SRI ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
Reserved on : 02.09.2026
Pronounced on : 16.10.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7425 OF 2025
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7426 OF 2025
IN CRL.P No. 7425/2025
BETWEEN:
SRI AMIT MALVIYA
S/O KAUSHLENDRA KUMAR MALVIYA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
RESIDING AT H NO.06, OFFICES FLATS,
MEENA BAGH, NIRMAN BHAWAN
CENTRAL DELHI, DELHI – 110 011.
…PETITIONER
Digitally
signed by
CHAYA S A
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
(BY SRI M.ARUNA SHYAM, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SUYOG HERELE E., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH HIGH GROUNDS PS,
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REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. SHRIKANTH SWAROOP B.N.,
S/O NATARAJ B.P.,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS
LEELA KARAN NO.227,
TH TH
13 CROSS, 5 MAIN ROAD,
ND
2 STAGE, INDIRANAGAR,
BENGALURU CITY – 560 038.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I, FOR R-1;
SRI C.M.DHANANJAYA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 OF BNSS PRAYING TO ALLOW
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION AND QUASH THE FIR AND COMPLAINT IN
CR.NO.0132/2025 FOR THE ALLEGED U/S 192 AND 352 OF THE
BNS, 2023 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT HIGH GROUNDS
ST
P.S. (ON THE FILE OF LEARNED 1 ADDL. CMM COURT,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD) AND ALL FURTHER ACTIONS PURSUANT
THERETO; (PRODUCED AT DOCUMENT NO.1 AND 2).
IN CRL.P NO. 7426/2025
BETWEEN:
1.
SRI ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI
S/O LATE SRI MANORANJAN GOSWAMI
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
RESIDING AT E-2/14, LAND-2
JAYPEE GREENS
SURAJPUR KASNA ROAD
- 3 -
PARI CHOWK, GREATER NOIDA
DADRI, GAUTAM BUDDHA NAGAR
UTTAR PRADESH – 201 306.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.ARUNA SHYAM, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SUYOG HERELE E., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUTH HIGH GROUNDS PS
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGHCOURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2.
SHRIKANTH SWAROOP B.N.,
S/O NATARAJ B.P.,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS
”LEELA KARAN”
TH
NO.227, 13 CROSS
TH
5 MAIN ROAD
ND
2 STAGE, INDIRANAGAR
BENGALUR CITY – 560 038.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1;
SRI C.M.DHANANJAYA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 OF BNSS., PRAYING TO
ALLOW THIS CRL.P AND QUASH AND FIR AND COMPLAINT
IN CR.NO.132/2025 FOR THE ALLEGED UNDER SEC.192,
352 OF BNS, 2023 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT
ST
HIGH GROUNDS P.S (ON THE FILE OF LEARNED 1
ADDL.C.M.M COURT NRUPATHUNGA ROAD) ANNEXURE-A
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AND ANNEXURE-B.
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 02.09.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
These petitions call in question a solitary crime registered in
Crime No.132 of 2025 registered for offences punishable under
Section 192 and 352 of the BNS. In Criminal Petition No.7425 of
2025, it is the accused No.1 who calls in question the said crime
and in Criminal Petition No.7426 of 2025, it is accused No.2.
2. Heard Sri M. Aruna Shyam, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned State
Public Prosecutor-I appearing for respondent No.1 and
Sri C.M. Dhananjaya, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.2.
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3. Facts, in brief, germane, are as follows:-
Criminal Petition No.7425 of 2025:
(a) The petitioner is the in-charge of BJP’s National
Information and Technology Department. It is the allegation made
nd
by the 2 respondent/complainant that the petitioner along
accused No.2 has maliciously propagated a fabricated claim that the
Istanbul Congress Centre in Turkey is the office of the Indian
National Congress. It is the further allegation that the said claim of
accused No.1 is telecasted in the Republic TV Network by accused
No.2, all with an intention of deceiving the Indian public, defaming
a major political institution, manipulating national sentiments and
inciting public unrest, resulting in undermining national security. It
nd
is on the said allegation, the 2 respondent, office bearer of the
Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee files a complaint before the
st
1 respondent - jurisdictional Police Station on 20-05-2025, which
becomes a crime in Crime No.132 of 2025 for the aforesaid
offences.
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Criminal Petition No.7426 of 2025:
(b) The petitioner is the Editor-in-Chief of the Republic media
network holding 20 years of experience in the field of journalism.
