Visa Worldwide Pte Limited vs Payu Payments Private Limited And Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on : 10 October 2026
Judgment pronounced on : 17 November 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010456132026
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 259/2026, CAV 464/2026 & CM APPL.
65749/2026
VISA WORLDWIDE PTE LIMITED .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Adv., Ms.
Binsy Susan, Mr. Akshay Sharma, Ms.
Pavitra Singh, Ms. Palak Kaushal, Ms.
Ayushi Jain, Mr. Krishnesh Bapat, Mr.
Mridul Tiwari, Advs.
versus
PAYU PAYMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sandeep Sethi and Mr.
Rajeeve Mehra, Sr. Advs. with Mr. V.
Anush Raajan, Mr. Ayush Singh Dhami, Ms.
Meghna Tandon, Ms. Palak Bhargava, Ms
Shreya Sethi, Mr. Krisna Gambhir, Mr.
Ritwik Sarma, Advs. for R-1/PPPL
Mr. Karthik Somasundaram, Ms. Sonam
Gupta, Mr. Mathew Chacko, Ms. Ankita
Hariramani, Ms. Anandita Rajesh, Mr.
Saumay Kapoor, Mr. Shiva Pande, Ms.
Ritvika Poswal, Advs. for R-2
Ms. Varuna Bharale, Mr. Vivek Krishnani,
Ms. Tanya Hasija, Advs. for R-3
Mr. Sidhant Kumar and Ms. Lahar Jain,
Advs. for R-5
Ms. Neelam Rathore, Adv with Mr. Umang
Saini, Adv. for R-6/IndusInd Bank
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:17.11.2026
17:30:42
FAO(OS) (COMM) 259/2026 Page 1 of 68
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA
JUDGMENT
% 17.11.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
Facilitative Index
S. No. Subject Para Nos
1. A. The lis 1 - 3
2. B. Facts 4 - 19
3. C. Rival Contentions 20 - 40
4. C.I. Submissions of Mr. Akhil Sibal for Visa 20 - 24
5. C.II Submissions of Mr. Sandeep Sethi 25 - 32
6. C.III Submissions of Mr. Rajeeve Mehra 33
7. C.IV Submissions of Mr. Akhil Sibal in
34 – 39
rejoinder
8. C.V Submissions in surrejoinder 40
9. D. Analysis 41 - 75
10. D.I Re. Section 12A of the Commercial
Courts Act
41 – 50
11. Patil Automation 44 – 44.8
12. Yamini Manohar 45 – 45.5
13. Dhanbad Fuels 46 – 46.19
14. Novenco 47 – 47.3
15. D.II Re. sustainability of interim direction in
para 19 of impugned judgment vis-à-vis
conditions for grant of interim injunction
51 - 65
16. D.III Apropos other contentions advanced by
66 – 72
Mr. Sibal
17. D.IV Scope of interference 73 – 75
18. E. Conclusion 76
A. The lis
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KUMAR
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1. Under challenge in the present appeal, filed under Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is an order passed by a learned Single
1
Judge of this Court on 14 September 2026 in CS (Comm) 974/2026 ,
to the extent of para 26 thereof, which reads as under:
“26. Since the RBI has been requested to find out a solution
within thirty days, the parties are requested to maintain status quo
in respect of claims arising out of past transactions already made
by Defendant No. 2 before Defendant No. 6, Defendant No. 6 shall
not issue or pass any final IRF determination in respect of the
pending IRF Claims arising out of past transactions against the
Defendant No. 1,3,4 and 5 and consequently, Defendant Nos. 1, 3,
4 and 5 shall not make any deductions / debits / netting from the
Plaintiff, while the mediation process is ongoing; and Defendant
No. 2 or any other Issuing Bank which is a party to these
proceedings will not make any further claims for interchange
income loss due to MCC misclassification in respect of
transactions involving the Plaintiff prior to the date of the Plaint
while the mediation process is ongoing.”
2. By order dated 23 September 2026, this Court, after hearing
Mr. Akhil Sibal for the appellant, restricted its examination of the
merits of the appeal to two contentions advanced by Mr. Sibal which,
as this Court felt, merited consideration. The first was that the learned
Single Judge erred in entertaining the suit without the respondent, as
2
the plaintiff in the suit, first complying with Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, which required pre-institution mediation to
be attempted before the suit was filed. The second was that the learned
Single Judge could not have issued the interlocutory directions
1
PayU Payments Pvt Ltd v. Yes Bank Ltd & others
2
12A. Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement. –
(1) A suit, which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief under this Act, shall not be
instituted unless the plaintiff exhausts the remedy of pre-institution mediation in accordance with
such manner and procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the Central Government.
(2) The Central Government may, by notification, authorise the Authorities constituted under
the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, for the purposes of pre-institution mediation.
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KUMAR
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contained in para 26 of the impugned judgment without returning
findings regarding existence of a prima facie case, balance of
convenience and the likelihood of irreparable loss to the respondent,
were such interim directions not to be passed.
3. We have, therefore, heard learned Senior Counsel on both sides
on the above aspects. Detailed written submissions have also been
filed.
B. Facts
4. We may briefly advert to the facts, to the extent they are
relevant to address the limited issues arising for consideration.
3
5. The appellant Visa Worldwide Pte Ltd is Defendant 6 in CS
4
(Comm) 974/2026 , and is the system provider which operates the
Visa card payment system in India. Respondent 2 Yes Bank Ltd,
5 6
Respondent 3 ICICI Bank Ltd , Respondent 4 Axis Bank Ltd ,
7
Respondent 5 Airtel Payments Bank Ltd and Respondent 6 IndusInd
8
Bank Ltd were Defendants 1 to 5 in the suit.
9
6. Respondent 1 PayU Payments Pvt Ltd was the plaintiff in the
suit. PayU claimed to be a payment aggregator, facilitating online
payment transactions throughout India. It claimed to provide an
3
“Visa” hereinafter, for ease of reference
4
also referred to, hereinafter, as "the suit"
5
“ICICI” hereinafter, for ease of reference
6
“Axis” hereinafter
7
“Airtel” hereinafter
8
“IndusInd” hereinafter
9
“PayU” hereinafter, for ease of reference
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KUMAR
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integrated platform over which customers could make payments to
merchants (the clients of PayU) using credit cards, debit cards, UPI,
wallets or other payment instruments. Such transactions were
processed, authenticated and settled by Respondents 2, 4, 5 and 6 (Yes
Bank, Axis, Airtel and IndusInd) as the Acquiring Banks who,
thereafter, remitted the net settled amounts to the Escrow Accounts of
PayU.
7. When a customer makes a payment through an issuing bank on
a website or App maintained by the merchant to whom the payment is
being made, the instruction for payment is rooted through the platform
of PayU to the relevant Acquiring Bank through the card network
which is maintained and operated by the appellant. The Acquiring
Bank raises an Interchange Fee from ICICI, as the Issuing Bank, on
10
the basis of a Merchant Category Code , assigned to the merchants
serviced by Visa. The MCC, which is a 4-digit code, identifies the
principal line of business of a merchant, and is relevant for
determination of the applicable Interchange Fee, payable by the
Acquiring Bank to ICICI. After the customer has made the payment
on the merchant’s website or App, and the payment instruction is
rooted through the platform of PayU to the relevant Acquiring Bank
through the card network and the transacted amount is transferred by
the Acquiring Bank into the Escrow Account of PayU after charging
the IRF. PayU thereafter pays the settled amount to the concerned
merchant.
10
"MCC" hereinafter
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8. The dispute forming subject matter of conflict in the suit arises
11
out of certain claims of Interchange Reimbursement Fee raised by
ICICI Bank before Visa, alleging that incorrect MCCs had been
assigned to certain merchants whose transactions had been processed
through the Acquiring Banks Respondents 2, 4, 5 and 6, resulting in
shortfall in the Interchange Fee received by ICICI.
9. Visa took up these complaints under its private IRF Compliance
Process.
10. PayU, which was not a party to the IRF Compliance Process of
Visa, apprehended that, on the basis of the findings and determination
arrived at consequent to the said IRF Compliance Process, deductions
would be made from its Escrow Account. PayU has, therefore,
instituted the suit, presently pending before the learned Single Judge,
alleging that Visa’s IRF Compliance Process did not satisfy the
12
mandatory requirements of Section 24 of the Payment and
13
Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and that determination of IRF through
the said process had no jurisdiction or legal effect, on the basis of
11
"IRF" hereinafter
12
24. Settlement of disputes. –
(1) The system provider shall make provision in its rules or regulations for creation of panel
consisting of not less than three system participants other than the system participants who are
parties to the dispute to decide the disputes between system participants in respect of any matter
connected with the operation of the payment system.
(2) Where any dispute in respect of any matter connected with the operation of the payment
system arises between two or more system participants, the system provider shall refer the dispute
to the panel referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) Where any dispute arises between any system participant and the system provider or
between system providers or where any of the system participants is not satisfied with the decision
of the panel referred to in sub-section (1), the dispute shall be referred to the Reserve Bank.
(4) The dispute referred to the Reserve Bank for adjudication under sub-section (3) shall be
disposed of by an officer of the Reserve Bank generally or specially authorised in this behalf and
the decision of the Reserve Bank shall be final and binding.
(5) Where a dispute arises between the Reserve Bank, while acting in its capacity as system
provider or as system participant, and another system provider or system participant, the matter
shall be referred to the Central Government which may authorise an officer not below the rank of
Joint Secretary for settlement of the dispute and the decision of such officer shall be final.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:17.11.2026
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which any deductions could be made from the Escrow Account of
PayU. The suit, therefore, contained the following prayer clause:
“In the premises, there Plaintiff praise that this Hon’ble Court be
pleased to pass a judgement and Decree in favour of the Plaintiff
and to:
a. Declare that Defendant No. 6's IRF Compliance
Process, as applied in respect of the present dispute, does
not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 24 of the
Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and that any
IRF determination issued through the said process
accordingly has no jurisdiction or legal effect, and cannot
constitute a lawfully issued determination capable of
founding any deduction from the Plaintiffs ongoing
settlements/Escrow Account;
b. Grant permanent injunction restraining Defendant
No. 1, 3, 4 and 5 whether by themselves, their officers,
servants, agents or otherwise, from making any
deduction(s) or recovery of any amounts representing IRF
claims from the Plaintiffs ongoing settlements/ Escrow
Account, until such time as the said claims are finally
resolved either through the appeal/cure mechanism
undertaken by Defendant No. 6 or under Section 24 of the
PSS Act.
c. Grant permanent injunction restraining Defendant
No. 6, whether by itself, its officers, servants, agents or
affiliates, from (i) issuing any instruction, direction,
communication, or automated debit command to Defendant
Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 (or to any other acquiring bank
processing the Plaintiffs merchants' transactions) directing,
authorising or facilitating any deduction, set-off, or
withholding from the settlement remittances due to the
Plaintiff on account of any IRF claim or IRF determination,
whether interim or final, under Defendant No. 6's IRF
Compliance Process; and (ii) issuing any final IRF
determination in respect of the pending IRF claims against
Defendant Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5, without first constituting a
panel satisfying the requirements of Section 24(1) of the
Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and without
affording the Plaintiff a fair and full opportunity to present
its contentions before the said panel;
13
"the PSSA" hereinafter
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KUMAR
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d. Grant Mandatory Injunction and/or a Judgment and
Decree of recovery directing Defendant No. 1 to forthwith
return all amounts in the sum of INR 6,88,18,850/-
unlawfully deducted from the subsequent settlement
payable by Defendant No. 1to the Escrow Accounts of the
Plaintiffs on account of the IRF claims of Defendant No. 2
together with interest thereon at 18% per annum from the
date of deduction;
e. Such further and other relief(s) as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the present case and as also would be
warranted in equity in favour of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendants jointly and/or severally.”
11. PayU claimed, before the learned Single Judge, not to play any
role in the assignment of the MCCs, and that its role was limited to
collecting and verifying the business information of the merchant and
forwarding the information to the Acquiring Bank, which
independently assessed the nature of the merchant’s business and
assigned the appropriate MCC, before the merchant could process the
transaction. Incorrect assignment of MCCs, therefore, according to
PayU, was attributable to the Acquiring Banks, and not to PayU.
