Rukhmani Keshwani vs Raju Agarbatti Works & Anr.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 19.03.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 01.07.2026
+ FAO (COMM) 99/2024, CM APPL. 30880/2024
RUKHMANI KESHWANI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Satish Kumar, Mr. Anil
Kumar Sahu, Mr. Roshan Kumar and Mr.
Suva Batabyal, Advs.
versus
RAJU AGARBATTI WORKS & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Yunus Saifi, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
% 01.07.2026
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA J.
FACTUAL MATRIX
1. The present appeal assails the impugned judgment dated
19.03.2024 passed by the District Judge (Commercial Court-03) 03),
1
Shahdara, Karkardooma Court, Delhi in CS (Comm.) No. 59/2022,
whereby the plaint filed by the plaintiff was returned under Order VII
2
Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the interim orders granted in
favour of the plaintiff were vacated.
1
“Trial Court/ District Judge” hereinafter
2
“CPC” hereinafter
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2. For the purpose of the present appeal, the parties shall continue
to be referred to in accordance with their array before the learned Trial
Court, i.e., the appellant shall be referred to as the ‘Plaintiff’ and the
respondents as the ‘Defendants
BRIEF FACTS
3. The plaintiff instituted the suit under Sections 134 and 135 of the
3
Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Sections 51 and 55 of the Copyright
4
Act, 1957 , seeking permanent injunction, passing off, infringement of
trademark and copyright, and other consequential reliefs in respect of
the trademark and trade dress “RADHEY KRISHNA”, which was
alleged to be the registered trademark and artistic work of the plaintiff.
4. It was the case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court that she was
carrying on business under the name and style of “Vishwas Agarbatti
Store”, engaged in the manufacture and trade of agarbattis and allied
goods.
5. The plaintiff claimed prior adoption of the mark and trade dress
“RADHEY KRISHNA” since 1995 and continuous use thereof, and
alleged that the defendants had adopted deceptively similar marks and
packaging under the names “Lucky Radha Krishna” and “Harsh Radha
Krishna” in relation to identical goods.
3
“Trade Marks Act” hereinafter
4
“Copyright Act” hereinafter
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6. Upon institution of the suit, the plaintiff filed an application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, seeking interim protection
against the defendants. Vide order dated 29.01.2022, the Trial Court
granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff,
restrained the defendants from using the impugned marks and trade
dress during the pendency of the proceedings.
7. Upon appearing in the proceedings, the defendants challenged
the maintainability of the suit on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction of the Shahdara Court and filed an application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC.
8. The defendants inter alia contended before the Trial Court that
both parties were carrying on business from Ajmer, Rajasthan, and that
no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Delhi Court. They further disputed the allegations pertaining to
sale and solicitation of goods within Delhi.
9. The plaintiff, however, maintained that the defendants were
selling, soliciting, and supplying the impugned goods within Delhi,
including Shahdara and adjoining markets, and conducting online
commercial activities through interactive websites and e-commerce
platforms accessible within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
10. Vide order dated 28.10.2022, the Trial Court allowed the
application filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and
rejected the plaint on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
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11. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff filed FAO(COMM)
188/2022 before this Court. This Court vide order dated 24.05.2023, set
aside the order of the Trial Court and restored the suit, observing that
the issue of territorial jurisdiction required adjudication upon
consideration of pleadings and evidence.
12. Pursuant to restoration of the suit, after hearing the parties and
considering the material placed on record, the Trial Court, vide
judgment dated 19.03.2024, held that the Court lacked territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the suit and accordingly directed return of the
plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for presentation before the
competent court. The Trial Court further vacated the interim orders in
favour of the plaintiff and imposed costs upon them.
13. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment dated 19.03.2024, the
plaintiff has preferred the present appeal before this Court.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
14. The Trial Court, after framing issues, while deciding Issue No.1
pertaining to territorial jurisdiction, analysed the scope and applicability
of Section 20 CPC, Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of
the Trade Marks Act and held that these provisions are to be construed
harmoniously and are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive.
