SMT. MANGAL W/O IRAGOUDA PATIL vs SOU. KAVITA W/O AMOL PATIL
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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WP No. 104104 of 2026
R
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
TH
DATED THIS THE 24 DAY OF JUNE, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
WRIT PETITION NO. 104104 OF 2026 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SMT. MANGAL W/O. IRAGOUDA PATIL
AGE: 76 YEARS, OCC: HOME MAKER
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH, PATIL GALLI,
CHIKKODI, TQ: CHIKODI,
DIST: BELAGAVI- 591201.
(SENIOR CITIZEN BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED)
… PETITIONER
(BY SRI DINESH M. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SOU. KAVITA W/O. AMOL PATIL
AGE: 33 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH,
PATIL GALLI, CHIKKODI
TQ: CHIKODI, DIST: BELAGAVI-591201.
2. KU. SUNNY S/O. AMOL PATIL
AGE: 10 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT,
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH,
PATIL GALLI, CHIKKODI
TQ: CHIKODI, DIST: BELAGAVI-591201.
RESPONDENT NO.2 BEING MINOR IS
REPRESENTED BY RESPONDENT NO.1
HIS MOTHER SOU. KAVITA W/O. AMOL PATIL.
3. SRI AMOL S/O. IRAGOUDA PATIL
AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH, PATIL GALLI,
CHIKKODI, TQ: CHIKODI,
Digitally signed by
MOHANKUMAR B
SHELAR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
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DIST: BELAGAVI-591201.
4. SRI RAHUL S/O. IRAGOUDA PATIL
AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH, PATIL GALLI,
CHIKKODI, TQ: CHIKODI,
DIST: BELAGAVI- 591201.
5. SOU. NEETA W/O. RAHUL PATIL
AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: HOME MAKER,
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH, PATIL GALLI,
CHIKKODI, TQ: CHIKODI,
DIST: BELAGAVI- 591201.
6. KUM. SUHANI D/O. RAHUL PATIL
AGE: 12 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT
R/O. RAVIWAR PETH, PATIL GALLI,
CHIKKODI, TQ: CHIKODI,
DIST: BELAGAVI- 591201.
(RESPONDENT NO.6 BEING MINOR
IS REPRESENTED BY RESPONDENT NO.5,
HIS MOTHER)
7. KU. SOHAM S/O RAHUL PATIL
AGE: 10 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT,
R/O. PATIL GALLI-CHIKKODI,
TQ. & DIST: BELAGAVI- 591201.
(RESPONDENT NO.7 BEING MINOR IS
REPRESENTED BY RESPONDENT NO.5
HIS MOTHER)
… RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND DECREE
PASSED BY TALUKA LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, CHIKODI, BEFORE
NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT CHIKODI BY ITS ORDER DATED
14.03.2026 IN O.S NO.04/2026 VIDE ANNEXURE-C AND ETC.,
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
1. Captioned petition is filed by defendant No.1
questioning the compromise decree recorded by Lok Adalat
in O.S. No.4 of 2026.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Perused the records.
3. Before this Court proceeds further, it would be
appropriate for this Court to extract the family tree, which
is as under:
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4. The plaintiffs, who are the wife and minor son of
defendant No.3, instituted the suit seeking partition and
separate possession of the suit schedule properties. During
the pendency of the suit, the dispute was referred to the
Lok Adalat, where the parties expressed their willingness to
amicably resolve the dispute by entering into a
compromise. The records of the Lok Adalat disclose that the
present petitioner, who was arrayed as defendant No.1, was
represented by learned counsel. The proceedings further
indicate that the terms and conditions of the compromise
petition were read over and explained to all the parties,
including the present petitioner, who, upon understanding
the contents thereof, consented to the settlement.
