HASMUKHBHAI NARSHIDAS KAKKAD vs RECOVERY OFFICER

Court: Gujarat High Court
Case type: LETTERS PATENT APPEAL
Decided on: 25-03-2026

<div> C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 Reserved On : 19/01/2026 Pronounced On : 25/03/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 31 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION/20018/2019 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 31 of 2026 With R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 32 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19792 of 2021 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 32 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19792 of 2021 With R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 33 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2430 of 2022 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 33 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2430 of 2022 With R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 34 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2431 of 2022 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 34 of 2026 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2431 of 2022 With R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1111 of 2025 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20034 of 2019 Page 1 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1111 of 2025 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20034 of 2019 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY ============================================= </div><table><thead><tr><th>Approved for Reporting</th><th>Yes</th><th>No</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><div> HASMUKHBHAI NARSHIDAS KAKKAD Versus RECOVERY OFFICER & ANR. ============================================= Appearance: MR RS SANJANWALA, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MS SANGEETA PAHWA FOR THAKKAR AND PAHWA ADVOCATES(1357) for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MR SN SOPARKAR, SR ADVOCATE WITH MR RC KAKKAD(389) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2 ============================================= </div><table><thead><tr><th>CORAM:</th><th>HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>and</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY</td></tr></tbody></table><div> CAV JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL) 1. These intra court appeals are directed against common judgment and order dated 10.07.2025 passed by the writ Court dismissing the writ petitions filed with the two set Page 2 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 of prayers, as follows:- (Prayers in Special Civil Application Nos. 20018/2019, 20034/2019 & 19792/2021) “A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned notice dated 29.10.2019 (Annexure-A) and all consequential actions in pursuance thereto, as being illegal, arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution of the impugned notice dated 29.10.2019 (Annexure-A) and all consequential actions in pursuance thereto, pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this appeal;” (Prayers in Special Civil Application Nos. 2431/2022 and 2431/2022) (A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned notice dated 18.1.2022 issued to all the petitioners as well as the public notice dated 18.1.2022 published in Newspaper (Annexure-A Colly) and all consequential actions in pursuance thereto, as being illegal, arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution of the impugned notice dated 18.1.2022 issued to all the petitioners as well as public notice dated 18.1.2022 published in Newspaper (Annexure-A Colly), pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this appeal;” 2. The facts leading to the filing of the above set of writ Page 3 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 petitions arising from the common occurrence, noted from the leading petition, i.e. Special Civil Application No. 20018 of 2019, as recorded in the judgment impugned are :- (a) The father of the petitioners herein and their brother as also their partnership firm, namely M/s. Narshidas Gordhandas Kakkad (hereinafter referred to as the “borrowers”), borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 4,00,000/- with 21% of simple interest as mortgage loans on 24.12.1999 and 25.02.2000; respectively, from the respondent no. 2 Bank, namely the Porbandar Vibhagiya Nagrik Sahakari Bank Limited. (b) The borrowers defaulted in payment of instalments, and as such, the respondent Bank filed Lavad Case Nos. 53 and 54 of 2001 before the Board of Nominees which proceedings culminated into an award dated 13.06.2003 passed in favour of the respondent bank aggregating to Rs.6,71,252/- (Rs.4,52,937/- and Rs.2,18,315/-) against two loan accounts with simple interest @ 21% leviable with effect from 01.01.2001. (c) Aggrieved by the award, the original petitioners herein filed Appeal Nos. 1012 and 1013 of 2003 before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad, under Section 102 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter Page 4 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 referred to as the “Act’ 1961”) which were dismissed by order dated 31.08.2004, which had not been challenged further and, thus, has attained finality. (d) Pursuant to the award, the Bank had attached the mortgaged property on 17.11.2003, and an amount of Rs.15,30,000/- was recovered as a result of auction of the said property, held on 09.05.2009. However, further amount of Rs. 10,18,000/- remained due to be recovered from the borrowers as an entire outstanding loan was not satisfied. (e) The Respondent Bank had further issued attachment notice dated 17.09.2012, seeking recovery of the remaining due loan amount, which was challenged by filing two Revision Applications No.208 and 209 of 2009 before the Joint Secretary (Appeals), Agriculture and Cooperation Department. (f) During the pendency of the said revision applications two Writ petitions being Special Civil Application Nos. 14847 of 2012 and 14947 of 2012 were preferred by the partnership firm (borrower) against which the award dated 13.06.2003 was passed. (g) On a request to consider for grant of one time settlement pursuant to the scheme of the State Page 5 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 known as “One Time Settlement Scheme” dated 18.09.2012, an interim order dated 30.10.2012 was passed by this Court therein directing the respondent Bank not to take any coercive measures against the petitioners. (h) Ultimately, by judgment and order dated 28.03.2013, the said writ petitions came to be dismissed, leaving it open for the respondent Bank to realize the amount which remained unchallenged with the observations that the petitioner therein would have no right whatsoever to resurrect the loan amount and ask for one time settlement. However, it was further directed by this Court that since the revision applications were pending, the revisional authority shall decide the same. (i) By way of an order dated 16.04.2013, the revisional authority, namely the Joint Secretary (Appeals) had quashed the Attachment Notice dated 17.09.2012 on technicality, leaving it open for the respondent Bank to initiate fresh recovery proceedings as per the rules and regulations. (j) Subsequent to the disposal of the Revision Applications, the petitioner preferred Letters Patent appeals challenging the judgment and order dated 28.02.2013 of dismissal of the aforesaid writ petitions. Initially an interim order dated Page 6 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 16.07.2013 was passed and, however, appeals were finally disposed of by judgment and order dated 29.09.2016, without interfering with the decision of the writ court, leaving it open for the petitioners to raise all objections regarding penal interest before the appropriate authority as and when fresh recovery proceedings were initiated. (k) Thereafter, the respondent Bank issued a fresh Attachment Notice dated 02.01.2017, which was further challenged before this Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 493 of 2017 and 503 of 2017. Again, an interim order dated 13.01.2017 was passed restraining the respondent bank from proceeding with the said attachment notice. (l) The respondent Bank, however, made