Government Of Canada vs Sanjay Madan And Ors

$~J-1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 02.09.2026
+ CS(OS) 379/2025
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ...... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Nakul Dewan, Sr. Adv. and Mr.
Shashank Verma, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Aaditya Vijay Kumar, Mr. Sooraj
Sharma, Mr. Vipul Agrawal, Mr.
Arjun Kant, Mr. Jatin Kochhar, Ms.
Akshita Katoch, Mr. Upamanyu
Ganguly, Mr. Gunjan Joshi, Ms.
Himashi Singh and Ms. Pratishtha
Chauhan, Advs.

Versus

SANJAY MADAN AND ORS ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Ramesh Singh, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Upinder Singh, Ms. Sharanya
Bhatnagar, Ms. Sommya Rohatgi and
Mr. Hage Nanya, Advs. for D-1.
Mr. Sameer Srivastava and Mr. Vinay
Kumar, Advs. for D-2.
Mr. Ateev Mathur, Mr. Amol Sharma,
Mr. Anmol Mehta and Mr. Sanjay
Gupta, Advs. for D-4.
Ms. Akshita Dogra, Adv. for
D6/ICICI Bank.
Mr. Ramesh Babu M.R., Ms. Nisha
Sharma and Ms. Tanya Chowdhary,
Advs. for D-11.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

JUDGMENT

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By:DEEPAK SINGH
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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VIKAS MAHAJAN, J.
I.A. 21667/2025 (by defendant no.1 under Order VII Rules 10 & 11 read
with Section 151 CPC)

1. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff [‘Government of
Canada’] seeking, inter alia , recovery of funds and rendition of accounts
relating to monies allegedly transferred from Canadian Bank Accounts to
Indian Bank Accounts, which are stated to be held in the names of defendant
no.1 and defendant no.2, who, it is alleged, have obtained monies through
fraud from the Government of Ontario. This includes recovery of funds
transferred through banking channels, along with the gains made on these
funds, such as interest earned on deposits, profits from investments, and
appreciation in the value of assets acquired using these funds. The plaintiff
also seeks recovery of funds transferred to India through non-banking
channels.
2. It is the case of the plaintiff that on 04.04.2023, defendant no.1
entered a guilty plea before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, admitting
to criminal charges pertaining to defrauding the Government of Ontario of
millions of dollars by abusing his official position within the Ministry of
Education. The defendant no.1 had further admitted having engaged in
fraudulent activities and receiving secret commissions/kickbacks, during the
period from 2011 to 2020.
3. It is stated that investigations have revealed that similar type of
fraudulent activities had commenced even prior to 2011. The defendant no. 1
further admitted of transferring the proceeds of the said fraudulent activities
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in India, where such funds were deposited in various bank accounts held in
his name and in the name of his wife, Mrs. Shalini Madan, across multiple
Indian Banks, which are arrayed as defendant nos. 3 to 10 in the instant suit.
4. It is averred that on 27.11.2023, defendant no.2 likewise pleaded
guilty to criminal charges laid by the Ontario Provincial Police, including
charges related to fraud, possession, and laundering of proceeds of crime. In
his plea, he is stated to have admitted to acting as an accomplice of
defendant no. 1 in the fraudulent schemes. It is stated that civil proceedings
arising out of the said fraudulent acts, involving defendant no. 1 and other
persons, including defendant no. 2, are presently pending adjudication in
Canada.
5. It is the case of plaintiff that the fraudulent activities were carried out
through two principal schemes. The first is described as the “Support for
Families Program (SFFP) Fraud” , which pertains to a scheme introduced
by the Government of Ontario in 2020 to provide financial assistance to
parents and guardians ‘for at-home learning expenses’ during the COVID-19
pandemic.
6. It is further the case of plaintiff that between April and July 2020,
defendant no.1 misused his position by submitting more than 78,000
fraudulent applications under the said scheme, of which over 44,000
applications were processed, resulting in disbursement of amounts
exceeding 10.8 million Canadian Dollars [‘ CAD ’]. These funds were then
credited to the Canadian bank accounts held by defendant no. 1, Mrs. Shalini
Madan, their sons, Chinmaya Madan and Ujjawal Madan, as well as to
accounts operated by defendant no.1’s accomplice i.e. defendant no. 2,
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leading to deposits of approximately CAD 103,000 into the bank accounts
opened by defendant no.2 at the instance of defendant no.1.
7. The second scheme is described as the “Fee for Service Consultants
(FFSC) Fraud” , which is stated to be another long-running fraudulent
scheme uncovered during the investigation into the ‘ SFFP fraud ’. It is
stated that from at least 2011 until August 2020, defendant no. 1, along with
other accomplices, caused the Government of Ontario to enter into contracts
with certain Vendors of Record for the provision of IT service consultants, in
return for which he received illicit commissions or kickbacks from such
vendors or their subcontractors.
8. It is the case of the plaintiff that in his guilty plea, defendant no. 1 has
admitted to his involvement in both, the SFFP and FFSC frauds, while
defendant no.2, in his plea dated 27.11.2023, admitted to actively
participating in the FFSC scheme and deriving unlawful gains therefrom.
They have also admitted of utilising the proceeds of the said fraud to acquire
immovable properties in India.
9. It is stated that on 19.10.2020, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
ordered a Mareva injunction against defendant nos. 1 and 2, freezing their
assets located in Ontario, which order was subsequently extended on
29.01.2021 to cover their worldwide assets. The Mareva injunction is stated
to have remained in force as on the date of institution of the present suit.
10. In sum and substance, it is the case of the plaintiff that a substantial
portion of the funds obtained through the aforesaid fraudulent schemes has
been transferred from Canada to India and deposited in bank accounts held
in the names of defendant no.1 and his wife i.e., Mrs. Shalini Madan.
Although certain amounts have been stated to be repatriated to Canada, a
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sum of at least CAD 33,345,991 remains unrecovered and are lying in India,
which has necessitated the filing of the instant suit.
11. In the backdrop of above facts, the defendant no.1 has filed the
present application under Order VII Rule 10 & 11 read with Section 151 of
CPC seeking return/rejection of plaint.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT NO.1
12. At the outset, Mr. Ramesh Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the applicant/defendant no.1 submits that while the present application
raises various grounds for rejection including lack of disclosure of cause of
action; forum non conveniens ; non-maintainability of the suit under Section
84 of the CPC on account of plaintiff's lack of locus to institute the present
suit against its own citizens, but he would be limiting his submissions to
three core issues viz. (i) the reliefs prayed being barred by limitation; (ii) this
Court lacking territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit; and (iii)
plaintiff having abused the process of law.
13. On the aspect of limitation, Mr. Singh submits that the reliefs
claimed are ex-facie time-barred under Article 68 and Article 91(a) of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. He substantiates by submitting that for
the purpose of Article 68 and Article 91(a)of the Schedule, the starting date
of limitation is the date of first discovery about misappropriated funds.
14. He submits that it is the admitted position in the plaint that
knowledge of alleged transfer of illegal funds to the bank accounts in India
was received by plaintiff between 22.10.2020 and 18.12.2020. Thus, the
present suit ought to have been filed on or before 18.12.2023, and the same
having been filed on 15.05.2025, makes it prima facie barred by limitation.
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By:DEEPAK SINGH
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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15. He submits that the repatriation of CAD 6,897,995 from the bank
accounts in India cannot extend the period of limitation under Section 19 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 as said repatriation was done by October 2020. He
further submits that even subsequent Settlement Agreement dated
10.03.2025 cannot revive the claims, firstly, because by the date of
settlement, the period of limitation for recovery had already expired;
secondly, the payment under the said settlement was to be credited in terms
of a restitution order passed in a criminal matter, but not on account of
alleged debt to be recovered by the plaintiff.
16. He submits that even prayer for rendition of accounts is barred both
under Article 4 or under Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
He submits that for the purpose of Article 4 if defendant no.1 is presumed to
be agent of plaintiff, the period of limitation would start when the neglect or
misconduct became known to the principal/plaintiff, and for applicability of
residuary Article 113, period of limitation would commence when right to
sue accrues. He submits that in both the scenarios, the alleged misconduct or
right to sue, the limitation would start running from 22.10.2020 - 18.12.2020
i.e. when the alleged misconduct had occurred or right to sue had accrued.
Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Sankar Dastidar v. Banjula Dastidar (Smt) and Anr., (2006) 13 SCC
470 .
17. Apropos the second ground, Mr. Singh argues that this Court lacks
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit as the entire cause of
action has arisen out of India. He submits that according to the averments in
the plaint, the entire structural matrix of the alleged misappropriation took
place in Canada. Even, the alleged amount of CAD 40,243,986 is stated to
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have been allegedly transferred from plaintiff’s bank accounts in Canada
into defendant nos.3 to 10 Banks. Thus, entire facts which have to be proved
by the plaintiff to succeed in the present suit originates in Canada.
18. He submits that the factum of alleged siphoned money finding its way
into the banks in India is merely incidental and not integral to be proved to
obtain a decree of recovery of amount as prayed for in the present suit,
which is in the nature of disgorgement.
19. Alternatively, Mr. Singh submits that even if a minuscule fraction of
the cause of action is assumed to have arisen within the jurisdiction of this
Court, this Court must decline to exercise its jurisdiction invoking the
doctrine of forum non-conveniens , as the absolute ‘centre of gravity’ of the
dispute, including all primary documentary evidence and key witnesses are
situated in Canada. He placed reliance on – (i) Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.
vs. UOI & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC , and (ii) Sterling Agro v. UOI and Ors. ,
(2011) SCC OnLine Del 3162 .
20. Lastly, regarding the third ground i.e. abuse of process of law, Mr.
Singh submits that present suit is liable to be dismissed by this Court in
exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 CPC as the present suit is
an abuse of the process of the Court.
21. He substantiates this plea by contending that the plaint itself discloses
that for recovery/disgorgement of alleged misappropriated amount, which
includes amount claimed in the present suit, both civil and criminal
proceedings are pending in Canada. Accordingly, present suit is nothing but
an attempt to re-litigate the very same issue, which amounts to an abuse of
the process of law. In support of this submission, he has placed reliance on
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the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi & Ors.,
(1998) 3 SCC 573 .
22. On these grounds, Mr. Singh submits that the present suit, which
seeks recovery of CAD 33,354,991 along with rendition of accounts against
defendant nos. 3 to 10 Banks, is fundamentally untenable and liable to be
rejected at the very threshold.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
23. Per contra , Mr. Nakul Dewan, learned Senior Counsel for non-
applicant/plaintiff strongly opposes the instant application by submitting at
the outset that the rejection of the plaint is sought solely by defendant no.1
in respect of reliefs sought against him, whereas distinct and independent
reliefs have also been claimed against the other defendants as well, which
include – (i) a decree for rendition of accounts against defendant nos. 3 to 10
Banks; (ii) various injunctive reliefs against defendant no.11/RBI qua
repatriation of funds; and (iii) a decree praying for interest. He, therefore,
submits that allowing the application filed by defendant no.1 would entail
rejection of plaint in part, which is not permissible in law. Reliance in this
regard is placed on Madhav Prasad Aggarwal and Anr. v. Axis Bank Ltd.
and Anr., (2019) 7 SCC 158 .
24. Further while relying upon Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer
Lunia & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208, Mr. Dewan contends that
selective severance of reliefs is impermissible where different causes of
action are independently pleaded and founded on distinct facts.
25. On the issue of limitation, Mr. Dewan submits that chronology
pleaded in the suit demonstrates that the cause of action did not arise at a
single isolated moment but evolved through successive discoveries,
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compelled disclosures, admissions, judicial findings and forensic
reconstruction, given the sophisticated and well-structured nature of
defendant nos.1 and 2’s fraud.
26. He submits that the plaint and its accompanying documents must be
read as a whole rather than selectively. According to Mr. Dewan, whole
reading of the plaint would clearly demonstrate that sophisticated, complex,
and layered fraud of siphoning public monies under the SFFP and the FFSC
Schemes in Canada was uncovered progressively through continuous and
extensive forensic investigations, interviews, and wiretaps.
27. He submits that although initial irregularities appeared in late 2020,
the nature and extent of fraud was unknown, given that a large number of
bank accounts had been opened and several documents had been fabricated
and ultimately, the suit was filed supported by KPMG India Report dated
07.01.2025, which provided an in-depth analysis of the movement of funds
to India.
28. He submits that in the meanwhile defendant no.1 had also entered into
a partial agreement vide Minutes of Settlement dated 06.03.2025, which was
approved on 24.04.2025, under which he gave his unconditional consent to
the forfeiture and repatriation of INR 65.9 crores [11.1 million CAD] from
his Indian bank accounts, representing a partial portion of CAD 33,345,991
still outstanding.
29. He further submits that given the discovery of fraud was progressive
in nature coupled with the fact that the fraud was layered over several bank
accounts (with several documents being fabricated by the defendant nos.1
and 2), which could not have been discovered without a comprehensive
forensic analysis, the facts to a large extent were discovered and unravelled
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with the forensic report of KPMG dated 07.01.2025. The suit was filed
within 4 months of the receipt of this Report. He submits all these facts,
which made plaintiff to file the instant suit in 2025, have been set out in
paragraphs relating to cause of action and limitation in the plaint.
30. He submits that Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 postpones the
commencement of limitation until plaintiff discovers the fraud, or could with
reasonable diligence have discovered it. Limitation begins only when the
plaintiff has knowledge sufficient to enable him to seek his remedy in Court.
He submits partial knowledge of fraud, where defendant no.1’s conduct
prevents it from becoming full knowledge, does not suffice to commence
limitation. Reliance in this regard is placed on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian &
Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 549 .
31. He submits that defendant nos.1 and 2 have made several
acknowledgments in writing in terms of section 18 of the Limitation Act,
1963, which is clear from (i) the agreed statement of facts signed by
defendant no.1 dated 04.04.2023; (ii) the forfeiture orders dated 04.04.2023;
(iii) letters dated 15.02.2024 and 25.03.2024 addressed by defendant no.1
and (iv) Minutes of Settlement dated 06.03.2025, approved on 24.04.2025.
These documents extend the corresponding limitation to sue, in terms of
section 18 of the Limitation Act,1963.
32. He submits that it is settled law that an acknowledgment need not be
accompanied by a promise to pay, need not specify the exact amount due,
and need not be express; it is sufficient if the statement indicates the
existence of a subsisting jural relationship and an intention to admit it, which
intention may be inferred from the circumstances. Reliance in this regard is
placed on Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy and Anr., (2021) 10 SCC
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330 and Asset Reconstruction Co.(India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal and Anr.,
(2021) 6 SCC 366 .
33. He submits that in any event whether these documents satisfy the
requirements of a valid acknowledgment under Section 18 is itself a matter
for trial and cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of Order VII
Rule 11 CPC.
34. He submits that for recovery/disgorgement of present nature and
rendition of accounts, the limitation accrues in terms of Article 113 of the
schedule to the Limitation Act, which employs the phrase ‘when the right to
sue accrues’ , which is different from provisions like Articles 58, 59, and 104
which use word ‘first accrues’ , therefore, the period of limitation for the
purpose of Article 113 would be differently computed depending upon the
last day when the cause of action therefor arose.
35. He submits that in cases involving fraud, the accrual of course of
action under Article 113 must necessarily be read in conjunction with
section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The right to sue cannot be said to
accrue until the fraud is discovered in the sense contemplated by that
provision. Applying this to the present case, the cause of action, as pleaded,
can be meaningfully asserted only when (i) the forensic link between the
Canadian fraud and specific Indian balances is reconstructed, and (ii)
plaintiff came in possession of material capable of being produced in legal
proceedings. This was possible only with the KPMG report dated
07.01.2025.
36. He submits that the issue of limitation constitutes a mixed question of
fact and law which cannot be decided under Order VII Rule 11.
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37. He submits that application filed by defendant no.1 does not set out or
mention the applicability of any particular Article of the Limitation Act,
1963. He submits that during arguments, Mr. Singh has relied upon Articles
4, 68 and 91(a). It is contended by Mr. Dewan that Mr. Singh’s reliance on
Articles 4, 68, and 91(a) is misconceived for the following reasons:
a) Article 91(a) does not apply to reimbursement of monies
as claimed in the plaint but applies to “compensation” or
“damages”. Since only reimbursement has been sought by
the plaintiff and damages are not claimed, Article 91(a) does
not apply;
b) Article 68 applies to suits for recovery of specific
movable property, not to money claims in restitution,
whereas the present suit seeks a quantified sum representing
fraud proceeds retained in Indian accounts, together with
rendition against the banks holding those accounts; and
c) Article 4 applies to a principal agent relationship.
Defendant no.1 was not an agent of plaintiff but a public
servant whose conduct amounts to fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty [and misconduct].
38. In response to the challenge regarding territorial jurisdiction and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens , Mr. Dewan argues that the plea of forum
non conveniens itself presupposes that this Court possesses the requisite
jurisdiction to try the suit, meaning thereby, it cannot form a ground for non-
suiting the plaintiff or rejecting its plaint under Order VII Rule 11.
39. He submits that in the present case, territorial jurisdiction is
uncontrovertibly established under Section 20(c) for following reasons: (i)
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proceeds from the fraud are retained in identified Indian accounts of
defendant no.1 at ten branches of the banks located in New Delhi; (ii)
rendition of accounts and repatriation directions can only be granted by an
Indian court; and (iii) Canada is not a reciprocating territory under Section
44A CPC, therefore, a Canadian decree cannot be executed directly in India
and a fresh suit on the original cause of action is necessary. Reliance in this
regard is placed on Marine Geotechnics Marine Geotechnics LLC v.
Coastal Marine Construction and Engineering Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine
Bom 309 .
40. He further submits that doctrine of forum non conveniens does not
apply to civil suits governed by Section 20 of the CPC, where even part of
the bundle of essential facts conferring jurisdiction is sufficient. Indubitably,
material components of a transaction, including fund transfers, occurred
within the jurisdiction of this Court (with banks located within the
jurisdiction of this Court). Consequently, this Court is competent to entertain
the suit. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following decisions (i)
Horlicks Ltd. and Anr. v. Heinz India (Pvt.) Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del
3342 , and (ii) Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Puro Wellness Pvt. Ltd., 2019 SCC
OnLine Del 7605 , which in turn relies upon Horlicks (supra).
41. He submits that Canadian criminal convictions, the Restitution Order,
and the partial forfeiture proceedings in Canada are not directly and
substantially the same subject matter as the present suit for recovery of
specific Indian-held balances, rendition of accounts from Indian banks, and
RBI-approved repatriation. Further, the pendency of foreign proceedings
does not bar an Indian court from entertaining a suit. Reliance in this regard
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is placed on Magotteaux Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. AIA Industries Ltd.,
ILR (2009) 3 Delhi 22 .
42. He submits that the present suit, in contrast, seeks recovery of the
balance CAD 33,345,991 lying in specifically identified Indian bank
accounts, together with rendition of accounts against defendant nos.3 to 10
banks; mandatory injunctions against Indian financial institutions, and; RBI
approval of repatriation. The reliefs are distinct, territorially specific, and
cannot be obtained from a Canadian court. The Ontario Superior Court
itself, in both the guilty plea proceedings and the Restitution Order,
expressly preserved the Crown’s right to pursue further civil recovery. He
submits that a suit that pursues reliefs no foreign court could grant, and that
is expressly preserved by the foreign court's own order, cannot be
characterised as “re-litigation” or an abuse of process.
REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS
43. In rejoinder, Mr. Singh submits that for the purpose of Article 68
and Article 91(a) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 the starting
date is the date of first discovery about the misappropriated funds. He
submits that as per para 157 of the plaint, the said date is October 22–23,
2020, as on the said dates ‘two bank statements were obtained and reviewed,
and plaintiff first discovered that illegal funds were transferred to bank
accounts in India.
44. He further submits that plaint in prayer (c) itself seeks rendition of
account in form of complete bank statements from defendant nos.3-10 banks
from 01.01.2011. In that view of the matter, the justification for filing the
suit only after obtaining complete information about the misappropriated
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money transferred in the Indian bank accounts, is ex facie misconceived/
self-defeating.
45. He submits that relief sought in prayer (c) further demonstrates that
present suit has been filed without having complete knowledge and
information regarding the extent of monies misappropriated and transferred
in India. In fact, KPMG Report itself records that future investigation is
ongoing. In other words, KPMG Report dated 07.01.2025 is not conclusive.
Given this position, plaintiff could have very well filed the present suit
earlier, when, as per its own pleaded case and documents filed, it had the
information regarding the figure of substantial misappropriated amount
having been transferred to the Indian bank accounts.
46. He submits that justification of filing the instant suit this late is also
misconceived for two reasons. Firstly, the very same plaintiff initiated civil
proceedings in Canada in October of 2020 itself and continue to amend its
plaint. The same could have been done here as well. Secondly, the Decree
for recovery sought for in the present suit is not completely in line with
KPMG Report, which records that current whereabouts of CAD 27.9
Million out of CAD 40.2 Million, is not known.
47. He submits that filing of the civil proceedings in Canada in October,
2020, itself shows the knowledge of fraud having come to the notice of the
plaintiff at least in October, 2020 itself.
48. He submits that whatever documents on which attention of the Court
has been drawn for showing applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 are no acknowledgement in terms of the said Section for the
reason that whatever has been recorded in the said documents are for the
purpose of compounding of criminal offence.
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49. He submits that Indian banks where the alleged misappropriated
amount have actually been transferred and stashed is not a relevant fact/
circumstances/cause of action for the purpose of grant of a decree of
recovery of alleged misappropriated money against defendant no.1. The
location of the banks may be relevant for executing the decree in terms of
prayer (a) but is not relevant for passing of the decree in terms of prayer (a).
Furthermore, he submits that even the factum of money lying in Indian bank
accounts is an incidental fact and not a material fact.
50. He submits that the fact that a decree granted by Court in Canada
cannot be executed in terms of Section 44A CPC is not a relevant factor for
according territorial jurisdiction to the Indian Courts when, otherwise no
material cause of action for grant of decree in terms of prayer (a) has arisen
in India.
51. As regards doctrine of forum non conveniens , Mr. Singh submits that
the doctrine applies vis-a-vis foreign forum, even though it may not be
applicable when two domestic forums are involved. He submits in the
present facts and situation, the doctrine shall be appliable in view of the fact
that the Courts in Canada (i.e. a foreign forum) are more appropriate Court
of competent jurisdiction to decided the lis . Reliance in this regard is placed
on Horlicks (supra).
ANALYSIS
52. I have heard learned senior counsel for the parties and have perused
the record.
53. The principal objection of defendant no.1/applicant as to the lack of
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and the alternative submission that even
if the small part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this
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Court, the doctrine of forum non-conveniens ought to be invoked in this
case, as the appropriate forum is the forum in Canada, needs to be addressed
first.
54. In the event, defendant no.1/applicant succeeds on this count, the
logical consequence thereof would be the return of plaint and the question of
entertaining other objections with regard to limitation and abuse of process
of law would not arise.
55. The law is well settled that the objection as to territorial jurisdiction
under Order VII Rule 10 CPC has to be appreciated by way of demurrer,
which means that it has to be seen taking all the averments made in the
plaint on its face value. In other words, such objection has to be considered
limited to the averments made in the plaint as well as the documents filed by
the plaintiff, whereas the defence set up by the defendant is irrelevant at that
stage.
56. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of the Division
Bench of this Court in M/s RSPL Ltd. v. Mukesh Sharma & Anr., 2016
SCC OnLine Del 4285 , wherein relying upon the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Exphar SA and Another v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd.
and Another, (2004) 3 SCC 688, following pertinent observations were
made:
“ 11. It must be stated that it is a settled proposition of law
that the objection to territorial jurisdiction in an
application under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC is by way of a
demurrer. This means that the objection to territorial
jurisdiction has to be construed after taking all the
averments in the plaint to be correct. In Exphar
SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Limited : (2004) 3 SCC 688,
the Supreme Court observed that when an objection to
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jurisdiction is raised by way of demurrer and not at the
trial, the objection must proceed on the basis that the facts,
as pleaded by the initiator of the impugned procedure, are
true. The Supreme Court further observed that the objection
as to jurisdiction in order to succeed must demonstrate that
granted those facts, the Court does not have jurisdiction as
a matter of law. It is also a settled proposition of law that
while considering a plaint from the standpoint of Order 7
Rule 10 CPC, it is only the plaint and the documents filed
along with it, that need to be seen. The written statement is
not to be looked into at all .”
(emphasis supplied)

