Suresh Kumar vs S. Esvinder Singii

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 03.11.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.11.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010640422025
+ RC.REV. 270/2025, CM APPL. 55323/2025 (Stay), CM APPL.
903/2026 (For stay of warrant of possession) & CM APPL.
904/2026 (Ex. From filing certified copies of order dt.
02.09.2025 & 23.12.2025)

SURESH KUMAR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Amit Vohra, Advocate.

versus

S. ESVINDER SINGII .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Jatin
Sharma, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Revision Petition has been preferred by the
Petitioner, under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent
1 2
Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Judgment dated 24.03.2025
passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller-01, Central
3
District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in RC ARC No. 79340/2016
(Old No. 479340/2016), titled “S. Esvinder Singh & Anr. v. Suresh

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Judgment
3
Learned ARC
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RC.REV. 270/2025 Page 1 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

Kumar (Deceased) Through LRs” , whereby the Eviction Petition
preferred by the Respondents herein, under Section 14(1)(e) read with
Section 25-B of the DRC Act, has been allowed in respect of the
tenanted premises.
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Respondents herein, claiming themselves to be the owners
and landlords of property bearing Municipal No. 1584/31, Abdul
Rehman Road, Nai Wala, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, instituted an
Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the
DRC Act, seeking eviction of the predecessor-in-interest of the
present Petitioner, namely, Late Sh. Suresh Kumar, from a
commercial shop situated at property bearing No. 1584/31, Abdul
Rehman Road, Nai Wala, Karol Bagh, New Delhi - 110005,
4
admeasuring approximately 14.36 square yards (9'3" × 13'9") .
3. The case set up by the Respondents before the learned ARC
was that their predecessor-in-interest had inducted M/s Pradeep
Automobiles, a partnership concern, as a tenant in the Subject
Premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. It was further their case that,
upon the dissolution of the said partnership concern, the tenancy
devolved upon Late Sh. Suresh Kumar, who continued to carry on
business from the subject premises. The Respondents claimed to have
acquired the property in question in the year 2003 from the erstwhile
owners, i.e., the legal heirs of Late Sh. Kasturi Lal Puri, by virtue of a
registered Agreement to Sell dated 21.05.2003, save and except the
10% undivided share stated to have been retained by Sh. Kailash
Chandra Puri.

4
Subject Premises
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

4. The principal ground urged by the Respondents in support of
their Eviction Petition was that they bona fide required the Subject
Premises for the expansion of their commercial activities. It was
contended that their business had witnessed substantial growth over
the years, necessitating additional space for the storage of goods and
for carrying out their day-to-day business operations. According to the
Respondents, the accommodation available with them was insufficient
to cater to their expanding business requirements, and the Subject
Premises, being situated in the same property, were therefore required
bona fide for the aforesaid purpose. In support of their case, the
Respondents also placed on record a site plan depicting the Subject
Premises and the portions of the property stated to be in their
occupation.
5. The Eviction Petition was contested by Late Sh. Suresh Kumar,
who disputed the Respondents' claim and sought leave to defend the
Eviction Petition. The learned ARC, vide Order dated 23.02.2013,
allowed the Application seeking leave to defend, upon finding that
triable issues arose for consideration. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a
detailed Written Statement, to which the Respondents filed their
Replication, and the matter proceeded to trial.
6. During the course of trial, the parties led their respective
evidence. The Respondents examined Sh. S. Esvinder Singh as PW-1
in support of their case, whereas the Petitioner examined Sh. Sahil
Valecha as RW-1 and Sh. Hukum Chand Valecha as RW-2. Besides
the aforesaid witnesses, other witnesses were also examined by the
parties in support of their respective cases. The witnesses were duly
subjected to cross-examination, and documentary evidence was also
placed on record by both sides.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

7. Upon conclusion of the evidence and hearing the final
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the learned ARC vide
the Impugned Judgment dated 24.03.2025allowed the Eviction
Petition and directed eviction of the Petitioner from the Subject
Premises. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner has approached this Court
by way of the present Revision Petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits
that the Impugned Judgment suffers from a material error inasmuch as
the learned ARC has failed to appreciate the misrepresentation made
by the Respondents with regard to the actual nature and configuration
of the property in question. It is contended that the Respondents, in
order to establish their alleged bona fide requirement for additional
accommodation for expansion of their business, deliberately projected
an artificial scarcity of space by placing on record an incorrect site
plan. In the said site plan, the portions of the property in their
occupation have been depicted as comprising separate rooms, a
kitchen, a tin shed and a bathroom, whereas the Respondents' own
testimony during cross-examination materially contradicts such
depiction.
9. Learned counsel draws the attention of this Court to the cross-
examination of PW-1, wherein the witness, while deposing on behalf
of the Respondents, stated that the premises constituted a single hall
without any partition and further expressed his lack of knowledge
regarding the existence of separate rooms and a kitchen in the
property, as depicted in the site plan. It is, thus, contended that these
admissions go to the root of the Respondents' assertion regarding the
inadequacy of the accommodation available with them and the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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consequent necessity for seeking eviction of the Petitioner from the
Subject Premises.
10. According to learned counsel, the aforesaid discrepancy was not
a mere technical irregularity in the site plan, but a material
circumstance bearing directly upon the genuineness of the alleged
requirement and the question of artificial scarcity of accommodation.
It is further submitted that the learned ARC has failed to appropriately
consider the aforesaid admissions and their effect upon the
Respondents' case before proceeding to allow the Eviction Petition.
11. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents submits that the challenge raised by the Petitioner with
respect to the site plan is misconceived. It is contended that a site plan
is merely a supporting document and that the absence of, or any
discrepancy in, the same would not, by itself, be sufficient to non-suit
a landlord in an Eviction Petition.

12. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the decisions in
5
Neelam Jain v. Vandana Sachdeva & Anr. and Rajender Kumar
6
Pahuja v. Anup Narain Gaur . Learned counsel further submits that
the Petitioner himself had identified the portion of the property in his
occupation during his cross-examination and, therefore, the identity of
the Subject Premises was never in dispute. It is, accordingly,
contended that the site plan was only intended to facilitate
identification of the premises and could not be treated as the
determinative basis for examining the Respondents' bona fide
requirement. On the aforesaid basis, learned counsel seeks to sustain

5
2025 SCC OnLine Del 5796
6
2025 : DHC : 7617
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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the findings returned by the learned ARC and opposes the present
Revision Petition.
13. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.
ANALYSIS:
14. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and has perused the material available on
record, including the pleadings, the evidence led before the learned
ARC, the depositions of the witnesses as well as the Impugned
Judgment.
15. At the outset, it is apposite to note that the jurisdiction exercised
by this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is
revisional in nature and is distinct from the appellate jurisdiction. The
scope of interference is confined to examining the legality and
propriety of the order passed by the learned ARC. However, where the
impugned order suffers from a material irregularity in the appreciation
of evidence, or where material evidence bearing upon the controversy
has been overlooked, this Court would be justified in exercising its
revisional jurisdiction.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain
7
Dua , has held that the High Court, while exercising revisional
jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision, is required to examine the
decision-making process adopted by the learned Rent Controller and
is not expected to substitute or supplant its own view for that of the
trial Court. The scope of interference is, therefore, restrictive and is
attracted only where the impugned order suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record or an infirmity warranting

7
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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supervisory correction. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in aforesaid Judgment read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

17. Having regard to the submissions advanced before this Court, it
is made clear that the controversy requiring consideration in the
present Revision Petition is confined to the Respondents' assertion of
bona fide requirement for additional accommodation for expansion of
their business, particularly in the context of the site plan placed on
record and the statements made by Respondent No. 1 during his cross-
examination.

18. The grievance of the Petitioner, in essence, is that the
Respondents projected an incorrect description of the accommodation
available with them, thereby creating an artificial scarcity of space,
whereas their own witness made material admissions during cross-
examination which were inconsistent with the depiction in the site
plan. It is in this limited factual and evidentiary context that the
Impugned Judgment is required to be examined.
19. In order to appreciate the aforesaid controversy, it would be
necessary to advert to the site plan placed on record by the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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Respondents in support of their Eviction Petition, which is reproduced
hereinbelow:

20. A perusal thereof reveals that the portions of the property stated
to be in the occupation of the Respondents have been depicted as
comprising separate rooms and a kitchen, apart from other portions.
The said depiction assumes significance in view of the Respondents'
case that the accommodation already available with them was
insufficient for carrying out their expanding commercial activities and
that they consequently required the subject premises for additional
space. Thus, the nature and extent of the accommodation already
available with the Respondents constituted a relevant circumstance for
examining the genuineness of their asserted requirement.
21. More importantly, the aforesaid depiction in the site plan was
required to be examined in conjunction with the testimony of
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

Respondent No. 1, Sh. S. Esvinder Singh (PW-1). A perusal of his
cross-examination reveals that the witness was specifically confronted
with the site plan and its depiction of the property. In response thereto,
PW-1 stated that he had seen the document but could not say whether
the same correctly represented the plan of his property. He further
expressed his inability to affirm whether the description of the
tenanted premises and the portions behind the shop, comprising two
rooms and a kitchen, as depicted in the site plan, was correct.
Significantly, the witness went on to state that there was no room or
kitchen in the property in his occupation and that the same constituted
a single hall without any partition. He also expressed his lack of
knowledge regarding the preparation of the site plan. The relevant
portion of the cross-examination is reproduced hereinbelow:
“I am using the premises no. 1584/31 and 1583/31, Abdul Rehman
Road, Naiwala, Karol Bagh, Delhi as a single hall without any
partition. I do not know, if a site plan of the property in question
was prepared before filing of present case. I do not know who has
prepared the site plan Ex. PW-1/1. I have seen this document and
cannot say if this site plan is that of my property. I cannot say if in
the site plan gives a description of the tenanted premises as
comprising of two rooms and one kitchen behind the shop. It is
correct that there is no room and kitchen in the suit property in my
occupation. It is a single hall.”

