Ved Parkash Since Deceased Thr. His Lrs vs State Of Haryana

104 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

RFA-725-2024 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 31.10.2026

Ved parkash (Deceased) Through LRs
...Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana and Another
...Respondents

CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL

Present:- Mr. Ajit Singh, Advocate for
Mr. Deepak Chauhan, Advocate
for the appellant.

Mr. Abhinash Jain, Addl. A.G., Haryana.



JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)

CM-1818-CI-2024

1. The applicant through instant application is seeking
condonation of delay of 3039 days in filing the main appeal.
2. The applicant is seeking condonation on the ground that she
was not aware of the status of the case. The similarly situated landowners
filed appeals which stand allowed by this Court. They are entitled to
compensation at par with similarly situated landowners.
3. Learned State counsel submits that claim of appellant is
covered by judgment of this Court, however, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that landowner would not be entitled to statutory benefits
and interest for the period of delay.
4. Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘ New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority Vs. Rameshwar @ Ramesh Chandra Sharma
(Dead) Through Legal Heir & Anr.’, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1599 while
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adverting to the inordinate delay in filing the appeals before the High
Court has held that delay may be condoned and enhanced compensation
may be granted, however, the beneficiary/acquiring body cannot be
saddled with the liability of statutory benefits and interest. Relevant
extracts of the judgment read as:-
“5.2 Even otherwise as rightly observed by the High
Court, the land owners are not entitled to the
compensation at Rs.297/- per sq.yard considering the
decision of this Court in the case of Nanak (Deceased)
through LRS. (supra). Nothing was pointed out that how
the case of the land owners was comparable with that of
the case of Nanak (Deceased) through LRS. (supra). On
the contrary with respect to the acquisition of the year
1982, this Hon'ble Court determined the compensation at
Rs.149/- per sq.yard in the case of Deo Karan &
Ors.(supra). 5.3 However, at the same time the acquiring
body and the beneficiary of acquisition shall not be
saddled with the liability of statutory benefits and the
interest which may be available under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed period. In the present
case the delay of 22 years can be said to be a substantial
delay. However, as the claimants are held to beentitled the
enhanced amount of compensation, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court can be said to
be justified in condoning the delay. However, at the same
time, the High Court has erred in awarding other statutory
benefits and interest for the delayed period. To saddle with
the liability to pay statutory benefits and interest for the
delayed period upon the beneficiary/acquiring body would
be a financial burden upon the public body and it may
increase the project cost which shall be against the public
interests. It cannot be disputed that the liability towards
the statutory benefits and the interest under the Act, 1984
would be a huge liability considering the interest at the
rate of 15% per annum, solatium, price rise etc. Therefore,
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RFA-725-2024 (O&M) -3-
while condoning the delay and enhancing the amount of
compensation at par with other land owners, the High
Court ought not to have saddled the liability upon the
appellant to pay statutory benefits and the interest payable
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed
period. To the aforesaid extent the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the High Court is required
to be modified and the present appeals are required to be
partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.”
[ Emphasis supplied ]

5. The Supreme Court vide judgment dated 23.04.2025 passed
in ‘ Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana’, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 896 has
reiterated that applications seeking condonation of delay ought to be
considered by adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach. It has
been observed that the discretion vested in the Courts under the law of
limitation should be exercised to advance substantial justice, and that a
technical or pedantic approach should not defeat the adjudication of
disputes on their merits. Relevant extracts of the judgement read as:-
“9. Implementing in letter and spirit, the observations
made as above, i, e., a liberal approach in condonation of
delay, we notice that this Court in quite a few judgments
has condoned substantial delay. We may refer to some of
them. In Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana The Court
observed that even though there was long delay in filing
the appeals, it was a case of compulsory acquisition and
there had been a difference in the amount of compensation
granted to some land losers vis-a-vis others. References
were also made to Market Committee Hodal v. Krishan
Murari wherein delay of 3240 days arising from the same
acquisition has been condoned. In Huchanagouda v.
Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer., this
Court, taking into account the poverty and illiteracy of the
land loser, condoned the delay of more than 2000 days. It
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RFA-725-2024 (O&M) -4-
was observed that equities had to be balanced by ensuring
that the determination of market value relates back to the
preliminary notification - making sure that there is no
prejudice to the acquiring authorities, as also no undue
advantage to the land loser. In other words, the appellants
who approached the Court with delay, would not be
granted interest for such period.