57. Section 20(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 specifically
provides that every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the defendant(s), at the time of commencement of the
suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally
works for gain. Whereas, Section 20(c) provides that a suit may be instituted
in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action
has wholly or partly arisen.
58. Ergo , in order to determine its territorial jurisdiction, this Court needs
to see two things: One , whether any of the defendants, at the time of
commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resided or carried on
business or personally worked for gain, within the local limits of this Court;
Second , whether any cause of action, wholly or in part has arisen within the
local limits of this Court; and for that, this Court has to peruse the relevant
paragraphs in the plaint as regards the cause of action/territorial jurisdiction,
that too, as noted above, only by way of demurrer.
59. It is settled law that a cause of action means every fact, which, if
traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support
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his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts,
which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to
1
relief against the defendant . Reference in this regard may be had to the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in South East Asia Shipping Co.
Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 443, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had articulated the above proposition in the
following words:
“ 3. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle
of facts which give cause to enforce the legal injury for
redress in a court of law. The cause of action means,
therefore, every fact, which if traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a
bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to
them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the
defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant
since in the absence of such an act no cause of action
would possibly accrue or would arise. In view of the
admitted position that contract was executed in Bombay,
i.e., within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay,
performance of the contract was also to be done within the
jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court; merely because
bank guarantee was executed at Delhi and transmitted for
performance to Bombay, it does not constitute a cause of
action to give rise to the respondent to lay the suit on the
original side of the Delhi High Court. The contention that
the Division Bench was right in its finding and that since the
bank guarantee was executed and liability was enforced
from the bank at Delhi, the Court got jurisdiction, cannot be
sustained.”
(emphasis supplied)

1
Swamy Atmananda & Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors., (2005) 10 SCC 51
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60. It is equally settled that for considering the plea for rejection of plaint
under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, the averments made in the plaint alone
have to be seen assuming the same to be correct. The Court cannot at that
stage examine the defence put forth by the defendant in the written
statement or the documents annexed thereto.
61. It is in the light of above settled legal proposition apropos
jurisprudence governing both return and rejection of plaint, the averments
made in the plaint with regard to the arising of cause of action, territorial
jurisdiction and limitation, assumes relevance, and the same are reproduced
herein below for ease of reference:
“7. Defendant No. 1 ("Sanjay") is a Canadian national who
also holds Overseas Citizenship of India. He possesses both
movable and immovable assets and multiple bank accounts
at various banks in India, particularly in New
Delhi……………………….

xxxx xxxx xxxx

8. Shalini Madan is Sanjay Madan's spouse and a Canadian
national. She possesses movable and immovable assets and
jointly holds bank accounts with Sanjay in India,
particularly in New
Delhi……………………………………………………….

xxxx xxxx xxxx

10. ……………. In the Canadian proceedings, Sanjay has
admitted to holding two accounts with Yes Bank, where
illegal funds derived from the fraud were transferred.
Additionally, Sanjay and Shalini jointly hold bank accounts
at Yes Bank branches located in New Delhi. The relief of
rendition of accounts, among other reliefs, has been
sought against Defendant No. 3……………….

11. ………….Sanjay holds two bank accounts with Kotak
Mahindra in New Delhi, where illegal funds derived from
the fraud were transferred. The Plaintiff seeks the relief of
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rendition of accounts, among other reliefs, against
Defendant No. 4………...
xxxx xxxx xxxx

14. ……..Sanjay holds at least two accounts with an IDBI
Bank branch in New Delhi, where illegal funds derived from
the fraud were transferred. The Plaintiff seeks the relief of
rendition of accounts, among other reliefs, against
Defendant No. 7……

15. ……………. Sanjay holds at least two bank accounts
with an Axis Bank branch in New Delhi, where illegal funds
derived from the fraud were transferred. Vidhan also holds
at least two bank accounts with an Axis Bank branch in New
Delhi. The Plaintiff seeks the relief of rendition of
accounts, among other reliefs, against Defendant No. 8.

16. ……………..Sanjay holds at least one bank account with
a PNB branch in New Delhi, where illegal funds derived
from the fraud were transferred. The Plaintiff seeks the
relief of rendition of accounts, among other reliefs,
against Defendant No.9.

17. …………… Sanjay holds at least one account with RBL
Bank in New Delhi, where illegal funds derived from the
fraud were transferred. The Plaintiff seeks the relief of
rendition of accounts, among other reliefs, against
Defendant No. 10.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

92. It is pertinent to note that Sanjay utilized the funds
from the Kickback Scheme to acquire various properties in
Canada and transferred a substantial portion of these
funds to Indian bank accounts via wire transfers, cheques,
or cash. During his interview with the OPP on February 17,
2021, Vidhan Singh stated that Sanjay had offered to assist
him in transferring funds obtained through the Kickback
Scheme (FFSC Fraud) to India for a 10% commission fee.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

94. Between 2011 and 2020, substantial funds were
regularly transferred from bank accounts controlled by the
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Madan Family in Canada to various beneficiary accounts
in India, held primarily by Sanjay and Shalini. These
transfers correspond with the Kickback Scheme's (FFSC
Fraud) operational period and the Support for Families
Program (SFFP). The data from Canadian bank accounts
under the control of the Madan Family aligns with this
timeframe, providing clear evidence of these transactions.