a statement before this Court that the attachment notice dated 02.01.2017 being composite notice, they will not proceed with the same and will issue fresh notices for realization of the amount against respective decrees. (m) Fresh notices dated 29.10.2019, thereafter were issued with reference to two loan accounts. For Loan Account No.1, the petitioners-successors were asked to pay an amount of Rs. 76,87,852.14, which was subjected to challenge in Special Civil Application No. 20018 of 2019. Page 7 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 (n) With regard to the second notice of the even date for the Loan Account No. 7, the recovery notice for an amount of Rs. 79,54,310.99 was subjected to challenge in Special Civil Application No. 20034 of 2019. (o) The other three writ petitions being Special Civil Application No. 19792 of 2021, Special Civil Application No. 2430 of 2022 and Special Civil Application No. 2431 of 2022 are pertaining to a second attachment notice dated 18.01.2022. (p) It is recorded by the writ court in the judgment impugned that the petitioners in the aforesaid set of writ petitions are heirs and legal representatives of the original borrowers, namely Tulsidas Narsidas Kakkad and Haridas Narsidas Kakkad. It was the case of the petitioners before the writ court that both the decrees/awards for recovery of the outstanding loan amount had become final in the year 2004 with the dismissal of the appeals of the borrowers filed before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, however, the recovery notices were issued in the year 2012 for the first time and moreover, the self-acquired properties of the heirs of the original borrower are sought to be attached pursuant to the recovery notices. The attachment notices issued in the year 2012 are legally barred by limitation. Page 8 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 (q) The further contention was that the Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited, the Apex Society, which has been conferred with the powers of the Registrar under Section 159 of the Act, 1961 by the notification of the State Government dated 07.10.2002 under section 162(b) of the Act, had sub-delegated his powers to the ‘recovery officer’, namely the respondent No. 2 therein, who happened to be an officer/employee of the respondent bank. (r) It was contended that the provisions of section 162 (b) or the Notification of the State did not entrust the Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited (in short as “GSUCBFL/Federal Society”) to sub-delegate the power of recovery to anyone else. It was only the Secretary of the said Federal Society who could have exercised the powers of the Registrar as enumerated under Section 159 of the Act 1961. Once the Federal Society was substituted for the Registrar and entrusted with its power under section 159 of the Act 1961, the Secretary of the Federal Society has no power to delegate its authority to anyone except its own employee, subordinate to the Secretary. (s) The third submission was with regard to the calculation of penal interest. Page 9 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 (t) The learned Single judge has returned the findings on the issue of sub-delegation/jurisdiction of the Federal authority in paragraphs ‘16’ and ‘17’, as under :- “16. Now, resorting to the merits of the matter, the first controversy raised is with regard to the jurisdiction of the officer authoring the impugned attachment notice. The notice was issued by the respondent having been conferred the powers by the Notification dated 07.10.2002 and under provisions of Section 162(b) of the Act. The powers of the Registrar are delegated under the Act. By way of Notification dated 07.10.2002 the delegation was given to three societies. One of them being Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited. In furtherance to the delegation, the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited has appointed respondent no. 2 as delegetee. The core question raised alleging that concerned officer is not employee or officer of the Gujarat State Urban Co- operative Bank Federation Limited, but he is the employee of another Bank. Therefore, it amounts to subdelegation and therefore, the jurisdiction of the person issuing the attachment is doubted. Therefore, the main contention is that recognized society i.e. Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited instead of exercising its power through its officer have appointed another officer of subordinate cooperative society for the purpose of recovery of the awarded dues and therefore, it amounts to sub-delegation of the powers. 17. The first aspect concerning the contention raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa is that the notification of the delegation of powers is Page 10 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 not under challenge. Therefore, the only issue that has to be seen is whether the powers vested with the Registrar are exercised in proper manner. Once the phrase Registrar has been substituted by delegated authority, namely the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank then the powers are to be exercised by the said Bank. It is not correct for learned advocate Ms. Pahwa to contend that the powers of the Urban Co-operative Bank are to be exercised only by the employee of the said Bank. The said Bank has appointed respondent no. 2 to execute the powers of conferred upon by the Bank. Therefore there is no substance in the contention raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa that the powers are exercised by the officer without jurisdiction. Once the challenge to Notification dated 07.10.2002 is not disputed then the challenge to power executed by the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited cannot be doubted. The decision relied upon by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa challenging the jurisdiction fundamentally revolve around the challenge to Notification dated 07.10.2002. In the instant case, the notification is not under challenge. For the reasons mentioned herein- above the challenge to power executed by the respondent no. 2 is untenable is required to negatived. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner would not be of any help as they would be different from the facts of the present case. In the decision in case of A. K. Roy (supra) and in case of Sahani Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (supra), the reasoning centers on the interpretation of the statutory provisions which permits to delegate the powers. Applying the maxim “ delegatus non potest delegare ”, the Court has concluded that sub- delegation without statutory authorization is impermissible. In the instant case, there is statutory force conferred to Notification dated Page 11 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 07.10.2002 under the provisions of Section 162(b) of the Act. The Notification dated 07.10.2022 is not under challenge. The statutory authority and the powers conferred by Notification dated 07.10.2002 are not under challenge and therefore, the decisions relied upon by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa would not be of any help to the case of the petitioner.” (u) On the issue of limitation, the findings are in paragraphs ‘17.1’ and ‘18’, which read as under:- “17.1. The second issue raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa is with regard to notice being barred by limitation. As per the facts of the case, the original award was passed on 13.06.2003 and appeal against the award was dismissed on 31.08.2004. It is the case of the petitioners that the execution proceedings against all the six judgment debtors commenced on 17.09.2012 and the impugned notice is issued in the year 2019 which is almost after 15 years and further fresh notices are issued to the legal heirs of the original borrowers on 18.01.2022 which is almost after 18 years. However what needs to be taken into consideration is pendency of this issue at various forums and before this Court. In the year 2012, the first writ petition was preferred where the stay was granted and the same was dismissed during the pendency of the revision applications. Thereafter the revision applications which were subject matter of remand were