12. PayU submitted that Yes Bank had already deducted amounts
from the ongoing settlement amounts of PayU towards IRF liability
and that, though, subsequently, Yes Bank had reversed an amount of
over ₹ 5.95 crores, it continued to retain ₹ 68,818,850. IRF claims
raised by ICICI against Axis, Airtel and IndusInd were approximately
₹ 5.26 crores, ₹ 27.3 crores and ₹ 8.82 crores respectively and,
submitted PayU, if these claims were determined or acted upon in a
manner adverse to Axis, Airtel or IndusInd, they, like Yes Bank, could
seek to recover the amounts from PayU by making deductions from its
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KUMAR
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Escrow Account. This would result in substantial financial liability to
PayU, despite its not being responsible, in any way, for assignment of
the MCCs, and also not being a party to the IRF proceedings being
conducted by Visa.
13. PayU contended that the IRF Compliance Process of Visa was
illegal, and that Visa was required, by law, to follow the statutory
dispute resolution mechanism envisaged by Section 24 of the PSSA.
14. Based on these submissions, PayU pressed the reliefs sought in
the suit.
15. PayU also filed, with the suit, IA 24414/2026, seeking
exemption from the requirement of pre-litigation mediation as
envisaged by Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.
16. Visa contended, per contra , before the learned Single Judge,
that it had nothing to do with PayU, and that PayU could not seek any
injunction interdicting Visa from carrying out its functions under its
IRF Compliance Process. Visa pointed out that it was not debiting the
Settlement Account of PayU, but was only determining liability
against the Acquiring Banks, with whom PayU had its own Master
Service Agreements. Visa claimed to have nothing to do with any
such deductions, even if they were effected. These deductions were, if
at all they were effected, in terms of the Master Service Agreements
between PayU and the Acquiring Banks, to which Visa was not privy.
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KUMAR
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17. Having recorded the rival contentions, the learned Single Judge
has, in the impugned order, recorded thus, in para 16:
“16. The crux of the issue is wrong MCCs given to various
merchants on- boarded by the Plaintiff. It is not clear as to who has
given the wrong MCCs which has resulted in determination of the
IRF and subsequent deductions by Defendant No.2 as Issuer Bank
or Defendants No.3, 4 & 5 as Acquiring Banks.”
18. Though it might result in the present judgment becoming
somewhat prolix, we have no option, given the nature of the rival
contentions advanced before us, but to reproduce paras 17 to 27 of the
impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in extenso :
“17. Admittedly, the present Suit is a commercial Suit. The
Plaintiff has to first comply with the mandate of Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Unless urgent interim measures are
required to be granted for which the Plaintiff cannot await pre-
litigation mediation process, the Plaintiff cannot seek exemption
from pre-litigation mediation process. The importance of
institution of pre-litigation mediation process under Section 12A of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been aptly stated by the
Apex Court in Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers
14
(P) Ltd. , wherein the Apex Court, after tracing the history and
importance of mediation, insisted that the parties must undergo the
process of pre-litigation mediation process and only in rare
circumstances can this process be given a go-by. In the said
Judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under:
"99. We may sum-up our reasoning as follows:
99.1. The Act did not originally contain Section 12-A. It
is by amendment in the year 2018 that Section 12-A was
inserted. The Statement of Objects and Reasons are explicit
that Section 12-A was contemplated as compulsory. The
object of the Act and the Amending Act of 2018, unerringly
point to at least partly foisting compulsory mediation on a
plaintiff who does not contemplate urgent interim relief.
The provision has been contemplated only with reference to
plaintiffs who do not contemplate urgent interim relief. The
14
(2022) 10 SCC 1
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legislature has taken care to expressly exclude the period
undergone during mediation for reckoning limitation under
the Limitation Act, 1963. The object is clear.
99.2. It is an undeniable reality that courts in India are
reeling under an extraordinary docket explosion.
Mediation, as an alternative dispute mechanism, has been
identified as a workable solution in commercial matters. In
other words, the cases under the Act lend themselves to be
resolved through mediation. Nobody has an absolute right
to file a civil suit. A civil suit can be barred absolutely or
the bar may operate unless certain conditions are fulfilled .
Cases in point, which amply illustrate this principle, are
Section 80CPC and Section 69 of the Partnership Act.
99.3. The language used in Section 12-A, which includes
the word 'shall", certainly, goes a long way to assist the
Court to hold that the provision is mandatory. The entire
procedure for carrying out the mediation, has been spelt out
in the Rules. The parties are free to engage counsel during
mediation. The expenses, as far as the fee payable to the
mediator, is concerned, is limited to a one-time fee, which
appears to be reasonable, particularly, having regard to the
fact that it is to be shared equally. A trained mediator can
work wonders.
99.4. Mediation must be perceived as a new mechanism
of access to justice. We have already highlighted its
benefits. Any reluctance on the part of the Court to give
Section 12-A, a mandatory interpretation, would result in
defeating the object and intention of Parliament. The fact
that the mediation can become a non-starter, cannot be a
reason to hold the provision not mandatory. Apparently,
the value judgment of the lawgiver is to give the provision,
a modicum of voluntariness for the defendant, whereas, the
plaintiff, who approaches the court, must, necessarily,
resort to it. Section 12-A elevates the settlement under the
Act and the Rules to an award within the meaning of
Section 30(4) of the Arbitration Act, giving it meaningful
enforceability. The period spent in mediation is excluded
for the purpose of limitation. The Act confers power to
order costs based on conduct of the parties.
100. In the cases before us, the suits do not contemplate
urgent interim relief. As to what should happen in suits
which do contemplate urgent interim relief or rather the
meaning of the word "contemplate" or urgent interim relief,
we need not dwell upon it. The other aspect raised about
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the word "contemplate" is that there can be attempts to
bypass the statutory mediation under Section 12-A by
contending that the plaintiff is contemplating urgent interim
relief, which in reality, it is found to be without any basis.
Section 80(2)CPC permits the suit to be filed where urgent
interim relief is sought by seeking the leave of the court.
The proviso to Section 80(2) contemplates that the court
shall, if, after hearing the parties, is satisfied that no urgent
or immediate relief need be granted in the suit, return the
plaint for presentation to the court after compliance. Our
attention is drawn to the fact that Section 12-A does not
contemplate such a procedure. This is a matter which may
engage attention of the lawmaker. Again, we reiterate that
these are not issues which arise for our consideration. In the
fact of the cases admittedly there is no urgent interim relief
contemplated in the plaints in question.
Some concerns
101. Mediation can become a potent alternate dispute
resolution device. There are, however, a few indispensable
requirements. The first requirement is the existence of
adequate infrastructural facilities and, what is more
important, availability of trained and skilled mediators. The
role of the mediator, as per Rule 5 of the Rules, is to
facilitate the voluntary resolution of a commercial dispute
and assist the parties in this regard. How can a mediator,
who is not properly trained, fulfil his responsibility under
Rule 5? Another area of concern is the availability in the
number of mediators in the country, particularly, in the
light of lowering of the monetary valuation from Rs 1 crore
to Rs 3 lakhs.
102. It is all well to pass a law with sublime objects as in
this case. However, the goal will not be realised unless the
State Governments and all other relevant authorities bestow
their attention in the matter of providing adequate facilities.
Knowledge of the laws, which are the subject-matter of the
suits under the Act, is indispensable for a mediator to
effectively discharge his duties. His role is supreme and it
is largely shaped by his own knowledge of the law that
governs commercial cases. There must be training by
experts, including at the State Judicial Academies. This
must be undertaken on a regular and urgent basis,
particularly keeping in mind when there is a dearth of
trained mediators. There is a need to have a dedicated Bar
for mediation. The effective participation of the Bar which
must be adequately remunerated for its service will assist in
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mediation evolving. The High Court concerned may also
undertake periodic exercise to establish a panel of trained
mediators in District and Taluka levels as per need."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. In the abovementioned Judgment, the Apex Court has held
that a Suit can be dismissed for not complying with the mandate of
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. Though the pre-
litigation mediation process under Section 12A of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 is to be resorted to before filing of the Suit and
the Suit can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if not
complied with the said provision, however, this does not bar the
Court from referring the parties to mediation even after institution
of the Suit. In Novenco Building & Industry A/S v. Xero Energy
15
Engg. Solutions (P) Ltd. , the Apex Court has resorted to the
same process.
19. At this juncture, this Court also does not want to brush
away the concern of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiffs are obliged to
maintain a certain amount in the escrow account and if the escrow
account goes below that minimum amount, the Plaintiffs may be
exposed to civil and criminal liability. However, this Court is not
dwelling further on this argument as other arguments on the
maintainability of the suit have been raised by all the Defendants.
20. In the opinion of this Court, since the entire regime is being
operated under the certificates granted by the RBI and under the
supervision of the RBI, instead of sending the parties for pre-
litigation mediation process, it would be more appropriate to
request the RBI to act as a mediator, even though it is not an
authority names under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 for
the purpose of pre-litigation mediation process. The endeavour is
to find out a solution to the problem of grant of wrong MCCs (if
any) and to find a solution to the problem which has arisen under
the regime.
21. This Court can take aid of Section 24 of the PSS Act which
establishes a framework for resolving disputes related to the
operation of payment systems in India. Section 24 of the PSS Act
reads as under:
"24. Settlement of disputes . –
(1) The system provider shall make provision in its
rules or regulations for creation of panel consisting of not
less than three system participants other than the system
15
(2026) 4 SCC 815
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participants who are parties to the dispute to decide the
disputes between system participants in respect of any
matter connected with the operation of the payment system.
(2) Where any dispute in respect of any matter
connected with the operation of the payment system arises
between two or more system participants, the system
provider shall refer the dispute to the panel referred to in
sub-section (1).
(3) Where any dispute arises between any system
participant and the system provider or between system
providers or where any of the system participants is not
satisfied with the decision of the panel referred to in sub-
section (1), the dispute shall be referred to the Reserve
Bank.
(4) The dispute referred to the Reserve Bank for
adjudication under sub-section (3) shall be disposed of by
an officer of the Reserve Bank generally or specially
authorised in this behalf and the decision of the Reserve
Bank shall be final and binding.
(5) Where a dispute arises between the Reserve Bank,
while acting in its capacity as system provider or as system
participant, and another system provider or system
participant, the matter shall be referred to the Central
Government which may authorise an officer not below the
rank of Joint Secretary for settlement of the dispute and the
decision of such officer shall be final."
22. Though, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff
has argued that referring the matter to RBI would deny an appeal
to the Plaintiff, this Court makes it clear that the matter is being
referred to RBI only as an effort to find out a solution regarding
creation and allocation of wrong MCCs and as to how the past
transactions can be settled and to make sure that the transactions
between the parties go smoothly under the system operated by
Defendant No.6 till the adjudication of disputes either by this Court
or by any other forum. It is made clear that RBI will only act as a
mediator and facilitator and not as a dispute resolution body as
contemplated under Section 24 of the PSS Act.
23. Viewed in this light and without making observation even
assuming that this Court comes to a conclusion that the present
Suit is not maintainable and that the Plaintiff would have to take
recourse to other modes of adjudication, the Appellate right of the
Plaintiff is not taken away.
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24. Accordingly, the RBI is requested to depute a senior officer
well- versed with the branch to make an endeavour to bring out a
solution within thirty days from today.
25. In the opinion of this Court, adopting this process will
ensure that the future transactions by the parties in the scheduled
course are not hampered pending mediation and in the opinion of
this Court, the senior officer of the RBI would be the most
competent person to assist the parties to come to a solution pending
the mediation process.
26. Since the RBI has been requested to find out a solution
within thirty days, the parties are requested to maintain status quo
in respect of claims arising out of past transactions already made
by Defendant No. 2 before Defendant No. 6, Defendant No. 6 shall
not issue or pass any final IRF determination in respect of the
pending IRF Claims arising out of past transactions against the
Defendant No. 1,3,4 and 5 and consequently, Defendant Nos. 1, 3,
4 and 5 shall not make any deductions / debits / netting from the
Plaintiff, while the mediation process is ongoing; and Defendant
No. 2 or any other Issuing Bank which is a party to these
proceedings will not make any further claims for interchange
income loss due to MCC misclassification in respect of
transactions involving the Plaintiff prior to the date of the Plaint
while the mediation process is ongoing.
27. It is made clear that this order shall not impact or obstruct
or modify the transactions between the parties in the ordinary and
usual course. This order will not affect their existing or future
contractual or legal rights, all questions in that regard being
expressly left open and will apply only to the transactions in which
the parties claim that wrong MCCs have been assigned to
merchants.”
19. The afore-extracted paras from the impugned order speak for
themselves, and it is not necessary for us, therefore, to paraphrase
them. They, however, constitute subject matter of challenge by Visa,
through Mr. Sibal.