22. The aforesaid deposition assumes considerable significance
when examined in the backdrop of the Respondents' own case
regarding the inadequacy of the accommodation available with them.
The issue was not confined to the mere correctness of the dimensions
or boundaries of the tenanted premises, but extended to the very
nature and configuration of the accommodation which the
Respondents claimed to be occupying. The distinction is material.
While the identification of the tenanted portion may establish the
identity of the premises from which eviction is sought, it does not, by
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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itself, resolve the controversy concerning the nature and extent of the
remaining accommodation available with the landlords. The latter
aspect bears directly upon the plea that the existing accommodation is
insufficient and that additional space is genuinely required for
expansion of business.
23. Learned counsel for the Respondents has sought to counter the
contention of the Petitioner by submitting that the Petitioner himself
identified the tenanted portion during his cross-examination and,
therefore, no prejudice can be said to have been caused on account of
any alleged discrepancy in the site plan. However, the aforesaid
submission, in the considered opinion of this Court, does not address
the precise controversy arising in the present case.
24. The identification of the portion occupied by the Petitioner
cannot, by any stretch, be construed as an admission regarding the
correctness of the entire site plan or the nature and configuration of
the remaining portions of the property. The controversy is not merely
whether the subject premises have been correctly identified, but
whether the accommodation depicted as being available with the
Respondents actually corresponds to the description set out in the site
plan. These are two distinct aspects and cannot be conflated.
Consequently, the fact that the Petitioner identified the portion in his
occupation does not, by itself, resolve the material discrepancy
emerging from the testimony of PW-1.
25. This Court is conscious of the settled legal position that a site
plan is essentially a supporting document and that the mere absence of
a site plan, or an inconsequential discrepancy therein, would not ipso
facto defeat an eviction petition. However, the aforesaid proposition
cannot be extended to mean that the contents of a site plan, once
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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placed on record, or the testimony of the landlord concerning the
accommodation available with him, can be disregarded altogether.
The relevance of a site plan has to be examined in the context of the
controversy arising in a particular case. Where the landlord seeks
eviction on the premise that the accommodation already available with
him is insufficient for his business requirements, the nature and extent
of such accommodation constitute relevant considerations. Therefore,
even if the site plan is not treated as an indispensable document for
maintaining an eviction petition, the material discrepancy between its
depiction and the landlord's own testimony cannot be brushed aside as
inconsequential.
26. In this regard, the reliance placed by learned counsel for the
Respondents upon the decision in Neelam Jain (supra) also requires
consideration. The aforesaid decision reiterates the principle that
where a tenant disputes the correctness of the site plan filed by the
landlord, the tenant is ordinarily expected to place on record an
alternative site plan to demonstrate the alleged discrepancy. However,
the factual context in which the said principle was applied is
materially distinguishable from the controversy arising in the present
case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ 19. Furthermore, Mr. Sindhwani argues, that the learned Rent
Controller has also taken the view that the petitioner had failed to
produce a site-plan in evidence, to describe the exact extent of
possession of respondent No. 1 with respect to the subject
premises. This has been recorded in the following extract of the
impugned judgment:
“21. Besides, no site plan has been brought in evidence on
behalf of petitioner to describe the exact extent of
possession of the respondent no. 1 with respect to the
tenanted premises. ”
20. Mr. Sindhwani submits however, that the site-plan was duly
filed by the petitioner at Serial No. 2 of Index dated 01.04.2013
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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before the learned Rent Controller. Learned senior counsel
submits, that the site-plan, a copy of which has been appended as
Annexure P-5 to the revision petition, was however not exhibited
in the course of deposition on behalf of the petitioner, which
however cannot be fatal to the petitioner's case, inasmuch as no
alternate site-plan was filed by respondent No. 1 nor did
respondent No. 1 dispute the correctness of the site-plan filed by
the petitioner.
21. In this behalf, Mr. Sindhwani has placed reliance on the
following judgments passed by Co-ordinate Benches of this court:
8
Amrit Lal v. Jagpal Singh Verma
“9. Learned Additional Rent Controller has also taken the
view that as the site plan was not filed, the petitioner
failed to prove the accommodation in his occupation. In
this regard it is notable that it is not at all the requirement
of law that site plan must be filed if the accommodation
could be clearly made out otherwise. (See (1988) 35 DLT
211 K.B. Mathur v. Sardar Bhagwanti Singh
(Deceased) Through LRs. ) Therefore this could not be a
ground to say that the petitioner did not bona fide require
the premises. ”
(emphasis supplied)
Harminder Singh Koghar v. Ramnath Exports Private
9
Ltd.
“15. However learned ARC failed to notice that the issue
of site plan is dispelled by the fact that though the
respondents challenged the veracity of the site plan,
however they did not show how the site plan filed by
Harminder Singh Koghar was not correct and filed no
counter site plan. The entire cross-examination of
Harminder Singh Koghar by the learned counsel for the
respondents was to show that he had no personal
knowledge of the exact rooms available in the suit
property. Even though Harminder Koghar may not have
visited the suit property personally, it is well settled that to
challenge the veracity of the site plan filed by the
landlord, the tenant must file a counter site plan and the
tenant cannot just get away by stating that the site plan
filed by the landlord was incorrect. (see V.S. Sachdeva v.
M.L. Grover (1997) 67 DLT 737 and Krishan Kumar
Gupta v. Swadesh Bhushan Gupta (2008) 152 DLT 556).
Further in Rishal Singh v. Bohat Ram (2014) 144 DRJ
633 it was held:
“11. …Apropos the contention that the site
plan filed by the landlord is incorrect as it
fails to disclose two shops lying vacant in the