disposed of with a direction to prefer fresh application. The dismissal of writ petitions which inter alia prayed for One Time Settlement Scheme was carried into appeal wherein stay was granted against recovery. Further the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed and subsequent to the dismissal of Letters Patent Appeal, Revision Page 12 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 Applications were also disposed of with a direction to pass a fresh order. The attachment order issued subsequent to the revision applications were further challenged by way of writ petition. Stay was granted in this writ petition. The writ petition preferred were again disposed of pursuant to the statement made to pass fresh attachment notice. This fresh attachment notice is subject matter of three writ petitions being Special Civil Application No. 20018 of 2019, Special Civil Application No.19792 of 2021 and Special Civil Application No. 20034 of 2019. The time consumed in these litigation have to be taken into account before coming to the conclusion on the issue of limitation. Therefore to exclude such time, Article 15 of the Limitation Act will come into play. It is trite law that the dismissal of the execution petition or withdrawal of the first execution petition would not come in the way of the second execution petition, but the time consumed while deciding the first execution notice or attachment notice which was pending litigation has to be excluded while deciding the period of limitation. In the facts of the case, the period from 2012 to 2017 has to be excluded while considering the period of limitation and therefore, the issue raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa would be untenable. The period for which litigation have been pending and prohibitory orders were passed would not considered while counting the period of limitation. Further the decision relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar would be squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The issue of limitation is raised in both the notices i.e. the notice issued in the year 2019 and the notice issued in the year 2022. The notice issued in the year 2019 is against the original borrowers. The fact that the litigation was pending and prohibitory order was passed Page 13 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 would become a factor for counting the period of limitation. Final appeal order was passed in the year 2004 and 12 years from the year 2004 would be in the year 2016. Further before coming to the final decision of the year 2016, the period of limitation and prohibitory orders have to be accounted for. Apart from that once the execution proceeding has been initiated then it cannot be deemed to be finally disposed of. Subsequent application has to be treated as continuance of the former one where the former execution application is disposed of for some reason, then the latter execution application would deemed to be one for revival of the former one. Therefore, once the execution has started before the period of limitation i.e. in the year 2012, then the second execution would be in continuance and revival of the earlier one. Therefore, the subsequent execution order of the year 2019 which has been initiated after variety of litigation and prohibitory orders and subsequent direction to pass fresh attachment orders cannot be said to be beyond the period of limitation. 18. Apart from this aspect, the other point raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa is with regard to the attachment notice issued in the year 2022. It has been submitted by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa that the attachment notice of the year 2022 is for legal heirs of the original borrowers and that issue has been raised for the first time in the year 2022 i.e. after a period of 18 years from 2004. It has to be noted that the subsequent attachment notice even if given to the legal heirs of the original borrowers is subsequent to the death of the original borrowers. Therefore it is in continuance of the earlier attachment notice to the original borrowers and cannot be said to be fresh attachment notice and beyond the Page 14 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 period of limitation. However, one aspect needs to be clarified is that the attachment notice to the legal heirs of the original borrowers would only be qua inheritance by the legal heirs for the property or estate of the original borrowers. There is no clarification given with regard to the explanation given by the legal heirs about the self acquired property. The petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 2430 of 2022 and Special Civil Application No. 2431 of 2022 being the legal heirs of original borrowers can very well demonstrate before the appropriate authority as to whether the property was self acquired or part of any estate or borrowed from the original borrowers. The notices cannot be issued to any of the self acquired property of the legal heirs. However, such exercise has to be conducted only before the appropriate authority. If the property are self acquired property of the legal heirs, then they cannot be subjected to any of the proceedings. Therefore, the issue raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa as regards limitation is answered against the petitioner. Further, the decisions relied upon by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa would not be of any help. The decision in case of Antonysami (supra) discusses of the application which was filed after 12 years of pronouncement of the judgment. In the instant case, the execution application was not filed after 12 years but there were multiple execution proceedings, subsequent to the order passed by the Tribunal or by this Court. As far as the new properties which were attached, the same was done after the demise of the original judgment debtor. Further, the scope of the attachment has to be looked from the angle of any asset being transferred by the original judgment debtor. In the instant case, the decision in case of Marulasiddappa. (supra) and in case of Page 15 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 Pentapati China Venkanna & Ors. (supra) would not be of any help to the petitioner. Therefore, the contention with regard to the aspect of limitation raised by the petitioner has to go against the petitioner.” (v) On the third aspect of wrong calculation of penal interest, the observations of the learned single judge in paragraph ‘19’ of the judgement are relevant to be noted hereinunder:- “19. The third and the last aspect raised by learned advocate Ms. Pahwa is with regard to the calculation of the original borrowers penal interest. Unfortunately this cannot be an aspect which has to be adjudicated before this Court. This Court cannot be relegated to a form of recovery officer wherein calculation with regard to original borrower raising interest have to be made. It would be upon for the petitioner to adjudicate this issue before the recovery officer or any appropriate forum as may be available in accordance with law.” 3. In the present appeals, the main issue initially pressed before us is about the delegation of powers of issuance of recovery certificate by the Secretary, Federal Society. Referring to Section 159 of the Act’ 1961, it was vehemently argued by Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned Senior counsel for the appellants/original petitioners, that the power to recover due amount together with interest by attachment and sale of property of any person against whom a decree or award has been passed, is conferred upon the Registrar or any officer subordinate to him and empowered by him in that regard. The delegation of powers of the Registrar under Page 16 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 the Act, 1961 to a Cooperative federal society recognized under Section 95 or to an officer of such society, is permissible in view of Section 162(b) by notification issued by the State Government in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions as imposed therein. 