10. In Executive Engineer, Nimna Dudhna Project Selu,
District Parbhani, Maharashtra v. State of Maharashtra,
this Court held that the Body acquiring land cannot be
saddled with the liability of paying interest for the period
of delay in preferring the appeals. The order of the High
Court, which granted interest also for five and half years'
delay, was modified to such an extent that interest shall not
be payable for delay. [See also Ningappa Thotappa Angadi
v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.]

11. In all judgments referred supra, the common thread
that can be observed is that delay is not a reason to deny
the land losers their compensation, which is just, fair and
reasonable for the land they have lost.

12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech Services
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., with reference to Coffee Board,
Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commission of Commercial Tax,
Karnataka that while the State has the power of eminent
domain, the owner of a land can only be divested thereof in
accordance with the procedure established by law after
appropriately compensating them. This is in view of Article
300 A and 31A of the Constitution of India.”

6. The Supreme Court in ‘ Urban Improvement Trust Vs.
Vidhya Devi & Ors.’, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725 while adopting a
liberal approach in condoning the delay in appeals preferred by
landowners in land acquisition matters, has deprecated a hyper-technical
approach. It has been observed that having regard to the beneficial nature
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RFA-725-2024 (O&M) -5-
of land acquisition jurisprudence and the rights involved the matters
ought to be adjudicated on their merits rather than being rejected on
technical ground of delay. The parameters laid down by the Court are
reproduced below: -
“47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this
Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020)
2 SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the
court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches
cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of
action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial
conscience of the court. Condonation of delay is a
matter of judicial discretion, which must be
exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts
and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the
breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There
is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts
to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.,
(1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
--- --- --- --- ---
49. Similarly, this Court in its decision in Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 held that:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
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RFA-725-2024 (O&M) -6-
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it would
not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which
might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
[Emphasis supplied]
--- --- --- --- ---
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that
the right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and
requires that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure
fairness and non-arbitrariness in decision-making
especially in cases of acquisition by the State. Therefore,
the delay in approaching the court, while a significant
factor, cannot override the necessity to address illegalities
and protect right to property enshrined in Article 300A.
The court must balance the need for finality in legal
proceedings with the need to rectify injustice. The right of
an individual to vindicate and protect private property
cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of delay
and laches.”

7. Learned counsel for the appellant on being confronted with
the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (supra), Suresh Kumar (supra) and Urban
Improvement Trust (supra) expressed his inability to controvert that in
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view of inordinate delay, the appellants are not entitled to statutory
benefits and interest.
8. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court reveals that liberal approach in case of application of a landowner
seeking condonation of delay in land acquisition matter should be
adopted. The Court has approved condonation of delay of more than 20
years. Cases of landowners must not be treated at par with other cases.
Delay irrespective of number of years ought to be condoned.
9. In the wake of statement of both sides and afore-cited
judgments, application for condonation of delay stands allowed and delay
in filing enclosed appeal is hereby condoned subject to the condition that
appellant shall not be entitled to statutory benefits and interest.
RFA-725-2024 (O&M)
1. The appellant through instant appeal under Section 54 of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is seeking setting aside of award dated
17.12.2013 whereby Ld. Additional District Judge, Jind did not award
claimed amount of compensation.
2. Notice of motion.
3. Mr. Abhinash Jain, Additional Advocate General, Haryana
who on advance notice is present in Court accepts notice on behalf of
respondent-State.
4. On the request of both sides, the appeal is taken up for
adjudication.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that issue involved
herein is squarely covered by judgment dated 25.07.2013 passed by this
Court in RFA-919-2022 titled as ‘ Kashmir Singh Versus State of
Haryana and others’ .
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6. On being asked, learned State counsel concedes that
appellant’s claim is squarely covered by aforesaid order.
7. The appeal is hereby allowed in terms of order dated
25.07.2013 passed by this Court in RFA-919-2022 titled as ‘ Kashmir
Singh Versus State of Haryana and others’ . It is made clear that
appellant shall not be entitled to interest for the delayed period i.e. 3039
days and statutory benefits.
8. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.



(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
31.10.2026
Prince Chawla

Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No





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