95. Investigations reveal that approximately $40.2 million
was transferred from five Canadian banks to numerous
bank accounts in India, held in the names of Sanjay and
Shalini, across nine different Indian banks . These
transactions were executed through wire transfers and
cheques. A detailed timeline of the movement of funds
from Canada to India is presented in Schedule 7-A of the
Report.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

98. Notably, 80% of the total funds were transferred to three
Indian banks- Induslnd Bank, ICICI Bank, and Yes Bank
Ltd. - all in accounts held by Sanjay and
Shalini……………………….

xxxx xxxx xxxx

100. Further investigation has identified additional bank
accounts held by Sanjay and Shalini in India, which were
used to receive the illegally obtained
funds ………………………

xxxx xxxx xxxx

Cause of Action

157. The cause of action for filing the present suit arose in
favour of the Plaintiff on October 22-23, 2020, when,
during investigations in Canada, two bank statements were
obtained and reviewed, and the Plaintiff first discovered
that illegal funds were transferred from accounts
controlled by Sanjay and Shalini in Canada to bank
accounts in India. Thereafter, the cause of action arose on
October 27-28, 2020, when KPMG LLP (Canada) received
bank support from SBI Canada and ICICI Canada, which
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confirmed the transfer of illegal funds to bank accounts in
India . The cause of action further arose on December 7,
2020, when Mr. Peter Armstrong (from KPMG LLP
(Canada)) filed an Affidavit in the Canadian proceedings
highlighting the movement of illicit funds to bank
accounts controlled by Sanjay and Shalini in India.
Additional causes of action arose on December 18, 2020,
when Sanjay submitted his asset affidavit in the Civil
Action, revealing the assets he held in India, and on
January 8, 2021, when Sanjay, during his cross-
examination on his sworn affidavit, in the Civil Action,
admitted to his involvement in the Kickback Scheme
(FFSC Fraud).
xxx xxx xxx
158. The cause of action further arose on January 29, 2021,
when the Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued a
Worldwide Mareva Injunction against the Defendant Nos. 1
and 2, restraining them from dealing with their assets
located anywhere in the world. A further cause of action
arose on February13, 2021, when the Plaintiff pursued
freezing of the accounts held with Defendant Nos. 5, 6 and
7, but the Plaintiff's requests were neither acknowledged
nor accepted. On February 18, 2021, Defendant No. 5
refused to comply with the freezing request, citing the
absence of an Indian court order.

159. The cause of action also arose on June 8, 2021, when
Sanjay was examined in the Civil Action and admitted to
using funds from the Kickback Scheme (FFSC Fraud) to
purchase moveable and immoveable assets. Additionally,
another cause of action arose on April 7, 2022, when the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, on the Crown's motion,
waived the deemed and implied undertaking rules,
authorizing the use of evidence from the Canadian
proceedings in the present suit to be filed in India.

160.The cause of action arose on April 4, 2023, when
Sanjay Madan entered a guilty plea before the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, admitting to defrauding the
Government of Ontario, and acknowledging that monies
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were due and recoverable, and was sentenced to 10 years of
imprisonment. It further arose on November 27, 2023, when
Sanjay Madan's accomplice, Vidhan Singh, entered a guilty
plea, which was accepted by the Canadian Court. The
cause of action also arose on January 7, 2025, when
KPMG LLP (Canada) furnished its Madan Investigation
Report for India, which provided critical evidence of the
flow of funds from Canada to Indian bank accounts
during the relevant period. The Investigation Report
prepared by KPMG LLP (Canada) has been instrumental
in unveiling the vast scope of the fraud perpetrated by
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and in tracing the diversion of
funds originating in Canada. Upon receipt of the Report,
the Plaintiff was able to fully comprehend the nature and
extent of the fraud, thereby providing the necessary
particulars to initiate the present suit for injunction,
recovery of the remaining sums, and rendition of
accounts . The cause of action further arose on April 24,
2025, when the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
approved the settlement in the civil proceedings under
which Sanj ay Madan consented to the forfeiture of INR
65.9 Crores from his Indian bank accounts, which is part
of the $33,345,991 (excluding interest or gains) to be
recovered by the Plaintiff, as well as the need for further
disclosures through rendition of accounts to identify
additional illicit funds or assets. The cause of action
continues to subsist on a continuing basis, for each day
that the remaining monies remain unrecovered,
undisclosed, or unaccounted for, thereby resulting in a
continuing deprivation of public funds rightfully owed to
the Plaintiff.

Limitation
161. The present suit is well within the prescribed period
of limitation under Indian law, as it has been instituted
within three years from the dates on which the causes of
action arose, as enumerated and explained in the
foregoing paragraphs . In addition, Defendant Nos. 1 and
2 have made express acknowledgments of liability during
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proceedings in Canada, which constitute
acknowledgments within the meaning of Section 18 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, thereby reviving and extending the
limitation period for the present claims . These
acknowledgments are contained in the Agreed Statement of
Facts recorded in the course of guilty plea proceedings held
on April 4, 2023 and November 27, 2023, before the 91
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, by Defendant Nos. 1 and
2 respectively.
Furthermore, the Minutes of Settlement dated March 6,
2025, approved on April 24, 2025, wherein Defendant No.
1 consented to the forfeiture of INR 65.9 Crores from his
Indian bank accounts, constitutes an additional
acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 18 of the
Limitation Act .
Furthermore, and without prejudice to the above, the
Plaintiff submits that even under Section 17 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation would
commence only from the date the fraud was discovered,
which occurred progressively, as outlined in the forensic
investigation report and disclosures mentioned in the
foregoing paragraphs.
XII. JURISDICTION
162.This Hon'ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to
try the present Suit as most of the bank accounts used for
transfer of the illegally obtained funds and/or those
suspected of holding such funds are situated within the
territorial limits of Delhi. In light of the investigation
revealing that the trail of illicit funds transferred to Indian
bank accounts can be last traced in Delhi , it is evident that
at least a part of the cause of action has arisen within the
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court . Therefore, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, which stipulates that a suit may
be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the cause of action has wholly or partly arisen,
the Plaintiff is filing the present Suit before this Hon'ble
Court . Further, as the value of the suit exceeds INR 2
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crores, this Hon'ble Court also has the requisite pecuniary
jurisdiction.”

(emphasis supplied)

62. For ascertaining whether this Court has the territorial jurisdiction in
terms of Section 20 CPC, the relevant averments in the plaint, which are
reproduced herein above, would reveal that it has been pleaded therein that
the bank accounts used by defendant nos.1 and 2 for transfer of illegally
obtained funds have been maintained with the defendant banks which are
located within the territorial limits of this Court i.e. Delhi. It is further
pleaded that the investigation conducted by the plaintiff has also revealed
that the alleged illicit funds transferred to Indian bank accounts can be
traced in Delhi. Indubitably, reading of plaint as a whole would reveal that
the part of cause of action involving transfer of funds has occurred within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, which furnishes to the plaintiff a
right to claim relief against the defendants, therefore, this Court has the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the present suit.
63. That apart, a specific prayer for passing a preliminary decree for
rendition of accounts against defendant nos.1 to 10, which includes the
banks/financial institutions [i.e. defendant nos.3 to 10] situated within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, has also been made in the Suit. Even the
relief has specifically been claimed against defendant no.11/RBI for
approving foreign remittance of funds from Indian bank accounts held by
defendant nos.1 and 2 to the plaintiff. Since the said defendants nos. 3 to 11
are carrying on their businesses within the local limits of this Court, in that
view of the matter as well, this Court would have the territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the present suit against the defendant nos. 3 to 11.
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64. It has also been argued on behalf of the plaintiff that Canada is not a
2
reciprocating territory in terms of Section 44A CPC , which position has not
been disputed on behalf of the defendant no.1. Reciprocating territory as per
Section 44A means any country or territory outside India, which the Central
Government may, by way of notification in the Official Gazette, declare to
be a reciprocating territory and ' Superior Courts ' in relation to such a
territory for the said Section. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact
that the Central Government has in exercise of the powers conferred upon it
3
by Explanation I to Section 44A has declared by way of separate Gazette
notifications approximately 12 countries to have reciprocal arrangement
with India, but Canada has not been so notified.
65. The law is well settled that a decree or a judgment of a foreign
country which has not been declared as a “Reciprocating Territory” by the
4
Central Govt. is not executable in India. The learned Single Judge of
Bombay High Court in Marine Geotechnics LLC. v. Costal Marine
Construction and Engineering Ltd., (2014) SCC OnLine Bom 309 ,
observed that since the decree of court in a non-reciprocating foreign
territory cannot be executed, the party possessing such a decree has two
options – either to file a suit in the domestic Indian court of competent
jurisdiction premised on such foreign decree or a suit based on the original

2
Section 44A. Execution of decrees passed by Courts in reciprocating territory.- (1) Where a certified
copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District
Court, the decree may be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court.
3
Explanation I .-" Reciprocating territory" means any country or territory outside India which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the
purposes of this section; and "superior Courts", with reference to any such territory, means such Courts as
may be specified in the said notification.
4
1 998 SCC OnLine Del 743 : Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Chauhan & Ors.