The complainant is the same and the incident is the same as
obtaining in the companion petition. The allegation against the
petitioner in the subject petition is that on 15-05-2025 the
petitioner hosted an on-air lead story raising questions on whether
the Congress party has an office in Turkey. The following day i.e.,
on 16-05-2025, two junior members of the Digital Desk of Republic
media network were displaying pictures over the lead story covered
by the petitioner on 15-05-2025. Based thereupon, the crime is
registered against the petitioner drawing him as accused No.2. It is
the registration of the crime that has driven the petitioner to this
Court in the subject petition.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri M.Aruna Shyam appearing
for the petitioners would vehemently contend that neither the
statement of accused No.1 nor the telecast of the said statement by
accused No.2 would attract offences as alleged. None of the
ingredients of the offences necessary even to its foundation are
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present in the case at hand. He would seek to place reliance upon
plethora of judgments on the issue, all of which would bear
consideration subject to their relevance.
5. Per contra , learned State Public Prosecutor - I appearing
for the State would submit that the complaint is registered by the
nd
2 respondent, which had just then became a crime in Crime
No.132 of 2025. The crime is registered on 20-05-2025. But, the
petition is preferred on 22-05-2025 and the investigation is stayed.
No investigation worth the name has even commenced in the case
at hand. He would, therefore, seek dismissal of the petitions
contending that the petitioners would have all the opportunities to
question the final report in the event the final report would go
against them. He would submit that there is no warrant of
interference at this stage of the proceedings.
nd
6. The learned counsel appearing for the 2 respondent
would also toe the lines of the learned State Public Prosecutor - I
appearing for the State in seeking dismissal of the petitions.
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7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts lie in a narrow compass. The
nd
entire issue has cropped up on a complaint registered by the 2
respondent said to be a spokesperson of the KPCC. The complaint
reads as follows:
“C.M. DHANANJAYA
SPOKESPERSON - KARNATAKA
PRADESH CONGRESS COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN - LEGAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
RTI DEPARTMENT
To,
Station House Officer,
High Grounds Police Station,
Bengaluru – 560 001.
Respected sir,
Subject: Urgent and Severe Complaint Against
Amit Malviya and Arnab Goswami for
Orchestrating a Malicious Criminal
Conspiracy to Spread False Information
with Intent to Subvert National Interest
and Incite Public Unrest
I am filing this critical and uncompromising complaint
against Mr. Amit Malviya, Head of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s
IT Cell, and Mr. Arnab Goswami, Editor-in-Chief of Republic TV,
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for masterminding a heinous and criminally motivated campaign
to disseminate patently false information. The accused have
maliciously propagated the fabricated claim that the Istanbul
Congress Center in Turkiye is the office of the Indian National
Congress (INC). This act was executed with clear and
undeniable criminal intent to deceive the Indian public, defame
major political institution, manipulate nationalist sentiments,
incite public unrest, and undermine national security and
democratic integrity. Context and Criminal Intent.
The actions of Mr.Malviya and Mr. Goswami are set
against the volatile backdrop of strained India-Turkiye relations,
driven by Turkiye's perceived support for Pakistan, a nation
widely regarded as India’s adversary. Indian citizens, in a
display of patriotic protest, have initiated a widespread boycott
of Turkish tourism, products, and economic engagements. By
falsely portraying the Istanbul Congress Center as an INC office,
the accused have pursued the following criminal objectives:
1. Exploitation of Nationalist Sentiments: Deliberately leveraging
public resentment against Turkiye to falsely associate the INC
with a nation currently viewed as antagonistic, thereby inciting
public outrage and eroding the INC's credibility.
2. Defamation of a Political Institution: Maliciously tarnishing the
reputation of the INC, a major opposition party, to weaken its
political standing and manipulate electoral outcomes.
3. Incitement of Public Unrest: Sowing division, mistrust, and
potential violence among citizens by exploiting sensitive
geopolitical issues, with the intent to destabilize social harmony.
4. Subversion of National Interest: Undermining India’s
democratic framework and national security by spreading
disinformation that misleads voters, erodes trust in institutions,
and risks escalating tensions with a foreign nation.
This orchestrated campaign is not a mere ethical lapse
but a deliberate criminal conspiracy, executed with
premeditation to cause public harm, destabilize the nation, and
advance partisan agendas. The accused have abused their
positions of influence—Mr. Malviya as a key political strategist
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and Mr. Goswami as a prominent media figure—to perpetrate a
grave assault on truth, public safety, and national interest.
Legal Violations and Non-Bailable Offenses .
The actions of Mr. Malviya and Mr. Goswami constitute severe
violations of Indian law, including non- bailable offenses under
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and other statutes, as outlined
below:
•
Section 120B, IPC (Criminal Conspiracy): The accused
conspired to spread false information with the intent to
defame, incite unrest, and harm national interest, a non-
bailable offense when coupled with serious Crimes.