C. Rival Contentions
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C.I Submissions of Mr. Akhil Sibal for Visa
20. Mr. Sibal first submits that the impugned order breaches
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. He rationalizes this
argument thus:
(i) Pre-institution mediation is mandatory under Section
12A, as held by paras 87, 88 and 99 of Patil Automation . The
Supreme Court has held that any suit, instituted without pre-
institution mediation as required by Section 12A, must be
16
rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
17
Procedure, 1908 .
(ii) Patil Automation further holds that, where no urgent
interim reliefs are contemplated, there can be no question of
substantial compliance with Section 12A by post-institution
reference to mediation.
(iii) That Section 12A does not envisage post-institution
mediation was expressly stated in paras 67 and 72 of Dhanbad
16
11. Rejection of plaint .—
The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court
to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper
insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite
stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the
requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the
plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such
time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.
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18
Fuels (P) Ltd v. Union of India , which further clarified that
the power to refer parties to mediation post-institution of the
suit, keeping the suit in abeyance, applied only to suits
instituted prior to 20 August 2022. The present suit was
instituted in 2026.
(iv) The reference of the parties to post-institution mediation,
by the impugned order, therefore, is in contravention of settled
law. The learned Single Judge had, before him, only two
options, in view of Section 12A. The first was to allow
exemption from complying with Section 12A, after due
application of mind and for reasons to be stated, as held in paras
19
10 to 12 of Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi , which also
clarified that the existence of a prayer for interim relief does
not, ipso facto , mean that urgent interim relief was
contemplated for the purposes of Section 12A. The second was
to reject the suit for failing to comply with Section 12A. There
was no third option available to him.
(v) No summons have, as yet, been issued in the suit. Patil
Automation holds that summons could be issued only in a
validly instituted suit. The fact that the learned Single Judge has
not issued summons indicates that he was not satisfied that the
suit was validly instituted. In such circumstances, the learned
Single Judge could not have proceeded to grant interim relief.
This is an inherent inconsistency, which vitiates the impugned
17
CPC
18
(2025) 9 SCC 424
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order. In this context, Mr. Siddhant Kumar, who supplements
the submissions of Mr. Sibal, also draws our attention to
20
Section 89(1) of the CPC.
(vi) The learned Single Judge erred in relying on Novenco to
justify his decision to refer the suit to post-institution mediation.
In Novenco , the Supreme Court, in its initial order dated 7
February 2025, framed the question as to whether non-
compliance with Section 12A merited dismissal of the suit
under Order VII Rule 11 or whether the suit could be kept in
abeyance while the parties explored the possibility of settlement
through mediation. The Supreme Court only directed Novenco
to approach the Mediation Centre attached to the High Court for
appointment of a mediator and requested participation by the
opposite side. This was a mere procedural direction, and no
interim protection was granted in the meanwhile. The final
judgment in Novenco did not adjudicate the issue raised in the
initial order dated 7 February 2025, or endorse post-institution
mediation. It held that Section 12A mandatorily required pre-
institution mediation, and that exception from this requirement
was available only where the plaint, read with the documents
filed there with, disclosed a real need for urgent interim relief.
19
(2024) 5 SCC 815
20
89. Settlement of disputes outside the Court.—
(1) Where it appears to the Court that there exist elements of a settlement which may be
acceptable to the parties, the Court shall formulate the terms of settlement and give them to the
parties for their observations and after receiving the observations of the parties, the Court may
reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for:—
(a) arbitration;
(b) conciliation;
(c) judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat; or
(d) mediation.
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(vii) The impugned judgment is, therefore, internally
irreconcilable. If the nature of the suit required pre-institution
mediation as envisaged by Section 12A, and did not disclose
any urgency as would justify exception from this requirement,
no interim relief could have been granted, pending such
mediation. If, on the other hand, urgent interim relief was
sought in the suit, justifying exception from the requirement of
compliance with Section 12A, the learned Single Judge ought to
have allowed the application for exemption, in which event
there would be no occasion to refer the matter to mediation. The
impugned judgment, therefore, suffers from a patent
jurisdictional error.
(viii) Moreover, the learned Single Judge could not have
21
appointed a senior official of the Reserve Bank of India as the
mediator, as Section 12A(2) requires mediation to be only
through authorities constituted under the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987, and RBI is not one such authority in
terms of the Commercial Courts (Pre-Institution Mediation and
22
Settlement) Rules, 2018 . This statutory position, in fact,
stands acknowledged in para 20 of the impugned judgment;
nonetheless, the learned Single Judge goes on to direct
mediation by the RBI, which is impermissible.
21. Mr. Sibal’s second objection to the impugned order is that it
grants interim relief without recording any finding regarding the
21
RBI
22
"the 2018 Rules" hereinafter
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existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable
loss, which are the inalienable prerequisites before any interim
protection can be granted. He cites, in this context, para 4 of Dalpat
23
Kumar v. Prahlad Singh , as well as a host of decisions of this
Court. Ad interim injunction, submits Mr. Sibal, cannot be granted as
a holding arrangement, insulated from the settled principles governing
grant of injunctive relief. The learned Single Judge has not considered
any of the submissions advanced by Visa on the aspects of prima facie
case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss, even though they
were reiterated in the written submissions filed before him. Mr. Sibal
submits that, in this context, Visa had contended that
(i) there was no privity of contract between Visa and PayU,
(ii) PayU had, therefore, no cause of action against Visa,
(iii) IRF determination was by the Acquiring Bank, towards
the Issuing Bank and PayU would, if at all, be affected only if
the Acquiring Bank chose to pass on that liability to PayU
under the Master Service Agreement between them,
(iv) each such Master Service Agreement contained an
arbitration clause, and the suit was, therefore, also barred by
24
Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
(v) Section 24 of the PSSA vested the RBI, and not civil
courts, with jurisdiction over disputes between system
providers, thereby implicitly barring a suit, for which purpose
Mr. Sibal places reliance on paras 15, 16 and 65 to 69 of the
23
(1992) 1 SCC 719
24
8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.
(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of
an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming
through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court
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judgment of the High Court of Madras in Info Edge (India) Ltd
25
v. Google India (P) Ltd ,
(vi) mere financial loss, capable of computation and recovery
by way of damages, did not constitute irreparable harm,
(vii) no urgency, justifying grant of ad interim relief, could be
said to exist, having regard to the delay between April 2026,
when PayU acquired knowledge of the IRF process and the
institution of the suit in late August 2026 and
(viii) the balance of convenience was also against grant of any
such interim relief, as the impugned judgment restrains Visa
from completing its IRF Compliance Process, which would
cause it direct operational prejudice.
22. The learned Single Judge, submits Mr. Sibal, has granted
interim relief solely because he deemed it appropriate to refer the
dispute to mediation by the RBI. There is no other ground for grant of
interim relief. This is impermissible in law.
23. The third objection of Mr. Sibal, to the impugned order, is that,
as Visa had questioned the maintainability of the suit, as noted in
paras 12 to 19 of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge was
required to address this issue, at least prima facie , before granting any
interim protection. He cites, for this purpose, para 50 of Asma Lateef
26
v. Shabbir Ahmad .
or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration
agreement exists.
25
2024 SCC OnLine Mad 150
26
(2024) 4 SCC 696
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24. Ms. Varuna Bhandare, appearing for the ICICI Bank, adopted
Mr. Sibal’s submissions. Mr. Kartik Somasundaram, for Yes Bank,
also did so, and further submitted that the learned Single Judge has
devised a workable solution, with which no interference would be
justified.
C.II Submissions of Mr. Sandeep Sethi
25. Responding to the submissions of Mr. Sibal, Mr. Sandeep Sethi
relies on an e-mail dated 9 September 2026 addressed by Yes Bank to
Visa, enclosing draft Minutes of an Order, pursuant to the directions
issued by the learned Single Judge, and Visa’s response thereto. He
submits that Visa’s response, as well as the responses of other parties
in the suit, made it clear that everyone was agreeable to submission of
the dispute to RBI, even though Visa was objecting to any restraint on
its network’s operation. He submits that Visa cannot be allowed to
approbate and reprobate. The impugned order was passed by the
learned Single Judge, referring the dispute to the RBI, on the basis of
consent by all parties.
26. Without prejudice, Mr. Sethi submits that the suit was not
barred by Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. He has drawn
our attention to the submissions of Visa, as recorded in para 13 of the
impugned order, and points out that no submission related to Section
12A, or its compliance, was advanced. He disputes Mr. Sibal’s
submission that the impugned order is non-reasoned, and submits that
para 19 of the order records prima facie reasons for directing
maintenance of status quo . He submits that the Supreme Court has, in
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Novenco , clarified that the enquiry, for the purposes of Section 12A,
has to be from the standpoint of the plaintiff, based on the averments
in the plaint along with contemporaneous documents. The learned
Single Judge, he submits, has noted the immediacy of the peril facing
PayU, the irreparable harm which would ensue, the risk of losing
further rights or assets, the statutory timelines involved and the fact
that any delay would render eventual relief ineffective. Relying on the
decision in Yamini Manohar , Mr. Sethi submits that, at the Section
12A stage, the Court is not to weigh the merits of the interim relief
sought, and is only to satisfy itself that the prayer for interim relief is
not a camouflage to bypass mediation.
27. Mr. Sethi further submits that IA 24414/2026, seeking
exemption from applicability of Section 12A, was filed only by way
of abundant caution. Relying on para 42 of Dhanbad Fuels , Mr.
Sethi submits that a plaintiff need only pray for urgent interim relief,
and becomes ipso facto entitled to institute the suit without pre-
institution mediation, unless the Court finds to the contrary. He
submits that, in para 19 of the impugned judgment, the learned Single
Judge has noticed the fact that PayU had prayed for interim relief in
the suit, and had further observed that the prayer could not be brushed
aside. This, by itself, was sufficient to justify permitting the suit to
continue without pre-institution mediation. He further cites, in this
context, paras 5 to 12 of Yamini Manohar and paras 2, 49, 50, 52 and
53 of Dhanbad Fuels . In Patil Automation , submits Mr. Sethi, there
was no prayer for interim relief.
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28. Mr. Sethi points out that, consequent on the enquiry conducted
by the IRF Compliance Process of Visa, ₹ 6.88 crores of PayU has
been withheld and there is further threat of withholding of ₹ 41.38
crores on instructions of Visa. He reiterates that the IRF Compliance
Process of Visa is not compliant with Sections 24(1) and (2) of the
PSSA.
29. Mr. Sethi points out that the impugned order of the learned
Single Judge, referring the parties to RBI for mediation, instead of a
pre-institution mediation process, was within the power of the Court,
in view of Section 89(b) read with Order X Rules 1-A to 1-C and
Section 151 of the CPC. He relies, for this purpose, on paras 53 to 55
27
of Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India , para 36 of
Afcons Infrastructure Ltd v. Cherian Varkey Construction Company
28 29
Pvt Ltd and para 3 of B.S. Krishnamoorthy v. B.S. Nagaraj . Paras
20 to 29 of the impugned order, submits Mr. Sethi, make it clear that
the reference to mediation, by the learned Single Judge, is not in terms
of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, and the interim stay
granted in the meanwhile is only intended to ensure that the mediation
is not frustrated. A similar procedure, he submits, was adopted by the
Supreme Court in its order dated 7 February 2025 in Novenco .
30. Mr. Sethi submits that para 19 of the impugned order, with
which Visa claims to be aggrieved, merely contains a 30-day
mediation linked case management direction, expressly without
prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. No issue is
27
(2005) 6 SCC 344
28
(2010) 8 SCC 24
29
(2011) 15 SCC 464
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decided by the impugned order, even prima facie . The Order XXXIX
application filed by PayU is still pending.
31. Mr. Sethi refutes Mr. Sibal’s contention that the impugned
order does not reflect consideration of the ingredients of prima facie
case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, which form the
basis of any injunctive order. He submits that para 16 of the impugned
order deals with the existence of a prima facie case, para 19 deals with
irreparable loss and paras 25, 27 and 30 deal with balance of
convenience. All these ingredients, therefore, are taken into account
by the impugned order. He submits that there is no requirement, in
law, for a Court to expressly employ the expressions “ prima facie
case”, “balance of convenience” or “irreparable loss”, before granting
interim injunction, and it is sufficient if the Court is alive to these
requirements, as is discernible from the tenor of the order. He relies,
for this purpose, on para 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
30
High Court Bar Association v. State of UP .
