Manpreet Kaur vs Jai Singh

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CR No.1884 of 2021 (O&M)
Manpreet Kaur . . . . Pe ''oner
vs.
Jai Singh . . . . Respondent
Reserved on: September 02, 2026
Pronounced on: September 07 , 2026
Pronounced fully/opera've part : Fully

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Argued By:- Mr. Vaibhav Sehgal, Advocate for the pe oner.

Mr. Amit Sharma (Kanav), Advocate for the respondent.
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
This revision pe on has been ﬁled by the tenant challenging
the order dated 12.08.2021 passed by learned Rent Controller, Jagraon in
Rent Peon No.5 of 2021, tled ‘Jai Singh v. Manpreet Kaur’, whereby the
applica on ﬁled by the peoner-tenant seeking leave to contest was
dismissed and, consequently, an order of ejectment was passed in a peon
instuted by the respondent-landlord under Secon 13-B of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restricon Act, 1949 (for short, ‘the 1949 Act’).
2. The pares shall be referred to as ‘tenant’ and ‘landlord’,
respecvely, to avoid any confusion.
3. A perusal of the record would show that the respondent-
landlord instuted the ejectment peon on 29.04.2021 under Secon 13-B
of the 1949 Act, claiming himself to be a Non-Resident Indian permanently
se;led in Canada. According to the landlord, the demised premises had been
purchased by him vide registered sale deed dated 24.05.2012 and therea<er
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CR No.1884 of 2021 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:125165
construc on was raised thereon. The demised residenal premises were let
out to the peoner on 17.01.2020 at a monthly rent of ₹20,000/-. Ejectment
was sought on the ground of bona ﬁde personal requirement, it being
pleaded that whenever the landlord visits India, he fails to ﬁnd any suitable
accommodaon other than the demised premises.
4. The peoner-tenant moved an applicaon seeking leave to
contest the ejectment peon. During the course of those proceedings,
learned Rent Controller, vide order dated 19.07.2021 (Annexure P-2), noced
that the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (for short, ‘the 1995 Act’) had already come
into force with eﬀect from 30.11.2013. Relying upon the judgment of this
Court in Krishan Kumar and others v. Kamla Devi and others, 2016 (1) RCR
(Rent) 525 , learned Rent Controller observed that the landlord was required
to move an appropriate applica on for amendment of the ejectment peon
so as to bring the same in conformity with Secon 24(3) of the 1995 Act.
5. Instead of seeking amendment of the peon, the landlord
moved an applicaon seeking reconsideraon of the order dated 19.07.2021.
It was contended that he had purchased the plot vide registered sale deed
dated 24.05.2012 and had therea<er raised construcon thereon and,
therefore, according to him, the provisions of the 1995 Act were not
applicable and the peon under the 1949 Act was maintainable.
6. The tenant, on the other hand, moved an applicaon seeking
dismissal of the ejectment peon on the ground that the 1949 Act had
already been repealed and that the peon under Secon 13-B thereof was
not maintainable.
7. Learned Rent Controller, vide the impugned order dated
12.08.2021, accepted the contenon of the landlord and observed that in
view of Secon 3(1) of the 1995 Act, the said Act was not applicable to the
demised premises and, consequently, the peon under the 1949 Act was
held to be maintainable. Learned Rent Controller therea<er considered the
applicaon ﬁled by the tenant seeking leave to contest. Although the delay in
ﬁling the said applicaon was condoned in view of the direcons issued by
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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
applica on seeking leave to contest was ulmately dismissed and an order of
ejectment was passed against the tenant on 12.08.2021. Hence, the present
revision peon.
8. Learned counsel for the peoner-tenant has assailed the
impugned order primarily on three grounds. Firstly , it is submi ;ed that
learned Rent Controller had no jurisdicon to review or reconsider its earlier
order dated 19.07.2021. In support of this submission, reliance has been
placed upon Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR
1970 SC 1273.
9. Secondly , learned counsel submits that even assuming that
Sec on 3 of the 1995 Act could have the eﬀect of excluding the demised
premises from the operaon of the 1995 Act, learned Rent Controller was
required to determine the date of compleon of construcon. The mere fact
that the plot was purchased in the year 2012 does not establish the date on
which the building was constructed. It is contended that if the building had
been constructed before 30.11.2013, there was no exempon under Secon
3(1)(c) of the 1995 Act and, conversely, if the building was constructed on or
a<er 30.11.2013, the exempon would operate only for the period
prescribed under the statute.
10. Thirdly, learned counsel submits that the 1949 Act stood
repealed with eﬀect from 30.11.2013 and no fresh right could be created
under the repealed enactment in favour of a landlord in respect of a tenancy
which itself came into existence in the year 2020. It is argued that the savings
clause contained in Sec on 75 of the 1995 Act cannot revive a right under the
repealed enactment, which had not accrued before its repeal. Reliance has
been placed upon Kesho Ram Co. and others v. Union of India and others,
(1989) 3 SCC 151 and State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh, (2011) 5 SCC 305 .
11. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has
defended the impugned order. It is submi ;ed that the construcon was
raised a<er the purchase of the plot in the year 2012 and, therefore, the
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premises were exempt from the opera on of the 1995 Act. It is further
contended that the respondent being an NRI is entled to seek possession of
the premises and that the impugned order does not call for interference in
revisional jurisdicon.
12. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the pares and have perused the record.
13. The controversy essenally requires examinaon of the
statutory scheme governing the demised premises a<er the coming into
force of the Punjab Rent Act, 1995. The 1995 Act came into force with eﬀect
from 30.11.2013. Secon 75(1) expressly repealed the 1949 Act. At the same
me, Secon 75 incorporated savings in respect of rights, privileges,
obligaons, liabilies and proceedings, which had already accrued or existed
under the repealed enactment. Secon 75(2) further provides that,
notwithstanding such repeal, cases and proceedings in respect of premises,
other than those owned by an NRI, let out prior to commencement of the
1995 Act would connue to be governed by the repealed Act.
14. The relevant provisions of Secon 3 of the 1995 Act also deserve
to be noced at this stage. Secon 3, as substuted by Punjab Act No.33 of
2013, provides, insofar as relevant, as under:
“ 3. Premises exempted from the opera 'on of the Act.— (1) Nothing in this
Act shall apply,—
(a) to any premises let out before the commencement of this Act;
(b) xxxx (not relevant to this case)
(c) to any premises constructed on or a <er the commencement of this Act ,
for a period of ﬁ <een years from the date of compleon of construcon;
Explanaon I.—The expression ‘date of compleon of construcon’ shall
mean the date of compleon as inmated to the concerned authority or of
assessment to property tax, whichever is earlier, and, where the premises
has been constructed in stages, the date on which the inial building was
completed and an inmaon thereof was sent to the concerned authority or
was assessed to property tax, whichever is earlier.
Explanaon II.—xxxx (not relevant to this case)”
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CR No.1884 of 2021 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:125165
[underlined por on emphasized by this court]
15. The statutory provision makes it clear that the exempon under
Secon 3(1)(c) is linked to the date of construcon/compleon of the
premises and not to the date of acquision of the land.
16. Thus, the fact that the respondent purchased the plot on
24.05.2012 cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the demised
premises were exempt from the operaon of the 1995 Act. What was
required to be determined was the date of construcon/compleon of the
demised building. The Explanaon to Secon 3 itself provides the statutory
method for determining the date of compleon.
17. The disncon is material in the present case because the
tenancy admi;edly commenced only on 17.01.2020. Therefore, the premises
were not “let out before the commencement” of the 1995 Act so as to fall
within Secon 3(1)(a). The landlord's case could, at the highest, be brought
within Secon 3(1)(c), but only if the statutory requirements concerning
construcon were established.
18. No such categorical ﬁnding regarding the date of compleon of
construcon has been recorded by learned Rent Controller. The impugned
order proceeds substanally on the premise that since the plot had been
purchased in 2012 and construcon had therea<er been raised, the 1995 Act
was inapplicable. Such reasoning does not sasfy the statutory test contained
in Secon 3(1)(c).
19. There is another and more fundamental aspect of the ma;er.
The respondent-landlord instuted the peon on 29.04.2021 under Secon
13-B of the 1949 Act. By that date, the 1949 Act had already been repealed
for more than seven years. The tenancy itself had been created in January
2020. Therefore, no right under Secon 13-B could have accrued in favour of
the respondent-landlord prior to repeal of the 1949 Act.
20. The judgment of this Court in Krishan Kumar v. Kamla Devi
(supra) , assumes signiﬁcance in this context. While considering the apparent
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CR No.1884 of 2021 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:125165
overlap and inconsistency between the 1949 Act and the 1995 Act, this Court
examined Sec ons 3, 24(3) and 75 of the 1995 Act and held that, in the case
of an NRI landlord, a peon instuted a<er 30.11.2013 was required to be
considered under the 1995 Act, notwithstanding the fact that the premises
may have been let out before commencement of the new Act. The Court also
noced the substanve changes introduced by the 1995 Act in the rights
available to NRI landlords.
21. The posion was subsequently considered in
Sharanjeet Singh v.
Harsimran Singh Manchanda, 2024(2) RCR (Rent) 347 . In that case also, the
pe on had been instuted a<er the 1995 Act had come into force but was
originally ﬁled under Secon 13-B of the 1949 Act. The Court examined the
interplay between Secons 3, 24(3) and 75 and reiterated that an NRI
landlord seeking the special remedy a<er commencement of the 1995 Act
has to sasfy the requirements of the new statutory regime.
22. The present case, however, stands on an even stronger foong
in favour of the tenant. Here, the tenancy itself was created on 17.01.2020,
i.e. more than six years a<er commencement of the 1995 Act.
23. Secon 24(3) of the 1995 Act provides:
“Where an owner is a non-resident Indian and returns to India for
permanent residence, he or she may apply to the Rent Authority for
recovery of immediate possession of residen al or/and non-residenal
premises let out by him or her on or prior to the commencement of this Act,
which are required for his or her use, or for the use of any one ordinarily
living with and dependent on him or her.”