•
Section 153A, IPC (Promoting Enmity Between Groups):
By exploiting nationalist sentiments and falsely linking
the INC to Turkiye, the accused have promoted enmity
on grounds of political affiliation and national identity, a
non-bailable offense.
•
Section 124A, IPC (Sedition): The deliberate spread of
disinformation to incite public unrest and undermine
trust in democratic institutions amounts to seditious
conduct, a non-bailable offense.
•
Section 295A, IPC (Outraging Religious or Communal
Sentiments): The accused's actions risk inflaming.
communal tensions by manipulating nationalist
sentiments, a non-bailable offense.
•
Section 505(1)(b), IPC (Statements Conducing to Public
Mischief): The false narrative was - disseminated with
intent to cause fear, alarm, or violence, a non-bailabfe
offense.
•
Section 499/500, IPC (Criminal Defamation): The
accused maliciously defamed the INC, causing
reputational harm.
•
Information Technology Act, 2000 (Section 66F - Cyber
Terrorism, if applicable); The-use of digital platforms to
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spread disinformation threatening national security may
attract non-bailable provisions.
•
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)
(Section 13, if applicable): If the campaign disrupts
India’s sovereignty, the accused may face non-bailable
charges.
Additionally; the accused have violated the Press Council
of India Guidelines and the News Broadcasting & Digital
Standards Authority (NBDSA) Code of Ethics by
disseminating unverified and fabricated claims. Demands
for Immediate and Stringent Action
Given the severity of these non-bailable offenses and
their profound threat to national security, public order,
and democratic integrity, I demand the following actions
without delay:
1. Immediate Criminal Investigation: Launch a high-
priority probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI), Cybercrime Division, and other relevant agencies
to investigate the roles of Mr. Malviya, Mr. Goswami, and
any accomplices.
2. Arrest and Prosecution: Arrest the accused under non-
bailable provisions of the IPC and other statutes, ensuring
swift prosecution for sedition, promoting enmity,
incitement, and cybercrimes.
3. Media Sanctions: Revoke Republic TV's broadcasting
license and impose a nationwide ban on its operations.
Mandate an immediate public apology and retraction of
the false narrative.
4. Political Accountability: Expel Mr. Malviya from his
position in the BJP IT Cell and investigate the misuse of
party resources. Bar him from holding public or political
office pending investigation.
5. Seizure of Assets: Freeze the financial assets and
digital infrastructure of the accused to prevent further
misuse.
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6. Legislative Reforms: Enact Stricter laws to regulate
digital and broadcast media, mandating real-time. fact-
checking and severe penalties for misinformation.
7. Public Redressal: Order a televised and published
correction, coupled with a public awareness initiative to
restore trust in media and institutions.
Details of the Offense
•
Accused Individuals: Amit Malviya (Head, BIP IT
Cell) and Arnab Goswami (Editor-in-Chief, Republic
TV) :
•
Offense: Deliberate fabrication and dissemination
of the claim that the Istanbul Congress Center is
the INC office in Turkiye
•
Criminal intent: To deceive the public, defame the
INC, exploit anti-Turkiye sentiment, incite unrest,
and undermine national security and democratic
processes.
•
Context: Indian citizens’ boycott of Turkish
products and tourism in response to Turkiye's
alleged support for Pakistan .
•
Impact: Erosion of public trust, defamation of a
political institution, incitement of discord, and
potential escalation to violence and international
tensions.
Call to Action .
The actions of Mr. Malviya and Mr. Goswami
represent an unprecedented attack on India’s
democratic foundations, public safety, and national
security. Their calculated misuse of influence to
spread falsehoods with criminal intent demands the
harshest response. | urge the Press Council of
India, NSDSA, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, CBI, and other law enforcement
agencies to treat this complaint as a national
emergency. The authorities must act decisively to
arrest the accused, dismantle their disinformation
networks, and restore public confidence in the rule
of law. Please provide regular updates on the
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investigation’s progress and punitive measures
enforced. Any delay or leniency will embolden
further threats to India’s sovereignty and social
fabric.