8
1996 SCC OnLine Del 509
9
2015 SCC OnLine Del 11597
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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same area, it is without merit as the tenant has
not filed any site plan to show the
inconsistency. It is well settled law that when
the tenant contents the accuracy of the site
plan filed by the landlord, he is required to file
a copy of the site plan he believes to be correct
so as to guide the Court in finding the
discrepancies of the site plan filed by the
landlord. Without such site plan being filed,
mere contentions raised to this effect will be
considered meritless.” ”
(emphasis supplied)
*
29. Moreover, the observation by the learned Rent Controller that
the petitioner had failed to prove the site-plan in evidence is also
inconsequential, inasmuch as a site-plan had been filed by the
petitioner under cover of Index dated 01.04.2013; and though the
respondents had objected to the correctness of the site-plan, they
had failed to adduce any alternate site-plan, which objection was
therefore irrelevant in view of the decisions in Amrit Lal and
Harminder Singh Koghar referred-to above.
30. In light of the above, this court is of the view, that having
correctly drawn the inferences as referred-to above, the learned
Rent Controller was completely remiss in then proceeding to
dismiss the petitioner's eviction petition, despite what had come on
record in the course of the proceedings before him.”
27. In Neelam Jain (supra), the Court noticed, inter alia , that the
contesting respondent had neither challenged the site plan before the
learned Rent Controller nor led any evidence in support of such
challenge. The objection regarding the site plan had, in fact, been
raised by another respondent, who had subsequently settled the matter
with the landlord. The Court, in the aforesaid circumstances, found no
basis to discredit the site plan relied upon by the landlord. In the
present case, however, the challenge is not founded merely upon a
bald assertion by the Petitioner regarding the incorrectness of the site
plan. Rather, the Petitioner relies upon the statements elicited from
PW-1 himself during cross-examination, wherein the witness
expressed his inability to affirm the correctness of the site plan and
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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made specific statements regarding the absence of separate rooms and
a kitchen in the property in his occupation. Thus, the controversy in
the present case arises from the Respondents' own evidence and not
merely from an unsubstantiated objection raised by the tenant.
Consequently, the principle laid down in Neelam Jain (supra), though
not disputed, does not conclude the controversy arising in the present
proceedings.
28. Similarly, the reliance placed upon Rajender Kumar
Pahuja (supra) , does not advance the case of the Respondents in the
factual circumstances obtaining herein. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“14. Qua the Site Plan filed by the respondent, interestingly, the
very same petitioner has admitted the very same Site Plan in the
replies filed in two other eviction petitions being E.No.46/2019 and
E.No.27/2018 under Section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Act
respectively inter se the very same parties, which has been
categorically observed by the learned ARC as well. The petitioner
cannot, thus, be allowed to blow hot and cold, and plead contrary
to his own earlier taken stand. Even otherwise, and as correctly
pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondent, the
learned ARC has still, for the sake of arguments, proceeded to
consider the contrary Site Plan(s) filed by the petitioner, and held
that, keeping inview the subsequent Partition, Relinquishment and
Sale Deeds, all of which were duly signed and registered, the
division of possession amongst the respondent and his brother and
sister was undoubted, and hence any inconsistencies, if there, were
immaterial. Further, it was held that there were no material
concealments in the Site Plan, since, even if the petitioner’s best
case is taken, some space on the first floor or the mezzanine of the
leased out adjacent shop, were also held to be irrelevant for the
purposes of the respondent’s eviction petition based on the
evidence on record. This Court does not find anything illegal/
unreasonable in the above findings of fact, and no case to interfere
with the same, at this stage, is made out.
15. In any event, it must be borne in mind that the respondent was
required to identify the subject premises as also give a Site Plan,
but it was not incumbent upon him to give the exact Site Plan
under such circumstances. Once it was established that the
respondent was the landlord of the subject premises, of which he
was admittedly not in possession, the issue of minor consistencies
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BHATIA
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in the Site Plan, if any, fades into insignificance. More so, as held
10
in Shakuntala Devi v. Mohan Das , even the non-filing of site
plan may not be fatal to the case of a landlord, depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case.
16. Therefore, the said issue qua the Site Plan filed by the
respondent is discarded . ”
29. In the said decision, while examining the challenge to the site
plan, this Court noticed that the tenant himself had admitted the very
same site plan in replies filed in other eviction proceedings between
the parties. The Court further took note of the subsequent registered
Partition Deed, Relinquishment Deed and Sale Deeds, which
sufficiently explained the division of possession amongst the
concerned parties. It was in the aforesaid factual backdrop that the
alleged inconsistencies in the site plan were held to be immaterial. The
Court also reiterated that a landlord is required to identify the subject
premises and furnish a site plan, but is not necessarily required to
establish the exact site plan in every circumstance. The aforesaid
observations, however, cannot be read in isolation or divorced from
the factual circumstances in which they were made.
30. In the present case, the Petitioner has not merely disputed the
site plan in the abstract; the challenge is founded upon the
Respondents' own witness being unable to affirm its correctness and
making statements which materially bear upon the actual
configuration of the property. Further, the identification of the
tenanted portion by the Petitioner cannot be equated with an
admission as to the correctness of the entire site plan. Thus, the
controversy in the present case is qualitatively different from the one
considered in Rajender Kumar Pahuja (supra), and the said decision