15. The Trial Court observed that although the aforesaid statutory
provisions confer an additional forum for instituting the suit, they must
be interpreted harmoniously with Section 20 of the CPC, which governs
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territorial jurisdiction generally.
16. In particular, the Trial Court examined Section 20(c) CPC, which
enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where the cause of action wholly or
in part arises, and considered its applicability to the facts of the present
case.
17. The Trial Court held that at the stage of final adjudication, the
principle under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or the ‘Doctrine of Demurrer ’
ceases to apply, and the issue of territorial jurisdiction must thereafter
be examined ,based on the pleadings, evidence led by the parties, and
the existence of infringement of trademark or copyright or violation of
rights within the jurisdiction.
18. The Trial Court placed extensive reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay
5
Dalia & Ors (‘IPRS’ hereinafter), which addressed issues of territorial
jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes.
19. The Trial Court further interpreted the IPRS(supra) judgment to
mean that where the plaintiff carries on business at the place where the
substantial cause of action has arisen, the plaintiff cannot invoke
jurisdiction of another forum merely on the basis of ancillary,
incidental, or limited business activity in such forum.
20. According to the Trial Court, the Supreme Court in IPRS (supra)
5
(2015) 10 Supreme Court Cases 161
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had specifically cautioned against “forum shopping”, whereby a
plaintiff attempts to drag defendants to distant jurisdictions despite both
parties conducting business at the place where the dispute substantially
arose.
21. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the
Trial Court observed that both the plaintiff and the defendants
admittedly carried on business from Ajmer, Rajasthan, and the search
and seizure proceedings pursuant to the appointment of a Local
Commissioner were conducted entirely in Ajmer. On that basis, the
Trial Court concluded that Ajmer constituted the real and substantial
situs of the dispute, and therefore, the Shahdara Court in Delhi lacked
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
22. The Trial Court, applying the principles laid down in
IPRS (supra), held that the plaintiff could not invoke the jurisdiction of
the Delhi Court merely on the ground that the defendants’ alleged India
Mart listings or online activities were accessible in Delhi. The Court
observed that mere accessibility of an interactive website, in the
absence of cogent evidence demonstrating purposeful commercial
activity or actual infringing sales within Delhi, would not confer
territorial jurisdiction.
23. The Trial Court specifically referred to paragraph 24 of the
IPRS (supra) judgment, interpreting it as discouraging the institution of
proceedings in distant jurisdictions based on a “part cause of action”,
such as online accessibility, when the parties admittedly reside and
conduct business at another common place where the dispute
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substantially arose. On this reasoning, the Trial Court concluded that
continuation of the suit before the Delhi Court would be contrary to the
principles laid down in IPRS(supra).
24. The Trial Court also relied upon the judgments in Ultra Home
6
Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey & Ors . and
7
Dodha House v. S K Maingi , observing that the mere availability or
sale of goods in a particular area would not, by itself, constitute carrying
on business within that jurisdiction.
25. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff had failed to place
sufficient and cogent material on record to establish that the defendants
were carrying out actual infringing commercial activities within the
territorial jurisdiction of Shahdara District Courts, Delhi.
26. It was further observed that the plaintiff had not produced any
material demonstrating that the defendants had an online presence or
were selling or displaying goods within Delhi.
27. The Court additionally observed that the plaintiff’s own online
sales through “Instamojo” could not, by themselves, confer territorial
jurisdiction upon the Delhi Court for adjudication of the present dispute.
The Trial Court concluded that the documents relied upon by the
plaintiff did not sufficiently establish that any substantial or integral
part of the cause of action had arisen within Shahdara District, Delhi.
6
227 (2016) DLT 320 (DB)
7
(2006) 9 SCC 41; 2005 SCC OnLine SC 1763
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28. Accordingly, the Trial Court held that no substantial or integral
part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Shahdara District Courts, Delhi, and that the plaintiff had failed
to establish territorial jurisdiction before the said Court.