Related ‘X' link mentioned below
1)https://x.com/amitmalviya/status/19238003467
58893906?t=-cRp1hcKh_jabYLnF_zb5g&s=19
Sincerely,
Sd/-
Shrikant swaroop B.N s/o Nataraj B.P, 27 Yrs,
th th nd
Leela Karan #227, 13 Cross, 5 Main, 2 Stage, ,
Indiranagar, Bengaluru-560038. Ph-9845021675
[email protected]”
Insofar as accused No.2, the Editor-in-Chief of the Republic media
network, is concerned, the alleged problem arose on 15-05-2025,
when the petitioner hosted an on-air lead story raising questions
about the congress party office in Turkey. On 20-05-2025, an
inadvertent error was highlighted on the social media. The error
was that on 15-05-2025, due to a technical glitch, an unrelated
picture of Istanbul building, not belonging to the congress party,
was aired over the lead story. Noticing the error, a Republic
corrigendum comes to be issued on 20-05-2025. It reads as
follows:
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The original clip that was aired on 15-05-2025 is as follows:
- 15 -
Insofar as accused No.1 is concerned, the allegation is of
maliciously propagating a slogan ‘Istanbul Congress Centre in
Turkey’. Whether this would be enough circumstance to hold the
petitioners prima facie vulnerable to the aforesaid offence is
required to be noticed. The issue need not detain this Court for long
or delve deep into the matter.
9.1. The Apex Court in the case of IMRAN PRATHAPGADHI
1
v. STATE OF GUJARAT has interpreted the ingredients of the
offence under Section 196 of the BNS, which is identical to the
offences alleged in the case at hand. The Apex Court holds as
follows:
“…. …. ….
15. The offence under Section 196 is attracted
when the words, either spoken or written, or by signs or
visible representations, promote enmity between
different groups, on the grounds of religion, race, place of
birth, residence, language, caste or, community or any
other ground. The offence will be attracted when the
words either spoken or written, or signs or visible
representation, promote or attempt to promote
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will
between different religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities. On a plain reading of the
poem, we find that the same has nothing to do with any
religion, caste, community or any particular group. The poem's
words do not bring about or promote disharmony or feelings of
1
(2026) 1 SCC 721
- 16 -
hatred or ill-will. It only seeks to challenge the injustice made
by the ruler. It is impossible to say that the words used by the
appellant disturb or are likely to disturb public tranquillity.
Therefore, neither clause ( a ) nor clause ( b ) of Section 196(1)
are attracted. There is no allegation against the appellant of
organising any exercise, movement, drill or similar activity.
There is no allegation against the appellant that he uttered the
words in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the
performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies.
Hence, clause ( c ) will have no application. The appellant has put
a video of a mass marriage function, and in the background, the
words are uttered. Therefore, Section 196 can have no
application.
…. …. ….
42. This Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam [ Javed
Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra , (2024) 4 SCC 156
: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , was dealing with an offence
punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Section 153-AIPC is
in pari materia with Section 196 BNS. The only difference
is that the words “or through electric communication”
have been added in clause ( a ) of Section 196 BNS, which
were not in clause ( a ) of Section 153-AIPC. When an
offence punishable under Section 196 BNS is alleged, the
effect of the spoken or written words will have to be
considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-
minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based
on the standards of people with weak and oscillating
minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot
be judged on the basis of the standards of people who
always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always
perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.
Ingredient of mens rea
43. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [ Manzar Sayeed Khan v.
State of Maharashtra , (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417]
and Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya [ Patricia Mukhim v.
State of Meghalaya , (2021) 15 SCC 35] , the ingredient of mens
rea has been read into Section 153-AIPC by this Court. Paras 8
to 14 of the decision in Javed Ahmad Hajam [ Javed Ahmad
Hajam v. State of Maharashtra , (2024) 4 SCC 156 : (2024) 2
SCC (Cri) 383] , which analyses both the above decisions, read
- 17 -
thus: ( Javed Ahmad Hajam case [ Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State
of Maharashtra , (2024) 4 SCC 156 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] ,
SCC pp. 161-64)
“ 8 . This Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan [ Manzar
Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 5 SCC 1 :
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] referred to the view taken by
Vivian Bose, J., as a Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High
Court in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt.,
C.P. & Berar [ Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial
Govt., C.P. & Berar , 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5] . A Division
Bench of the High Court dealt with the offence of
sedition under Section 124-AIPC and Section 4(1) of the
Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The issue was
whether a particular article in the press tends,
directly or indirectly, to bring hatred or contempt
to the Government established in law. This Court
has approved this view in its decision in Ramesh v.
Union of India [ Ramesh v. Union of India , (1988) 1
SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] . In the said case,
this Court dealt with the issue of applicability of
Section 153-AIPC. In para 13, it was held thus:
( Ramesh case [ Ramesh v. Union of India , (1988) 1
SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] , SCC p. 676)
‘ 13 . … the effect of the words must
be judged from the standards of
reasonable, strong-minded, firm and
courageous men, and not those of weak
and vacillating minds, nor of those who
scent danger in every hostile point of
view . … It is the standard of ordinary
reasonable man or as they say in English
law “the man on the top of a Clapham
omnibus”.’