4. In the instant case, by the Notification dated 07.10.2002, issued in exercise of powers conferred by Section 162(b) of the Act, 1961, published in the Official Gazette, the powers of the Registrar under Section 159 of the Act 1961 to recover sum, interest, cost, etc., has been delegated to the Federal Society registered under the Act and recognized, as such, under sub-section (1) of Section 95. The schedule to the said notification issued by the Agriculture and Cooperation Department, published in the Official Gazette, also makes it clear that the power of the Registrar was conferred to the officer, namely the Secretary of the Federal Society, i.e. Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Banks Federation Limited. 5. Another Notification of the same date, i.e. 07.10.2002, published under Section 161, provides that the provisions of Section 95(1) of the Act, 1961 shall apply to the societies specified in the schedule annexed thereto, which contains the name of the Gujarat State Urban Co- operative Banks Federation Limited. 6. The result is that the State Government, by Notification Page 17 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 dated 07.10.2002, delegated the power of the Registrar under the Act 1961, as conferred upon the Registrar under Section 159, to make attachment and recovery of sum due by sale, to the Secretary of the Federal Society. However, in an illegal manner, the Secretary of the Federal Society issued a communication dated 10.08.2021 to the officers/employees of the respondent bank designating them as the “recovery officer” delegating the power of making recovery under Section 159 of the Act. The attachment and recovery notices having been issued by the said officer to whom sub- delegation was made by the communication dated 10.08.2021 issued by the Secretary of the Federal Society, are wholly without jurisdiction. 7. It was vehemently argued that the respondent no.1 herein, an employee of the respondent No.2 bank, namely Porbandar Vibhagiya Nagrik Sahakari Bank Limited, even otherwise, could not have been sub- delegated the Registrar's power of recovery which was delegated to the Secretary of the Federal Society under Section 162(b) of the Act, 1961 by the State Government. 8. Further pressing upon the language employed in Section 161, it was vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that assuming for a moment that the power of the Registrar conferred upon the Secretary of the Federal Society could have been further given to any subordinate officer, but then it was Page 18 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 incumbent that the said subordinate officer should be an officer of the Federal Society only, who is subordinate to the Secretary of the Federal Society, who could have been entrusted to exercise the powers of the Registrar under Section 159, by virtue of the Notification dated 07.10.2002 of the State Government. 9. The submission is that the respondent no.1 herein who has been entrusted with the powers of the Recovery Officer, is an employee of the respondent Bank and not an officer subordinate to the Secretary of the Federal Society. Further, an officer of the respondent Bank itself could not have been entrusted with the power to make recovery, inasmuch as, there would be an element of bias in making recovery by the said officer who is an employee of the respondent Bank who itself is litigating with the appellants herein, namely the original petitioners. 10. Besides that, it was argued that the initial liability for which the suit was decreed was in total only to an amount of Rs.6,71,252/- with interest payable with effect from 01.01.2001 and the respondent Bank had attached the mortgaged property as early as on 17.11.2003. But, the auction sale was conducted only on 09.05.2009, which had resulted in accrual of interest @ 21% for a period of 6 years when the respondent bank itself did not proceed to complete the auction sale for recovery of the decreetal amount. This delay on the part of the respondent bank resulted in issuance of further Page 19 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 proceedings of recovery of the sum due in the year 2009, which was Rs.10,18,000/-. The accumulated interest @ 21% on the decretal amount of Rs. 6,71,252/- only had resulted into recovery demanding a huge amount of more than Rs.1.5 crores. The attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 with respect to two loan accounts whereunder only Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 4,00,000/- were borrowed in the years 1999 and 2000, demanded a huge sum of Rs. 1,56,42,162.93, for the above reasons. 11. The submission is that the levy of 21% interest resulted into swelling of the decretal amount of only about Rs. 6 lakhs & odd to a huge sum of more than Rs. 1.5 crores, which itself makes the entire recovery as unconscionable. 12. It was, thus, vehemently argued by Mr. Sanjanwala, the learned Senior counsel for the appellants that for the fault of the respondent bank in not making recoveries of the awarded amount well in time by auction sale of the mortgaged property which was already attached in the year 2003 itself, the liability of such a huge amount has been fastened upon the petitioners/appellants herein for no fault of theirs. It was argued that the respondent bank cannot recover any amount beyond the amount of Rs.15,30,000/- recovered by it by way of auction sale dated 09.05.2009 of the mortgaged property, held to set- off the entire outstanding loan. 13. The decree under the award dated 13.06.2003 is held to Page 20 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 be satisfied with the recovery of the due amount from the auction sale of the mortgaged property in the year 2009 itself. All the subsequent attachment notices for recovery of the alleged due amount of Rs.10,00,000/- and odd as on 09.05.2009, are liable to be quashed having been issued in a malafide exercise of power. 14. To substantiate the submissions of the petitioners before the writ court about the delay in execution of the decree/award, reliance was placed upon the decisions in Marulasiddappa v. Lakshmipathi, 1950 [SCC OnLine Kar 13] (a Full Bench decision of the then Mysore High Court). 15. Placing the judgement of the Apex Court in Pentapati China Venkanna v. Pentapati Bangararaju [1964 SCC OnLine SC 250], it was further argued before us that the attachment notices in the year 2019 was issued in relation to three properties, viz. Survey Nos. 363, 364 and 344. Two persons out of whom against the said recovery notices were issued had already died on 29.01.2006 and 23.03.2014. A fresh notice, subject matter of challenge herein is dated 18.01.2022 issued in relation to the fourth property, viz. Survey No. 1573, which was not included initially in the recovery notices of the year 2019. The notice dated 18.01.2022, thus, would be barred by limitation, as it would be a new attachment notice having been issued for the first time, seeking to attach a property, which is substantially different from the three properties, which are yet to be Page 21 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 realised. In other words, it was argued that the notice dated 18.01.2022 is to be rendered invalid being barred by limitation, inasmuch as, the recovery initiated thereunder against the new property would have to be treated as a fresh application within the meaning of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance is placed on paragraph ‘9’ of the decision in Pentapati China Venkanna (supra) to substantiate the same. 16. Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Senior advocate in his extensive arguments spread over many days, while challenging the order of the writ court, in the crux, raises five issues. The submissions were that the order of the writ court cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, the recovery initiated against the petitioners vide both the notices of the year 2019 and 2022 suffer from the errors of law and fact on the following five issues :- (i) The delegation of power of the recovery officer to an employee of the respondent Bank by the Secretary of the Federal Society, is illegal; (ii) No recovery certificate had been issued by the Registrar in exercise of the power under Section 159 of the Act, 1961 and, as such, the recovery notices are liable to be quashed; (iii) The recovery notices dated 29.10.2019 and 18.01.2022 are barred by limitation for the recovery having been initiated after a period of Page 22 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 more than 12 years as per Article 182 of the Limitation Act; (iv) The award fails, inasmuch as, 21% interest levied in the loan agreement is unconscionable; (v) There is an apparent bias in view of the appointment of an officer of the respondent Bank as a recovery officer, inasmuch as, no one can be a judge of its own cause. 