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underlying cause of action, or on both. The relevant extract from the said
decision is reproduced herein below for ready reference:
“21. Armed with a decree of a court in a non-
reciprocating foreign territory, what must a party do in
India ? His option is to file, in a domestic Indian court of
competent jurisdiction, a suit on that foreign decree, or on
the original, underlying cause of action, or both (Badat
and Co. v. East India Trading Co., AIR 1964 SC 538 ;
(1964) 66 BLR 402). He cannot simply execute such a
foreign decree. He can only execute the resultant domestic
decree . To obtain that decree, he must show that the foreign
decree, if he sues on it, satisfies the tests of section 13. If the
decree is, on the other hand, of a court in a reciprocating
territory, then he can straightaway put it into execution,
following the procedure under section 44A and Order 21,
rule 22 of the CPC. At that time, the judgment-debtor can
resist the decree holder by raising any of the grounds under
section 13. If he does not, or fails in his attempt, the decree
will be executed as if it were a decree passed by a
competent court in India.”
(emphasis supplied)

66. This Court also in Century Metal Recycling Private Limited v.
Sachin Chhabra & Ors. 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12582 , in the context of
foreign judgment from a non-reciprocating territory, observed that though a
suit can be filed in India based on such judgment but still the plaintiff will
have to show that the cause of action therefor accrued within the territory of
India, jurisdiction whereof is invoked or that the defendant, at the time of
commencement of suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain within the said territory. The relevant
extract of the decision reads thus:
“26. I am afraid, Section 13 of the CPC does not provide for
filing of a suit. Section 13 merely provides for cases in
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which a foreign judgment would be conclusive and in
which it would not and though undoubtedly on the foreign
judgment of a territory with which India does not have
reciprocity treaty, a suit can be filed in India but the
plaintiff would still have to show that the cause of action
therefor accrued within the territory of India, jurisdiction
whereof is invoked or that the defendant, at the time of
commencement of suit, actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business or personally works for grain within
the said territory. If no cause of action is shown to have
accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court or if the
defendants are not shown to be so residing in or carrying on
business within the jurisdiction of this Court, nothing in
Section 13 of the CPC can entitle the plaintiff to institute a
suit in this Court.”
(emphasis supplied)

67. Reference may also be beneficially had to the decision in Elis Jane
Quinlan & Ors. v. Naveen Kumar Seth , 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 1011 ,
wherein it was observed as under:
“23. Ordinarily, when foreign court passes a judgment and
a decree, which is sought to be executed in India, a suit
needs to be filed in Indian court, which needs to conduct an
inquiry into existence of circumstances under clauses (a) to
(f) of Section 13 of the Code. Thus, a decree of a foreign
court is not executable in Indian courts unless Indian
court makes a decree on the foreign judgment. However,
Section 44A of the Code makes an exception where a
decree is passed by foreign courts in reciprocating
territories. Reciprocating territory means a country or
territory outside India which the Central Government
declares to be a reciprocating territory by issuance of a
Notification. When a decree is made by Superior Courts of
any reciprocating territory, the same can be filed in a
District Court and it can be executed by the District Court
as if it has been passed by the District Court itself . Section
44A of the Code provides thus: […]”

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xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
24. Thus, there is a vital distinction between the decree
passed by the foreign court in non-reciprocating territory
and a decree passed by the foreign court in reciprocating
territory. In the former case, the decree is not directly
executable, and it is necessary to institute a suit on foreign
judgment to secure a domestic decree on the foreign
judgment. However, in the latter case, the decree passed by
the foreign court in reciprocating territory can be directly
executed by the District Court . However, even while
executing the decree of a foreign court in reciprocating
territory, the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of
Section 13 of the Code continue to apply and the District
Court can refuse execution if the decree demonstrably falls
in any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of
Section 13 of the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)


68. As can be seen from the above, since India does not have a reciprocal
treaty with Canada, the decree obtained by the plaintiff in Canada would not
be executable in India. Even after obtaining the decree from Canada, the
plaintiff will still have to file a suit in Delhi where the monies transferred by
defendant no.1 to his various accounts maintained with defendant nos. 3 to
10 banks is stated to be lying, either based on such a decree or on the basis
of underlying original cause of action, or both. In that view of the matter as
well, no useful purpose will be served by asking the plaintiff to first obtain a
decree from Canada, and then to file a suit in Delhi; rather it would be waste
of time and effort when eventually the suit has to be filed within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, again showing that the cause of action
has arisen in Delhi or at the time of commencement of suit, defendants
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works
for gain within Delhi.
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69. Now adverting to the contention of the applicant/defendant no.1 that
this Court is forum non-conveniens , therefore, the suit may not be
entertained, it is to be noted that it is a trite law that the doctrine of forum
non-conveniens does not apply to the civil suits in India which are governed
by the provisions of CPC. Such a doctrine can though be invoked in an anti-
suit injunction filed in the domestic Court in respect of a foreign forum ,
however, the present is not such a case.
70. The law in this regard has been exposited by the Division Bench of
this Court in Horlicks (supra). The relevant extract from the said decision
reads thus:
“Legal position

43. The legal position arising from the conspectus of the
aforesaid judgments is thus abundantly clear that the
principle of anti-suit injunction and forum non
conveniens do apply to the foreign forums/Courts once the
test laid down for exercise of such jurisdiction is satisfied
and this legal position is prevalent in UK, USA, Australia,
Canada as also in India. The option under the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908.
xxx xxx xxx

55. The moot point, however, remains as to whether the
exercise of power of anti-suit injunction in respect of
another domestic forum or of the principle of forum non
conveniens is something which is permissible under
Section 151 of the said Code as being matters which are
not envisaged. Once again as noticed above, there is really
no dispute that Section 151 of the said Code is the
fountain from which flows the power to stay another suit
or to give a finding that the Court where the suit is filed is
not the forum convenience in respect of matters where
litigation has been instituted in foreign forums. However,
its application to domestic forums would have to be dealt
with separately as there are pronouncements dealing with
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this aspect in different situations as also legislative
enactments taking into consideration the earlier legal
perspective and providing for a change in the legal position
by specific acts of the legislature. Doctrine of anti-suit
injunction and the principle of forum non conveniens as
applicable to domestic forums.

56. The crux of the issue in the present case is the
applicability of the principles of forum non conveniens
i.e. whether the Court in which the suit is filed and which
would otherwise have jurisdiction under the said Code can
non-suit the plaintiff on the ground that there is a better
situated forum to decide the matter in issue and the Court
where the suit is filed is forum non conveniens. The
learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment has taken
a view that this is permissible . The contention of the
respondent that the principle of forum non conveniens being
the other side of the coin of the doctrine of anti-suit
injunction and having been applied to domestic forums of
the Indian Courts, there could be no doubt that the principle
of forum non conveniens would equally apply. It would thus
be appropriate to consider the issue of applicability of the
doctrine of anti-suit injunction to domestic forums.
xxx xxx xxx
65. In our considered view, there is little doubt in the legal
proposition that an anti-suit injunction cannot be issued
by a domestic forum against another domestic forum in
India in view of the specific bar contained in Section 41(b)
of the said Act. The only thing now to be considered is
whether there can be a different legal position applicable to
the principle of forum non conveniens. The plea of the
learned Counsel for the respondent, in fact, was that since
anti-suit injunction could be granted, principles of forum
non conveniens would apply as it would be the other side of
the same coin. If that be so, nothing survives in the
contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent. We,
however, consider it appropriate to discuss some of the
judgments referred to by learned Counsel for the parties in
support of their respective pleas.
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xxx xxx xxx
78. The aforesaid exposition thus shows that principles
while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot ipso facto
be applied to a civil proceeding governed by the said Code .
Not only that, the principle of forum non
conveniens emerged as a principle of admiralty law
applicable primarily to foreign forums. It finds no place in
a domestic forum in India. The plaintiff is always
the dominus litis and so long as the Court has jurisdiction
to try a suit, a party cannot be non-suited. A suit has to be
governed by the provisions of the said Code. In this context,
we may refer to the observations made in Abdul
Gafur v. State of Uttarakhand, (2008) 10 SCC 97, where the
Supreme Court held that since Section 9 of the said Code
provides that a civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all
suits of civil nature excepting the suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred, the civil
Courts have inherent jurisdiction unless a part of that
jurisdiction is carved out. Thus, the law confers on every
person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of
one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim
may be, unless it is barred by a statute. It was further
observed that a plaint can only be rejected in terms of
Order 7 Rule 11 of the said Code and similarly a plea of bar
to jurisdiction of a civil Court can be examined.
xxx xxx xxx
80. We have found that there have been some passing
references made to the principle of forum non
conveniens. Some of them are in the context of exercising
writ jurisdiction while others are in the context of a
foreign forum . Every judgment is not to be treated as a
precedent nor every passing sentence in a judgment is to be
read as a provision in a statute.
xxx xxx xxx
88. We are in agreement with the submissions of the
learned Counsel for the appellants that if the principle
of forum non conveniens would be applied to a civil suit
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governed by the said Code, the plaintiff would be left in the
dark. There may be more than one Court which may have
jurisdiction in the matter but so long as a particular Court
has the jurisdiction, the privilege is of the plaintiff . The
plaintiff may be made to run from one Court to the other
without knowing where the initial case ought to be
instituted. Such a situation is not envisaged by the said
Code.
xxx xxx xxx
Conclusion
91. The appeals had been argued at length. The legal
position enunciated in different countries was cited before
us. This required all the aspects and the judgments to be
analyzed. The fact, however, remains that there was really
no dispute about the applicability of the doctrine of anti-
suit injunction and the principle of forum non
conveniens as applicable to foreign forums . The question
was only whether the principle of forum non
conveniens would apply to domestic forums and the same
required consideration of the application of doctrine of anti-
suit injunction to domestic forums on account of direction of
the arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondent
that the principle of forum non conveniens was the other
side of the coin of the doctrine of anti-suit injunction. The
factual aspect which required consideration was even if
such a principle of forum non conveniens was applicable in
the given facts of a case whether it could be said that such a
principle ought to have been applied to the present case and
the nature of relief.
92. On the conspectus of the aforesaid, we hold as under :
(i) The doctrine of anti-suit injunction though may be
applicable both in foreign forums and domestic forums in
different countries has no place in India regarding
another domestic forum in view of the specific bar created
by Section 41(b) of the said Act as interpreted in Cotton
Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank
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Limited case (supra). It would apply only in case of a
foreign forum or in a situation where an injunction is
sought against a domestic Court which is subordinate to
the one where such an application is made.
(ii) The principle of forum non conveniens applies to
foreign forums and Indian Courts can apply the said
principle vis-a-vis foreign forums or while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
(iii) The principle of forum non conveniens does not apply
to civil suits in India which are governed by the said Code,
there being no provision under the Code for the same and
recourse to Section 151, CPC is not permissible for
application of the principle of forum non conveniens to
domestic forums especially keeping in mind that it is the
other side of the coin of the doctrine of anti-suit
injunction. An aggrieved party can, however, approach the
Supreme Court under Section 25 of the said Code.
(iv) The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge
rejecting and returning the plaint cannot be sustained and is
thus set aside.
(v) In the given facts of the case, even otherwise, if the
principle of forum non conveniens had been applicable,
then there was no reason not to proceed with the suits on
merits.
(vi) The interlocutory applications for injunction would be
required to be heard on merits by the learned Single Judge
and decided in accordance with law.”
(emphasis supplied)
71. As can be seen from above, the plaintiff is always the dominus
litis and so long as the Court has jurisdiction to try a suit, a party cannot be
non-suited. A suit has to be governed by the CPC. The principle of forum
non-conveniens in a suit governed by provisions of CPC applies only in
respect of foreign forum and that too in an exceptional circumstance, when a
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suit is filed as an anti-suit injunction to prevent a proceeding in the foreign
forum from becoming vexatious and oppressive. The said principle has no
applicability in the suits filed in the domestic forums in India as they are
governed by the CPC, although the writ courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution may refuse to exercise jurisdiction in appropriate cases
invoking the doctrine of forum non-conveniens . Even in the context of
foreign forums as well, the principle of forum non-conveniens has been held
to be the other side of the coin of the doctrine of anti-suit injunction.
72. In light of the above exposition, this Court is of the considered view
that since it is not an anti-suit injunction, therefore, the doctrine of forum
non-conveniens cannot be invoked in the present case. Accordingly, the
alternative plea of forum non-conveniens as articulated by the defendant
no.1/applicant is also rejected.
73. Insofar as defendant no.1/applicant’s objection that the suit is barred
by limitation is concerned, it is to be noted that the plaintiff has sought to
invoke Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter ‘the Act’) to
contend that the period of limitation would commence only from the date
the fraud was discovered, which occurred progressively, as last as on
07.01.2025, when KPMG LLP (Canada) furnished its Madan Investigation
Report for India providing critical evidence of flow of funds from Canada to
Indian Bank accounts during the relevant period.
74. To appreciate the controversy as to limitation, it would be apposite to
reproduce Section 17 of the Limitation Act, which deals with the effect of
fraud or mistake and reads thus:
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“17. Effect of fraud or mistake.— (1) Where, in the case of
any suit or application for which a period of limitation is
prescribed by this Act,—
(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the
defendant or respondent or his agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or
application is founded is concealed by the fraud of any
such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences
of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the right of
the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently concealed
from him,