Therefore, the yardstick laid down by Vivian
Bose, J., will have to be applied while judging the effect
of the words, spoken or written, in the context of
Section 153-AIPC.
9 . We may also make a useful reference to a
decision of this Court in Patricia Mukhim v. State of
Meghalaya [ Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya ,
(2021) 15 SCC 35] . Paras 8 to 10 of the said decision
read thus: (SCC pp. 41-43)
‘8. “ It is of utmost importance to keep all
speech free in order for the truth to emerge and
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have a civil society .”— Thomas Jefferson.
Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Article 19(1)( a ) of the Constitution is a very
valuable fundamental right. However, the right is
not absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be
placed on the right of free speech and expression
in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of
India, security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States, public order, decency or
morality or in relation to contempt of Court,
defamation or incitement to an offence. Speech
crime is punishable under Section 153-AIPC.
Promotion of enmity between different groups on
grounds of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, etc. and doing acts
prejudicial to maintenance of harmony is
punishable with imprisonment which may extend
to three years or with fine or with both under
Section 153-A. As we are called upon to decide
whether a prima facie case is made out against the
appellant for committing offences under Sections 153-
A and 505(1)( c ), it is relevant to reproduce the
provisions which are as follows:
*
9 . Only where the written or spoken
words have the tendency of creating public
disorder or disturbance of law and order or
affecting public tranquillity, the law needs to
step in to prevent such an activity. The intention
to cause disorder or incite people to violence is
the sine qua non of the offence under Section
153-AIPC and the prosecution has to prove the
existence of mens rea in order to succeed .
[ Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab , (1995) 3 SCC
214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]
10 . The gist of the offence under Section
153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of
enmity or hatred between different classes of
people . The intention has to be judged primarily
by the language of the piece of writing and the
circumstances in which it was written and
published. The matter complained of within the
ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole.
One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated
passages for proving the charge nor indeed can
one take a sentence here and a sentence there
and connect them by a meticulous process of
inferential reasoning [ Manzar Sayeed Khan v.
- 19 -
State of Maharashtra , (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 417] .”
10 . Now, coming back to Section 153-A,
clause ( a ) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC
is attracted when by words, either spoken or
written or by signs or by visible representations or
otherwise, an attempt is made to promote
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will
between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities. The
promotion of disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will
must be on the grounds of religion, race, place of
birth, residence, language, caste, community or
any other analogous grounds. Clause ( b ) of sub-
section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will apply only
when an act is committed which is prejudicial to
the maintenance of harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquillity.
11 . Now, coming to the words used by the
appellant on his WhatsApp status, we may note here
that the first statement is that August 5 is a Black Day
for Jammu and Kashmir. 5-8-2019 is the day on which
Article 370 of the Constitution of India was abrogated,
and two separate Union Territories of Jammu and
Kashmir were formed. Further, the appellant has posted
that “Article 370 was abrogated, we are not happy”. On
a plain reading, the appellant intended to criticise the
action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India. He has expressed unhappiness
over the said act of abrogation. The aforesaid words do
not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community. It is a simple protest by
the appellant against the decision to abrogate Article
370 of the Constitution of India and the further steps
taken based on that decision. The Constitution of India,
under Article 19(1)( a ), guarantees freedom of speech
and expression. Under the said guarantee, every citizen
has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation
of Article 370 or, for that matter, every decision of the
State. He has the right to say he is unhappy with any
decision of the State.
12 . In Manzar Sayeed Khan [ Manzar Sayeed
Khan v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 5 SCC 1 :
- 20 -
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] , this Court has read
“intention” as an essential ingredient of the said
offence . The alleged objectionable words or
expressions used by the appellant, on its plain
reading, cannot promote disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill will between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities. The WhatsApp status of the
appellant has a photograph of two barbed wires, below
which it is mentioned that “AUGUST 5 — BLACK DAY —
JAMMU & KASHMIR”. This is an expression of his
individual view and his reaction to the abrogation of
Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It does not
reflect any intention to do something which is prohibited
under Section 153-A. At best, it is a protest, which is a
part of his freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1)( a ).
13 . Every citizen of India has a right to be critical
of the action of abrogation of Article 370 and the change
of status of Jammu and Kashmir. Describing the day the
abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression
of protest and anguish. If every criticism or protest of
the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under
Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature
of the Constitution of India, will not survive.