29. Consequently, the Trial Court directed return of the plaint under
Order VII Rule 10 CPC, vacated the interim orders earlier operating in
favour of the plaintiff, and imposed costs of Rs 75,000/- upon the
plaintiff, apportioned equally (50% each) between the defendants,
while disposing of the suit proceedings.
PROCEEDINDS BEFORE THIS COURT
SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANT/ PLAINTIFF
30. Mr. Satish Kumar learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff, submitted that the Trial Court has territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the suit, as the defendants are carrying on the impugned
business and infringing the plaintiff’s statutory rights through e-
commerce platforms, including www.indiamart.com , which is easily
accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
31. It was further submitted that the plaintiff’s goods bearing the
trademark/label “RADHEY KRISHNA” are also sold through the
interactive website www.instamojo.com , which is likewise accessible
within the jurisdiction of this Court.
32. The plaintiff contended that the Trial Court erred in interpreting
the IPRS(supra) judgment, as Sections 134 of the Trade Marks Act and
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Section 62 of the Copyright Act, can be invoked independently of
Section 20 of CPC, and such statutory provisions do not dilute or negate
the principles of Section 20 (c) of CPC.
33. It was further submitted that Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks
Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act operate in addition to, and
not in exclusion of, Section 20 of CPC. In the present case, the plaintiff
has made out a case that a part cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
34. The learned Counsel drew attention to the cross-examination of
DW-1 dated 27.10.2023, wherein the witness admitted that he became
aware of the display of goods on the India Mart website only after
institution of the plaint, that no complaint had been lodged with India
Mart regarding such display, and further affirmed the address and GST
number reflected therein.
35. It was further submitted that Trial Court misinterpreted Section
20(c) of CPC, which operates independently of clauses (a) and (b). It
was contended that the defendants are individuals and not corporations,
and therefore the defence available to a corporation under the
Explanation to Section 20 of CPC is not applicable. Consequently, the
plaintiff’s right to institute a suit at a place where the cause of action
has arisen is not extinguished, even if neither party resides within such
jurisdiction.
36. Reliance was placed upon the judgments in Kohinoor Seed
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8
Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd ., Raju Kumar
9
V. Vinod Shah , and World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. V. M/s
10
Reshma Collection & Ors ( WWE hereinafter) .
37. The learned Counsel ultimately submitted that the plaintiff and
the defendants advertise, sell, and promote their respective goods
through online e-commerce platforms that are accessible within the
jurisdiction of this Court, and therefore this Court possesses territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 134 of the Trade Marks
Act, Section 62 of the Copyright Act, and Section 20(c) of CPC.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS/ DEFENDANTS
38. Mr. Yunus Saifi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
defendants, submitted that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed,
as no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court.
39. It was further submitted that the trademark registration held by
the plaintiff was granted subject to restrictions confined to the State of
Rajasthan alone.
40. The learned Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff was
carrying on business in Rajasthan, including maintaining its registered
office within the State of Rajasthan, and that no act of infringement or
8
2025:DHC:10789-DB
9
2026:DHC:351-DB
10
2014 (60) PTC 452 (DB)
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passing off had occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial
Court in Delhi.
41. It was submitted that the plaintiff had failed to establish territorial
jurisdiction before the Trial Court, and that “carrying on business” is a
sine qua non for attracting territorial jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of
the Copyright Act and Section 124(2) of the Trade Marks Act, .
42. The learned Counsel further contended that the Trial Court had
rightly followed the principles law laid down in IPRS(supra), Dodha
11
House(Supra) and Dabur India Ltd. v K R Industries , which
according to the defendants’ restrict the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction to the place where the substantial cause of action has arisen .
43. In conclusion, it was submitted that the mere existence of an
interactive website accessible from any location cannot, by itself, confer
territorial jurisdiction. The present appeal, according to the defendants,
is an attempt at forum shopping and is therefore liable to be dismissed.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
44. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by the parties
and examined the pleadings and documentary material on record, we
are of the considered view that the learned District Judge committed a
manifest error in declining the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at
Delhi.