the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the
plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the
mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered it ; or in the case of a concealed document, until
the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of
producing the concealed document or compelling its
production :

Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any
suit to be instituted or application to be made to recover or
enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction
affecting, any property which—

(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable
consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud
and did not at the time of the purchase know, or have
reason to believe, that any fraud had been committed, or
(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable
consideration subsequently to the transaction in which the
mistake was made, by a person who did not know, or have
reason to believe, that the mistake had been made, or
(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has been
purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was
not a party to the concealment and, did not at the time of
purchase know, or have reason to believe, that the document
had been concealed.

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(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force,
prevented the execution of a decree or order within the
period of limitation, the court may, on the application of the
judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the said period
extend the period for execution of the decree or order:
Provided that such application is made within one year
from the date of the discovery of the fraud or the cessation
of force, as the case may be.”
(emphasis supplied)

75. In Pallav Sheth (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion
to consider the import and scope of Section 17 of the Limitation Act. The
relevant observation of the Court reads thus:
“47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides
that where, in the case of any suit or application for which
a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the
knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or
application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the
defendant or his agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any
document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff
or the applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him
[Section 17(1)(d)], the period of limitation shall not begin
to run until the plaintiff or the applicant has discovered
the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed
document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the
means of producing the concealed document or
compelling its production. These provisions embody
fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. that a party
should not be penalised for failing to adopt legal
proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to
do so have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a
party who has acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit
of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud.”

(emphasis supplied)

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76. Reference may also advantageously be had to the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saranpal Kaur Anand v. Praduman Singh
Chandhok and Ors., 2022 8 SCC 401 , wherein the Court while construing
the provisions of Section 17 of the Act made the following relevant
observations:
“11. The general principle, which also manifests itself in
Section 17 of the Limitation Act, is that every person is
presumed to know his own legal right and title in the
property, and if he does not take care of his own right and
title to the property, the time for filing of the suit based on
such a right or title to the property is not prevented from
running against him. The provisions of Section 17(1)
embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz.
that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt
legal proceedings when the facts or the documents have
been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party
who had acted fraudulently should not be given the benefit
of limitation running in its favour by virtue of such frauds.
[Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549] However it
is important to remember that Section 17 does not defer the
starting point of limitation merely because the defendant
has committed a fraud. Section 17 does not encompass all
kinds of frauds, but specific situations covered by clauses
(a) to (d) to Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act. Sections
17(1)(b) and (d) encompass only those fraudulent
documents or acts of concealment of documents which have
the effect of suppressing knowledge entitling the party to
pursue his legal remedy. Once a party becomes aware of
antecedent facts necessary to pursue legal proceedings, the
period of limitation commences. [P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok
Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 773]

12. Therefore in the event the plaintiff makes out a case
that falls within any or more of the four clauses to sub-
section (1) to Section 17 of the Limitation Act, the period
of limitation for filing of the suit shall not begin to run
until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the
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fraud/mistake or could with reasonable diligence have
discovered it or if the document is concealed till the
plaintiff has the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production a fortiori.

13. “Diligence” as a word of common parlance means
attention, carefulness, and persistence in efforts of doing
something. [ P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Major Law Lexicon
(4th Edn., Lexis Nexis Publication)] This Court in Chander
Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand [Chander Kanta
Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117] , in
reference to the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code,
defined “diligence” as : (SCC pp. 122-23, para 16)

“16. … According to Oxford Dictionary (Edn. 2006),
the word “diligence” means careful and persistent
application or effort. “Diligent” means careful and
steady in application to one's work and duties,
showing care and effort. As per Black's Law
Dictionary (18th Edn.), “diligence” means a
continual effort to accomplish something, care;
caution; the attention and care required from a
person in a given situation.”

14. The word “diligence” read with the word “reasonable”
in the context of Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act is
subjective and relative, and would depend upon
circumstances of which the actor called upon to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. Vague clues or hints
may not matter. Whether the plaintiff/applicant had the
means to know the fraud is a relevant consideration. It is
manifest that Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act does not
protect a party at fault for failure to exercise reasonable
diligence when the circumstances demand such exercise
and on exercise of which the plaintiff/applicant could have
discovered the fraud. When the time starts ticking
subsequent events will not stop the limitation . The time
starts running from the date of knowledge of the
fraud/mistake ; or the plaintiff/applicant when required to
exercise reasonable diligence could have first known or
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discovered the fraud or mistake . In case of a concealed
document, the period of limitation will begin to run when
the plaintiff/applicant had the means of producing the
concealed document or compelling its production.

15. Thus when the plaintiff relies on Section 17(1)(b) of the
Limitation Act asserting fraud or mistake, he has to state the
date on which he has discovered the fraud or mistake, and
also state that he could not have discovered the fraud or
mistake with reasonable diligence on a date earlier than on
which he has based his cause of action.”
(emphasis supplied)