32. Equally, submits Mr. Sethi, there is no cast-iron requirement, in
law, for a Court to pronounce on the maintainability of the suit before
granting interim relief. In an appropriate case, he submits that interim
relief can be granted even pending decision on maintainability and
cites, for this purpose, para 50 of Asma Lateef .
C.III Submissions of Mr. Rajeeve Mehra
30
2024 SCC OnLine SC 207
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33. Mr. Rajeeve Mehra, appearing for Yes Bank, largely adopts the
submissions of Mr. Sethi. He has also sought to submit that, inasmuch
as Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act envisages pre-
institution mediation, the reference of the dispute to mediation by the
RBI, by the impugned order, cannot be treated as an exercise relatable
to Section 12A. This, however, does not render the impugned order
illegal or unsustainable. Mr. Mehra further submits that, as the issue
involved in the suit requires understanding of circulars issued by the
RBI for payment aggregation arrangements and a keen understanding
of the card payment ecosystem, the expertise of a senior RBI officer,
well-versed with this branch, would be helpful in facilitating an
effective mediation. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order
deserves to be sustained, subject to the clarification that the RBI
officer would act only as a mediator in a post-institution, non-
adjudicatory process.
C.IV Submissions of Mr. Akhil Sibal in rejoinder
34. In rejoinder, Mr. Sibal contests Mr. Sethi’s submission that
there was any consent, by the parties, to refer the dispute to mediation
by the RBI. He submits that the impugned order does not even purport
to be a consent order. The e-mails to which Mr. Sethi refers, he
submits, were without prejudice communications. He further points
out that the said e-mails envisage reference of the dispute to RBI in
terms of Section 24(3) of the PSSA, which envisages adjudication,
and not mediation.
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35. Mr. Sibal further seeks to submit that the impugned order does
not purport to have been passed in exercise of the powers vested by
Section 89 of the CPC, but expressly purports to have been issued
under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. He refers, in this
context, to paras 11, 12, 17, 18, 20 and 23 of the impugned order.
36. Mr. Sibal further disputes Mr. Sethi’s contention that Section
151 of the CPC empowers the Court to refer the matter to mediation.
Mediation, he submits, has to be either relatable to Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act or to Section 89 of the CPC. Unlike Section
89, he points out that, under Section 12A, the Court does not direct
mediation of the dispute. He further submits that, where the Court
refers to a particular provision to draw power for its order, the
principle of availability of power elsewhere would not apply. In
support of his submissions, Mr. Sibal relies on paras 92, 94.1 and 94.3
of Patil Automation . For the proposition that the impugned directions
could not be said to have been issued under Section 89, Mr. Sibal cites
paras 8, 24, 30, 41 and 43 of Afcons Infrastructure .
37. Mr. Sibal disputes Mr. Sethi’s contention that the impugned
order reflects consideration of the elements of prima facie case,
balance of convenience and irreparable loss. He submits that there is
no such consideration, either in form or in substance. Any
consideration of the existence, or otherwise, of a prima facie case, he
submits, should reflect at least tentative findings on the arguments
advanced by the parties, which are absent. Though Visa’s contentions
are recorded in para 13 of the impugned order, Mr. Sibal submits that
the order does not deal with them before granting injunction.
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38. Mr. Sibal places further reliance on Section 38 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1973, to submit that, if perpetual injunction cannot be
granted, neither can temporary injunction be granted.
39. Apropos the judgments cited by Mr. Sethi, Mr. Sibal cites paras
16, 17, 22, 24 and 25 of Natco , paras 48, 49 and 51 of Newgen and
para 6 of High Court Bar Association .
C.V Submissions in surrejoinder
40. Mr. Sethi, in a brief surrejoinder, sought to submit that Section
89 of the CPC had been amended. Mr. Sibal submits, in this regard,
that the amendment had not been notified, whereas Mr. Sethi submits
that it was notified on 3 November 2025, and was effected because of
the anomalies noted in para 7, 11, 15, 19, 25, 36 and 45 of Afcons
Infrastructure . Mr. Sibal submits that, in any case, Section 59 of the
Mediation Act has not been notified.
D. Analysis
D.I Re. Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act
41. We first proceed to examine the rival contentions with respect
to whether the impugned order infracts Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act.
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42. On its plain terms, Section 12A(1) proscribes the institution of a
suit, which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief, without
exhausting pre-institution mediation, as prescribed by the rules. In
order to effectuate Section 12A(1), the Commercial Courts (Pre-
31
Institution Mediation and Settlement) Rules, 2018 were notified on 3
July 2018.
43. The law relating to Section 12A, its application and
applicability, and the consequences of failure to comply with the
provision, are no longer res integra , in view of the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Patil Automation , Yamini Manohar , Dhanbad
Fuels and Novenco to which, therefore, we may immediately allude.
44. Patil Automation
44.1 It is necessary to bear in mind, as Mr. Sethi has pointed out, the
fact that Patil Automation was a case in which no interim relief had
been sought in the suit . Needless to say, however, the judgment
remains binding on all hierarchically lower judicial authorities,
including us, and we would be loath to discount its precedential value
merely for this reason. The fact, however, assumes importance in view
of para 100 of the report, which read thus:
“100. In the cases before us, the suits do not contemplate urgent
interim relief. As to what should happen in suits which do
contemplate urgent interim relief or rather the meaning of the
word “contemplate” or urgent interim relief, we need not dwell
upon it. The other aspect raised about the word “contemplate” is
that there can be attempts to bypass the statutory mediation under
Section 12-A by contending that the plaintiff is contemplating
31
"the Rules” hereinafter
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urgent interim relief, which in reality, it is found to be without any
basis. Section 80(2) CPC permits the suit to be filed where urgent
interim relief is sought by seeking the leave of the court. The
proviso to Section 80(2) contemplates that the court shall, if, after
hearing the parties, is satisfied that no urgent or immediate relief
need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to the
court after compliance. Our attention is drawn to the fact that
Section 12-A does not contemplate such a procedure. This is a
matter which may engage attention of the lawmaker. Again, we
reiterate that these are not issues which arise for our
consideration. In the fact of the cases admittedly there is no urgent
interim relief contemplated in the plaints in question. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
44.2 That, despite the constitutional imperative contained in Article
32
141 , judgments of the Supreme Court – and, indeed, of all courts –
have to be understood in the light of the facts which were before the
Court, and not analogised to theorems of Euclid is, again, no longer
33
res integra . In Union of India v. Bharat Forge Ltd , the Supreme
Court observed that it was “elementary that principles enunciated in
the facts are not to be likened to Euclid’s Theorem, having an
inexorable operation divorced from the facts which arise for
consideration”. In almost identical terms, Vinay Prakash Singh v.
34
Sameer Gehlaut observes thus:
“11. We must bear in mind as has been laid down by this Court
in an unbroken catena of decisions that a judgment of a Court is
not to be read as the Euclid's Theorem shorn of the facts and the
context in which the law has been declared.”
35
To the same effect are the decisions in C. Ronald v. State , Gauhati
36 37
High Court v. Gogo Ete and Manoj Sharma v. State . In Deepak
32
141. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
33
(2022) 17 SCC 188
34
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1595
35
(2011) 12 SCC 428
36
(2018) 16 SCC 51
37
(2008) 16 SCC 1
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38
Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra , the Supreme Court, to support this
principle, approvingly placed reliance on the dictum of Lord Halsbury
39
in Quinn v. Leathem :
“7. It is well settled that a judgment of a Court is not to be read
mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as if it was a statute.
8. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in
Quinn v. Leathem :
40
“Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood and
what was decided therein, there are two observations of a
general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat
what I have very often said before, that every judgment
must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or
assumed to be proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there are not intended to
be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and
qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only
an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that
it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow
logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that
the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer
must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”
We entirely agree with the above observations.”
44.3 In view of para 100 of Patil Automation and the afore-cited
decisions, we cannot, therefore, be oblivious to the fact that, in that
case, no interim relief was sought at all in the suit.
41
44.4 Patil Automation was the defendant in the suit from which
the appeal travelled to the Supreme Court. Rakheja Engineers (P)
42
Ltd , which instituted the suit, did not seek any interim relief at all.
38
(2008) 16 SCC 14
39
1901 AC 495
40
(1898) AC 1
41
"Patil" hereinafter
42
"Rakheja" hereinafter
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The suit was instituted without pre-institution mediation. Patil moved
an application, before the learned trial court, under Order VII Rule 11
of the CPC, praying for dismissal of the suit as it was not maintainable
on account of failure to comply with Section 12A of the Commercial
Courts Act. The application was dismissed by the learned trial court,
and that decision was affirmed by the High Court in appeal. Patil,
therefore, approached the Supreme Court.
44.5 The Supreme Court, in clear and unequivocal terms, held that,
in a case of a suit which did not contemplate any interim relief, the
requirement of pre-institution mediation, as envisaged by Section
12A, was mandatory and imperative. The suit was, in the absence of
such attempt at pre-institution mediation, not maintainable, and was
liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The
Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the decision of the High Court.
44.6 We may reproduce, for ready reference, the following extracts
from the judgment of the Supreme Court, which emphasize the
mandatory nature of Section 12A:
“62. Since, Section 12-A also contemplated the making of Rules
to give effect to the scheme of pre-litigation mediation. The Rules
were promptly made and published on 3-7-2018. Rule 3
elaborately provides for the manner in which the mediation process
is initiated. It contemplates that a party, to a commercial dispute,
may make an application to the Authority. This Rule speaks about
a party. Section 12-A declares that the plaintiff must exhaust the
remedy of pre-litigation mediation. What, apparently is required is
that the suit cannot be filed except after the remedy of pre-
litigation mediation, contemplated under the Act and the Rules, is
attempted and exhausted. What Rule 3(1) provides is the form in
which the application is to be made viz. Form I, as specified in
Schedule I. The making of the Form can be by online transmission
or by post or by hand.
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63. The view expressed by the High Court of Madras that the
use of the word “may”, detracts from the mandatory flavour of
Section 12-A is clearly untenable . Section 12-A is part of the
parent enactment. Rule 3, being a subordinate legislation, must be
interpreted harmoniously, in the first place, with the parent
enactment. That apart, on a proper understanding of Rule 3, there
is really no conflict between Section 12-A and Rule 3. Rule 3 only
gives a discretion to the applicant, in regard to the mode of making
the application. So understood, we are of the clear view that, if
Section 12-A is otherwise mandatory, Rule 3(1) can only be
understood as providing three different modes for making the
application, contemplated in Section 12-A(1).
*
67. A mediation settlement arrived at under Section 89CPC
must be scrutinised by the court and only on its imprimatur being
given it is effective [ see para 40 of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd. ]. Since a settlement
under Section 12-A of the Act is accorded the status of an award
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it unerringly points to
the object of the legislature to make pre-litigation mediation
compulsory. We again underscore the vital role, the lawyers
engaged can and must discharge in arriving at a just and valid
settlement translating into an effective award and therefore, a
decree.
*
71. It does not require much debate to conclude that there is a
direct relationship between ease of doing business and an early and
expeditious termination of disputes, which may arise in
commercial matters. The speed with which the justice delivery
system in any country responds to the problem of docket
explosion, particularly in the realm of commercial disputes can be
regarded as a very safe index of the ease of doing business in that
country. The Act, therefore, is, in the said sense, a unique
experiment to push the pace of disposal of commercial disputes. It
is in this background that the Court must approach the issue of
whether Section 12-A has been perceived as being a mandatory
provision. We say this for the reason that the decisive element in
the search for the answer, in the interpretation of such a statute,
must be to ascertain the intention of the legislature. The first
principle, of course, must be the golden rule of interpretation,
which means, the interpretation in conformity with the plain
language, which is used. There cannot even be a shadow of a
doubt that the language used in Section 12-A is plainly imperative
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in nature. However, we will not be led by the mere use of the word
“shall”.
*
74. It is noteworthy that Section 12-A provides for a bypass
and a fast-track route without for a moment taking the precious
time of a court. At this juncture, it must be immediately noticed
that the lawgiver has, in Section 12-A, provided for pre-institution
mediation only in suits, which do not contemplate any urgent
interim relief. Therefore, pre-institution mediation has been
mandated only in a class of suits. We say this for the reason that in
suits which contemplate urgent interim relief, the lawgiver has
carefully vouchsafed immediate access to justice as contemplated
ordinarily through the courts. The carving out of a class of suits
and selecting them for compulsory mediation, harmonises with the
attainment of the object of the law. The load on the Judges is
lightened. They can concentrate on matters where urgent interim
relief is contemplated and, on other matters, which already crowd
their dockets.