11
2008 (10) SCC 595
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45. The principal premise relied upon by the learned District Judge
was that both the parties carried on business from the State of Rajasthan,
and therefore, Rajasthan constituted the “natural forum” for institution
of the proceedings. The Court further held that mere accessibility of an
online platform or internet listing would not, by itself, confer territorial
jurisdiction upon the Courts at Delhi. While the said proposition is, in
abstract, a correct statement of law, its application to the peculiar facts
of the present case reflects an unduly narrow and restrictive
appreciation of the evolving principles governing territorial jurisdiction
in the context of contemporary digital commerce and online
commercial solicitation.
46. At the outset, it is necessary to notice Section 134 of the Trade
Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act, which are special
jurisdiction conferring provisions enacted to afford an additional forum
to the proprietor of intellectual property rights. The non-obstante clause
contained therein unmistakably reflects the legislative intent to relax the
rigors of Section 20 of CPC.
47. In IPRS (supra) , the Supreme Court, while interpreting the scope
of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright
Act, did not nullify or dilute the additional forum created by the
legislature. The Court merely cautioned against an interpretation that
would encourage abuse of process, or permit a plaintiff to invoke a
wholly unconnected and artificial forum solely on the basis of the
existence of a subordinate office. The ratio of the judgment cannot be
expanded beyond the specific mischief it sought to be remedy.
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48. The doctrine enunciated in IPRS (supra) is principally attracted
where the chosen forum bears no real nexus to the underlying cause of
action, and where the plaintiff seeks to abandon the place where both
the principal office is situated and where the substantive cause of action
arose. The decision was never intended to foreclose jurisdiction in every
forum other than the place of principal business, particularly where the
independent and substantive elements of the cause of action arise within
such forum, or where the special provisions under Sections 134 and 62
override Section 20 of CPC.
49. The Court in IPRS (supra) observed:
“18. On a due and anxious consideration of the provisions contained
in Section 20 CPC, Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134
of the Trade Marks Act, and the object with which the latter
provisions have been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has
arisen wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having its
principal office/carries on business or personally works for gain, the
suit can be filed at such place(s). The plaintiff(s) can also institute a
suit at a place where he is residing, carrying on business or
personally works for gain dehors the fact that the cause of action
has not arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one of
them is residing, carries on business or personally works for gain.
However, this right to institute suit at such a place has to be read
subject to certain restrictions, such as in case the plaintiff is residing
or carrying on business at a particular place/having its head office
and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in part,
the plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is
carrying on business at other far-flung places also. The very
intendment of the insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and the
Trade Marks Act is the convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of
convenience of the parties has been given a statutory expression in
Section 20 CPC as well. The interpretation of provisions has to be
such which prevents the mischief of causing inconvenience to the
parties.”
50. The Court further clarified that:
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“19. The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted in the
Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a forum to the
plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business or personally
works for gain. The object is to ensure that the plaintiff is not
deterred from instituting infringement proceedings “because the
court in which proceedings are to be instituted is at a considerable
distance from the place of their ordinary residence”. The
impediment created to the plaintiff by Section 20 CPC of going to a
place where it was not having ordinary residence or principal place
of business was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the
corporation is having ordinary residence/principal place of
business and cause of action has also arisen at that place, it has to
institute a suit at the said place and not at other places. The
provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the field where the
plaintiff is having its principal place of business at a particular place
and the cause of action has also arisen at that place so as to enable
it to file a suit at a distant place where its subordinate office is
situated though at such place no cause of action has arisen. Such
interpretation would cause great harm and would be juxtaposed to
the very legislative intendment of the provisions so enacted.”
51. The limitation on invocation such jurisdiction operates only
where the plaintiff seeks to institute proceedings in a wholly
disconnected forum solely by reference to a branch office, despite the
substantial cause of action arising elsewhere. At the same time, the
judgment does not exclude jurisdiction in any other forum where a part
of the cause of action independently arises under Section 20(c) CPC.
52. In the present case, the material placed on record unmistakably
demonstrates that the dispute is not confined to Rajasthan. The plaintiff
has produced documentary evidence of commercial transactions and
deliveries effected within Delhi through its official and interactive
online platform. Such transactions constitute substantive commercial
activity extending into the territorial limits of Delhi.