14 . The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful
manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed
under Article 19(1)( a ). Every individual must respect the
right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully
protest against the decisions of the Government is an
essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a
lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to
lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by
Article 21. But the protest or dissent must be within four
corners of the modes permissible in a democratic set up.
It is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in
accordance with clause (2) of Article 19. In the present
case, the appellant has not at all crossed the line.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)
…. …. ….
53.6. When an offence punishable under Section
196 BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written
- 21 -
words will have to be considered based on standards of
reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous
individuals and not based on the standards of people with
weak and oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken or
written words cannot be judged on the basis of the
standards of people who always have a sense of
insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a
threat to their power or position .”
9.2. Earlier to the afore-quoted judgment, the Apex Court in
the case of JAVED AHMAD HAJAM v. STATE OF
2
MAHARASHTRA , while interpreting Section 153A of the erstwhile
regime - the IPC, has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A, clause ( a )
of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC is attracted when
by words, either spoken or written or by signs or by
visible representations or otherwise, an attempt is made
to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill
will between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities. The promotion
of disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will must be on the
grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste, community or any other analogous
grounds. Clause ( b ) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-
AIPC will apply only when an act is committed which is
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between
different religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities and which disturbs or is likely to
disturb the public tranquillity.
11. Now, coming to the words used by the appellant on
his WhatsApp status, we may note here that the first statement
is that August 5 is a Black Day for Jammu and Kashmir. 5-8-
2
(2024) 4 SCC 156
- 22 -
2019 is the day on which Article 370 of the Constitution of India
was abrogated, and two separate Union Territories of Jammu
and Kashmir were formed. Further, the appellant has posted
that “Article 370 was abrogated, we are not happy”. On a plain
reading, the appellant intended to criticise the action of the
abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India. He has
expressed unhappiness over the said act of abrogation. The
aforesaid words do not refer to any religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, caste or community. It is a simple protest
by the appellant against the decision to abrogate Article 370 of
the Constitution of India and the further steps taken based on
that decision. The Constitution of India, under Article 19(1)( a ),
guarantees freedom of speech and expression. Under the said
guarantee, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the
action of abrogation of Article 370 or, for that matter, every
decision of the State. He has the right to say he is unhappy with
any decision of the State.
12. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [ Manzar Sayeed
Khan v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC
(Cri) 417] , this Court has read “intention” as an essential
ingredient of the said offence. The alleged objectionable words
or expressions used by the appellant, on its plain reading,
cannot promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill
will between different religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities. The WhatsApp status of the
appellant has a photograph of two barbed wires, below which it
AUGUST BLACK DAY JAMMU KASHMIR
is mentioned that “ 5 — — & ”. This
is an expression of his individual view and his reaction to the
abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It does not
reflect any intention to do something which is prohibited under
Section 153-A. At best, it is a protest, which is a part of his
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article
19(1)( a ).
13. Every citizen of India has a right to be critical of
the action of abrogation of Article 370 and the change of
status of Jammu and Kashmir. Describing the day the
abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of
protest and anguish. If every criticism or protest of the
actions of the State is to be held as an offence under
Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature
of the Constitution of India, will not survive.
- 23 -
14. The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful
manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under
Article 19(1)( a ). Every individual must respect the right
of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest
against the decisions of the Government is an essential
part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful
manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a
dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21.
But the protest or dissent must be within four corners of
the modes permissible in a democratic set up. It is
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance
with clause (2) of Article 19. In the present case, the
appellant has not at all crossed the line.
15. The High Court has held [ Javed Ahmed
Hajam v. State of Maharashtra , 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 819]
that the possibility of stirring up the emotions of a group of
people cannot be ruled out. The appellant's college teachers,
students, and parents were allegedly members of the WhatsApp
group. As held by Vivian Bose, J., the effect of the words used
by the appellant on his WhatsApp status will have to be judged
from the standards of reasonable women and men. We cannot
apply the standards of people with weak and vacillating minds.
Our country has been a democratic republic for more than 75
years. The people of our country know the importance of
democratic values. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that
the words will promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred
or ill will between different religious groups. The test to be
applied is not the effect of the words on some individuals with
weak minds or who see a danger in every hostile point of view.
The test is of the general impact of the utterances on
reasonable people who are significant in numbers. Merely
because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will
not be sufficient to attract clause ( a ) of sub-section (1) of
Section 153-AIPC.