*
88. We may immediately draw a parallel between Sections
80(1)CPC and 12-A of the Act. In Section 12-A also, the bar of
institution of the suit is applicable only in a case in which plaintiff
does not contemplate urgent interim relief. The situation is akin to
what is contemplated in Section 80(1)CPC. In other words, the suit
under the Act which does not contemplate urgent interim relief is
like a suit covered by Section 80(1)CPC which does not project the
need for any urgent or interim relief. In regard to a suit covered
under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, namely, in a
suit where interim relief is not contemplated, there can be no
substantial compliance by way of post institution reference to
mediation. The argument of the plaintiff overlooks the object apart
from the language used besides the design and scheme of the law.
It will, if accepted, lead to courts also spending their invaluable
time on such matters which follow from adjournments, objections
and hearings. There is no need to adopt such a course.
*
91. Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act provides for
mediation. This is a provision, which was inserted as per the
Amending Act (Act 28 of 2018) enacted in the year 2018 and it
came into force with effect from 3-5-2018. By the said
amendment, in fact, Chapter III-A was inserted and Section 12-A
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is the sole section in the said chapter. A plain reading of Section
12-A makes the following position clear:
91.1. The lawgiver has declared that if a suit under the Act does
not “contemplate” any urgent interim relief, then, it cannot be
instituted unless the plaintiff seeks pre-litigation mediation. The
pre-institution mediation is to be done in the manner, procedure,
which is to be prescribed by the Central Government. The pre-
litigation mediation is to be completed within a period of three
months from the date of the application made by the plaintiff under
sub-section (1) [see Section 12-A sub-section (3)].
*
91.4. Spread over five sub-sections, this standalone section in
Chapter III-A, no doubt, supported by the Rules, in our view,
substantially manifests a definite scheme to effectively deal with
the perceived urgent problem of acute clogging of the justice
delivery system, which had to be de-congested . Section 12-A
cannot be perceived as merely intended to reach quicker justice,
and what is more, on terms, which are mutually acceptable to the
parties concerned. Even, more importantly, it was to produce a
vital and significant effect on the very interest of the nation. We
have perused the Statement of Objects and Reasons. To attract
foreign capital by enhancing its rather low standard in the ease of
doing business, it was and is still necessary to showcase an
efficient and quick justice delivery system in commercial matters.
In fact, India, which was ranked at 142 out of 189 countries, in the
Ease of Doing Business Index, in 2015, climbed up to only 130 in
the year 2016. By 2020, India stood at the 63rd position.
*
94.3. Order 7 Rule 11 does not provide that the court is to
discharge its duty of rejecting the plaint only on an application.
Order 7 Rule 11 is, in fact, silent about any such requirement.
Since summon is to be issued in a duly instituted suit, in a case
where the plaint is barred under Order 7 Rule 11(d), the stage
begins at that time when the court can reject the plaint under
Order 7 Rule 11 . No doubt it would take a clear case where the
court is satisfied. The Court has to hear the plaintiff before it
invokes its power besides giving reasons under Order 7 Rule 12. In
a clear case, where on allegations in the suit, it is found that the
suit is barred by any law, as would be the case, where the plaintiff
in a suit under the Act does not plead circumstances to take his
case out of the requirement of Section 12-A, the plaint should be
rejected without issuing summons. Undoubtedly, on issuing
summons it will be always open to the defendant to make an
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application as well under Order 7 Rule 11. In other words, the
power under Order 7 Rule 11 is available to the court to be
exercised suo motu. (See in this regard, the judgment of this Court
in Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v. Peddireddigari
43
Ramachandra Reddy .)
*
99. We may sum-up our reasoning as follows:
99.1. The Act did not originally contain Section 12-A. It is by
amendment in the year 2018 that Section 12-A was inserted. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons are explicit that Section 12-A
was contemplated as compulsory. The object of the Act and the
Amending Act of 2018, unerringly point to at least partly foisting
compulsory mediation on a plaintiff who does not contemplate
urgent interim relief. The provision has been contemplated only
with reference to plaintiffs who do not contemplate urgent interim
relief. The legislature has taken care to expressly exclude the
period undergone during mediation for reckoning limitation under
the Limitation Act, 1963. The object is clear .
99.2. It is an undeniable reality that courts in India are reeling
under an extraordinary docket explosion. Mediation, as an
alternative dispute mechanism, has been identified as a workable
solution in commercial matters. In other words, the cases under the
Act lend themselves to be resolved through mediation. Nobody has
an absolute right to file a civil suit. A civil suit can be barred
absolutely or the bar may operate unless certain conditions are
fulfilled. Cases in point, which amply illustrate this principle, are
Section 80CPC and Section 69 of the Partnership Act.
99.3. The language used in Section 12-A, which includes the
word “shall”, certainly, goes a long way to assist the Court to hold
that the provision is mandatory . The entire procedure for carrying
out the mediation, has been spelt out in the Rules. The parties are
free to engage counsel during mediation. The expenses, as far as
the fee payable to the mediator, is concerned, is limited to a one-
time fee, which appears to be reasonable, particularly, having
regard to the fact that it is to be shared equally. A trained mediator
can work wonders.
*
100. In the cases before us, the suits do not contemplate urgent
interim relief. As to what should happen in suits which do
43
(2018) 14 SCC 1
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contemplate urgent interim relief or rather the meaning of the
word “contemplate” or urgent interim relief, we need not dwell
upon it. The other aspect raised about the word “contemplate” is
that there can be attempts to bypass the statutory mediation under
Section 12-A by contending that the plaintiff is contemplating
urgent interim relief, which in reality, it is found to be without any
basis. Section 80(2)CPC permits the suit to be filed where urgent
interim relief is sought by seeking the leave of the court. The
proviso to Section 80(2) contemplates that the court shall, if, after
hearing the parties, is satisfied that no urgent or immediate relief
need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to the
court after compliance. Our attention is drawn to the fact that
Section 12-A does not contemplate such a procedure. This is a
matter which may engage attention of the lawmaker. Again, we
reiterate that these are not issues which arise for our
consideration. In the fact of the cases admittedly there is no urgent
interim relief contemplated in the plaints in question.
*
The relief
104. On the findings we have entered, the impugned orders must
be set aside and the applications under Order 7 Rule 11 allowed.
This would mean that the plaints must be rejected. Necessarily, this
would involve the loss of the court fee paid by the plaintiffs in
these cases. They would have to bring a fresh suit, no doubt after
complying with Section 12-A, as permitted under Order 7 Rule 13.
Moreover, the declaration of law by this Court would relate back to
the date of the Amending Act of 2018.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44.7 It is clear, therefore, that the requirement of attempting pre-
institution mediation, in the case of a suit which does not contemplate
urgent interim relief, is irreconcilable and mandatory. Such a suit, if
instituted, is liable to be thrown out at the threshold under Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC.
44.8 At the same time, the Supreme Court also clarified that it was
not entering into the semantics of the expression “contemplate”, as
contained in Section 12A, and as to whether, if a prayer for urgent
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interim relief was contained in the suit, the Court could go behind the
prayer and examine whether the “contemplation” was, or was not,
genuine. On this aspect, therefore, Patil Automation may not be an
authoritative precedent, and we agree with Mr Sethi in this regard.
45. Yamini Manohar
45.1 This decision, though brief, has examined, in some detail, the
contours of “contemplation” as envisaged in Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act. After noting that Patil Automation had held
that the requirement of attempting pre-institution mediation, in a suit
which does not contemplate urgent interim relief, is mandatory, the
Supreme Court extracted para 100 from Patil Automation, already
reproduced supra. Thereafter, the Supreme Court proceeded to
observe and hold as under:
“5. Section 12-A of the CC Act does not contemplate leave of
the court, as is clear from the language and words used therein.
Nor does the provision necessarily require an application seeking
exemption. An application seeking waiver on account of urgent
interim relief setting out grounds and reasons may allay a
challenge and assist the court, but in the absence of any statutory
mandate or rules made by the Central Government, an application
per se is not a condition under Section 12-A of the CC Act;
pleadings on record and oral submissions would be sufficient.
6. The words used in Section 12-A of the CC Act are — “ A
suit which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief ”,
wherein the word “contemplate” connotes to deliberate and
consider. Further, the legal position that the plaint can be rejected
and not entertained reflects application of mind by the court viz.
the requirement of “urgent interim relief”.
7. In the present case, it is an accepted fact that an urgent
interim relief has been prayed for and the condition that the plaint
“contemplates” an urgent interim relief is satisfied. Therefore, the
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impugned judgment/order of the Delhi High Court dated 8-5-2023,
which upholds the order of the District Judge (Commercial Court)-
01, South District at Saket, New Delhi dated 6-2-2023, rejecting
the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, is correct and in
accordance with law.
*
10. We are of the opinion that when a plaint is filed under the
CC Act, with a prayer for an urgent interim relief, the commercial
court should examine the nature and the subject-matter of the suit,
the cause of action, and the prayer for interim relief. The prayer
for urgent interim relief should not be a disguise or mask to
wriggle out of and get over Section 12-A of the CC Act. The facts
and circumstances of the case have to be considered holistically
from the standpoint of the plaintiff. Non-grant of interim relief at
the ad interim stage, when the plaint is taken up for
registration/admission and examination, will not justify dismissal
of the commercial suit under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code; at
times, interim relief is granted after issuance of notice. Nor can the
suit be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, because the
interim relief, post the arguments, is denied on merits and on
examination of the three principles, namely : (i) prima facie case,
(ii) irreparable harm and injury, and (iii) balance of convenience.
The fact that the court issued notice and/or granted interim stay
may indicate that the court is inclined to entertain the plaint.
11. Having stated so, it is difficult to agree with the proposition
that the plaintiff has the absolute choice and right to paralyse
Section 12-A of the CC Act by making a prayer for urgent interim
relief. Camouflage and guise to bypass the statutory mandate of
pre-litigation mediation should be checked when deception and
falsity is apparent or established. The proposition that the
commercial courts do have a role, albeit a limited one, should be
accepted, otherwise it would be up to the plaintiff alone to decide
whether to resort to the procedure under Section 12-A of the CC
Act. An “absolute and unfettered right” approach is not justified if
the pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the CC Act is
mandatory , as held by this Court in Patil Automation .
12. The words “contemplate any urgent interim relief” in
Section 12-A(1) of the CC Act, with reference to the suit, should be
read as conferring power on the court to be satisfied. They suggest
that the suit must “contemplate”, which means the plaint,
documents and facts should show and indicate the need for an
urgent interim relief. This is the precise and limited exercise that
the commercial courts will undertake, the contours of which have
been explained in the earlier paragraph(s). This will be sufficient
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to keep in check and ensure that the legislative object/intent behind
the enactment of Section 12-A of the CC Act is not defeated. ”
45.2 The Court is, therefore, required to satisfy itself that the urgent
interim relief sought in the suit is not a mere camouflage to escape
Section 12-A. Several important markers, in this regard, are to be
found in paras 10 to 12 of Yamini Manohar , and it would be useful to
enumerate them, thus:
(i) In ascertaining whether the suit in fact contemplates
urgent interim relief, the Court should examine
(a) the nature and subject matter of the suit,
(b) the cause of action, and
(c) the prayer for interim relief.
The plaint, documents and facts should show and indicate the
need for urgent interim relief.
(ii) The prayer for urgent interim relief should not be a
disguise or mask to wriggle out of Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act. A mere prayer, absent any actual
urgent interim relief as sought, would not justify bypassing the
requirement of pre-institution mediation.
(iii) The facts of the case have to be considered holistically
from the standpoint of the plaintiff .
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(iv) At the same time, the plaintiff cannot be the absolute
arbiter of the issue of whether the suit contemplates any urgent
interim relief; else, by making a mere prayer, it would be
possible, in every case, to escape Section 12A.
(v) Non-grant of interim relief at the ad interim stage would
not justify dismissal of the suit under Order VII Rule 11 on the
ground that it does not contemplate any urgent interim relief.
(vi) Dismissal of the suit would also not be justified merely
on the ground that, even post arguments, interim relief, as
sought, is denied on merits.
(vii) The fact that the Court issued notice and/or granted
interim stay may indicate that the court is inclined to entertain
the plaint.
45.3 Para 5 of Yamini Manohar also confirms that Section 12A
does not envisage seeking leave of the Court, or grant of leave by the
Court. Nor does it require any application to be filed seeking
exemption from Section 12A. All that the plaint is required to contain
is a prayer for urgent interim relief. Once such a prayer is contained in
the plaint, it is for the Court to satisfy itself that the prayer is not a
camouflage, to fraudulently escape the rigour of Section 12A. The
Court is not expected, however, to enter into the merits of the prayer.