10
2024:DHC:9368
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BHATIA
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does not obviate the necessity of examining the material admissions
emerging from the testimony of PW-1.
31. It is, therefore, not the proposition that every discrepancy in a
site plan would vitiate an eviction proceeding, nor is this Court laying
down that a landlord must invariably establish the precise internal
layout of the entire property through a site plan. The concern in the
present case is substantially different. The Respondents have founded
their claim for additional accommodation upon the assertion that the
space already available with them is insufficient for the expansion of
their business. In such circumstances, the description of the existing
accommodation and the testimony of the Respondents' own witness
concerning its physical configuration assume material significance.
32. The statement of PW-1 that the property in his occupation
comprises a single hall without any partition, coupled with his
inability to affirm the correctness of the site plan depicting separate
rooms and a kitchen, was an aspect which required due consideration
by the learned ARC. Equally, the fact that the Petitioner identified
only the portion in his own occupation could not have been treated as
resolving the aforesaid discrepancy. The two aspects required
independent and cumulative appreciation.
33. At this juncture, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant
observations made by the learned ARC in the Impugned Judgment,
which read as under:
“ BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT
23) Moving forward, in order to succeed in their petition,
petitioners are required to establish their bonafide need. Petitioners
have averred that the petitioners require the tenanted premises as
the business of the partnership firm of the petitioners being run
from the subject premises has flourished and therefore, holding of
stock has also increased. Hence, it is stated that due to the
expansion of business, additional space is required for the day-to-
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day activities of the business and since the tenanted premises are
situated in the same subject premises, therefore, it is most suitable
for their bonafide need. However, respondent has contended that
the petitioners are in the business of purchasing and selling
property. But no material in this regard has been filed on behalf of
the respondent. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has
held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for
bonafide need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine
and bonafide. Additionally, the burden to refute the said
presumption squarely lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the
part of tenant is insufficient. Further, the provision of Section 19
(2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case
the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises
are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit
the premises are held within two months of obtaining such
possession or having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to
any other person within three years from the date of obtaining the
possession. Thus, the said contention is also devoid of merits.
24) Secondly, it is contended that the present petition has been
filed on the basis of false documents. Further, it is contended that
the respondent has no other place for business. However, it is trite
to state that the respondent cannot challenge the title documents of
the landlord. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Sh.
Bharat Bhushan Vs. Arti Teckchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247 .
Furthermore, Hon'ble Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain
Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 , held that requirement is the existence of
bona fide need, when there is no other “reasonably suitable
accommodation”. Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two
grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the
non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential
accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to
be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant .
Therefore, the contention that respondent has no other place for
business has no bearing on the merits of present case. Also, in case
titled as “ Satyawati Sharma Vs. U. O. I. AIR 2008 SC 3148” , it
was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 14 (1)(e) of
the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in
Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far as it discriminates
between the premises let for residential and non-residential
purposes when the same are required bonafide by the landlord for
occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent
on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant
from the premises let for residential purposes only. Thus, a portion
of Section 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act was held to be discriminatory and
the remaining part thereof was held to be read as under:-
“that the premises are required bonafide by the landlord
for himself or for any member of his family dependent on
him, if he is the owner thereof; or for any person for
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whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord
or such person has no other reasonably suitable
accommodation.”
25) Thus, the contention of respondent that the tenanted premises
is being used by him for commercial purpose and so the provision
of Section 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act is not applicable is misconceived
and is hereby rejected. Also, the contention that five years have not
lapsed from the acquisition of interest of the petitioner in the
subject premises and therefore, the petition is barred by law, is also
not maintainable. The present eviction petition has been instituted
on 29.01.2011 whereas the petitioners had acquired interest in the
subject premises on 10.04.2003 and 21.05.2003 which was
subsequently rectified on 14.10.2003 vide rectification deed. Thus,
the said contention is clearly misplaced and not made out from the
record.
26) Lastly, it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not
bonafide as sufficient accommodation is available with the
petitioner in the subject premises itself and therefore, petitioner is
keeping several rooms locked. But no such material has been
produced on record to show that any room is being kept locked.
Furthermore, RW-1 has admitted in his cross-examination that no
new construction has been done by the petitioners in the subject
premises after acquiring the same. As far as contention is
concerned that petitioners had acquired portion vacated from
Sohan Singh, Tapan Dass and Parmeshwar Das by erstwhile owner
and merged the said portion, PW-1 has conceded that the entire
subject premises except tenanted premises and portion in
occupation of Kailash Chand Puri is in their occupation. However,
as per the case of respondent itself, portion of Sohan Singh was
acquired in 1995, from Tapan Dass in 1998 and from Parmeshwar
Das in 2001 and said portion had been acquired by erstwhile owner
Kailash Chand Puri. Therefore, the said portion was already
available to petitioners since the time of acquisition. In the case of
Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534 ,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is settled position of law
that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or
business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter.
Reference may also be made to the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v.
T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353. It is trite to state that time is not
static. With lapse of time, new needs may emerge which were not
existing earlier. In the present case, PW1 has relied upon books of
account to show that the sales had expanded from 31.03.2003 till
the time of filing of petition. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and the Delhi High Court has repeatedly held that the Courts
are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how
the available property of the landlord is to be best utilized by him.
The landlord is the absolute owner of his property and is the best
person to decide which property is to be utilized in what way. The
respondent cannot dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his
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property. The landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their
specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is
not within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the
landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of
the tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from
prescribing any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices
(residential or commercial).
Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in the case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mukul Raj & Ors. RC
Rev. 417/2016 in this regard.
Thus, mere assertion on the part of the respondent that petitioner
is keeping several rooms locked is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption in favour of the petitioner. Also, no counter site plan
has been filed. In the case of V.S. Sachdeva Vs. M.L. Grover 1997
(2) RCR 302 , it was held that if no site plan is filed by tenant, then
the site plan filed by the landlord is deemed to be correct. Also, in
the case of Rishal Singh Vs. Bohat Ram & Ors. 2014 (144) DLT
633 , the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that it is settled law that
when the tenant contests the accuracy of the site plan filed by the
landlord, he is required to file a copy of the site plan, he believes to
be correct so as to guide the Court in finding the discrepancies in
the site plan filed by the landlord. It was observed that without
such site plan being filed, the mere contentions raised to this
effect will be considered meritless. Thus, the aforesaid contention
is devoid of merits.
27) Hence, I find that, the petitioners have been able to establish
their bonafide requirement for the tenanted premises .”
34. A perusal of the Impugned Judgment reveals that although the
learned ARC has adverted to the rival contentions concerning the site
plan and has noticed the decisions relied upon in that regard, the
aforesaid material aspect emerging from the cross-examination of
PW-1 has not received requisite consideration. The learned ARC was
required to examine the site plan in conjunction with the testimony of
the Respondents' witness and determine the effect of the statements
made by him upon the Respondents' assertion regarding the
inadequacy of the accommodation available with them. Merely
noticing that the Petitioner had identified the tenanted premises, or
proceeding on the premise that a site plan is only a supporting
document, would not constitute a complete examination of the
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controversy. The material question was whether the Respondents' own
evidence was consistent with the description of the accommodation
upon which their plea of additional space requirement was founded.
The failure to undertake such an examination has resulted in a
material aspect of the evidence being left unappreciated.
35. It is apposite to reiterate that the jurisdiction exercised by this
Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is
supervisory in nature and is not intended to provide a second
opportunity for reappreciation of the entire evidence.
36. The aforesaid principle, however, does not imply that the High
Court is precluded from examining whether material evidence bearing
upon the controversy has been duly considered by the Court below. In
11
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh , a
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while delineating
the contours of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Control
legislations, held that a finding of fact which has been arrived at
without consideration of material evidence, is based on no evidence,
or proceeds on a misreading of the evidence, would not constitute a
finding according to law and is amenable to correction in revision.
The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ 19. In Shiv Sarup Gupta [ Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand
Gupta , (1999) 6 SCC 222 ] , this Court with reference to the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25-B(8) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, though reiterated that the High
Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence
merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as
if it were a court of facts, but also held that the High Court is
obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of
“whether it is according to law” and, for that limited purpose, may
enter into reappraisal of evidence i.e. for the purpose of