77. Clearly, the time starts running from the date of knowledge of the
fraud/mistake; or the plaintiff could have first known or discovered the fraud
or mistake by exercising reasonable diligence. It is thus, manifest that
Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act does not protect a party at fault for
failure to exercise reasonable diligence when the circumstances demand
such exercise and on exercise of which the plaintiff/applicant could have
discovered the fraud.
78. Indubitably, the questions that whether the documents or material had
been fraudulently concealed by the defendant no.1 from the plaintiff or the
plaintiff had the means to know the fraud or the plaintiff had exercised
reasonable diligence, are not only relevant considerations, but the same are
questions of fact.
79. However, in the context of plea of limitation raised in terms of Order
VII Rule 11(d) what is significant is to examine, are the averments made in
the plaint. The relevant averments which are germane for the issue reads
thus:
“155. The mediated settlement strengthens the evidentiary
foundation of the Plaintiff's claims in the present Suit. It
records Defendant No.1's explicit consent to the forfeiture of
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INR 65.9 Crores from accounts held by him in India and
establishes a framework for the repatriation of such funds
through proceedings to be initiated before Indian courts. As
reflected in the Madan Investigation Report for India,
prepared by KPMG LLP (Canada) dated January 7, 2025,
a total of CAD 40,243,986 was transferred from Canada to
India, of which CAD 6,897,995 was repatriated by October
2020, leaving a balance of CAD 33,345,991 (exclusive of
interest or gains) to be recovered. The INR 65.9 Crores
identified in the Canadian settlement constitutes a partial
portion of the outstanding balance of CAD 33,345,991 that
is still to be recovered. The settlement and the admissions
contained therein substantiate the Plaintiffs assertions
regarding the unlawful diversion of public funds and bolster
the necessity of pursuing interim relief to prevent further
dissipation of assets, as well as discovery and rendition of
accounts for the identification and recovery of remaining
sums.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
160. The cause of action arose on April 4, 2023, when
Sanjay Madan entered a guilty plea before the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, admitting to defrauding the
Government of Ontario, and acknowledging that monies
were due and recoverable, and was sentenced to 10 years of
imprisonment. It further arose on November 27, 2023, when
Sanjay Madan's accomplice, Vidhan Singh, entered a guilty
plea, which was accepted by the Canadian Court. The
cause of action also arose on January 7, 2025, when
KPMG LLP (Canada) furnished its Madan Investigation
Report for India, which provided critical evidence of the
flow of funds from Canada to Indian bank accounts
during the relevant period. The Investigation Report
prepared by KPMG LLP (Canada) has been instrumental
in unveiling the vast scope of the fraud perpetrated by
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and in tracing the diversion of
funds originating in Canada. Upon receipt of the Report,
the Plaintiff was able to fully comprehend the nature and
extent of the fraud, thereby providing the necessary
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particulars to initiate the present suit for injunction,
recovery of the remaining sums, and rendition of
accounts. The cause of action further arose on April 24,
2025, when the Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved
the settlement in the civil proceedings under which Sanjay
Madan consented to the forfeiture of INR 65. 9 Crores from
his Indian bank accounts, which is part of the $33,345,991
(excluding interest or gains) to be recovered by the Plaintiff,
as well as the need for further disclosures through rendition
of accounts to identify additional illicit funds or assets. The
cause of action continues to subsist on a continuing basis,
for each day that the remaining monies remain
unrecovered, undisclosed, or unaccounted for, thereby
resulting in a continuing deprivation of public funds
rightfully owed to the Plaintiff.

161. [….] Furthermore, and without prejudice to the
above, the Plaintiff submits that even under Section 17 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation would
commence only from the date the fraud was discovered,
which occurred progressively, as outlined in the forensic
investigation report and disclosures mentioned in the
foregoing paragraphs. ”
(emphasis supplied)

80. Once the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the forensic report
dated 07.01.2025 of KPMG LLP (Canada) provided critical evidence of the
flow of funds from Canada to Indian bank accounts during the relevant
period and that it only upon receipt of said report, the plaintiff was able to
fully comprehend the nature and extent of the fraud, which provided the
necessary particulars to initiate the present suit for injunction, recovery of
the remaining sums, and rendition of accounts, at this stage there is no
reason not to accept the same. Such an averment becomes a mixed question
of law and fact that cannot be decided summarily at this threshold stage
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under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at
this stage holding that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation.
81. Reference in this regard may had to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy (2015) 8 SCC 331 ,
wherein it was observed that the conditions precedent to terminate a civil
action at the threshold are stringent, more so when rejection of plaint is
sought on the ground of limitation. It was further held that when plaintiff
claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to cause of
action, at a particular point of time, the same has to accepted. The relevant
portion of the decision reads thus:
“6 . In the present case, reading the plaint as a whole and
proceeding on the basis that the averments made therein are
correct, which is what the Court is required to do, it cannot
be said that the said pleadings ex facie disclose that the suit
is barred by limitation or is barred under any other
provision of law. The claim of the plaintiffs with regard to
the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause
of action as pleaded will have to be accepted as correct. At
the stage of consideration of the application under Order 7
Rule 11 the stand of the defendants in the written statement
would be altogether irrelevant.”
(emphasis supplied)

82. Likewise, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jaikrushnabhai Thakkar,
(2018) 6 SCC 422 , it was pointed out that the date on which the plaintiffs
gained knowledge of essential facts is relevant for deciding as to whether the
suit is barred by limitation or not. Such a plea, it was held, becomes a
triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.
83. There is another facet to the question of limitation. It has been
contended on behalf of the defendant no.1 that the suit of the plaintiff shall
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be governed by the limitation period as prescribed under Article 4, 68 and
91(a) of the Act. To appreciate the submissions on behalf of defendant no.1 /
applicant, relevant it would be to set out the said Articles from the Schedule
to the limitation, which reads thus:
Article Description of suit Period of
limitation
Time from
which period
begins to run
PART I. - SUITS RELATING TO ACCOUNTS
Other suits by principals against
4.
agents for neglect or misconduct
Three years
When the neglect
or misconduct
becomes known to
the plaintiff.
PART VI.—SUITS RELATING TO MOVABLE PROPERTY
For specific movable property
68.
lost, or acquired by theft, or
dishonest misappropriation or
conversion


Three years
When the person
having the right to
the possession of
the property first
learns in whose
possession it is.



PART VII.—SUITS RELATING TO TORT
For compensation.-
91.
(a) for wrongfully taking or
detaining any specific movable
property lost, or acquired by theft,
or dishonest misappropriation, or
conversion;
Three years When the person
having the right to
the possession of
the property first
learns in whose
possession it is.

84. Article 4 is applicable to the suits by principals against agents for
neglect or misconduct. The present suit is not a suit filed by the principal
against its agent for any alleged neglect or misconduct. Rather, it is the
plaintiff’s pleaded case that defendant no.1 was working as Sr. Govt. official
with Government of Onterio, and has allegedly committed fraud, making it
clear that there was neither principal-agent relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant no.1 nor suit has been filed alleging misconduct or neglect on
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part of defendant no.1. Likewise, it is also not the case of defendant no.1
that he was working as agent for the plaintiff. Further, since the present suit
inter alia seeks recovery of monies obtained through fraud, Article 4 would
not apply to the present suit.
85. Article 68 of the Schedule of the Act in Part VI titled as “suits
relating to movable properties” provides limitation period of three years in
case of suit filed for ‘specific movable property’ lost, or acquired by theft, or
dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Whereas, Article 91(a) in Part VII
titled as “suits relating to tort” of the Schedule provides limitation period of
three years for the suit claiming compensation for wrongfully taking or
detaining any ‘specific movable property’ lost or acquired by theft or
dishonest misappropriation, or conversion.
86. Incidentally, both the Articles 68 and 91(a) use the expression
‘specific movable property’ . A Coordinate Bench of this Court in K. K.
Sharma v. M/s. City Bank and Anr., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12283
observed that Article 68 of the Act has no application to monies as the same
applies only to movable properties and not monies. The relevant paragraphs
from the said decision reads thus:
“17. Article 68 of the Limitation Act also would have no
application because the subject matter of this Article is
movable properties and not monies . Movable properties
not being monies, there does not arise any issue of any
misappropriation or conversion under Article 68 of the
Limitation Act if monies are wrongfully collected by the
defendant no. 1/Bank for its customer. The present case
would really be a case of illegal endorsement not falling
within Sections 14 and 15 of the N.I. Act and the present
case is property first learns in whose possession it is. not a
case of recovery of specific movable property under Article
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68 of the Limitation Act. This argument of the plaintiff is
also therefore rejected.”
(emphasis supplied)

87. The applicant/defendant no.1 has not pointed out any other specific
Article from the Schedule of the Act which would apply to the subject
matter of the present suit viz . recovery of fraudulently transferred money to
Indian Banks and rendition of accounts by such banks in respect of such
money, and in the prima facie opinion of this Court their exists none.
88. It is trite that if a suit is not covered by any specific Article under the
Schedule to the Act, then it would fall within the realm of residuary Article
viz . Article 113. The said Article prescribes the limitation period of three
years for filing any suit for which no period of limitation is provided
elsewhere in the Schedule and the limitation period for filing such a suit
begins to run “when the right to sue accrues” .
89. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. West
Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Another, (2004) 2 SCC 747, had an occasion to
examine the expression “when the right to sue first accrues” as used in
Article 58 in contradistinction to the expression “when the right to sue
accrues” used in Article 113 of the Act. For ready reference, Articles 58
and 113 of the Act are reproduced herein below:
Description of suit Period of
limitation
Time from
which period
begins to run
58. To obtain any other
declaration.
Three years When the
right to sue
first accrues .
*
113. Any suit for which no
period of limitation is
Three years When the
right to sue
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provided elsewhere in this
Schedule.
accrues .
_____________________________________________________________
90. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noting the distinction between
expressions used in Articles 58 and 113 observed that in case of Article 113,
the period of limitation would be reckoned from the date on which cause of
action arose first. However, under Article 113, the limitation would be
reckoned from the ‘last day’ when the cause of action arose. The relevant
extract from the said decision reads thus:
“21. A distinction furthermore, which is required to be
noticed is that whereas in terms of Article 58 the period of
three years is to be counted from the date when “the right to
sue first accrues”, in terms of Article 113 thereof, the period
of limitation would be counted from the date “when the
right to sue accrues”. The distinction between Article 58
and Article 113 is, thus, apparent inasmuch as the right to
sue may accrue to a suitor in a given case at different
points of time and, thus, whereas in terms of Article 58 the
period of limitation would be reckoned from the date on
which the cause of action arose first, in the latter the
period of limitation would be differently computed
depending upon the last day when the cause of action
therefor arose .”
(emphasis supplied)
91. Again, in Shakti Bhog (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying
upon the decision in West Coast (supra) had drawn distinction between the
language used in Article 113 vis-à-vis with other Articles in the first division
of the Schedule i.e. Article 58, 59 and 104 to observe that to read expression
“first” would tantamount to rewriting the provision and doing violence to the
legislative intent. It was explicitly laid down that in cases governed by
Article 113, what is required to be noted is - “when the right to sue accrues”
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(and not when the right to sue “first” accrues). The relevant extract from
said decision reads thus:
“17. The expression used in Article 113 of the 1963 Act is
“when the right to sue accrues”, which is markedly distinct
from the expression used in other Articles in First Division
of the Schedule dealing with suits, which unambiguously
refer to the happening of a specified event. Whereas, Article
113 being a residuary clause and which has been invoked
by all the three courts in this case, does not specify
happening of particular event as such, but merely refers to
the accrual of cause of action on the basis of which the right
to sue would accrue.