45.4 No specific guidelines, on the basis of which the Court is to
arrive at a conclusion as to whether the prayer for urgent interim relief
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is genuine, or a mere camouflage, are, however, to be found in the
decision in Yamini Manohar , and, therefore, it would ultimately be
for the best judgment of the Court, in its wisdom, to arrive at a
conclusion in that regard.
45.5 It is in the backdrop of this legal position that we have to
examine the merits of Mr. Sethi’s contention that, as
(i) the plaint, in the suit in the present case, claimed urgent
interim relief, and as
(ii) the impugned order has observed, in para 19, that it did
not “want to brush away the concern of the plaintiff that the
plaintiffs are obliged to maintain a certain amount in the escrow
account and that if the escrow account goes below that
minimum amount, the plaintiff may be exposed to civil and
criminal liability”,
both the requisite ingredients for exempting PayU from the need to
comply with Section 12A, i.e., (i) a prayer for urgent interim relief,
and (ii) satisfaction, by the Court, that the prayer was not one which
could be brushed aside, stand satisfied.
46. Dhanbad Fuels
46.1 This case, again, dealt with a money suit instituted by the Union
of India against Dhanbad Fuels, with no prayer for interim relief.
Dhanbad Fuels, in its written statement, disputed the maintainability
of the suit, as it was instituted without complying with the
requirement of pre-institution mediation envisaged by Section 12A of
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the Commercial Courts Act. This was followed by an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, seeking rejection of the
plaint. The learned Commercial Court dismissed the application and
appointed an advocate to mediate on the dispute. In appeal, the High
Court reversed the decision of the learned Commercial Court only to
the extent of the appointment of the advocate as mediator and, instead,
directed the Union of India to approach the District Legal Services
Authority to mediate on the dispute. Aggrieved thereby, Dhanbad
Fuels appealed to the Supreme Court.
46.2 Thus, this case, too, like Patil Automation , involved a suit
without any prayer for urgent interim relief.
46.3 The Supreme Court, in paras 40 to 48 of the report, relied on
Patil Automation to hold that Section 12A was mandatory and that,
even if no objection to the plaint on that ground is taken by the
defendant in the suit, the Court must suo motu take cognizance and
reject the plaint, irrespective of the stage of the suit.
46.4 The Supreme Court, however, noted the fact that the judgment
in Patil Automation itself made its application prospective from the
date of rendition of the judgment, i.e. 20 August 2022.
46.5 The Supreme Court, thereafter, echoed the observations in
Yamini Manohar , to the effect that no application for waiver from
complying with Section 12A was required to be filed and that it was
for the Court to satisfy itself that the prayer for urgent interim relief
was, if made, genuine. In other words, as expressed in para 52 of the
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report, “the test under Section 12A is not whether the prayer for the
urgent interim relief actually comes to be allowed or not, but whether
on an examination of the nature and the subject matter of the suit and
the cause of action, the prayer of urgent interim relief by the plaintiff
could be said to be contemplable when the matter is seen from the
standpoint of the plaintiff”. The Court was also required to be satisfied
that “the urgent interim relief must not be merely an unfounded
excuse by the plaintiff to bypass the mandatory requirement of
Section 12A”. Having noted this legal position, the Supreme Court, in
para 53, observed that, in the case before it, no urgent interim relief
was claimed in the suit.
46.6 The suit, in Dhanbad Fuels , had been instituted much prior to
20 August 2022 and was not, therefore, hit by the law declared in
Patil Automation . The Supreme Court observed, in para 66, that a
holistic reading of Patil Automation revealed that, “while Section
12A is held to be mandatory from the date of the inception of the
provision itself, the consequence of rejection for non-compliance is
only made applicable prospectively”.
46.7 The Supreme Court, in para 65 of the report, observed that the
question which for consideration before it was “whether the approach
adopted by the trial court and approved by the High Court in the
present case, in keeping the suit in abeyance, and sending the parties
to mediation … was the correct approach”. It proceeded to deal with
and answer this issue thus:
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“66. The answer to the aforesaid question requires us to
harmoniously construe the two observations made by this Court in
Patil Automation . The Court observed in para 104 of the said
decision that the declaration of the law by the Court would relate
back to the date of the amending Act. However, keeping in mind
practical considerations, the Court in para 113.1 observed that the
consequence of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 for not
complying with Section 12-A of the 2015 Act would only be
operative prospectively with effect from 20-8-2022. Thus, what is
clear from a joint reading of both these observations is that while
Section 12-A is held to be mandatory from the date of the inception
of the provision itself, the consequence of rejection for non-
compliance is only made applicable prospectively.
67. Thus, although suits which were instituted before the date
of the decision in Patil Automation may not be rejected under
Order 7 Rule 11 for not complying with Section 12-A of the 2015
Act, unless they fall within the exceptional categories described in
the said decision itself, yet this would not obviate the requirement
of giving the parties a chance to attempt to resolve the disputes
through mediation as envisaged under Section 12-A of the 2015
Act. One of the ways by which this can be achieved is by keeping
the suit in abeyance and referring the parties to a time-bound
mediation and only proceeding with the suit once the report of the
mediator is received. This approach would ensure that even if not
pre-institution, the parties at the very least get an opportunity to
resolve the disputes through mediation post the institution of the
suit. This in no way means that Section 12-A envisages post-
institution mediation. Post-institution mediation, while keeping the
suit in abeyance, is only envisaged for the limited category of cases
which are not covered by the prospective declaration made in Patil
Automation as the rejection of plaints under Order 7 Rule 11 has
been done away with in the interest of justice in such category of
cases. This approach also received the tacit approval of this Court
in Patil Automation , wherein while disapproving the reasoning
adopted in the order impugned therein, the Court refused to
interfere with the impugned order which had referred the parties to
mediation while keeping the suit in abeyance.
68. However, it is also important to clarify that in cases where
a suit instituted prior to 20-8-2022 has been decided, it would not
be of any avail to the parties to revisit the same on the ground of
mandatory compliance with Section 12-A of the 2015 Act.
However, wherever such a suit is pending before the trial court
and an objection is raised by the defendant for non-compliance
with Section 12-A of the 2015 Act, or any intent to settle the
dispute by mediation is exhibited by the parties, then it would be
permissible for the court to keep the suit in abeyance and refer the
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parties to time-bound mediation in accordance with the 2015 Act,
the PIMS Rules and the 2020 SOP .
69. Before we part with the matter, we also deem it appropriate
to address one of the main contentions of the appellant that having
regard to the fact that the suit is still at the nascent stage of filing of
written statement and no substantial progress has been made
therein, this Court must reject the plaint and direct the respondents
to institute a fresh suit after complying with the mandatory
requirement of Section 12-A. However, we do not find any force in
the aforesaid submission. We do not see how directing the
respondents to institute a fresh suit would be of any benefit to the
appellant.
70. We have discussed in detail that this Court in Patil
Automation made its decision prospectively applicable keeping in
mind the predicament of suits like the one at hand wherein owing
to a lack of clarity in law, Section 12-A of the 2015 Act could not
be complied with in certain cases. Directing the institution of a
fresh suit would only result into the forfeiture of the court fees
deposited by the respondents, which would only be an unnecessary
burden on the public exchequer. The approach adopted by the trial
court and the High Court in keeping the suit in abeyance and
directing the parties to approach the competent authority for
mediation commends more to us as it complies with a harmonious
reading of the decision in Patil Automation and prevents
unnecessary delays and burden on the public exchequer .”
(Emphasis supplied)
46.8 The Supreme Court proceeded, in conclusion, to summarise its
findings thus:
“71. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our
findings as under:
71.1. The decision of this Court in Patil Automation lays down
the correct position of law as regards Section 12-A of the 2015 Act
by holding it to be mandatory in nature.
71.2. As held in para 104 of the decision in Patil Automation ,
the declaration of the mandatory nature of Section 12-A of the
2015 Act relates back to the date of the amending Act.
71.3. As held in para 113.1 of the decision in Patil Automation ,
any suit which is instituted under the 2015 Act without complying
with Section 12-A is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11.
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However, this declaration applies prospectively to suits instituted
on or after 20-8-2022.
71.4. A suit which contemplates an urgent interim relief may be
filed under the 2015 Act without first resorting to mediation as
prescribed under Section 12-A of the 2015 Act.
71.5. Unlike Section 80(2)CPC, leave of the court is not required
to be obtained before filing a suit without complying with Section
12-A of the 2015 Act.
71.6. The test for “urgent interim relief” is if on an examination
of the nature and the subject-matter of the suit and the cause of
action, the prayer of urgent interim relief by the plaintiff could be
said to be contemplable when the matter is seen from the
standpoint of the plaintiff.
71.7. The Courts must also be wary of the fact that the urgent
interim relief must not be merely an unfounded excuse by the
plaintiff to bypass the mandatory requirement of Section 12-A of
the 2015 Act.
71.8. Even if the urgent interim relief ultimately comes to be
denied, the suit of the plaintiff may be proceeded with without
compliance with Section 12-A if the test for “urgent interim relief”
is satisfied notwithstanding the actual outcome on merits.
71.9. Suits instituted without complying with Section 12-A of the
2015 Act prior to 20-8-2022 cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule
11 on the ground of non-compliance with Section 12-A unless they
fall within the exceptions stipulated in paras 113.2 and 113.3 of the
decision in Patil Automation .
72. Thus, the answer to the question formulated by us whether
a suit filed without complying with Section 12-A of the 2015 Act
must be dismissed or be kept in abeyance with a direction to the
parties to explore mediation is as follows:
72.1. If the suit is instituted on or after the date of the decision in
Patil Automation i.e. 20-8-2022, without complying with Section
12-A of the 2015 Act, then it must meet with rejection under Order
7 Rule 11, either on an application by the defendant or suo motu by
the court.
72.2. If the suit was instituted prior to 20-8-2022 without
complying with Section 12-A of the 2015 Act, and the same does
not fall within one of the exceptional categories as explained in
para 55 of this judgment, then it would be open to the court to keep
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the suit in abeyance and direct the parties to explore the possibility
of mediation in accordance with the 2015 Act, the PIMS Rules and
the 2020 SOP.”
46.9 Dhanbad Fuels thus reiterates many of the principles already
enunciated in Patil Automation and Yamini Monohar . Also, as we
have already noticed, Dhanbad Fuels , too, dealt with a situation in
which no interim relief was sought in the suit. Moreover, the suit was
instituted before 20 August 2022 and, therefore, even if there was no
compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, the
plaint could not have been rejected on that ground, as the consequence
of failure to comply with Section 12A was made expressly
prospective after 20 August 2022.
46.10 Dhanbad Fuels is, however, of significance, for us, for two
important reasons.
46.11 Mr. Sibal placed extensive reliance on the following words,
contained in para 67 of the report in Dhanbad Fuels :
“This in no way means that Section 12-A envisages post-institution
mediation. Post-institution mediation, while keeping the suit in
abeyance, is only envisaged for the limited category of cases which
are not covered by the prospective declaration made in Patil
Automation as the rejection of plaints under Order 7 Rule 11 has
been done away with in the interest of justice in such category of
cases.”
Mr. Sibal’s contention is that, as the present suit has been instituted
after 20 August 2022, post-institution mediation was impermissible
and that, therefore, in directing post-institution mediation, the
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impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge falls foul of Dhanbad
Fuels .
46.12 To employ a time-worn cliché, the argument is attractive, but at
first blush. It is true that the suit, in the case before us, was instituted
th
after 20 August 2022 and that, therefore, the plaint would be liable to
be rejected if there is no compliance with Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act. It is also true that, if the afore-extracted
words from para 67 of Dhanbad Fuels are read in isolation, it would
appear that post-institution mediation could not have been directed in
the present suit, as it was instituted after 20 August 2022.
46.13 The argument is attractive, however, only when the afore-
extracted words are read in isolation, and without reference to the
context in which they have been made. Reading words in a judgment
in isolation, divorced from the context in which they are said, has
been disapproved by the Supreme Court in a plethora of decisions. In
44
Goan Real Estate & Construction Ltd v. Union of India , this
principle was thus stated:
“31. It is well settled that an order of a court must be construed
having regard to the text and context in which the same was
passed. For the said purpose, the judgment of this Court is required
to be read in its entirety. A judgment, it is well settled, cannot be
read as a statute. Construction of a judgment should be made in the
light of the factual matrix involved therein. What is more
important is to see the issues involved therein and the context
wherein the observations were made. Observation made in a
judgment, it is trite, should not be read in isolation and out of
context .”