17. Considering the submissions on the above noted issues during the course of arguments itself, a query was posed to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the issue nos.(ii), (iv) and (v) having not been been raised before the writ court in the original writ petitions, cannot be appreciated at the stage of appeal. There is no foundation in the writ petition about the challenge to the delegation of power under Section 162(b) to the Secretary of the Federal Society by the notification of the State Government and further, that the interest of 21% being part of the contract, cannot be said to be unconscionable, inasmuch as, this Court cannot go beyond the decree. 18. As regards the issue of bias, no allegations of bias can be borne out from the record nor the said issue has been raised before the writ court. The personal bias of the recovery officer as agitated during the course of argument in this appeal, by the learned Senior counsel Page 23 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 for the appellant cannot be appreciated for two reasons, inasmuch as, the recovery has not even been proceeded as on date, because of the challenge raised to the recovery notices of 2019 and 2022 and further that the recovery officer had not been impleaded by name before the writ court nor there is any allegation against him in the writ petition. 19. As regards the perceived allegations of bias made for the first time in the present appeal, only because of the fact of the Recovery Officer being the officer of the respondent Bank, we do not find any good ground to appreciate the arguments of the learned Senior advocate. 20. Before proceeding to analyse the arguments of the learned Senior counsel for the appellants, we may note at this juncture, that the issue nos.(ii), (iv) and (v) agitated before us, as noted hereinabove, are required to be rejected at the threshold, as we do not find any answer to our queries posed to the learned Advocate. 21. We further proceed to consider only two grounds of challenge to the recovery notices, upturned by the writ court, viz. issue nos. (i) and (iii) on the plea of sub- delegation and the recovery notices being beyond limitation. We, therefore, do not find any good reason to burden this judgment with the arguments of the learned Senior counsel made extensively on the issue nos.(ii), (iv) and (v), not raised before the writ court and rejected by Page 24 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 us, at the threshold even during the course of arguments made by him. 22. Proceeding further, we may record the submissions of Mr. Saurabh Soparkar, learned Senior advocate, in rebuttal to the arguments made on the question of delegation of power by the Secretary of the Federal Society and limitation. The learned Senior advocate for the respondent Bank would submit that Section 95 of the Act, 1961 contemplates constitution of Cooperative federal societies for the supervision of a society or a class of societies. A Federal society, thus, is an independent society constituted to monitor or supervise the working of its Member society. Sub-section (1) of Section 95 provides that the State Government may recognise one or more cooperative federal societies in such manner “as may be prescribed” and subject to such conditions as the State Government may impose for the supervision of a society or a class of societies. 23. Section 161 of the Act, 1961 empowers the State Government, by general or special order, to be published in the official gazette, to exempt any society or class of societies from any provisions of the Act or to direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modification not affecting the substance thereof as may be specified in the order. 24. Attention of the Court is invited to page ‘186’ of the paper book to submit that vide notification dated Page 25 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 07.10.2002, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 161 of the Act, 1961, the State Government has applied the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 95 to the societies specified in the schedule annexed thereto, by substituting the words “in such manner as may be prescribed” appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 95 with the words “by notification in the Official Gazette”. Resultantly, the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited has been conferred the status of a Cooperative Federal Society having powers for supervision of its Member societies. 25. With another notification of the same date, i.e. 07.10.2002, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 162 (b), the State Government delegated the powers of the Registrar under Section 159 of the Act, 1961 to the Secretary, Federal Society, viz. the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited, mentioned in Column 3 of the Schedule, being a society registered under the Act, 1961 and recognised under sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Act, by notification dated 07.10.2002, for supervision of its members. 26. By placing the said notification dated 07.10.2002, issued by the Agriculture and Cooperation Department, Government of Gujarat, in exercise of powers under Section 162 (b) of the Act, 1961, it was submitted by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent Bank that the officer mentioned in Column 2 of the Schedule to the said notification is the officer through whom the Page 26 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 Cooperative Federal Society is supposed to work. The Secretary of the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited has, thus, been mentioned in Column 2 as the officer of the Cooperative Federal Society, viz. the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited. 27. It is, thus, submitted that the delegation of power to the Secretary, Federal Society, viz. the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited by the notification dated 07.10.2002 being in line with the statutory provision, cannot be disputed and moreover, there has been no challenge to the validity of the said notification before the writ court. The submission, thus, is that the appellants herein cannot assail the conferment of the power of the Registrar upon the Secretary, Federal Society by virtue of the notification of the State Government published in the year 2002. The contention of the appellants that the recovery proceedings could have been initiated only by the Registrar in view of Section 159 of the Act, 1961 is, therefore, liable to be rejected. 28. As regards the arguments about further delegation or sub-delegation of the powers to make recoveries by the Secretary, Federal Society, it is submitted that in light of the scheme of Section 159 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, it would be only a question of empowerment of an officer to act on behalf of the Secretary, Federal Society who is the officer to act on behalf of the Federal Page 27 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 Society, viz. the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited conferred with the powers of the Registrar under Section 159 of the Act, 1961. 29. No exception, as such, can be taken to the order dated 10.08.2021 passed by the Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited designating the officer of the respondent Bank as “recovery officer” in the matter of recoveries under the Act, 1961. 30. It was further argued that, even otherwise, there was no challenge to the order dated 10.08.2021 of the nomination of the “recovery officer” of the respondent Bank, passed by the Secretary, Federal Society. 