 140 and
141 of the 1988 Act). Paras 32 to 35 read thus : (SCC pp. 109-12)

“32. So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the
common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be
ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the
future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the
death with the “pecuniary advantage” which from whatever source
comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing
of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to
change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be
interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that his Act
delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental
injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary
advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, correlating with
the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor
Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by
accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural
death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by
accident, through train, air flight not involving a motor vehicle, it would
not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of
the general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the
computation of compensation under this Act must correlate to this type
of injury or death viz. accidental. If the words “pecuniary advantage”
from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death
under this Act, it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the
claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the “pecuniary
advantage” resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming
under all forms of death then it will include all the assets, movable,
immovable, shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable
under any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is
willed by the deceased, etc. This would obliterate both, all possible
conferment of economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the
intentions of the legislature. By such an interpretation, the tortfeasor in
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spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death,
would have in many cases no liability or meagre liability. In our
considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of
this statute viz. the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the
accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus,
under the present Act, whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the
claimant, from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the
claimant on account of the accidental death and not other forms of death.
The constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal itself under
Section 110 is, as the section states:
‘… for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in
respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to.…’
33. Thus, it would not include that which the claimant receives on
account of other forms of deaths, which he would have received even
apart from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have
no co-relation to the accidental death for which compensation is
computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the
accidental death but that which would have come to the claimant even
otherwise, could not be construed to be the “pecuniary advantage”, liable
for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as
against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received
out of such insurance on the happening of such incident may be an
amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of
such contingency through the proviso of Section 95. Under it the liability
of the insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of and
in the course of employment of an employee.
34. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of
the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is
excluded thus, either through the wisdom of the legislature or through
the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the
claimant twice arising from the same transaction viz. the same accident.
It is significant to record here in both the sources viz. either under the
Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable
by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer
securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount
without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour
or contribution towards one's wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or
for his family which such person knows under the law has to go to his
heirs after his death either by succession or under a will could be said to
be the “pecuniary gain” only on account of one's accidental death. This,
of course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be
balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the
Motor Vehicles Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts.
Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract
be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly,
how an amount receivable under a statute has any co-relation with an
amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on
the same plane within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract
to the contrary or any provisions of law.
35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is
a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during

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the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to
receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is
secured and is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor
Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the
event viz. accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family
pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the
form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions
receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension
even otherwise than the accidental death. No co-relation between the
two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or
the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for
which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable
even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums.
In the case of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs,
again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount
is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but
otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in
terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly, any cash, bank
balance, shares fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage
receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no
co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only
on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within
the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary
advantage” liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and
gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se,
between them and not to which there is no semblance of any co-relation.
The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives
the amount which has no co-relation to the compensation computed as
against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As
aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on
account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards
it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions
of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor
Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any
contribution. As we have said, the compensation payable under the
Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the
life insurance policy is contractual.”

(emphasis supplied)
15. The principle expounded in this decision in Helen C. Rebello case [Helen
C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] that
the application of general principles under the common law to estimate
damages cannot be invoked for computing compensation under the Motor
Vehicles Act. Further, the “pecuniary advantage” from whatever source must
correlate to the injury or death caused on account of motor accident. The view
so taken is the correct analysis and interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, and must apply proprio vigore to the
corresponding provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This principle has
been restated in the subsequent decision of the two-Judge Bench in Patricia
Jean Mahajan case [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan,
(2002) 6 SCC 281 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1294] , to reject the argument of the
Insurance Company to deduct the amount receivable by the dependants of the
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deceased by way of “social security compensation” and “life insurance policy”.

16. In Bhakra Beas Management Board [Bhakra Beas Management Board v.
Kanta Aggarwal, (2008) 11 SCC 366 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 154] , ostensibly, it
may appear that a departure has been made in allowing deduction of the
pecuniary advantage received by the claimants from other source on account of
death of her husband. However, on a closer analysis of the said decision, two
aspects become prominent. Firstly, the grievance of the appellant Board was
that the claimants had filed an appeal before the High Court for enhancement
of compensation of amount, which was still pending. However, the appeal
preferred by the Board against the same decision was dismissed by the High
Court. The grievance of the appellant was essentially about the inappropriate
approach of the High Court in dismissing its appeal. That can be discerned
from the observation in para 13 of the reported decision. From the observation
found in para 14 of the reported decision, it is seen that the High Court
judgment has been held to be clearly unsustainable. That must be understood as
disapproving the approach of the High Court in dismissing the appeal filed by
the appellants, though cross-appeal filed by the claimants for enhancement of
compensation amount was pending before it. The second aspect is that, the
Court, to do complete justice between the parties and for bringing quietus to
the long pending litigation (14 years) between them, including to dispose of
appeal of the claimants pending before the High Court, passed an order for full
and final settlement of all the claims inter partes. That can be discerned from
paras 13 and 14, which read thus : (SCC pp. 372-73)