(Emphasis supplied)
44
(2010) 5 SCC 388
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The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in a similar vein, ruled
45
thus, in P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd :
“ Precedent
144. While analysing different decisions rendered by this Court,
an attempt has been made to read the judgments as should be read
under the rule of precedents. A decision, it is trite, should not be
read as a statute.
145. A decision is an authority for the questions of law
determined by it. While applying the ratio, the court may not pick
out a word or a sentence from the judgment divorced from the
context in which the said question arose for consideration . A
judgment, as is well known, must be read in its entirety and the
observations made therein should receive consideration in the light
of the questions raised before it. [See Haryana Financial Corpn.
46 47
v. Jagdamba Oil Mills , Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi ,
Nalini Mahajan (Dr.) v. Director of Income Tax
48
(Investigation) , State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
49 50
Ltd. , A-One Granites v. State of U.P . and Bhavnagar
51
University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. ]
146. Although decisions are galore on this point, we may refer
to a recent one in State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S.
52
Mahamandal wherein this Court held:
“It is trite that any observation made during the course of
reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from
the context in which it was used.”
147. It is further well settled that a decision is not an authority
for the proposition which did not fall for its consideration.”
46.14 The words from para 67 of Dhanbad Fuels , on which Mr. Sibal
places reliance have, therefore, to be understood in context. Earlier in
para 67, the Supreme Court observes that, in the case of suits
45
(2004) 11 SCC 672
46
(2002) 3 SCC 496
47
(1996) 6 SCC 44
48
(2002) 257 ITR 123 (Del)
49
(1991) 4 SCC 139
50
(2001) 3 SCC 537
51
(2003) 2 SCC 111
52
(2004) 5 SCC 155
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instituted before 20 August 2022, the parties could be provided a
chance to attempt to resolve their disputes through mediation, as
envisaged by Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. One of the
ways of ensuring this, according to the Supreme Court, is by referring
the parties to mediation and keeping the suit in abeyance till a report
from mediation is obtained. It is by way of clarification that the
Supreme Court proceeds to observe that this course of action, as
suggested by the Supreme Court, would not mean that Section 12A
permits post-institution mediation. In other words, in a case in which
the ingredients of Section 12A are satisfied, i.e., in a case in which no
urgent interim relief is sought, the mediation exercise has necessarily
to precede, and not succeed, the institution of the suit. Post-institution
mediation is, therefore, proscribed only where the suit attracts Section
12A, and is therefore necessarily required to be preceded, prior to its
institution, by an attempt at pre-institution mediation.
46.15 Mr. Sibal’s reliance on the afore-extracted words from para 67
of Dhanbad Fuels , to contend that there is an absolute proscription on
post-institution mediation is, therefore, not acceptable, as it reads
these words out of the context in which they were employed.
46.16 Which takes us to the second reason as to why the decision in
Dhnabad Fuels is significant for us.
46.17 As we have already understood, the proscription on post-
institution mediation would not, therefore, apply in a case in which
pre-institution mediation is not mandatory in the facts of the case, as
urgent interim relief is contemplated. Such a case would be, legally,
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on par with a case in which the suit itself was instituted prior to 20
August 2022 as, even in such a case, the suit would not be fatally
imperilled for failure to comply with the requirement of pre-institution
mediation.
46.18 The Supreme Court has, in Dhanbad Fuels , approved the
practice of referring the parties to mediation and keeping the progress
of the suit in abeyance, pending the outcome of mediation, where
failure to resort to pre-institution mediation does not defeat the suit,
as it was instituted prior to 20 August 2022. By extrapolation, it would
be equally permissible to refer the parties to mediation and keep the
suit in abeyance in the interregnum, where urgent interim relief is
sought in the suit, so that the requirement of pre-institution mediation,
envisaged in Section 12A, is obviated. In either case, non-compliance
with Section 12A is not fatal to the suit.
46.19 Dhanbad Fuels is, therefore, to that extent dispositive not only
of the objection of Mr. Sibal based on failure, on the part of PayU, to
resort to pre-institution mediation, but also of the submission that the
learned Single Judge could not have directed maintenance of status
quo pending the outcome of mediation.
47. Novenco
47.1 This was a case involving intellectual property rights. Novenco
53
Building and Industry A/S , a manufacturer of industrial fans under
the brand “Novenco ZerAx” alleged that the first respondent Xero
53
"Novenco" hereinafter
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54
Energy Engineering Solutions Pvt Ltd had incorporated the second
55
respondent Aeronaut Fans Industry Pvt Ltd , for manufacture and
sale of identical fans with deceptively similar name and appearance.
Novenco, therefore, filed a suit before the High Court, alleging patent
and design infringement by Xero and Aeronaut. An application under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC was also filed, seeking an
interim injunction, along with a separate application under Section
151 of the CPC, seeking exemption from pre-institution mediation.
Xero, in response, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that no urgency
was involved and that failure to resort to pre-institution mediation, as
required by Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, was fatal to
the suit. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the
application under Order VII Rule 11, inter alia agreeing with Xero
that the failure to resort to pre-institution mediation was fatal to the
suit. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the learned
Single Judge. Novenco appealed to the Supreme Court.
47.2 The Supreme Court culled out, at the outset, the following
principles as emanating from Patil Automation , Yamini Monohar
and Dhanbad Fuels :
“19.1. Section 12-A mandatorily requires pre-institution
mediation for commercial suits, non-compliance of which would
ordinarily render the plaint institutionally defective.
19.2. A plaintiff can be exempted from the requirement of
Section 12-A only when the plaint and the documents attached
with it clearly show a real need for urgent interim intervention . A
54
“Xero” hereinafter
55
“Aeronaut” hereinafter
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wholesome reading of the plaint and the material annexed to the
plaint ought to disclose the need for urgent relief.
19.3. The court must look at the plaint, pleadings and supporting
documents to decide whether urgent interim relief is genuinely
contemplated. The court may also look for immediacy of the peril,
irreparable harm, risk of losing rights/assets, statutory timelines,
perishable subject-matter, or where delay would render eventual
relief ineffective .
19.4. A pro forma or anticipatory prayer for urgent relief used as
a device to skip mediation will be ignored and the court can
require the parties to comply with Section 12-A of the Act.
19.5. The court is not concerned with the merits of the urgent
relief, but if the relief sought seems to be plausibly urgent from the
standpoint of the plaintiff the court can dispense with the
requirement under Section 12-A of the Act .”
(Emphasis supplied)
The standard, therefore, is one of plausible urgency from the
standpoint of the plaintiff . The merits of the prayer for interim relief
are irrelevant at this stage.
47.3 The Court then proceeded to apply the above principles, to the
facts before it, thus:
“ Analysis
20. Thus, the question whether a suit ‘contemplates any urgent
interim relief’ needs to be examined on the touchstone of the
aforementioned criteria. The issue which arises for consideration in
this appeal is whether a suit alleging continuing infringement of
patent and design rights, accompanied by a prayer for interim
injunction, can be said to contemplate urgent relief within the
meaning of Section 12-A of the Act, notwithstanding certain delay
in its institution.
21. The subject matter of the present action is continuing
infringement of intellectual property. Each act of manufacture,
sale, or offer for sale of the infringing product constitutes a fresh
wrong and recurring cause of action. It is well-settled in law that
mere delay in bringing an action does not legalise an infringement
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and the same cannot defeat the right of the proprietor to seek
injunctive relief against the dishonest user Midas Hygiene
56
Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia . The appellant has pleaded
that Xero Energy, its former distributor, has dishonestly
appropriated its proprietary designs and patents to manufacture and
market identical fans under deceptively similar name. The
accompanying material demonstrates that such infringing activity
is continuing and causing immediate and irreparable harm to the
appellant's business reputation, goodwill and proprietary rights.
22. From the standpoint of the appellant, each day of
continuing infringement aggravates injury to its intellectual
property and erodes its market standing. The urgency, therefore, is
inherent in the nature of the wrong and does not lie in the age of
the cause but in the persistence of the peril. The court cannot be
unmindful of the fact that intellectual property disputes are not
confined to the private realm. When imitation masquerades as
innovation, it sows confusion among consumers, taints the
marketplace and diminishes faith in the sanctity of the trade. The
public interest, therefore, becomes the moral axis upon which the
urgency turns. Therefore, the public interest element, need to
prevent confusion in the market and to protect consumers from
deception further imparts a colour of immediacy to the reliefs
sought.
23. The appellant's prayer for injunction cannot be
characterised as mere camouflage to evade mediation. It is a real
grievance founded on the continuing nature of infringement and
irreparable prejudice likely to be caused by the delay. The court
must look beyond time lag and evaluate the substance of the plea
for interim protection. The insistence of pre-institution mediation
in a situation of ongoing infringement, in effect, would render the
plaintiff remediless allowing the infringer to continue to profit
under the protection of procedural formality. Section 12-A of the
Act was not intended to achieve such kind of anomalous result.
24. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of
the High Court erred in construing the test for urgent relief
enumerated in Section 12-A of the Act, inasmuch as the courts
have proceeded to examine the entitlement of the appellant to
urgent relief based on the merits of the case rather than looking at
the urgency as is evident from the plaint and the documents
annexed thereto from the standpoint of the plaintiff. The High
Court has proceeded on the premise that lapse of time between the
appellant's discovery of infringement and filing of suit negated the
element of urgency. Such an approach, in our considered view, is
56
(2004) 3 SCC 90
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contrary to the principles laid down by the decisions of this Court.
The High Court has also failed to take into account that the present
action is one of the continuous infringement of intellectual
property.”
48. On a conjoint appreciation of the law declared in these
decisions, therefore, we are unable to sustain Mr. Sibal’s contention
that the impugned judgment falls foul of Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act. The learned Single Judge has applied Section
12A. As has been correctly contended by Mr. Sethi, and as also flows
from the decision in Yamini Monohar , a plaintiff facially satisfies
Section 12A if the plaint seeks urgent interim relief. No doubt, the
plaintiff cannot be permitted the last word in this regard, and the
Court is required to satisfy itself that the plea for interim relief is not
a mere façade or a sham, so as to evade the requirement of pre-
institution mediation. In the present case, we are convinced that the
impugned judgment satisfies this requirement as well, as the learned
Single Judge has, in para 19, noted the ground on which the plaintiff
has pleaded existence of urgent interim relief, and has categorically
stated that it cannot be brushed aside.
49. Once urgent interim relief has been sought in the plaint, and
the learned Single Judge has held that the prayer cannot be brushed
aside, thereby indicating that it is not a façade or a camouflage to
evade the requirement of pre-institution mediation, Section 12A
stands worked out.
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50. We, therefore, reject Mr. Sibal’s contention that the impugned
judgment violates the mandate of Section 12A of the Commercial
Courts Act.
D.II Re. sustainability of interim direction in para 19 of impugned
judgment vis-à-vis conditions for grant of interim injunction
51. This objection of Mr. Sibal, in fact, stands decided against him
by the decision in Dhanbad Fuels . In Dhanbad Fuels , the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff Union of India was not required to attempt
pre-institution mediation under Section 12A as the suit had been
instituted prior to 20 April 2022. Having thus held that the
requirement of pre-institution mediation would not apply, the
Supreme Court endorsed – in fact, commended – the approach of the
High Court in referring the dispute to mediation and keeping the suit
in abeyance pending, till the outcome of mediation. Clearly, the
reference to mediation would not be relatable, in such a case, to
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.
52. The situation before us is qualitatively the same. Before us, too,
PayU is not required to attempt pre-institution mediation, as already
held by us, as the suit prayed for urgent ad interim relief and the
prayer was found, by the learned Single Judge in para 19 of the
impugned judgment, to be deserving of consideration. Once the
requirement of pre-institution mediation thus stood eschewed, the
learned Single Judge has, in the present case, done precisely what the
Supreme Court, in para 67 of Dhanbad Fuels , advocated, by referring
the issue to mediation by the RBI and directing status quo , with
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respect to any further deductions from the Escrow account of PayU, in
the interregnum.
53. As in the case of Dhanbad Fuels , the reference to mediation, in
para 19 of the impugned order, cannot be said to be relatable to
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.
54. Ergo, the objection that the RBI is not one of the mediators
envisaged by the 2018 Rules, which apply only to mediation under
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, is also not sustainable in
law.