16. As regards the picture containing “Chand” and below
that the words “14th August-Happy Independence Day
Pakistan”, we are of the view that it will not attract clause ( a ) of
sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC. Every citizen has the right
to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on
their respective Independence Days. If a citizen of India extends
- 24 -
good wishes to the citizens of Pakistan on 14th August, which is
their Independence Day, there is nothing wrong with it. It is a
gesture of goodwill. In such a case, it cannot be said that such
acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred
or ill will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be
attributed to the appellant only because he belongs to a
particular religion.
17. Now, the time has come to enlighten and educate our
police machinery on the concept of freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)( a ) of the Constitution
and the extent of reasonable restraint on their free speech and
expression. They must be sensitised about the democratic
values enshrined in our Constitution.
18. For the same reasons, clause ( b ) of sub-section (1) of
Section 153-AIPC will not be attracted as what is depicted on
the WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various
groups as stated therein. Thus, continuation of the prosecution
of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 153-
AIPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law.”
9.3. Both these judgments followed the judgment of the Apex
3
Court in PATRICIA MUKHIM v. STATE OF MEGHALAYA wherein
it is held as follows:
“…. …. ….
9. Only where the written or spoken words have the
tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law
and order or affecting public tranquility, the law needs to
step in to prevent such an activity. The intention to cause
disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non
of the offence under Section 153-AIPC and the
prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
3
(2021) 15 SCC 35
- 25 -
order to succeed. [ Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab ,
(1995) 3 SCC 214: 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]
10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC
is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred
between different classes of people. The intention has to
be judged primarily by the language of the piece of
writing and the circumstances in which it was written
and published. The matter complained of within the
ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One
cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for
proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence
here and a sentence there and connect them by a
meticulous process of inferential reasoning [ Manzar
Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 5 SCC 1:
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417].
11. In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. [ Bilal Ahmed
Kaloo v. State of A.P. , (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
1094] , this Court analysed the ingredients of Sections 153-A
and 505(2)IPC. It was held that Section 153-A covers a case
where a person by “words, either spoken or written, or by signs
or by visible representations”, promotes or attempts to promote
feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will. Under Section 505(2)
promotion of such feeling should have been done by
making a publication or circulating any statement or
report containing rumour or alarming news. Mens rea
was held to be a necessary ingredient for the offence
under Sections 153-A and 505(2). The common factor of
both the sections being promotion of feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill will between different religious or racial or
linguistics or religious groups or castes or communities, it
is necessary that at least two such groups or
communities should be involved. It was further held in
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo [ Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. ,
(1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094] that merely
inciting the feelings of one community or group without
any reference to any other community or group cannot
attract any of the two sections. The Court went on to
highlight the distinction between the two offences,
holding that publication of words or representation is
sine qua non under Section 505. It is also relevant to
refer to the judgment of this Court in Ramesh v. Union of
- 26 -
India [ Ramesh v. Union of India , (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988
SCC (Cri) 266] in which it was held that words used in
the alleged criminal speech should be judged from the
standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and
courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating
minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile
point of view. The standard of an ordinary reasonable
man or as they say in English law “the man on the top of
a Clapham omnibus” should be applied.
12. This Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union
of India [ Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India ,
(2014) 11 SCC 477 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 400] had referred
to the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Saskatchewan
(Human Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott
[ Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. William
Whatcott , 2013 SCC OnLine Can SC 6 : (2013) 1 SCR 467]
. In that judgment, the Canadian Supreme Court set out
what it considered to be a workable approach in
interpreting “hatred” as is used in legislative provisions
prohibiting hate speech. The first test was for the Courts
to apply the hate speech prohibition objectively and in so
doing, ask whether a reasonable person, aware of the
context and circumstances, would view the expression as
exposing the protected group to hatred. The second test
was to restrict interpretation of the legislative term
“hatred” to those extreme manifestations of the emotion
described by the words “detestation” and “vilification”.
This would filter out and protect speech which might be
repugnant and offensive, but does not incite the level of
abhorrence, delegitimisation and rejection that risks
causing discrimination or injury. The third test was for
the Courts to focus their analysis on the effect of the
expression at issue, namely, whether it is likely to expose
the targeted person or group to hatred by others. Mere
repugnancy of the ideas expressed is insufficient to
constitute the crime attracting penalty.