18. Concededly, the expression used in Article 113 is
distinct from the expressions used in other Articles in the
First Division dealing with suits such as Article 58 (when
the right to sue “first” accrues), Article 59 (when the facts
entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree
cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded “first”
become known to him) and Article 104 (when the plaintiff is
“first” refused the enjoyment of the right). The view taken
by the trial court, which commended to the first appellate
court and the High Court in the second appeal, would
inevitably entail in reading the expression in Article 113 as
— when the right to sue (first) accrues. This would be
rewriting of that provision and doing violence to the
legislative intent. We must assume that Parliament was
conscious of the distinction between the provisions
referred to above and had advisedly used generic
expression “when the right to sue accrues” in Article 113
of the 1963 Act . Inasmuch as, it would also cover cases
falling under Section 22 of the 1963 Act, to wit, continuing
breaches and torts.
xxx xxx xxx
25. The respondents had also relied on the dictum of this
Court in Fatehji & Co. v. L.M. Nagpal [Fatehji & Co. v.
L.M. Nagpal, (2015) 8 SCC 390 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 371] .
Indeed, in that case, this Court upheld the order of rejection
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of the plaint on the finding that the suit was barred by
limitation under Article 54 of the 1963 Act, in the fact
situation of that case. The Court was dealing with a suit for
specific performance of a written agreement of sale dated 2-
7-1973 and as per the terms, the performance of the
contract was fixed for 2-12-1973. In that background, the
Court noted that the subsequent letters exchanged between
the parties cannot be the basis to extend the period of
limitation. Moreover, the Court dealt with the case
governed by Article 54 of the 1963 Act, which stipulates the
timeline for commencement of period of limitation, being the
date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed,
when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. In
cases governed by Article 113 of the 1963 Act, such as the
present case, however, what is required to be noted is —
“when the right to sue accrues” (and not when the right to
sue “first” accrues). ”
(emphasis supplied)

92. The Division Bench of this Court in O.P. Khandelwal v. Steel
Authority of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6664 relying upon the decision
in Shakti Bhog (supra) held that where Article 113 of the Act is invoked, the
period of limitation would be reckoned from the date on which the cause of
action last arose. The relevant para 23 of the said decision reads thus:
“23. The aforesaid view taken by the Supreme Court
makes it clear that in a suit where Article 113 of the
Limitation Act is invoked, the period of limitation would be
calculated from the date on which the cause of action last
arose , which in the present case would be on 23rd January,
2020, when the appellant was supplied the amending
Internal Guidelines by the respondent.”
(emphasis supplied)

93. The plaintiff has specifically averred that the cause of action has inter
alia arisen on 07.01.2025 when the KPMG LLP (Canada) furnished its
investigation report for India, which provided critical evidence of the flow
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of funds from Canada to Indian Bank accounts during the relevant period. It
is further stated in explicit terms that the investigation report prepared by
KMPG LLP (Canada) has been instrumental in unveiling the vast scope of
fraud perpetrated by defendant nos. 1 and 2 and in tracing the diversion of
funds originating in Canada. It is upon receipt of the report, the plaintiff was
able to fully comprehend the nature and extent of the fraud, thereby
providing necessary particulars to initiate the present suit. The plaintiff has
further pleaded that cause of action also arose on 24.04.2025, when the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved settlement in the civil
proceedings under which defendant no.1 has consented to the forfeiture of
INR 65.9 Crore from his Indian Bank accounts, which is part of CAD
33,345,991 to be recovered by the plaintiff.
94. Keeping in view that the plaintiff has pleaded cause of action on
07.01.2025 as well as on 24.04.2025, besides on various other dates viz.,
22-23 October, 2020; 27-28 October, 2020; 07 December, 2020; 18
December, 2020; 08 January, 2021; 29 January, 2021, 13 February, 2021; 18
February, 2021, 08 June, 2021; 07 April, 2022; 04 April, 2023; 27
November, 2023, therefore, the suit cannot be said to be ex facie barred by
limitation, in light of the law exposited in West Coast (supra); Shakti Bhog
(supra), and; O.P. Khandelwal (supra), warranting rejection of plaint at the
stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. However, the question as to whether any
cause of action arose on 07.01.2025 and on 24.04.2025 as well as on other
alleged dates is a question of fact, which cannot be decided at this threshold
stage.
95. As this Court has come to the conclusion that the suit is not ex facie
barred by limitation, the plea taken on behalf of plaintiff that
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acknowledgments made by defendant nos.1 and 2 would also extend the
period of limitation in terms of Section 18 of the Act, pales into
insignificance for the time being and accordingly, the same is not being
adverted to at this stage.
96. Next, it was argued on behalf of the applicant/defendant no.1 is that
the present suit amounts to abuse of the process of law. The argument is
predicated on the assertion that for the recovery / disgorgement of allegedly
misappropriated amount, which includes the amount claimed in the present
suit, similar civil proceedings are pending in Canada. On the other hand, the
plaintiff has inter alia taken a stand that the proceedings in the Canadian
Court are criminal proceedings and the restitution order of CAD 47,462,649
is a criminal procedure order of compensation, and further partial forfeiture
and repatriation of assets in Canada was to the limited extent, whereas in
contrast, the present suit seeks recovery of the balance CAD 33,345,991
lying in specifically identified Indian Bank accounts. Having regard to the
rival stand taken by the parties, this also appears to be a disputed question of
fact for which the provision of Section 151 cannot be invoked at this stage.
97. The submission is misconceived also for the reason that an
5
Explanation to Section 10 CPC explicitly provides that the pendency of suit
in foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in India from trying the suit
founded on the same cause of action. Reference in this regard may be had to
the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Magotteaux Industries
Pvt. Ltd. (supra) wherein in the context of anti injunction suit, it was
observed as under:

5
Explanation. -The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in 1[India] from
trying a suit founded on the same cause of action.
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“53. As we have seen earlier in the discussion that the
question of anti-suit injunction has been discussed by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modi's case (supra) and
subsequently followed by this Hon'ble Court in many
decisions. Most of the decisions given by this Court as well
as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modi's case involves
contractual dispute Wherein the parties have agreed to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of one court or the
other i.e. the foreign court. Such kind of situation is
missing in the present case. In the absence of contractual
dispute between the parties, we have to examine the
present controversy by applying principles of ordinary civil
law more specifically under the provisions of Section 10 of
CPC in the principles of res subjudice. The explanation to
Section 10 provides that the pendency of a suit in a foreign
court does not preclude the courts in India from trying a
suit founded on the same cause of action. Applying the
said principle conversely would mean that the foreign court
is not precluded from entertaining any suit on the basis of
some cause of action merely because the suit is pending in
Indian Court. In the case in hand pending in this Court and
the cause of action pertaining to the proceedings pending in
the US Court is different. Even assuming the cause of
action pertaining to both the proceedings are same then by
applying the explanation of Section 10 of CPC, the said
action is maintainable in the US Court and the grant of
anti-suit injunction by the learned single judge is not
appropriate in the present case. ”
(emphasis supplied)

98. Before parting, apt would it be to deal with the decisions relied upon
on behalf of applicant/defendant no.1. The defendant no.1 has relied on the
decision in Sankar Dastidar (supra) to buttress the contention that the suit is
barred by limitation. The said decision dilates on the applicability of Articles
68, 69 and 91 of the Act. This Court has already held that Articles 68 and 91
are applicable only to ‘specific movable properties’ which does not include
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monies. Similarly, plain reading of Article 69 shows that it also sets a
limitation period of three years for a suit to recover "other specific movable
property" and not for monies. Therefore, the reliance placed by defendant
no.1/applicant on the said decision is of no avail.
99. Similarly, the reliance placed by the defendant no.1/applicant on the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots (supra) and
Sterling Agro Industries Limited (supra) is misplaced. In both the said
decisions, it was observed that even if part of cause of action has arisen,
within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, still the High
Court can refuse to entertain the writ petition invoking the principle of
forum conveniens . Incidentally, both these decisions were rendered in the
context of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, where High
Courts have discretion not to entertain the writ petition invoking the
principle of forum conveniens , whereas the present is not a writ petition. It is
also not an anti-suit injunction, to which the principle of forum non
conveniens may apply only qua foreign forum.
100. Reverting to the decision in Bhagat Singh Bugga (supra), it is noted
that said decision is a pre-independence Calcutta High Court decision
related to grant of anti-suit injunction and scope of Section 10 of the CPC as
it then stood. It is not an authority dealing with return of plaint under Order
VII Rule 10 or on grounds of forum non conveniens or rejection of plaint
under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. Further, in that case no such issue
pertaining to a suit already pending/decided before a foreign Court was
involved nor Explanation to Section 10 which expressly provides that the
pendency of a suit in a foreign Court is no bar to a suit in an Indian Court,
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was under consideration. Therefore, reliance placed on Bhagat Singh
Bugga (supra) is misconceived.
101. As regards the Modi Entertainment Network (supra), suffice it to say
that the Apex Court in the said decision was dealing with the question of
grant of anti-suit injunction restraining the proceedings in a foreign forum,
therefore, the principles laid therein would not be applicable to the present
case, which is not an anti-suit injunction.
102. In K.K. Modi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically
observed that it is an abuse of process of the Court and contrary to justice
and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already
been tried and decided earlier against him. Though, there is no quarrel to this
proposition of law, however, as noted above, explanation to Section 10
specifically provides that pendency of a suit in a foreign court does not
preclude the Courts in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of
action. Thus, this decision will also not help the cause of the applicant.
103. Under the circumstances discussed herein above, the application is
devoid of merit. The same is accordingly dismissed.



VIKAS MAHAJAN, J.
SEPTEMBER 02, 2026
aj/jg
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