31. The attention of the Court is further invited to Rules 2(iv) and (v) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965, which read as under :- “(iv) "Recovery Officer" means a person subordinate to Registrar who is empowered to exercise the powers of the Registrar under section 159; (v) "Sale Officer" means an Officer empowered by the Registrar by a general or special order to attach and sell the property of defaulter or to execute any decree by attachment and sale under section 159 or a person effecting a sale in pursuance of the provisions of section 134, as the case may be;” 32. By reading of the said clauses of Rules, 1965, it is Page 28 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 submitted that the “Recovery Officer” or the “Sale Officer” within the meaning of the said Rules, 1965 are the officers subordinate to the Registrar empowered by the Registrar to exercise the powers of the Registrar under Section 159 of the Act, 1961 for the purposes of recovery of any amount due under the award of the Board of Nominee by the attachment and sale under Section 159 of the Act, 1961. The “Recovery Officer” or the “Sale Officer”, as defined under Rule 2(iv) or (v), as the case may be, empowered by the Registrar shall act on behalf of the Registrar to exercise the power of the Registrar conferred under Section 159 of the Act, 1961. The “Registrar” has been substituted by the officer of the Federal Society, i.e. Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited by virtue of the notification dated 07.10.2002 and, as such, the word “Registrar” occurring in Rule 2(iv) and (v) of the Rules, 1965 is to be substituted and replaced by the word “Secretary, Cooperative Federal Society”. 33. The Secretary, Cooperative Federal Society, viz. Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited, thus, has empowered the officers of the respondent Bank to act as “Recovery Officer” and “Sale Officer” within the meaning of Rule 2(iv) and (v) of the Rules, 1965, by virtue of his power conferred under Section 159 of the Act, 1961. It is not a case of sub-delegation of powers by the delegatee, rather delegatee acting in exercise of its power conferred under the Act by way of delegation. It Page 29 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 was urged that all arguments of the learned Senior counsel for the appellant, to the contrary are, therefore, liable to be turned down. 34. On the issue of limitation, it was argued by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent bank that the same is not entertainable for the simple reason that the original petitioners herein have been litigating with the respondent Bank through out the passing of the award dated 13.06.2003 by the Board of Nominees in Lavad Case Nos. 53 and 54 of 2001. After challenge to the said award was turned down with the dismissal of the statutory appeals on 31.08.2004, the attachment proceedings were initiated by the respondent Bank and the mortgaged property was put up for sale for recovery of the due amount. However, the entire due amount could not be recovered in the auction sale held on 09.05.2009 and, as such, attachment notices were issued on 17.09.2012 whereafter the matter went back and forth on various challenges brought by the original borrowers and their legal heirs, namely the petitioners herein. 35. The attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 were issued after the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 493 of 2017 and 503 of 2017, which were disposed of by the order dated 19.07.2019 in view of the statement made on behalf of the respondent Bank that the composite notices dated 02.01.2017 shall be withdrawn and fresh separate notices for realisation of Page 30 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 the amount in respect of respective decrees would be issued, while keeping it open for the petitioners to raise the issues, in the legal proceedings on issuance of the fresh notices, if any. 36. The contention, thus, is that there is no question to attract the provisions of Article 182 of the Limitation Act when the recovery proceedings were initiated immediately after the award of the Board of Nominees had attained finality with the dismissal of appeals in the year 2004, and further continued with the attachment notices dated 17.09.2012, whereafter the parties are litigating throughout. 37. The submission is that the present appeal being the fifth round of litigation to challenge the recovery notices issued by the respondent Bank for recovery of the due amount, the first being Special Civil Application Nos. 14847 of 2012 and 14947 of 2012, which were filed against the attachment notices dated 17.09.2012, the submission with regard to the impugned recovery notices being time barred are liable to be rejected at the threshold. 38. The submission is that by litigating with the respondent Bank, the original borrowers and now the petitioners who are the heirs and legal representatives of the original borrower have succeeded in avoiding their liability and they cannot deny the interest liability agreed upon by the original borrower in the loan Page 31 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 agreement. The respondent Bank cannot be faulted in making calculation of its outstanding loan amounts which was to the tune of total Rs. 10,18,000/- calculated after the auction sale was held on 09.05.2009, after setting off the amount fetched in the sale. 39. Reliance is further placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Manguben Ratilal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat [2014 SCC OnLine Guj 4045] by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent bank to submit that the question as to the validity of the provisions of Sections 95, 161 and 162 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 and the notification dated 07.10.2002 issued thereunder have been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in the said decision and the dispute with regard to the delegation, raised herein, cannot be appreciated. 40. In rejoinder, Mr. Sanjanwala, the learned Senior counsel for the appellants made an effort to distinguish the arguments made by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent bank, based on the decision in Manguben Ratilal Thakkar (supra) by placing paragraph ‘34’ thereof. 41. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record, the undisputed facts of the matter culled out from the record of the writ petitions and the instant appeals are as under :- Page 32 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 (i) That the ancestors of the petitioners were the borrowers of the loan granted by the respondent no.2 Bank in the year 1999-2000. The borrowers defaulted in payment of installment and hence, Lavad Suits filed by the respondent Bank culminated into the awards dated 13.06.2003, which had attained finality with the dismissal of the appeals under Section 102 of the Act, 1961 by the Cooperative Tribunal on 31.08.2004. (ii) The respondent Bank had attached the mortgaged property after the awards were passed and put them to sale, however, the entire outstanding loan amount could not be realised by the auction sale amount, so there was set off of the loan accounts. (iii) Against the outstanding amount, first attachment notices dated 17.09.2012 were issued by the respondent Bank, which had led to the filing of the writ petitions before this Court by the partnership firm (borrower) seeking for settlement of the outstanding amount under One Time Settlement Scheme of the State. Initially, an interim order was passed therein staying recovery, but later on the writ petitions were dismissed rejecting the prayer for One Time Settlement and pursue the revision applications pending before the competent authority. Pertinent is to note that there is no whisper in the said writ petitions about the alleged delay in the auction sale or the sale amount set off Page 33 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 by the bank leading to calculation of the outstanding amount against two loan accounts. (iv) In revision, though the attachment notices dated 17.09.2012 were quashed on technicality, but liberty was kept open for the Bank to initiate fresh recovery proceedings, which had led to filing of the Letters Patent Appeals before this Court by the borrowers/petitioners. The said litigation was also brought to an end with the judgment and order dated 29.09.2016 leaving it open for the petitioners to raise objections regarding penal interest before the appropriate authority as and when fresh recovery