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53. Equally significant is the evidence concerning the defendants’
India Mart listings. During cross-examination, the defendants admitted
awareness of the impugned online listings and confirmed that the GST
particulars and business address reflected therein corresponded to their
commercial establishment. They further took no steps to dispute or
remove such listings. The inevitable conclusion is that the defendants
knowingly projected and offered their goods on an interactive
commercial platform accessible to consumers beyond Rajasthan,
thereby bringing a part of the cause of action within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court.
54. The jurisprudence governing internet-based territorial
jurisdiction has evolved progressively, beginning with the principles
enunciated in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna
12
Reddy , where the Court differentiated between a passive website and
an interactive commercial platform designed to target consumers within
a particular jurisdiction.
55. This principle, however, did not remain confined to the narrow
passive versus interactive website dichotomy. The doctrine was
subsequently expanded and contextualized in WWE(supra) , wherein
the Court recognized that the true test is whether the defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the forum by commercially targeting
customers therein through electronic means.
12
2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780
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56. The aforesaid principles were further elaborated by one of us (C.
Hari Shankar J.) in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed
13
Sciences Pvt. Ltd. , where this Court, while noting the transformation
of commercial activity in the digital era, observed that modern e-
commerce platforms are designed to transcend territorial barriers and
facilitate commercial engagement across jurisdictions. This Court
emphasized that once a defendant consciously projects its goods or
services through interactive online interfaces enabling commercial
solicitation, inquiry, negotiation, or purchase by consumers situated
within a forum State, such activity constitutes a material part of the
cause of action.
57. The judgment further clarified that insistence upon proof of an
actual concluded sale within the jurisdiction would amount to an unduly
restrictive application of traditional jurisdictional principles to
contemporary digital commerce.
58. The ratio emerging from Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd
(supra) is that the Court must examine the substance of the commercial
targeting and the purposeful availment of the forum, rather than
mechanically confining itself to the existence or absence of completed
transactions. Thus, where online listings are intended to solicit business,
display commercial contact details, facilitate customer interaction, and
expand market reach into multiple jurisdictions, the territorial nexus is
sufficiently established.
14
59. This Bench in Raju Kumar v. Vinod Sah (authored by C. Hari
13
2025:DHC:10789-DB
14
2026:DHC:351-DB
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Shankar J.) relied upon and applied the principles enunciated in
Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt . Ltd . (supra) while determining
territorial jurisdiction in online trademark disputes. The judgment in
Raju Kumar (supra) has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in
15
Vinod Sah v. Raju Kumar .
60. The learned District judge correctly observed that the doctrine of
demurrer applies at the preliminary stage, where pleadings alone are
assumed to be true, a proposition which we fully endorse. It was also
correctly noted that the present matter stands on a materially different
footing, since the trial had concluded, witnesses had been examined,
and the Court was required to adjudicate territorial jurisdiction on the
basis of proven facts rather than presumptive pleadings.
61. While the learned District Judge was fully justified in subjecting
the jurisdictional facts to evidentiary scrutiny after the conclusion of
trial, the error lies in the restrictive standard applied in appreciating
such evidence. Once the plaintiff led documentary and oral evidence
substantiating the pleaded jurisdictional facts, including commercial
activity and online solicitation extending into Delhi, the inquiry ceased
to be founded merely upon pleadings and became one supported by a
proved jurisdictional nexus.
62. In the present case, the plaintiff did not rest its claim upon mere
assertions of online accessibility. The plaintiff led affirmative
documentary evidence demonstrating commercial deliveries within
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SLP(C) No.12585/2026
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Delhi through its interactive online platform. The evidence further
established that the defendants maintained IndiaMart listings bearing
GST particulars and business addresses admittedly traceable to
themselves. These facts were not confined to the pleadings but stood
corroborated by documentary material and cross-examination.