13. In the instant case, applying the principles laid down
by this Court as mentioned above, the question that arises for
our consideration is whether the Facebook post dated 4-7-2020
was intentionally made for promoting class/community hatred
and has the tendency to provoke enmity between two
- 27 -
communities. A close scrutiny of the Facebook post would
indicate that the agony of the appellant was directed against the
apathy shown by the Chief Minister of Meghalaya, the Director
General of Police and the Dorbar Shnong of the area in not
taking any action against the culprits who attacked the non-
tribals youngsters. The appellant referred to the attacks on non-
tribals in 1979. At the most, the Facebook post can be
understood to highlight the discrimination against non-tribals in
the State of Meghalaya. However, the appellant made it clear
that criminal elements have no community and immediate
action has to be taken against persons who had indulged in the
brutal attack on non-tribal youngsters playing basketball. The
Facebook post read in its entirety pleads for equality of non-
tribals in the State of Meghalaya. In our understanding, there
was no intention on the part of the appellant to promote
class/community hatred. As there is no attempt made by the
appellant to incite people belonging to a community to indulge
in any violence, the basic ingredients of the offence under
Sections 153-A and 505(1)( c ) have not been made out. Where
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are
taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused, the FIR is liable to be quashed [ State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .
14. India is a plural and multicultural society. The
promise of liberty, enunciated in the Preamble, manifests
itself in various provisions which outline each citizen's
rights; they include the right to free speech, to travel
freely and settle (subject to such reasonable restrictions
that may be validly enacted) throughout the length and
breadth of India. At times, when in the legitimate
exercise of such a right, individuals travel, settle down or
carry on a vocation in a place where they find conditions
conducive, there may be resentments, especially if such
citizens prosper, leading to hostility or possibly violence.
In such instances, if the victims voice their discontent,
and speak out, especially if the State authorities turn a
blind eye, or drag their feet, such voicing of discontent is
really a cry for anguish, for justice denied — or delayed.
This is exactly what appears to have happened in this
case.
- 28 -
15. The attack upon six non-locals, carried out by
masked individuals, is not denied by the State; its reporting too
is not denied. The State in fact issued a press release. There
appears to be no headway in the investigations. The complaint
made by the DorbarShnong, Lawsohtun that the statement of
the appellant would incite communal tension and might
instigate a communal conflict in the entire State is only a
figment of imagination. The fervent plea made by the appellant
for protection of non-tribals living in the State of Meghalaya and
for their equality cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
categorised as hate speech. It was a call for justice — for action
according to law, which every citizen has a right to expect and
articulate. Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be
branded as an attempt to promote hatred between different
communities. Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot
be stifled by implicating them in criminal cases, unless such
speech has the tendency to affect public order. The sequitur of
above analysis of the Facebook post made by the appellant is
that no case is made out against the appellant for an offence
under Sections 153-A and 505(1)( c )IPC.”
9.4. Again, the Apex Court in the case of MITHUN
4
CHAKRAVARTY DEVIDAS SHET v. STATE OF KARNATAKA has
held as follows:
“ O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant
and learned counsel appearing for the State. Despite notice
being served, there was no representation on behalf of the
contesting respondent, on the earlier occasion. The same
position continues even today.
4
S.L.P.No.14305 of 2024 decided on 25-07-2025
- 29 -
3. The proceedings have been initiated against the
appellant at the instance of the contesting respondent for
making the derogatory remark of ‘ayogya’.
4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the said statement is not derogatory and has to
be seen contextually.
5. Learned counsel for the State submitted that whether
the offence is made out or not is a matter for trial.
6. The appellant has been charged for the offences
punishable under Sections 153-A, 153-B and 505 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 along with the provisions of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the ‘SC/ST Act’).
7. The High Court itself has quashed the charges
with respect to the provisions of the SC/ST Act. What
remains and is now before us are the other provisions of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 with which the appellant has
been charged.
8. As rightly submitted by the learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant, on a perusal of the
very complaint, we do not find that the ingredients are
made out. Continuing the proceedings against the
appellant would be a gross abuse of the process of law.
The statement made is subject to the interpretation in
different ways.
9. Considering the above and by taking note of the
fact that the contesting respondent is not interested in
prosecuting the matter, we are inclined to set aside the
impugned order.
10. Accordingly, the impugned order stands set aside.
The proceedings initiated against the appellants stand quashed.
11. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
12. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.”
- 30 -
The Apex Court in MITHUN CHAKRAVARTY DEVIDAS SHET ’s
case holds that since the complaint did not make out basic
ingredients of offence, permitting investigation even, would not be
necessary. The said finding would, on the face of it, become
applicable to the cases at hand. Therefore, permitting further
investigation even, against the petitioners, would become an abuse
of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
10. It now becomes apposite to refer to decision of the Apex
5
Court in STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL wherein it is held
as follows:
“…. …. ….
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
5
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
- 31 -
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
- 32 -
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
11. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal Petitions are allowed.
(ii) FIR in Crime No.132 of 2025 registered before High
Grounds Police Station and pending before the I
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
stands quashed qua the petitioners.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
BKP