“13. The learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and
additionally submitted that appeal of Respondent 1 is pending. In normal
course, when two appeals are directed against the common judgment,
both the appeals should be heard by the same Bench of the High Court.
But we find that the High Court had lost sight of the fact that the benefits
which the claimant receives on account of the death or injury have to be
duly considered while fixing the compensation. It is pointed out that
Respondent 1 was getting Rs 4700 p.m. and a residence has been
provided to her and actually the compassionate appointment was given
immediately after the accident.
14. In view of what has been stated above, the High Court's judgment is
clearly unsustainable. However, the accident took place more than 14
years back and it would not be desirable to send the matter back to the
Tribunal for fresh consideration. A sum of rupees five lakhs has been
deposited vide this Court's order dated 1-11-2004. We are of the
considered view that in view of the background facts, it is just and
proper that the sum of rupees five lakhs already deposited shall be
permitted to be withdrawn by the claimants in full and final settlement of
the claim relatable to the death of the deceased. It is for the Tribunal to
fix the quantum of fixed deposit and the amount to be released to the
claimants.”
(emphasis supplied)

Thus understood, Bhakra Beas case [Bhakra Beas Management Board v.
Kanta Aggarwal, (2008) 11 SCC 366 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 154] is not an
authority of having taken a contra view than the view expressed in Helen
C. Rebello [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 :
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1999 SCC (Cri) 197] and Patricia case [United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC 281 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1294] . As
a matter of fact, in para 11 of the reported decision in Bhakra Beas case
[Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal, (2008) 11 SCC
366 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 154] , paras 32 to 34 of Helen C. Rebello case
[Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC
(Cri) 197] have been reproduced in their entirety. No observation is
found in the entire decision, to have doubted the correctness of the
dictum in Helen C. Rebello [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC,
(1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] and Patricia case [United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC 281 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 1294] .

17. Be that as it may, the term “compensation” has not been defined in the
1988 Act. By interpretative process, it has been understood to mean to
recompense the claimants for the possible loss suffered or likely to be suffered
due to sudden and untimely death of their family member as a result of motor
accident. Two cardinal principles run through the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of determination of compensation. Firstly,
the measure of compensation must be just and adequate; and secondly, no
double benefit should be passed on to the claimants in the matter of award of
compensation. Section 168 of the 1988 Act makes the first principle explicit.
Sub-section (1) of that provision makes it clear that the amount of
compensation must be just. The word “just” means—fair, adequate, and
reasonable. It has been derived from the Latin word “justus”, connoting right
and fair. In para 7 of State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur [State of Haryana v. Jasbir
Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1671] , it has been held that the
expression “just” denotes that the amount must be equitable, fair, reasonable
and not arbitrary. In para 16 of Sarla Verma v. DTC [Sarla Verma v. DTC,
(2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] , this
Court has observed that the compensation “is not intended to be a bonanza,
largesse or source of profit”. That, however, may depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, as to what amount would be a just compensation.

18. The principle discernible from the exposition in Helen C. Rebello case
[Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri)
197] is that if the amount “would be due to the dependants of the deceased
even otherwise”, the same shall not be deductible from the compensation
amount payable under the 1988 Act. At the same time, it must be borne in
mind that loss of income is a significant head under which compensation is
claimed in terms of the 1988 Act. The component of quantum of “loss of
income”, inter alia, can be “pay and wages” which otherwise would have been
earned by the deceased employee if he had survived the injury caused to him
due to motor accident. If the dependants of the deceased employee, however,
were to be compensated by the employer in that behalf, as is predicated by the
2006 Rules—to grant compassionate assistance by way of ex gratia financial
assistance on compassionate grounds to the dependants of the deceased
government employee who dies in harness, it is unfathomable that the
dependants can still be permitted to claim the same amount as a possible or
likely loss of income to be suffered by them to maintain a claim for
compensation under the 1988 Act."

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 24-10-2026
13:44:04

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:84926
13 MA-1591-2012
17. Therefore, the judgment in the case of Kanta Agarwal (supra) has

been explained by the Larger Bench as in view of the peculiar facts of that
case and not diluting the ratio in case of Helen C. Rebello (supra) in any
manner.
18. Therefore, this court is unable to uphold the award of the
Tribunal in MA 1584/2012, in so far as the Tribunal has reduced the amount
of compensation of Rs. 7,10,926/- to Rs. 5,00,000/- by holding it to be
exorbitant in view of compassionate appointment and family pension given
to dependents of the deceased Ram Charan Gupta.
19. The Tribunal has also not granted any amount towards future
prospects in any of these cases, which needs to be granted.
20. The deceased in MA 1591/2012 was stated to be around 28 years
of age and was self-employed. Therefore, by following the dictum in the case
of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC
680, the increment in compensation towards future prospects has to be made
to the extent of 40%.
20. In MA 1584/2012, the deceased Ram Charan Gupta has been
held to be 50 years of age at the time of accident and he was in permanent
employment in Krishi Upaj Mandi, which is a Government-owned
organization. Therefore, by following the dictum in case of Pranay Sethi
(supra), an increment of 15% has to be made for the claimants in MA
1584/2012.
21. Therefore, both these appeals are partly allowed in the following
terms:
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 24-10-2026
13:44:04

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:84926
14 MA-1591-2012
1. The deduction towards contributory negligence to the

tune of 50% is upheld.
2. The future prospects shall be payable to claimants in
MA 1591/2012 to the extent of 40%. The compensation payable
shall be enhanced to Rs.4,82,745/-.
3. The principal claim amount to be payable to claimants
in MA 1584/2012 shall be Rs.7,10,926/- in place of Rs. 5,00,000/-
.
4. The claimants in MA 1584/2012 shall also be entitled
to future prospects @ 15% on amount of Rs.7,10,926/-, taking the
total to Rs. 8,17,565/-.
5. Interest shall be payable on the enhanced amounts @
6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition before
the Claims Tribunal till the date of actual payment.
22. No order as to cost.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
MISHRA
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 24-10-2026
13:44:04