11
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ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent
Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable
person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material
available. The Court observed that ignoring the weight of evidence,
proceeding on a wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion
from the established facts as betray a lack of reason and/or
objectivity would render the finding of the Controller “not
according to law” calling for an interference under the proviso to
sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
20. Again in Ram Narain Arora [ Ram Narain Arora v. Asha
Rani , (1999) 1 SCC 141 ] , a two-Judge Bench with reference to
revisional power under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 observed as follows: (SCC p. 148, para 12)
“ 12 . It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition
under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control
Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the
legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent
Controller, the High Court could examine the facts
available in order to find out whether he had correctly or
on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to
decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to
be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding
of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it
would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with
such a matter. In this case, the Rent Controller proceeded
to analyse the matter that non-disclosure of a particular
information was fatal and, therefore, dismissed the claim
made by the landlord. It is in these circumstances that it
became necessary for the High Court to re-examine the
matter and then decide the entire question. We do not
think that any of the decisions referred to by the learned
counsel decides the question of the same nature with
which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed reference to
them is not required.”
*
28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and
extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control
Acts, a quick observation about the “appellate jurisdiction” and
“revisional jurisdiction” is necessary. Conceptually, revisional
jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa.
Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures
of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of
appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original
proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is
coextensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate
jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such
jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for the
appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction,
though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be
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equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision
is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid
of Revisional Court is invoked on the revisional side, it can
interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute.
It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order
passed by the Tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the
Revisional Court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as
regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much
would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute
conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction.
*
31. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja
Lakshmi Dyeing Works [ Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v.
Rangaswamy Chettiar , (1980) 4 SCC 259 ] that where both
expressions “appeal” and “revision” are employed in a statute,
obviously, the expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of
a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression
“appeal”. The use of two expressions “appeal” and “revision”
when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional
power, we think, is not without purpose and significance.
Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is
not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute
provides the remedy by way of an “appeal” and so also of a
“revision”. If that were so, the revisional power would become
coextensive with that of the trial court or the subordinate tribunal
which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant
[ Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao
Janagaval , (1975) 2 SCC 246 ] that revisional power under the
Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power
under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide
enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal,
commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that
in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three rent
control statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second
court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the
scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.
32. Insofar as the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Ram
Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] is
concerned, it rightly observes that revisional power is subject to
well-known limitations inherent in all the revisional jurisdictions
and the matter essentially turns on the language of the statute
investing the jurisdiction. We do not think that there can ever be
objection to the above statement. The controversy centres round
the following observation in Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] , “... that jurisdiction enables the
court of revision, in appropriate cases, to examine the correctness
of the findings of facts also ….” It is suggested that by observing
so, the three-Judge Bench in Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] has enabled the High Court to
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interfere with the findings of fact by reappreciating the evidence.
We do not think that the three-Judge Bench has gone to that extent
in Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] .
The observation in Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander ,
(1988) 3 SCC 131 ] that as the expression used conferring
revisional jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court
has wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of revision
vested in the High Court in the statute is wider than the power
conferred on it under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
it is not confined to the jurisdictional error alone. However, in
dealing with the findings of fact, the examination of findings of
fact by the High Court is limited to satisfy itself that the decision is
“according to law”. This is expressly stated in Ram Dass [ Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] . Whether or not a
finding of fact recorded by the subordinate court/tribunal is
according to law, is required to be seen on the touchstone whether
such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers
from any illegality like misreading of the evidence or overlooking
and ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers from
perversity or any such illegality or such finding has resulted in
gross miscarriage of justice. Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] does not lay down as a proposition
of law that the revisional power of the High Court under the Rent
Control Act is as wide as that of the appellate court or the appellate
authority or such power is coextensive with that of the appellate
authority or that the concluded finding of fact recorded by the
original authority or the appellate authority can be interfered with
by the High Court by reappreciating evidence because Revisional
Court/authority is not in agreement with the finding of fact
recorded by the court/authority below. Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v.
Ishwar Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] does not exposit that the
revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an
appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming
to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the
court/authority below. Rather, it emphasises that while examining
the correctness of findings of fact, the Revisional Court is not the
second court of first appeal. Ram Dass [ Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131 ] does not cross the limits of
Revisional Court as explained in Dattonpant [ Dattonpant
Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval , (1975)
2 SCC 246 ] .
*
43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts
entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact
recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority
because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different
from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination
of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under
these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by
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the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer
from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority
below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of
the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or
misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed
to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In
that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction
under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the
impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is
entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety
of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or
propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court
shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or
reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts.
Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal.
Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is
according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned
before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”