63. In this context, reliance may be placed upon the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Muddasani Venkata Narasaiah (Dead) through
16
LRs v. Muddasani Sarojana and State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (Dead)
17
& Ors . , wherein it was authoritatively held that where material
evidence adduced by a party remains unchallenged in cross-
examination, it is liable to be accepted and treated as admitted. In the
present case, the documentary evidence of commercial deliveries within
Delhi, coupled with the defendants’ admitted IndiaMart listings bearing
GST particulars corresponding to their business establishment, was
never effectively discredited during cross-examination. The evidentiary
value of such material could not have been ignored while adjudicating
the issue of territorial jurisdiction.
64. We deem it appropriate to reproduce para 12 of ABC Laminart
18
(P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies , where the Court defined ‘cause of action’
as follows:
“12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right
to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts
which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right
to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the
16
(2016) 12 SCC 288
17
(1998) 3 SCC 561
18
(1989) 2 SCC 163
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defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the
right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is
founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such
facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him
to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the
defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause
of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may
be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of
the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.
19
65. Similarly, in Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India , the
Supreme Court held that:
“ 9. By “cause of action” it is meant every fact, which, if traversed,
it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support
his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of
facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to
succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal
Desai [(1994) 6 SCC 322].) 10. In a generic and wide sense (as in
Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action”
means every fact, which it is necessary to establish to support a right
to obtain a judgment. (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil
Kumar [(1998) 6 SCC 514 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1471].) 11. It is settled
law that “cause of action” consists of a bundle of facts, which give
cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In
other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law
applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against
the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since
in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly
accrue or would arise. [See South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v.
Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 443] ] 12. The
expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially.
settled meaning. In the restricted sense “cause of action” means the
circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate
occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary
conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the
infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right
itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every
fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court.
Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from
every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact,
19
(2006) 6 SCC 207 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 24 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 758
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comprises in “cause of action”. (See Rajasthan High Court
Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 294].)
13. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed
to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which
constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more.
In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote
the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in
order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the
proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. (See Gurdit Singh v.
Munsha Singh [(1977) 1 SCC 791] .)
14. The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to
mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an
action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise
to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles one
person to obtain a remedy in court from another person (see Black's
Law Dictionary). In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a “cause of
action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an
enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which if
traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In
Words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase
“cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those
facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.
(See Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra [(2000) 7
SCC 640 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 215] .) 15. In Halsbury's Laws of
England (4th Edn.) it has been stated as follows: “ ‘Cause of action’
has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence
of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy
against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time
to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the
plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a
right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that
a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff
his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding
the action, not merely the technical cause of action.”
*
17. It would be appropriate to quote para 61 of the said judgment,
which reads as follows : (Mohd. Khalil Khan case [(1947-48) 75 IA
121 : AIR 1949 PC 78] , AIR p. 86) “61. …(2) The cause of action
means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if
traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. (Read v.
Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 : 58 LJQB 120 : 60 LT 250 (CA)] ) (3)
If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes
of action are also different. (Brunsden v. Humphrey [(1884) 14 QBD
141 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 357 : 53 LJQB 476 : 51 LT 529 (CA)] )
(4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the
same if in substance they are identical. (Brunsden v. Humphrey
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[(1884) 14 QBD 141 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 357 : 53 LJQB 476 :
51 LT 529 (CA)] ) (5) The cause of action has no relation whatever
to the defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend
upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers
… to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour. (Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [(1887-88)
15 IA 156 : ILR 16 Cal 98 (PC)] ) This observation was made by
Lord Watson in a case under Section 43 of the Act of 1882
(corresponding to Order 2 Rule 2) where plaintiff made various
claims in the same suit.” (IA pp. 139-40)”
The Court further clarified that the cause of action is independent
of the defence available to the defendant, and that it comprises all
material facts necessary to establish the plaintiff’s right to relief, not
merely the technical basis of the claim.
66. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is clear
that the defendants’ interactive India Mart listings, linked to their GST-
verified business identity, coupled with the plaintiff’s commercial
deliveries and online sales activity within Delhi, constitute material and
integral facts forming part of the bundle of cause of action under Section
20(c) of CPC. These facts, if traversed, would be necessary for the
plaintiff to establish to support its claim, and therefore, they satisfy the
test for territorial jurisdiction in the present proceedings.
67. The learned District Judge, while fully entitled to scrutinize the
sufficiency of evidence post-trial, could not disregarded the settled
legal position that commercial solicitation, online projection, offer for
sale, and interactive targeting constitute integral components of the
cause of action in intellectual property disputes.
68. The decision in IPRS(supra) does not mandate a contrary
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conclusion. The judgment was directed against abuse of jurisdiction,
where a plaintiff sought to invoke a wholly disconnected forums solely
on account of the existence of a subordinate office. The present case is
fundamentally distinguishable, as the plaintiff did not rely upon Delhi
merely as a situs of convenience.
69. In the present case, the jurisdiction of the Delhi Courts was
invoked on the basis of independent jurisdictional facts established
during trial, namely: (i) actual commercial deliveries within Delhi, (ii)
interactive web-based commercial activity accessible and operational
within Delhi, and (iii) defendants’ admitted online commercial listings
linked to their GST-verified business identity.
70. The defendants, by consciously projecting their commercial
activities through interactive electronic platforms, intended to solicit
business beyond Rajasthan, thereby purposefully availed themselves of
markets extending into Delhi. In contemporary e-commerce
jurisprudence, such purposeful commercial availment constitutes a
substantive territorial nexus, sufficient to attract jurisdiction under
Section 20(c) of CPC read with Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act..
71. The post-trial nature of the adjudication does not weaken the
plaintiff’s case; rather, it fortifies it. The jurisdictional nexus pleaded
by the plaintiff was not left resting on mere assertions but was
corroborated through documentary evidence and admissions elicited
during cross-examination. Consequently, while the learned District
Judge was correct in undertaking evidentiary scrutiny, the error lies in
applying an unduly restrictive conception of “cause of action” in the
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context of modern online commercial infringement.
72. The reasoning adopted in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt . Ltd
(supra) assumes particular significance in the present context. The
Court recognized that modern online marketplaces are inherently
designed to facilitate commercial interaction beyond territorial
boundaries, and that jurisdictional analysis must account for the
commercial reality of digital trade, rather than remain confined to
traditional notions of physical territoriality. The emphasis was placed
upon purposeful commercial targeting and availability for commercial
engagement within the forum.
73. Relevant paragraphs from Kohinoor Seeds Fields India Pvt . Ltd
(supra) provide guidance and merits reproduction:
“19.5.4 The existence of a website of the plaintiff, over which a
commercial transaction could be concluded was, therefore,
regarded by the Division Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment
as sufficient to amount to “carrying on a business” by WWE within
the jurisdiction of this Court. The actual conclusion of a transaction
was, therefore, no longer indispensable, after World Wrestling
Entertainment .
19.5.5 World Wrestling Entertainment undoubtedly is not an
authority for understanding the expression “cause of action” as
contained in Section 20(c) of the CPC. However, it is an authority
for the understanding of the expression “carries on business” in an
era in which business is considerably carried on over e-commerce
websites. The Division Bench has held, in World Wrestling
Entertainment , that, even if the website of the plaintiff was
interactive and one over which a commercial transaction could be
concluded, that would suffice to constitute “carrying on of business
by the plaintiff”, as, in the e-commerce universe, every place where
the website of an entity would be accessible for the purpose of
concluding a commercial transaction would amount to a place
where the entity has a market place. If, therefore, WWE had a
website over which commercial transactions could be concluded at
Delhi, it was equivalent to WWE having a brick and mortar store in
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Delhi, resulting in this Court having territorial jurisdiction in the
matter. Thus, the requirement of actual concluding of a commercial
transaction over the website stands diluted in World Wrestling
Entertainment .