5. The present petitioner is the widow of the
propositus, late Iregouda, and the mother of defendant
Nos.2, 3 and 4. Under the compromise, while the petitioner
was otherwise entitled to a share in the joint family
properties, she voluntarily agreed to restrict her entitlement
by accepting only a life interest in the property allotted to
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her, coupled with a stipulation that she would not alienate,
encumber or create any third-party rights over the said
property during her lifetime. The compromise, therefore,
reflects a conscious and voluntary relinquishment of her
larger proprietary rights in favour of a limited right of
enjoyment.
6. The present writ petition is instituted questioning
the compromise decree primarily on the allegation that the
compromise was procured by fraud. It is contended that the
petitioner was unaware of the terms embodied in the
compromise petition and that no substantive share was
allotted to her under the settlement.
7. On a careful examination of the pleadings and
the family pedigree, this Court finds that the compromise
was recorded in such a manner as to safeguard the
interests of the wife and minor son of defendant No.3 by
allotting them an appropriate share with the consent of all
the branches of the family. The plaint averments clearly
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disclose serious allegations that defendant No.1 and
defendant Nos.3 to 5 were attempting to alienate the
ancestral properties without any legal necessity, thereby
jeopardizing the legitimate rights of the plaintiffs.
8. It is in the aforesaid factual background that
plaintiff No.1, acting not only in her individual capacity but
also on behalf of her minor son aged about ten years,
instituted the suit seeking partition and separate
possession. The records reveal that all the defendants,
including the present petitioner, were represented by a
common counsel before the Lok Adalat. The compromise
petition bears the signatures of all the parties as well as the
learned counsel representing them, which clearly
demonstrates that the settlement was entered into with the
knowledge and consent of all concerned.
9. At this distance of time, any interference with the
compromise decree would unsettle the rights crystallised
under the settlement and restore the parties to the stage of
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a contested partition suit, thereby causing serious prejudice
to the plaintiffs, particularly the minor child, whose interests
have been duly protected under the compromise. Except
making bald and vague allegations that the compromise
was brought about by fraud and collusion, the petitioner
has failed to place any cogent, convincing or acceptable
material to substantiate such allegations. Mere assertions of
fraud, unsupported by tangible evidence, cannot furnish a
valid ground to annul a compromise decree recorded before
the Lok Adalat.
10. It is well settled that a compromise arrived at
before the Lok Adalat, voluntarily entered into by the
parties and recorded after due satisfaction of the
conciliators, carries a greater degree of sanctity and finality.
Unless there is convincing material to establish that a party
was misled, coerced or induced by fraud, such settlements
ought not to be lightly interfered with. In the present case,
absolutely no material is forthcoming to demonstrate that
the aged petitioner was deceived either by her sons or by
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the learned counsel who represented her before the Lok
Adalat.
11. The proceedings of the Lok Adalat further reveal
that the Judicial Member and the Conciliator have
specifically recorded that the terms of the compromise
petition were explained to all the parties and that the
parties voluntarily accepted the settlement. Such
contemporaneous recording by the Lok Adalat completely
belies the petitioner’s plea that she was unaware of the
contents of the compromise. In the absence of any material
to discredit the proceedings of the Lok Adalat, this Court
finds no justification to interfere with the compromise
decree.
12. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for
the petitioner on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. [(2020) 9
SCC 1] is wholly misconceived. The principles laid down
therein pertain to the rights of daughters in coparcenary
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property under the amended provisions of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 and have no application to the
controversy involved in the present case, which concerns
the validity of a compromise voluntarily entered into before
the Lok Adalat.
13. The submission advanced by the learned counsel
for the petitioner that the limited right created under the
compromise decree automatically blossoms into an absolute
estate by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956, is wholly misconceived and proceeds on a
complete misapprehension of the scheme underlying
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
14. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
embodies a socially transformative provision intended to
abolish the traditional concept of a limited estate held by a
Hindu female and to enlarge such limited estate into an
absolute estate where the property is possessed by her in
recognition of a pre-existing legal right. The legislative
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object was to remove the disability attached to a Hindu
woman’s limited ownership under the old Hindu law and to
confer upon her full ownership in respect of property
acquired by inheritance, partition, maintenance, arrears of
maintenance, gift from relatives or by any other mode
referable to an antecedent or pre-existing right. It is in this
context that the doctrine of a “limited estate blossoming
into an absolute estate” has consistently been applied by
the Courts. The enlargement contemplated under Section
14(1) presupposes that the limited estate was merely a
recognition or manifestation of a pre-existing legal
entitlement and was not the creation of an independent or
fresh title for the first time.