37. The aforesaid principle was also reiterated in Mohd. Inam v.
12
Sanjay Kumar Singhal , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
recognised that omission to consider relevant and clinching evidence,
or a finding founded upon misreading or ignorance of the evidence on
record, may constitute a material irregularity warranting interference
in revisional jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 26. It can thus be seen, that the Constitution Bench in Dilbahar
Singh case [ Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh ,
(2014) 9 SCC 78 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 723 ] has settled the
position, that the revisional power does not entitle the High Court
to interfere with the finding of the fact recorded by the first
appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation
of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority
below. The consideration or examination of the evidence is
confined to find out as to whether the finding of facts recorded by
the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer
from any error of law. It has been held, that a finding of fact
recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived
at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is

12
(2020) 7 SCC 327
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based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly
erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross
miscarriage of justice, in such a case, it is open to correction
because it is not treated as a finding according to law.
27. No doubt, that the observations in the aforesaid cases deal with
the revisional powers to be exercised by the High Court under the
special statute. This Court has observed, that in examining the
legality and the propriety of the order under challenge in revision,
what is required to be seen by the High Court, is whether it is in
violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or
suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider
relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the
facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the
like. It has been held, that if such a finding is allowed to stand, it
would be gross miscarriage of justice and is open to correction
because it is not to be treated as a finding according to law.”

38. The aforesaid authorities, therefore, make it clear that while this
Court cannot undertake a wholesale reassessment of the evidence, it is
nevertheless competent to examine whether the material evidence
bearing upon the controversy has been duly considered and
appreciated by the learned ARC.
39. The aforesaid principles find further support from the decision
of this Court in Sh. Tek Chand (Deceased) Through LRs v. Smt.
13
Meenakshi Gupta & Anr . In the said case, the tenant had challenged
the genuineness of the landlady's bona fide requirement on the ground
that she had projected an artificial scarcity of accommodation and had
made contradictory statements regarding the availability and
occupation of an adjoining premises. The tenant had specifically relied
upon the documentary evidence as well as the cross-examination of
the landlady, which, according to him, disclosed material
inconsistencies concerning the actual occupation and letting out of the
adjoining premises. Finding that material considerations had been left
out while adjudicating the issue of bona fide requirement, this Court

13
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set aside the impugned Judgment and remanded the matter to the
learned ARC for fresh consideration on the basis of the material
already available on record. The aforesaid decision is particularly
relevant to the controversy arising in the present case, inasmuch as the
challenge herein also emanates from the failure to appropriately
examine material evidence bearing upon the genuineness of the
alleged bona fide requirement and the plea of artificial scarcity of
accommodation. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 21. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that all
throughout the learned ARC has proceeded entirely on the
presumption of bona fide requirement on part of the landlady, as
well as the genuineness and honesty thereof, placing the burden
squarely on the tenant to dispute the same. Despite holding in the
impugned judgment that “… once the matter is put to trial, every
fact needs to be proved on the basis of evidence… ”, the learned
ARC has contrarily observed that “… the Court must presume the
bona fide requirement of the landlord… ”, and rendered his
findings qua the same without any appreciation of the defense
raised by the tenant and the evidence adduced by him, insofar as
the documents exhibited as well as the detailed cross-examination
have not been adverted to in toto while concluding that the bone
fide requirement has been sufficiently made out by the landlady.
22. While the landlady was/is the best judge of her needs, it is also
well-settled that in order to avail the benefit under Section 14(1)(e)
of the Act, the requirement urged by the landlady, in order to
qualify as bona fide , must be proven to be a real requirement and
not a mere wish or a fanciful desire, as also must be genuine,
honest, sincere and devoid of deceit and falsehood, for which
reliance has correctly been placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Sarvate T.B. (supra), Mattulal (supra) and Shiv
Sarup (supra) by Mr. Ajay Kohli, learned counsel for the tenant. In
fact, reference may further be made to the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul
14
Rasul Moulali Kotkunde wherein it has been categorically held
that the Act itself places the burden on the landlord to show that he
has a bona fide requirement which can only be satisfied through
the subject premises, and should the Court feel any doubt qua the
genuineness of the same, it is for the landlord to clear all such
doubts.

