TIRATHRAM BANERJEE vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010308112026 2026:CGHC:38523
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed
by ALOK
SHARMA
Date:
2026.09.02
18:40:12 +0530
ALOK
SHARMA
ACQA No. 160 of 2026
Tirathram Banerjee S/o Ramratan Banerjee Aged About 40 Years R/o
Village Hardi Vishal, P.S. Baloda District Janjgir Champa C.G.
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Azak, District
Janjgir Champa C.G.
2 - Matwar Yadav S/o Late Atmaram Aged About 70 Years R/o Village
Hardi Vishal, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir Champa C.G.
3 - Smt, Lilamati W/o Matwar Aged About 67 Years R/o Village Hardi,
Vishal, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir Champa C.G.
4 - Smt, Rajni Yadav W/o Sukhen Yadav Aged About 35 Years R/o
Village Hardi Vishal, P.S. Baloda, District Janjgir Champa C.G.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Suresh Kumar Verma, Advocate.
For State : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Panel Lawyer.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Judgment on Board
31/08/2026
1. The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the appellant
against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 20.07.2026

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passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Janjgir, District
Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 49/2025,
whereby the respondent/accused persons have been acquitted of
the offences under Sections 296, 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 (in short, ‘SC/ST Act’).
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 13.07.2025, there was an
altercation between the complainant and the respondent/accused
persons with respect to the putting up of fencing in the field of the
complainant. At about 04:30 PM, the accused persons, namely,
Matwar Yadav, his wife and daughter-in-law, came there, raised a
quarrel with him and abused him in filthy language in the name of
his caste. The matter was reported to the police on 14.07.2025,
whereupon the FIR was registered, the accused persons were
arrested, and after investigation, the charge-sheet was filed.
3. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused
persons for the offences under Sections 296, 130 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the ‘SC/ST
Act’, which the accused persons denied and claimed trial.
4. In order to prove the charge against the accused persons, the
prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses, and one defence
witness was also examined. The statements of the accused
persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. have also been recorded, in
which they denied the circumstances appearing against them,

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pleaded innocence, and submitted that they have been falsely
implicated in the offence.
5.
After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led
by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has acquitted the
respondent/accused persons from all the offences, holding that
the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, this acquittal appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there are
sufficient material ingredients in the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses which clearly satisfy the ingredients for the offences
under the ‘SC/ST Act’ and also under Section 296 of the BNS,
2023, as the complainant was annoyed with the abuse made by
the accused persons. He would further submit that the learned
trial Court has erroneously considered that the word used by the
accused is normally used in the village when a quarrel takes place
between any of the parties, which does not satisfy the ingredients
either under Section 296 of the BNS and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s)
of the ‘SC/ST Act’. He would further submit that the complainant
duly proved his case by raising allegations against the accused
persons and, by misappreciation of the evidence, the learned trial
Court has acquitted the respondent/accused persons. There is
sufficient evidence led by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused persons, yet the learned trial Court has acquitted them.
Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set
aside and the accused persons are liable to be convicted.

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7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the record
of the trial Court, and gone through the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court.
8. From perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, it
transpires that the learned trial Court, after considering the
evidence of the complainant PW-1, observed in its judgment that
the particular word allegedly used by the accused persons was
not used intentionally by the accused persons to cause
annoyance to the complainant. The complainant does not belong
to that particular caste, but he belongs to the Satnami caste.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused persons intentionally
insulted and intimidated the person belonging to the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes community and, by giving the benefit
of doubt, the learned trial Court has acquitted the
respondent/accused persons.
9. From perusal of the evidence of PW-1, the complainant, it is
admitted by him that in the year 2004, the accused was his surety
in the offence registered against him at Police Station Baloda. He
also admitted that for the last 2-3 years, the accused Matwar
Yadav has been paralysed. He further admitted that in his written
complaint, he had not mentioned that the quarrel took place on
the basis of the particular word. He admitted that he does not
belong to that particular caste and that he had gone to stop the
excessive way of the accused persons.

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10. PW-2 is the person who claimed to be an eye-witness to the
incident, but in cross-examination, he admitted that he saw the
incident from a distance of 50 mtrs. He did not intervene in the
altercation between both the parties, who were in an altercation
with each other.
11. From perusal of the evidence of PW-3, who was the person
engaged in fencing the field of the complainant, it transpires that
the accused persons came there and pointed towards
complainant PW-1 and abused him, stating that it was on account
of this person that all the incidents and activities were taking
place. When the altercation started, he, along with the other
witnesses, walked away from that place. He too has stated that
accused Matwar is paralysed and that he himself had not lodged
any report with the police. He was an accused in an offence of
murder, and the accused persons were in support of the victim
party.
12. From the evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court
came to the conclusion that there was sufficient and clinching
evidence to convict the accused persons, however, by giving them
the benefit of doubt, they have been acquitted by the impugned
judgment. The view taken by the trial court is one of the plausible
view which cannot be said to be perverse or illegal under the facts
and circumstances as well as evidence available on record.
13. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal
acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ State of

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Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram ” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC
984 , has held as follows:-
“8. The scope of interference in an appeal against
acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the
view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse,
it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of
acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is
not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal,
merely because the Appellate Court finds the way
of conviction to be more probable. The
interference would be warranted only if the view
taken is not possible at all.”
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and
Ors Vs. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 , has considered the
scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at
Para 25 which reads as under:
“25. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C. the
appellate court has to consider whether the trial
court’s view can be termed as a possible one,
particularly when evidence on record has been
analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal
adds up to the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court
has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of
the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the
presumption in favour of the accused does not
get weakened but only strengthened. Such as
double presumption that ensures in favour of the
accused has to be disturbed only by thorough
scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
15. After considering the material available on record as well as well
reasoned judgment passed by learned trial Court and being very
much conscious of the said legal position is held in the case of

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State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram (Supra) and Jafarudheen
and Ors Vs. State of Kerala , (Supra) that in appeal against the
acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of evidence led by
the prosecution and the trial Court taking one view in favour of the
accused, reversal of the findings of the acquittal by the appellate
Court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not
permissible in law. I ,therefore, of the considered opinion that the
judgment impugned acquitting the accused respondent is just and
proper and does not call for any interference.
16. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal being devoid of
merits and the same is hereby dismissed .
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Alok