proceedings were initiated. (v) Upon issuance of the fresh attachment notice dated 02.01.2017, in the third round of litigation before this Court brought by the borrowers/petitioners herein, initially an interim order was passed restraining the respondent bank from proceeding with the attachment notices. However, the matter was decided finally on the statement of the Bank that the common attachment notice dated 02.01.2017 being composite notice for recovery against two decrees be withdrawn and fresh notices for realisation of the amount with the respective decrees shall be issued. (vi) The said writ petitions were, thus, disposed of granting liberty to the Bank to proceed in Page 34 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 accordance with law and leaving it open for the petitioners to raise all contentions upon issuance of fresh notices. (vii) The attachment notices dated 29.10.2019, subject matter of challenge before us in this bunch, were consequently issued. (viii)During the pendency of the writ petitions challenging the notice dated 29.10.2019, another attachment notice dated 18.01.2022 has been issued seeking to attach one more property of the petitioners for realisation of the loan amount with the changed circumstances. 42. In view of the above noted sequence of events, when we consider the arguments of the learned Senior counsel for the appellants on the issue of limitation, we do not find any error in the opinion drawn by the learned Single Judge that the period from 2012-2017 has to be excluded in view of the pending litigations and the prohibitory orders passed by this Court against the Bank in three rounds of challenge brought to the recovery proceedings. The recovery proceedings were initiated with the issuance of the first attachment notices on 17.09.2012 and cannot be said to have been finally disposed of and, as such, the subsequent recovery notices have to be treated as continuance of the former one. In other words, the latter attachment notices would be deemed to be ones for revival of the former ones. It Page 35 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 would be considered that the execution of the decree/award dated 13.06.2003 had commenced in the year 2012 and continued with the revivals by the subsequent attachment notices in view of the liberty granted by this Court in the actions brought by the borrowers/petitioners herein. 43. We do not find any error in the said conclusion drawn by the writ court that the subsequent execution orders or the attachment notice of the year 2019, which have been initiated after variety of litigations and prohibitory orders and subsequent directions to pass fresh attachment orders, cannot be said to be beyond the period of limitation. 44. As regard the issues pertaining to the validity of the attachment notice for the recoveries initiated against the heirs and legal representatives of the original borrowers, insofar as the issue as to whether the property was a self-acquired property or part of any estate or borrowed from the original borrowers, suffice it to say that the writ court has carefully observed that the said issue can very well be demonstrated before the appropriate authority and that such exercise has to be conducted only before the appropriate authority. The legality of attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 and 18.01.2022 on the plea of the said notices having been issued for attachment of the self-acquired properties of the heirs of the original borrowers, rightly have not been looked into in the writ proceedings being factual in nature. Suffice it to say Page 36 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 that the said issue cannot be raised to assail the limitation in execution of the awards dated 13.06.2003, inasmuch as, the same would be pertaining to the merits of the attachment notices, which is not to be examined by us. 45. This view taken by the Writ court further finds support from the decision of the Apex Court in Pentapati China Venkanna (supra), wherein the Apex Court noticing the provisions of Order 21 Rule 17 (1) of the Code, considering the facts of the said case, has recorded that as there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for making orders for closure of the execution proceedings and any phraseology used by the executing court such as “closed for statistical purposes”, “struck off”, “recorded” would not amount to finally terminate the execution proceedings. In the said case, the first execution application was “closed for statistical purposes” and on a fresh execution application, an argument was raised that there being no power conferred upon the Court to close the execution proceedings for statistical purposes, in the event of such order being made, it must be deemed to be an order dismissing the execution application. The question therein was as to whether the subsequent execution application shall be considered to be a fresh application within the meaning of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure’ 1908. 46. Noticing the above, the Apex Court has held therein that Page 37 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 whether the order was without jurisdiction or whether it was valid, the legal position would be the same, i.e. in one case, it would be ignored and in the other, it would mean what it is stated. In either case, the execution application would be pending on the file of the Court. Whatever terminology would be used, it is for the Court to ascertain having regard to the circumstances under which the said order was made, whether the Court intended to finally terminate the execution proceeding. In the said case, it was held that the previous execution petition was pending on the file of the executing court and that the subsequent one was only an application to continue the same. 47. The further contention of the learned advocate therein was that the subsequent execution petition being against the legal representatives of some of the defendants/judgement debtors; and that the decree holder did not seek to proceed against all the properties against which they sought to proceed in the former execution petition; and for additional reliefs prayed in for attachment of the amount deposited in the Court, subsequent application should be treated as completely new one, being completely different from the former one, both in form and in particulars. Answering the same, it was held therein that nothing turns upon it, inasmuch as, the new parties added in the subsequent execution petition were either legal representatives of the deceased parties or the representative of a party Page 38 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 who had become insolvent. Further, the decree holder cannot be compelled to proceed against all the properties against which at one time they sought to proceed. It was, thus, concluded that in substance, in both the execution petitions (the previous & the subsequent), the decree holders sought to proceed against the same parties and against the same properties and hence, the subsequent execution petition cannot be treated as fresh application within the meaning of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 48. Applying the said legal principles, we do not find any error in the judgement impugned. However, a new argument has been made before us by the learned Senior counsel for the appellants about the attachment notices dated 18.01.2022, being barred by limitation, having been issued for attachment of a new property, which is substantially different from three properties, subject matter of attachment in the notices dated 29.10.2019. 49. On this argument as well, we do not find any reason to delve deep, inasmuch as, the said attachment notices dated 18.01.2022 are also to be treated as continuance of the previous attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 and cannot be quashed on the plea of being barred by limitation. 50. Having said that, we are also required to note that the petitioners herein had prolonged the recovery of the Page 39 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 outstanding loan for a substantial period raising various grounds challenging the attachment notices issued from time to time, in order to avoid the recovery of the outstanding amount, which has caused accumulation of interest @ 21%, resulting into the outstanding loan amount being swollen from the original amount due under the attachment notices dated 17.09.2012, substantially under the attachment notices issued in the year 2019, subject matter of challenge in the writ proceedings. 