24. The statutory language is signiﬁcant. The special remedy under
Sec on 24(3) is available in respect of premises let out on or prior to the
commencement of the 1995 Act. The present premises were admi;edly let
out on 17.01.2020. Consequently, the respondent cannot invoke Secon
24(3) in respect of the present tenancy either.
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25. This dis ncon was not required to be examined in the same
manner in cases such as Krishan Kumar (supra), where the Court was
concerned with premises, which had been let out before commencement of
the 1995 Act. The present case concerns a tenancy, which came into
existence in 2020 and therefore falls outside the express temporal
requirement contained in Sec on 24(3).
26. It follows that the respondent cannot obtain the beneﬁt of
Secon 13-B of the repealed 1949 Act by merely describing himself as an NRI.
Nor can he automacally convert such a peon into one under Secon 24(3)
of the 1995 Act, because the admi;ed date of tenancy itself takes the case
outside the scope of Secon 24(3).
27. The posion under Secon 75 of the 1995 Act also does not
assist the respondent. Secon 75 saves the previous operaon of the
repealed enactment and rights, privileges, obligaons or liabilies already
acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder. It does not create a new right
under the repealed Act a<er the date of repeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognised the disncon between preservaon of an
accrued right and creaon of a fresh right a<er repeal.
28. In the present case, there was no pending proceeding under the
1949 Act on 30.11.2013. There was also no tenancy in favour of the
peoner on that date. The tenancy itself was created in 2020. Therefore,
there could be no accrued right in favour of the respondent under Secon
13-B of the 1949 Act, which could be saved by Secon 75.
29. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the tenant upon Patel
is also well
Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (supra),
founded to the extent that learned Rent Controller could not exercise a
substan ve power of review in the absence of statutory conferment of such
power. The order dated 19.07.2021 had already recorded a judicial
determinaon concerning the applicability of the 1995 Act and required the
landlord to take appropriate steps in that regard. Instead of availing an
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appropriate remedy against that order, the landlord sought its
reconsidera on before the same authority.
30. Nevertheless, even assuming that the subsequent order dated
12.08.2021 is examined independently and the earlier order dated
19.07.2021 is not treated as having a;ained ﬁnality, the ulmate conclusion
of the learned Rent Controller cannot be sustained for the substanve
reasons noced hereinabove.
31. The learned Rent Controller was required to determine, ﬁrst,
whether the 1995 Act applied to the demised premises. If the landlord
claimed exempon under Secon 3(1)(c), the date of compleon of
construcon was required to be established in accordance with the statutory
Explanaon. Mere purchase of the plot in December 2012 was insuﬃcient for
this purpose.
32. If the premises were not exempt under Secon 3(1)(c), the
proceedings had necessarily to be governed by the 1995 Act. The special NRI
remedy under Secon 24(3), however, was itself unavailable because the
tenancy was created only in 2020. If, on the other hand, the premises were
found to be exempt under Secon 3(1)(c), the respondent could not revive
Secon 13-B of the already repealed 1949 Act merely on that account. His
remedy, if any, would have to be determined in accordance with the general
law governing such exempt premises.
33. The statutory scheme, therefore, does not permit the
respondent to travel from one enactment to another so as to retain the
special remedy under Secon 13-B despite the repeal of the 1949 Act and the
admi;edly post-2013 creaon of the tenancy.
34. Once the very maintainability of the ejectment peon under
Secon 13-B of the 1949 Act fails, the queson whether the tenant had
disclosed suﬃcient grounds for grant of leave to contest becomes academic.
An order of ejectment could not have been passed in a proceeding, which
was not maintainable under the provision invoked by the landlord.
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CR No.1884 of 2021 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:125165
35. It is, therefore, unnecessary for this Court to examine the
individual grounds taken by the tenant in his applica on for leave to contest
or to record any ﬁnding on the alleged bona ﬁde requirement of the landlord.
Any such ﬁnding may prejudice the pares in any proceedings, which the
landlord may herea<er be entled to instute under the law applicable to
the premises.
36. For the reasons recorded above, the present revision peon is
allowed. The impugned orders dated 12.08.2021 passed by learned Rent
Controller, Jagraon in Rent Peon No.5 of 2021, tled Jai Singh v. Manpreet
Kaur, whereby the applicaon ﬁled by the peoner seeking leave to contest
was dismissed and the consequenal order of ejectment was passed, are set
aside.
37. The ejectment peon ﬁled by the respondent under Secon 13-
B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restricon Act, 1949 is held to be not
maintainable. The respondent shall, however, be at liberty to avail such
remedy as may be available to him in accordance with law. Nothing
contained in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the
merits of the landlord's alleged bona ﬁde requirement or on the rights of
either party under any other applicable statutory or general law.
38. It is clariﬁed that if the respondent chooses to instute any fresh
proceedings, the same shall be considered by the competent forum
independently and in accordance with the statutory requirements applicable
thereto. The observaons made herein are conﬁned to the maintainability of
the present proceedings under Secon 13-B of the repealed 1949 Act.
39. Pending miscellaneous applicaon(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of. There shall be no order as to costs.
September 07, 2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Sarita
JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned? : Yes/No
Whether reportable? : Yes/No
Uploaded on: September 07, 2026
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