14
(1999) 4 SCC 1
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23. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, whence the
onus was upon the landlady in light of the letting out of the
adjacent premises, and there was a doubt on the bone fide
requirement by her, especially whence the application for leave to
defend of the tenant was allowed by the learned ARC vide order
dated 21.01.2020, as also whence it was the consistent case of the
tenant at every single stage until trial that the falsehood in the
eviction petition negated the bona fides of the landlady, the glaring
omission of adjudication thereon, and rendering of findings on
bona fide requirement simply on a presumption in favour of the
landlady without consideration of the material on record by the
learned ARC was wholly perverse and impermissible in the
considered opinion of this Court.
24. The only observation made qua the letting out of the adjacent
premises by the learned ARC to the effect that the same is a “ single
instance ” and the landlady has “ not let out so many properties ” is
not sustainable, especially in view of the contention of Mr. Ajay
Kohli, learned counsel for the tenant that the said finding is
arbitrary and unsustainable in law, when the very same single
instance of letting out and concealment thereof was in issue before
the learned ARC.
25. The learned ARC has further erred in going beyond the
contentions raised by the parties by moving on to the realm of
subsequently arisen requirement, when the moot crux for
adjudication before him was the truthfulness of the eviction
petition and the bona fide of the landlady at the time of filing of the
eviction petition.
26. While it is trite, as also argued by Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta,
learned counsel for the landlady and held by this Court in Asiya
Jamil (supra) and Rajender Kumar Pahuja (supra), that this Court
in revisional jurisdiction cannot assume the powers of a Court of
appeal and substitute its views in place of those expressed by the
learned ARC, however, it is also a settled position of law that
acting in supervisory jurisdiction, it is incumbent upon this Court
to test whether the impugned judgment/order suffers from any
arbitrariness, perversity, illegality, impropriety or the like. Finding
manifest errors of the said nature apparent on the face of the
record, it is the bounden duty of this Court to invoke its powers
under revisional jurisdiction. This Court finds ample support from
the five-Judge Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
15
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh
highlighting the conditions for interference by this Court in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
27. Thus, considering the afore-going analysis, and especially in
light of non-appreciation of evidence adduced by both sides as well
as misapplication of law in the impugned judgment by the learned
ARC, this Court is of the view that the present is a fit case for

15
(2014) 9 SCC 78
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section
25B(8) of the Act. So much so, since the root of the dispute has
been circumvented by way of the impugned judgment, and
material considerations have been left out while rendering findings
on triable issues, the impugned judgment cannot be said to have
been passed in accordance with law and allowing the same to stand
would result in a gross miscarriage of justice.
28. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the impugned
judgment dated 07.05.2024 passed by the learned ARC is set aside.
The matter is remanded back to the learned ARC for fresh
consideration on the aspect of bona fide requirement of the
landlady as urged in the eviction petition filed by her, on the basis
of the available material on record. In the interest of justice, the
learned ARC is requested to make every endeavor for expeditious
disposal of the same, latest within a period of six months from the
passing of this order.”
40. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the grievance raised by the Petitioner cannot
be brushed aside merely by characterising the site plan as a supporting
document or by observing that the Petitioner had identified the portion
in his occupation. The material question requiring consideration was
whether the depiction of the accommodation available with the
Respondents in the site plan was consistent with the testimony of their
own witness and, if not, what bearing such discrepancy would have
upon the asserted requirement for additional space. The said question
assumes particular significance since the Respondents' claim for
eviction is founded, inter alia , upon the inadequacy of the
accommodation already available with them for expansion of their
business. The failure to undertake such an examination, in the
considered opinion of this Court, amounts to non-consideration of
material evidence having a direct bearing upon the controversy.
CONCLUSION:
41. In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the Impugned Judgment dated 24.03.2025 suffers from a material
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

infirmity warranting interference in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction of this Court. The learned ARC has failed to adequately
consider the material statements made by PW-1 during his cross-
examination and their bearing upon the Respondents' assertion
regarding the inadequacy of the accommodation available with them.
In these circumstances, the Impugned Judgment cannot be sustained
in its present form and is accordingly liable to be set aside, with the
matter being remitted to the learned ARC for fresh adjudication.
42. Accordingly, the present Revision Petition is allowed. The
Impugned Judgment dated 24.03.2025 passed by the learned
Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi, in RC ARC No. 79340/2016 (Old No. 47934/2016), is hereby
set aside. The Eviction Petition is remanded to the learned ARC for de
novo consideration on merits, on the basis of the material already
available on record , in accordance with law.

43. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the rival claims, including the genuineness of the
Respondents' alleged bona fide requirement. The learned ARC shall
independently examine the pleadings, documentary evidence and oral
testimony, including the relevant admissions emerging from the cross-
examination of the witnesses, and thereafter return its findings in
accordance with law.
44. The parties are directed to appear before the learned ARC on
the date to be notified by the Registry. The learned ARC shall
endeavour to dispose of the Eviction Petition expeditiously, preferably
within a period of six (06) months from the date of receipt of this
Judgment.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37

45. The present Revision Petition, along with all pending
Application(s), stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/ma


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RC.REV. 270/2025 Page 30 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:25:37