51. The question is whether the decree would be satisfied by the attachment and sale of properties, subject matter of attachment notices dated 29.10.2019. Moreover, as per the own case of the petitioners, two of the original noticees had passed away in the years 2006 and 2014. The question again would be as to whether the Bank would be entitled to proceed against the properties, subject matter of two notices dated 29.10.2019 and 18.01.2022 being part of any estate or borrowed from the original borrower or the said notices are in respect of any self-acquired property of the legal heirs, which have been left to be agitated before the appropriate authority, by the writ court. 52. The Judgment impugned categorically records that the scope of the attachment has to be looked from the angle of any asset being transferred by the original judgment debtor, insofar as the issue that the attachment notices were issued after demise of the original judgement Page 40 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 debtor. 53. We, therefore, reach at an irresistible conclusion that the validity of the attachment notices dated 18.01.2022 allegedly seeking to include a new property for execution of the award dated 15.06.2003 need not be examined by us on merits. As has been held that both the attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 and 18.01.2022 shall be treated as continuance of the first attachment notice dated 17.09.2012, we do not find substance in the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellants based on the observation made in paragraph ‘9’ of the Apex Court in Pentapati China Venkanna (supra) that merely because a new property is sought to be attached, which was not included in the previous attachment notices, the attachment notices dated 18.01.2022 are to be held to be fresh execution petitions within the meaning of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said issue was open only after previous notices were finally disposed of and the new one can be be held to be barred by limitation having been issued after 12 years from the date of the decree/award. In the present case, the circumstances speak otherwise. 54. All arguments made by the learned Senior counsel for the appellants to challenge the attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 and 18.01.2022 being barred by limitation in view of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 182 of the Limitation Act, are, therefore, turned down being devoid of any force. Page 41 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 55. Coming to the second issue of sub-delegation by the Secretary, Cooperative Federal Society vide order dated 10.08.2021 by empowering an officer of the respondent Bank as “Recovery Officer” in the matter of recoveries under the Act, 1961, suffice it to say that having gone through the scheme of the Act, 1961 as well as the Rules, 1965 framed thereunder, it is evident that the Secretary, Cooperative Federation Society, viz. the Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited, stepped into the shoes of the Registrar for the purposes of exercise of the powers under Section 159 of the Act, 1961 for initiating recovery proceedings. 56. Further, with the conferment of the powers upon the Secretary, Federal Society to act as the Registrar under Section 159 of the Act, 1961, it was well within his power to empower any officer subordinate to him to act on his behalf to exercise the powers under Section 159 as a “Recovery Officer” within the meaning of Rule 2(iv) and any other officer as “Sale Officer” to attach and sell the property of a defaulter or to execute any decree by attachment and sale under Section 159 of the Act, 1961. There is no challenge to the order dated 10.08.2021 passed by the Secretary, Federal Society to empower the officer of the respondent Bank to act as the “recovery officer” as aforesaid. 57. The only issue raised is as to whether the officer or employee of the respondent Bank, who has been empowered by the Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co- Page 42 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 operative Bank Federation Limited by the order dated 10.08.2021 to act as “Recovery officer” or “Sale Officer” under Rule 2(iv) and (v) of the Rules, 1965, can be said to be an officer subordinate to the Secretary, Federal Society or not. 58. On this issue, we do not need to delve deep, inasmuch as, the Federal Society is an Apex body constituted or recognised under Section 95(1) of the Act, 1961 to supervise society or class of societies. The “federal society” is defined in Section 2(9) as under :- "federal society" means society, not less than ten members of which are themselves societies;” 59. The class of societies which are brought under the provisions of a federal society, by virtue of Section 95(1), thus, are the members of the federal society. 60. The “Officer” of a society defined in Section 2(14) of the Act, 1961 include a Secretary of a Society appointed under the Act, the Rules or the by-laws in regard to the business of such society. The Federal Society acting through its Secretary having supervision and control over its Member societies, the officers or employees of a member society appointed under the Act, Rules or by- laws shall have to be considered as officers or employees subordinate to the Secretary, Federal Society who is conferred with the power to give directions in regard to the business of such society under its supervisory control. Page 43 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 61. The “recovery officer” nominated by the Secretary, Federal Society, in the instant case, cannot be said to be an officer not being subordinate to the Secretary, Federal Society, who could not have been empowered to exercise the powers of recovery within the scheme of Section 159 of the Act, 1961, acting on behalf of the Secretary, Federal Society, upon whom the powers under the said section has been conferred with the notification dated 07.10.2002 by the State Government under Section 162(b) of the Act, 1961. 62. At the cost of repetition, it is noted here that since there is no challenge to the order dated 10.08.2021 passed by the Secretary, Gujarat State Urban Co-operative Bank Federation Limited designating the officer of the respondent Bank as “Recovery Officer” in the matter of recoveries under the Act, 1961, inasmuch as, no relief has been sought in the present set of writ petitions, the submissions raised with regard to power of the Secretary to designate the officer of the bank as “recovery officer’ cannot be sustained. 63. As noted, hereinbefore, the challenge in the present set of writ petitions are only to the attachment notices dated 29.10.2019 and 18.01.2022 on the grounds of being beyond limitation and the “Recovery Officer” being incompetent to issue such notices. Both the issues having been answered in view of the discussion made above, we do not find any good ground to attach any error to the judgment and order dated 10.07.2025 Page 44 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026 C/LPA/31/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/03/2026 passed by the Writ Court. 64. The present set of intra court appeals are accordingly, dismissed being devoid of merits. No order as to costs. Pending Civil Applications would not survive and shall stand disposed of, accordingly. (SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ ) (D.N.RAY,J) FURTHER ORDER After pronouncement of the judgment, Ms.Sangeeta Pahwa, the learned advocate appearing for the Thakkar and Pahwa Advocates for the appellants would make a request to stay the operation of this judgment, which is denied noticing that the recovery proceedings had been stalled for a sufficiently long time because of the repeated litigations initiated by the appellants. (SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ ) (D.N.RAY,J) BIJOY B. PILLAI Page 45 of 45 Uploaded by BIJOY B. PILLAI(HC00202) on Wed Mar 25 2026 Downloaded on : Wed Mar 25 18:56:20 IST 2026</div>