*
19.8 The submission is unquestionably weighty. After all, the tort of
infringement is not infringer innocent. Section 29 of the Trade Marks
Act envisages infringement only vis-à-vis an infringer, who must be
using the infringing marks without proprietorial or permissive right
to do so. The finding of the learned Single Judge that, if the
respondent has nothing to do with the listing of the allegedly
infringing products on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, the
respondent cannot be held to account therefor is, therefore, prima
facie correct.
19.9 Where, however, the learned Single Judge, in our considered
opinion, has erred on this issue is in the observation, in para 42 of
the impugned judgment, that the listing of the products on the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of the
respondent. In so observing, the learned Single Judge, in our
considered opinion, failed to realize the fact that the issue before
him was the right of the appellant to sue. Insofar as the appellant
was concerned, the allegedly infringing goods were available, for
sale and purchase, across e-commerce websites, over which a
transaction could be concluded within the territorial limits of the
jurisdiction of this Court. There is no admission, in the plaint, that
the listing of the products on the IndianMart or Kalgudi websites
was not at the instance of the respondent. It would be for the
respondent to so aver, and that averment, which could emerge at the
earliest in the respondent’s written statement, could not be
considered while examining the aspect of territorial jurisdiction
under Order VII Rule 10, which has to be limited to the assertions
in the plaint. At the highest, therefore, the issue of whether the
respondent had anything to do with the listing of the allegedly
infringing goods over the IndiaMart or Kalgudi websites would be
a matter of trial. Arguendo, if the appellant were able to establish,
in trial, that the entities who placed the respondent’s goods for sale
and purchase on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites did so at the
instance of the respondent, or with its knowledge, the respondent
might still be answerable therefor.
19.10 That the goods were, in fact, available for purchase across the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, is not disputed. That the goods
could be purchased across the said websites within the jurisdiction
of this Court, is equally not disputed. Whether the respondent,
directly or indirectly, was involved in the said listings, is, at best, a
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matter of trial. The learned Single Judge could not, therefore, have
held that the appellant could not sue the respondent in this Court,
even when the allegedly infringing goods could be purchased,
across the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, within its jurisdiction,
on the premise that the respondent was innocent of the listings.
*
19.13 We are in agreement with Mr. Agarwal that the issue of
whether the listings on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi e-commerce
platforms, of the allegedly infringing goods of the respondent, for
sale, were at the instance of the respondent or of some other party,
is extraneous to the aspect of territorial jurisdiction. Once the
infringing goods were available for sale, the tort of infringement,
which predicates use of the infringed mark, or a mark which is
deceptively similar thereto, for trade, stood committed. The suit,
seeking relief thereagainst, could be filed before every Court having
territorial jurisdiction over the situs of sale of such goods. World
Wrestling Entertainment extends, in a case of e-commerce, the situs
to include every place where a commercial transaction could be
concluded and the goods bought or sold. Every Court having
jurisdiction over such place can, therefore, adjudicate on the aspect
of infringement, or passing off. The decision of the learned Single
Judge is clearly contrary to this principle.
74. Applying these principles to the present case, the defendants
consciously projected their commercial activities through interactive
online listings accessible within Delhi, disclosing GST-verified
business particulars, while the plaintiff demonstrated actual commercial
transactions and deliveries within Delhi through its electronic platform.
These circumstances cumulatively establish a real, substantial, and
proximate nexus with the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi Courts.
75. We are therefore of the considered opinion that the learned
District Judge erred in treating the post-trial status as weakening the
plaintiff’s jurisdictional case. On the contrary, the evidence adduced
during trial substantively corroborates the pleaded jurisdictional facts,
demonstrating that a material part of the cause of action arose within
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Delhi.
76. Consequently, the finding that the Courts at Delhi lacked
territorial jurisdiction is unsustainable both on facts and in law, and is
accordingly set aside.
77. In light of the above, the appeal is accordingly allowed.
78. The suit filed by the plaintiff is restored to its original number
and shall proceed in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge
shall now adjudicate the suit uninfluenced by any observations made in
this judgment.
79. The parties are directed to appear before the learned District
Judge on 10 July 2026 for further proceedings.
80. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. No order as to costs.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
JULY 01, 2026/ AT/ss
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