55. Nor has the direction for mediation, by the RBI been issued
under Section 24 of the PSSA. Mr. Sibal’s contention that the RBI,
under Section 24, can only act as an adjudicator, and not as a mediator
has, therefore, no substance. The learned Single Judge has merely
taken the aid of Section 24, as is apparent from the opening words of
para 21 of the impugned order, even while clarifying, towards the
conclusion of para 22, that the RBI was only “to act as a mediator and
facilitator and not as a dispute resolution body as contemplated under
Section 24 of the PSS Act ”.
56. The impugned order cannot, therefore, be set to infract Section
24 of the PSSA, as it has not called upon the RBI to exercise any
powers thereunder. The learned Single Judge was empowered,
applying the law declared in Dhanbad Fuels , to refer the dispute to
mediation. The inter se communications between the parties, to which
Mr. Sethi drew our attention, clearly evince consent, even if tacit, to
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reference of the dispute to the RBI. The RBI was not, therefore, an
authority to the reference of the dispute to whom any of the parties
had serious objection, as would have constrained the learned Single
Judge in his view.
57. The mediation itself was not in terms of Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act. This, again, is clear from the opening words
of para 18 of the impugned order. The learned Single Judge has
correctly observed, in para 18, that pre-institution mediation was
required to be resorted to, prior to the institution of the suit, and that a
suit instituted without complying therewith was liable to be dismissed
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. We have already held that, in the
present case, the facts of the case, as well as the observations of the
learned Single Judge in the impugned order themselves, made out a
case for dispensing with the requirement of pre-institution mediation.
58. Once pre-institution mediation was not required to be
undertaken, the observation of the learned Single Judge, in para 18,
that there was no bar to “the Court from referring the parties to
mediation even after institution of the Suit” becomes unexceptionable,
especially in view of para 67 of Dhanbad Fuels .
59. In so far as the direction to maintain status quo , with respect to
further debits from the Escrow account of PayU, pending mediation,
is concerned, this direction has clearly been issued only so that the
mediation proceedings are not prejudiced. This is nothing but a
natural sequitur to the decision to refer the matter to mediation by the
RBI.
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60. If status quo regarding the subject matter of mediation is not
maintained while the mediation proceedings are underway, the entire
reference to mediation may become futile. In such a case, the
considerations of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable loss would have to be applied qua the decision to refer the
dispute to mediation, and not with respect to the merits of the main lis
between the parties.
61. In Novenco , though this aspect did not arise for consideration at
the stage of final hearing and does not, therefore, find elucidation in
the final judgment rendered by the Supreme Court, it does find some
reflection in the initial order passed by the Supreme Court on 7
February 2025, issuing notice, which read:
“1. Issue notice, returnable in the week commencing 24.03.2025.
2. Notice will be served by all modes, including dasti.
3. The question that requires consideration by this Court is
whether, due to non-compliance with Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a suit should be dismissed under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, or whether it
should be kept in abeyance, directing the parties to first explore
the possibility of settlement by instituting mediation.
4. In the meanwhile, the petitioner, Novenco Building and
Industry A/S, will move a letter before the Mediation Centre
attached to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, seeking
appointment of a mediator, to explore the possibility of settlement
and request the opposite side to join such mediation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
At the very least, it can be said that there is a tentative expression of
opinion, even in para 3 of this order, that, where the parties are
directed to explore resolution of the dispute by mediation, proceedings
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in the suit may have to be kept in abeyance. Of course, we are aware
that this cannot constitute declaration of the law by the Supreme Court
within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
62. We may also observe, in this context, that, at least in two orders
passed by the Supreme Court in appeals arising out of orders passed
by this Court in intellectual property matters, the Supreme Court has,
while referring the dispute between the parties to mediation, stayed
57
the operation of the orders passed by this Court. In fact, it would
almost appear to be axiomatic that status quo should be maintained by
the parties when a dispute is referred to mediation, as any change in
their inter se position has the propensity to derail the mediation itself.
In an ecosystem in which the attempt, at every stage, is to foster and
promote mediation as the most acceptable mode of dispute resolution,
as it culminates in rapprochement rather than rancour, it becomes
imperative to ensure that attempts at mediation are not frustrated or
defeated by alteration of the status quo in the meanwhile.
63. Besides, even on merits, the learned Single Judge has observed,
in para 19 of the impugned order, that, if the amount in the Escrow
account of PayU were to fall below a certain limit, PayU would be
exposed to civil and criminal liability. This satisfies the requirements
of consideration of a prima facie case and irreparable loss, even
regarding the substantive dispute between the parties. The learned
Single Judge has also maintained the balance of convenience by
clarifying, in paras 25, 27 and 30 of the impugned order, that the
57
Order dated 25 March 2026 in SLP (C) 9593/2026 [Thukral Mechanical Works v. P.M. Diesels Pvt
Ltd] and order dated 19 January 2026 in SLP (C) 615/2026 [Karim Hotels Pvt Ltd v. Mohammad Talha]
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course of action which he was adopting would ensure that future
transactions by the parties were not hampered, as all questions in that
regard were expressly left open.
64. The course of action adopted by the learned Single Judge is, in
fact, eminently wholesome. Litigation, especially commercial
58
litigation, tends to be red in tooth and claw . Acrimony abounds. If,
therefore, instead of setting in motion an expensive, adversarial and
acrimonious litigation, the learned Single Judge decided it appropriate
to attempt a resolution of the entire dispute through the good offices
of the RBI, which was, after all, operating the entire regime in which
the dispute had arisen, the attempt, we feel, deserves commendation,
rather than condemnation.
65. We, therefore, are not inclined to countenance Mr. Sibal’s
contention that the direction to maintain status quo regarding the
claims of the Acquiring Banks against PayU, pending mediation of
the dispute, suffers from any such illegality or infirmity as would
justify interference in appeal.
D.III Apropos other contentions advanced by Mr. Sibal
66. Summons, submits Mr. Sibal, are issued only in validly
instituted suits. The learned Single Judge has yet to issue summons in
the suit, thereby indicating that he was not prima facie satisfied that
the suit was validly instituted. Without arriving at such a prima facie
58
Refer Lord Alfred Tennyson’s In Memoriam A.H.H. (1856)
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satisfaction, Mr. Sibal submits that the learned Single Judge could not
have granted any interlocutory relief.
67. This submission clearly fails to understand what exactly the
learned Single Judge has done, as he has merely attempted a
resolution of the dispute through mediation by the RBI so that a
quietus could be achieved to the controversy. Mediation can be
resorted to at any stage, prior to or after the institution of the suit.
There is no embargo to referring the dispute to mediation before
issuing summons in the suit. The interim status quo that has been
granted was merely a stepping aid of facilitating mediation, so that the
mediation would not be rendered an empty exercise in futility. The
submission of Mr. Sibal, though it is facially logical, would not,
therefore, come to his aid in the present case.
68. On the aspect of whether, without pronouncing on
maintainability, an interim direction such as that contained in para 26
of the impugned order, could have been passed, both sides rely on
para 50 of Asma Lateef , which reads thus:
“50. Although not directly arising in the present case, we also
wish to observe that the question of jurisdiction would assume
importance even at the stage a court considers the question of grant
of interim relief. Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a
civil court and the party to be affected by grant of such relief, or
any other party to the suit, raises a point of maintainability thereof
or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis that
interim relief should not be granted, grant of relief in whatever
form, if at all, ought to be preceded by formation and recording of
at least a prima facie satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or
that it is not barred by law. Such a satisfaction resting on
appreciation of the averments in the plaint, the application for
interim relief and the written objection thereto, as well as the
relevant law that is cited in support of the objection, would be a
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part of the court's reasoning of a prima facie case having been set
up for interim relief, that the balance of convenience is in favour of
the grant and non-grant would cause irreparable harm and
prejudice. It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from
recording its prima facie satisfaction on the question of
maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro tem on the
assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided
as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2CPC. That could
amount to an improper exercise of power. If the court is of the
opinion at the stage of hearing the application for interim relief that
the suit is barred by law or is otherwise not maintainable, it cannot
dismiss it without framing a preliminary issue after the written
statement is filed but can most certainly assign such opinion for
refusing interim relief. However, if an extraordinary situation
arises where it could take time to decide the point of
maintainability of the suit and non-grant of protection pro tem
pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the
court may proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner
indicated above justifying the course of action it adopts. In other
words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid
irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming
the relief and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered
infructuous by reason of non-interference by the court.”
Mr. Sibal relies on the initial part of the afore-extracted para 50,
submitting that the Supreme Court has disapproved granting interim
or pro tem directions without adjudicating on the issue of
maintainability. Mr. Sethi submits, on the other hand, that the
concluding part of para 50 clarifies that, in an exceptional case,
interim directions may be passed even before pronouncing on the
aspect of maintainability.
69. This controversy is largely academic, in view of our finding
that the learned Single Judge has effectively dealt with the aspect of
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, which is the main ground
on which Visa contests the maintainability of the suit. We have
observed that, once urgent interim relief purports to be sought in the
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plaint, the plaintiff has effectively discharged his duty under Section
12A, and would be entitled to maintain the suit without having to
resort to pre-institution mediation, subject to the Court satisfying itself
that the plea of urgent interim relief is not a mere camouflage or ruse
to escape Section 12A. In the present case, PayU had sought interim
relief. The learned Single Judge has recorded the reason for the
interim relief having been claimed by PayU to be urgent and has
further observed that the concern of PayU could not be brushed aside.
That, as we have held, suffices to satisfy Section 12A, so that the
aspect of whether the interlocutory direction contained in para 26 of
the impugned order could have been issued without a positive
decision on maintainability, becomes academic.
70. Mr. Sibal has further sought to contend that there is an inherent
inconsistency in the impugned order. He submits that, if the case
required pre-institution mediation to be undertaken, the learned Single
Judge could not have granted any interim relief, pending such
mediation. If, on the other hand, a case for urgent interim relief was
found to exist, the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the
application seeking exemption from pre-institution mediation under
Section 12A. In granting interim relief without adjudicating on the
application, Mr. Sibal submits that the impugned order suffers from a
serious jurisdictional flaw.
71. The basic fallacy in this argument, to our mind, is the
presumption that an application for exemption from pre-institution
mediation is required to be filed, and allowed, before a suit, instituted
without pre-institution mediation, is allowed to proceed. That this is
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not the legal position has been conclusively held in Patil Automation
as well as Yamini Manohar . No such application is required to be
filed. All that the plaintiff is to do is to plead and seek urgent interim
relief in the plaint. It is for the Court, thereafter, to satisfy itself that
the urgent interim relief is not a mere camouflage to avoid compliance
with Section 12A. For this purpose, the Court has only to satisfy itself
that a plausible case for seeking interim relief is made out. The merits
of the prayer are irrelevant. By this standard, as we have already held,
the impugned order has noted the prayer for interim relief contained in
the plaint instituted by PayU, the ground on which it was pleaded as
urgent, and has also observed that the prayer could not be brushed
aside. These observations and findings, cumulatively, satisfy the
standard required for permitting the suit to be instituted without
requiring pre-institution mediation. There is, therefore, no such
jurisdictional flaw, in the impugned order, as Mr. Sibal would seek to
contend.
72. Inasmuch as the mediation has not been directed in terms of
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, the objection, of Mr.
Sibal, to the RBI being asked to mediate on the issue, has necessarily
to be rejected.
D.IV Scope of interference
73. Though we have found the order of the learned Single Judge to
be legally sustainable, we deem it appropriate, before concluding this
judgment, to add a postscript with respect to the scope of interference
in the present appeal.
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74. Appeals against interlocutory orders in commercial matters are
appeals on principle. The appellate Court does not substitute its own
subjective view for the view of the learned Commercial Court. It is
only if the learned Commercial Court is found to have seriously erred
on principle that the Court would interfere. In all such cases, the Court
has also to bear in mind the constitutional imperative to ensure that
commercial disputes achieve a speedy resolution. The scope of
interference has thus been classically delineated in Wander Ltd v.
Antox (India) Pvt Ltd :
“14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion
is said to be an appeal on principle . Appellate court will not
reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from
the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court
was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would
normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a
contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the
trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the
appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify
interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion . After
referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
59
(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph :
“... These principles are well established, but as has been
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v.
60
Jhanaton ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of
appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of
his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that
59
AIR 1960 SC 1156
60
1942 AC 130
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arises is due only to the application of well settled
principles in an individual case’.”
75. Within these limited peripheries, we are not convinced that any
case for interference with the impugned order of the learned Single
Judge is made out.
E. Conclusion
76. The appeal is therefore dismissed with no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA, J.
November 17, 2026/ dsn
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