15. Section 14(2), however, carves out a clear
exception to the general rule enacted under Section 14(1).
The latter provision expressly excludes from the operation
of sub-section (1) those cases where a restricted estate is
created for the first time under a gift, will, decree, order of
a Court, award or any other instrument prescribing the
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nature and extent of the interest to be enjoyed by the
female. The legislative intent is manifest that where the
instrument itself consciously limits the estate and the
female accepts such restriction under the terms of the
instrument, the restriction continues to operate and cannot
be obliterated by invoking Section 14(1).
16. The present case stands on an entirely different
footing. The petitioner is the widow of late Iregouda. The
parties are admittedly governed by the Bombay School of
Hindu Law. Under the applicable personal law, the widow
was not a mere holder of a right of maintenance or a person
claiming a derivative interest. On the contrary, she had an
independent and pre-existing substantive right to claim an
equal share in the coparcenary property along with the
other sharers. Thus, at the inception itself, the petitioner
possessed an enforceable proprietary right in the joint
family properties equivalent to that of the other
coparceners entitled to a share on partition.
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17. It is significant to note that the compromise did
not create or confer any right upon the petitioner for the
first time. Nor can it be said that the compromise merely
recognised a limited estate flowing from an antecedent right
so as to attract the principle embodied in Section 14(1).
What, in fact, transpired is precisely the converse. The
petitioner, though entitled to claim an equal share in
absolute ownership, consciously, voluntarily and with full
knowledge of the consequences, agreed before the Lok
Adalat to restrict the amplitude of her own legitimate
entitlement. Instead of insisting upon an absolute share,
she elected to retain only a limited right of enjoyment
during her lifetime with an express stipulation restraining
her from alienating or creating third-party interests in the
property.
18. Therefore, the foundation of the petitioner’s
argument that the limited estate has subsequently enlarged
into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) is
fundamentally flawed. The doctrine of a limited estate
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“blossoming” into an absolute estate has no application to a
case where the female herself, while possessing an existing
and enforceable right to absolute ownership, voluntarily
enters into a family settlement and consciously curtails the
extent of that right. Such a restriction is not one imposed
by the pre-existing law but is one accepted by the petitioner
herself under the terms of a compromise voluntarily entered
into before the Lok Adalat.
19. Viewed from this perspective, the present case is
clearly governed by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 . The petitioner’s restricted estate is the direct
consequence of the terms consciously incorporated in the
compromise decree, which she voluntarily accepted after
being fully apprised of its contents. Having elected to accept
only a life interest in substitution of her equal share in the
event Male members chose to partition ancestral properties
which was otherwise available to her, she cannot
subsequently invoke Section 14(1) to nullify the very
conditions upon which the settlement was founded. To
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permit such a course would not only defeat the statutory
distinction maintained between sub-sections (1) and (2) of
Section 14 but would also undermine the sanctity and
finality attached to compromise decrees and family
settlements voluntarily entered into by parties.
20. This Court is, therefore, of the considered
opinion that the petitioner’s case falls squarely within the
ambit of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
and not under Section 14(1). The plea that the life estate
reserved in her favour has matured into an absolute estate
is accordingly liable to be rejected.
21. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to establish
any circumstance warranting interference with the
compromise decree passed by the Lok Adalat. The writ
petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed .
22. It is, however, made clear that the dismissal of
this writ petition shall not preclude the petitioner, who is an
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aged mother, from availing such remedies as may be
available to her under the provisions of the Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, in the
event she is neglected or deprived of maintenance by her
children.
Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
VNP / CT: GSM
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 28